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Abstract 
This thesis examines the internal politics of the Labour party during the Second World War. 
There are two primary elements to the study: on the one hand, an analysis of the techniques of 
party management, and, on the other, examination of the personal conflicts and rivalries which 
dominated Labour's war. The thesis considers the way in which the party's leadership group 
performed a delicate balancing act to prepare the ground for entry into office in an eventual 
coalition during the 'phoney' war of September 1939 to May 1940, continually strengthening 
their bargaining position while working to keep the Labour party itself subordinate to their 
authority and establish the primacy of their own decision making. The key figure in this was the 
party leader, Clement Attlee. The thesis then analyses how, once Labour entered the Churchill 
Coalition, its leaders again worked to preserve their strategy of membership of the government by 
expanding their own power and influence during five years of internal upheavals. But their course 
was an unpopular one, and provoked much disaffection within the party's ranks. All the while, 
Labour's internal politics were shaped by a series of personal conflicts and rivalries, animated by 
competing ambitions and enmities. The most significant was the long-running struggle for the 
leadership itself, between Attlee and the heir apparent, Herbert Morrison. The thesis focuses upon 
a wide range of individual actors, but Attlee is central: examining the way in which Attlee 
controlled his party, established his authority, and sought to expand his influence within 
government, while simultaneously struggling against his great rival Morrison, the thesis is 
essentially a study in the leadership of this most impenetrable, yet skilled, of politicians. 
Considering the language and rhetoric which the party's senior figures used to steer their course 
and retain the backing of their followers, as well as devoting close attention to the manoeuvre, 
intrigue, and pursuit of personal vendettas which impacted upon Labour politics between 1939 
and 1945, the thesis argues that power-political interpretations of the period are more useful than 
explanations which look to ideological conflict. It also questions how far sociological change, in 
particular national 'emergency' and wartime radicalisation, really altered the attitudes of the 
British political elite. 
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Preface 
Between 1939 and 1945, the Labour party was wracked by a series of intemecine struggles which 
pushed it to the brink of outright schism. The most important of these were the conflicts over the 
course which its leaders had chosen for Labour against the background of the Second World War, 
and the parallel rivalry between party leader Clement Attlee and heir apparent Herbert Morrison 
for the Labour leadership. The thesis is an account of these struggles. The party's leadership 
group - denoting here the 'Big Four' of Attlee, Morrison, Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton - 
followed a course of perhaps unique political difficulty, firstly in guiding Labour towards office 
after the outbreak of war in September 1939, and then as members of the Coalition government 
under Winston Churchill from the following May. For six years, the leaders fought to control the 
party and maintain it along their chosen trajectory, engaging in a series of conflicts against those 
determined to challenge this course. That the leadership group was compelled to combine the 
day-to-day running of the Labour party with concentration upon their ambitions for office created 
a power imbalance at the heart of the party. It was here that the challenges to their authority were 
made. The overriding objectives of those leaders was to win access to government, play a central 
role in the war effort, advance a Labour policy agenda and acquire the credibility necessary to be 
candidates for off ice in the post-war era. As such, they were determined that the Labour party 
should be kept loyal and quiescent to their course, and were unwilling to tolerate open dissension. 
Managing the competing demands of party, government and ambition, Attlee and his colleagues 
performed a political balancing act for the entire war. All the while, Labour was gripped by 
innumerable personal conflicts and rivalries. The most significant of these occurred amongst the 
senior figures themselves, as Attlee and Morrison circled one another for six years, probing, 
manoeuvring, and competing for the support of their followers in a protracted struggle over the 
leadership. The thesis examines these conflicts and the fluid environment in which Labour 
politicians operated between 1939 and 1945. Moreover, the approach it adopts is rooted in the 
'high politics' school of political history. ' The thesis is therefore power-political in its orientation 
and concerns, focusing upon personal ity-based politics, and the struggle for individual advantage 
and ascendancy, in the narrow and restrictive conditions of wartime. 
' See Maurice Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The Passing of the Second Reform Bill 
(Cambridge, 1967); The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning ofModern British Politics 
(Cambridge, 197 1); The Impact ofIlitler. - British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 1975). 
See also, for example, Michael Bentley, Politics Without Democracy 1815-1914 (London, 1984); A. B. 
Cooke and John Vincent, The Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party Politics in Britain 1885- 
86 (Sussex, 1974); Philip Williamson, National Crisis andNational Government: British Politics, the 
Economy and Empire 1926-1932 (Cambridge, 1992). 
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Labour was a fractious and restless party during the war - angry with its leaders, disillusioned by 
political inactivity, and hostile at being kept on a short leash. It was this context of restlessness 
which provided the environment for the struggles described here. The central focus of the thesis is 
the way in which the party's leadership group controlled, managed and directed Labour between 
1939 and 1945 - firstly in guiding it towards office during the first stage of the conflict, and then 
maintaining their position once within the Coalition. Attlee was the key figure in achieving both, 
and it was his strategy which the party pursued for six years. Though a deeply uncharismatic 
politician, as the thesis will demonstrate Attlee was in fact a skilled political operator and ruthless 
manoeuvrer. The investigation undertaken here proceeds from awareness that Attlee was one of 
the most puzzling, 'unknowable' major politicians of the last century. Yet it contends that the 
methods, character and leadership style of Attlee can be understood - provided we are willing to 
study him in the right way. As such it is essentially a study in leadership. 
The leaders followed a strategy intended to exploit the opportunities of war by achieving a 
recovery of the party's fortunes and ensconcing themselves in office. It was intended to keep the 
Labour party loyal and secure freedom of action in directing it. The result was an effort to both 
rigidly control Labour and wield governmental power via membership of a coalition on 
favourable terms. Having fought to rebuild the party following its 1931 collapse, the necessities 
of war and patriotism combined with political opportunity to afford senior figures the prospect of 
seizing power from a position of parliamentary weakness. Attlee and his colleagues navigated this 
difficult course through a judicious combination of calls for national unity and patriotism, 
gestures to appease the party, intrigues to cluster all power and initiative in their own hands, and 
open assertions of authority. Attlee came into his own as a leader for the first time, the 
uncharismatic but guileful figure astutely imposing a political straitjacket on his party and 
working to foil all attempts at escape. But the other leaders, particularly Morrison, were similarly 
significant. Their chosen path facilitated Labour's evolution into a genuine governing force for 
the first time in its history. But the strategy was controversial and resented by many at all levels 
of the party. It is this story of party management - the struggle to control Labour and use it as a 
platform - which represents the core of the thesis. 
During the period of the 'phoney war' from September 1939 until May 1940, the leadership 
struggled to keep dissent contained, while strengthening Labour's hand for entry into off ice when 
an opportune moment presented itself. Unwilling to serve under the prime minister, Neville 
Chamberlain - who Labour despised and blamed for the current crisis - the leadership group set 
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out upon a careful ly-calculated trajectory. Refusing Chamberlain's offer of coalition but agreeing 
to an electoral 'truce' for the sake of national unity, Attlee and the other senior figures instead 
stood back and played a critical role in the weakening of his ministry, while waiting for 
circumstances to change and the prime minister to be removed. In this fashion, Attlee and his 
colleagues moved, crab-like, towards coalition, appeasing a restless party keen to launch partisan 
attacks while building their credibility with a policy of 'constructive Opposition'. Intending from 
the outset that the Labour party should be subordinated to their own authority, Attlee, Morrison, 
Bevin and Dalton worked determinedly to enforce this. By exercising control over the party and 
establishing an image of themselves as responsible statesmen, over the course of eight months 
Attlee and the rest of the leadership group were able to transform Labour's bargaining position. In 
May 1940 they seized a powerful role in the Churchill government, extracting from the new 
prime minister a significant degree of influence in the administration and a central role in the war 
effort. But in attempting to prevent political tensions from derailing their plans, they found 
themselves engaged in a protracted and bitter struggle with their own followers which only 
worsened as the war progressed. Simultaneously, however, during the 'phoney war' the senior 
figures themselves were gripped by personal conflict, as Morrison and Dalton made efforts to 
jettison Attlee from the party leadership, the deputy leader Arthur Greenwood attained new 
heights, and Attlee sought to decisively impose his authority on the Labour party for the first time 
in his four years as leader. 
Once in office, the Labour ministers were even more determined to prevent any challenge to their 
suzerainty over the party. Conscious that Labour's position between government and Opposition 
left them exposed, and aware that internal dissension could undermine the gains they had secured, 
they sought to maintain the tight controls on the party they had established during the 'phoney 
war'. But their immersion in office, and Labour's growing restlessness and anger at the 
compromises necessitated by coalition, engendered opportunities for others to challenge their 
authority. Harold Laski, Emanuel Shinwell and Aneurin Bevan were the most threatening of these 
internal opponents, but, before long, disaffection over the political situation was so widespread 
that the party was an increasingly hostile environment to its representatives. Open revolt 
constantly threatened and the position of the Labour ministers became progressively more 
difficult. Attlee and his colleagues engaged in a long series of struggles with opponents 
determined to force Labour in a new direction. The threat facing the Labour ministers was not 
necessarily that they would be overthrown - there were too few alternative senior figures to 
replace them with - but that the opportunity that Attlee had manufactured would be wrecked. 
Moreover, even against this backdrop, the personal rivalry between the leader and Morrison 
continued, as both sought to strengthen their own position relative to the other by establishing 
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their credentials as the more vigorous champion of the party, undermine their rival, and prepare 
for an inevitable confrontation - yet, all the while, working alongside one another to keep the 
Labour party subordinate. Attlee had won the 1935 election for the post of leader, but in 1939 the 
struggle between the two had only intensified in the intervening four years. Indeed, the contest 
between them which lasted for two decades was probably at its most bitter here. The strategy 
implemented by the Labour ministers secured a degree of power in government out of all 
proportion to the party's parliamentary representation and, in the posts allotted to Attlee, Bevin 
and Morrison, a dominant role on the home front. But it also precipitated a rancorous series of 
conflicts between key figures vying for influence and the opportunity to lay down markers both 
for the present and the future. 
The form which these clashes took was personal conflict. As will be seen, politicians at all levels 
of the party intrigued and manoeuvred against one another in a relentless search for advantage. 
There is little evidence that any of the protagonists did this from a coherent ideological position; 
rather, the struggles within the party were determined by a combination of short- and long-term 
bids for advantage. Even the mood of disaffection felt by the mass of the party - which provides 
the environment for the conflicts described here - was not about 'ideology', but the sheer 
boredom felt by Labour at the political inactivity of the 'truce' and coalition. The issues which 
were fought over were largely symbolic, and often essentially means of giving free rein to rivalry 
and personal hostility in a manner that would not be publicly acceptable if sheer ambition was 
openly acknowledged as the driving force of the actions of leading politicians during a period of 
national emergency. Most significantly, as alluded to above, although the Big Four were in 
agreement on the necessity of keeping their followers in line, they were also divided amongst 
themselves. Bevin and Morrison had a long-standing mutual loathing which frequently put them 
on a collision course. Dalton and Attlee had poor relations stemming from the formers' low 
opinion of the leader and desire to see him removed. Morrison and Dalton's relationship 
fluctuated. But the most serious, of course, was the struggle between Attlee and Morrison. As Will 
be demonstrated, the Labour party's internal politics over this period were often used by the two 
as mere instruments in this rivalry. 
But the party was beset by other conflicts as well. Laski, an intellectual rather than a conventional 
politician, worked to turn the NEC into his personal fiefdom, challenging the leadership group's 
direction of Labour and pursuing a bitter vendetta against Attlee. Bevan, previously only a minor 
player in Labour politics, used the war as a platform to transform himself into one of Britain's 
major political figures by its end, engaging in conflicts with most of the leading politicians of the 
period in an unashamedly carecrist attempt to construct a powerful position. Shinwell, a much 
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more important actor at the outset, followed a similar - if even more vituperative - course. Such 
people were concerned not merely with the problems that instigated internal dissent, but in 
exploiting them in such a manner as to enable them to increase their own influence. For people 
like Bevan, the war was a dream come true. The deputy leader Arthur Greenwood, a staunch ally 
of the leadership group, rose to previously-unthinkable heights in the early stages of the war, 
before proving a failure in government, and then playing a central role as a 'proxy' for the Labour 
ministers in bearing the brunt of the struggle against internal disillusionment. He was assisted in 
this task by Herbert B. Lees-Smith and Frederick W. Pethick-Lawrence, middle-ranking figures 
who assumed key roles in the implementation of Attlee's political strategy. Each of these 
individuals will be described more fully in the following chapter, but for now it is sufficient to 
state that, for six years, the entire party was convulsed not by struggles motivated by ideology or 
sociological change - as prevailing interpretative approaches tend to explain Labour party history 
- but instead by personal conflict, rivalry, and the struggle to ascend the proverbial 'greasy pole'. 
The thesis will examine the conflicts which gripped the party by charting their progress across the 
entirety of the Labour party's organisational structure. The bureaucratic and institutional setting is 
an important element of the analysis assembled here, for these struggles did not take place in a 
political vacuum - it was the machinery of the party which provided the forums in which 
authority was contested and power sought. It offered platforms and positions which acted as a 
base for the protagonists, and the leadership group had to wield control of that machinery if their 
attempt to straddle the bridge between government and Opposition was to be a success. They 
therefore sought to dominate the entire apparatus and employ it to curtail opposition. Their 
enemies also utilised it as the anchorage necessary to challenge the leaders. The key arenas where 
the conflicts described in the thesis were played out were the National Executive Committee 
(NEC), Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), PLP Administrative Committee, and the annual 
Conference. Others included the National Council of Labour (NCL), and Trades Union Congress 
(TUC). Here, perhaps more than in any other period, control of that machinery was crucial: the 
leaders needed to dominate it if they were to keep the rest of the Labour party largely powerless. 
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The years in question currently lack a study of Labour party factional and leadership politics from 
this particular perspective. The agenda for the study of British politics between 1939 and 1945 
has been set largely by the question of whether the war created a political 'consensus' which 
lasted until 1979. The leading proponents of the consensus theory were Paul Addison and Angus 
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Calder, their landmark analyses stimulating a debate on the subject which has lasted for decades. 2 
Addison's study of wartime politics remains the standard work. Indeed, many of the omissions in 
the literature on the period should be traced to Addison; put bluntly, his book is so good as to 
have not only opened but, in the minds of many, perhaps also closed study of the period. 
Asserting that the 1930s saw political life deeply polarised, he believed that the new social 
cohesion of the war fundamentally altered the country, while the existence of the Coalition 
government and corresponding high-level co-operation between the parties precipitated a similar 
cohesion in politics. Though differences remained, the war framed the nature of political debate 
for over thirty years. Addison charted this transition from conflict to convergence through the 
initial phases of the war, when partisan hostility was at its height, to the formation of the 
Churchill government and its success in running the country through five years of war. The 
legislative measures undertaken by that ministry laid the foundations for this 'consensus'. Calder, 
similarly, argued that the conflict with Germany provided a backdrop for a transformation of 
Britain. Fuelled by the romanticism and mythology of Britain's struggle with Germany, 
'consensus' has shaped the literature of both wartime and post-war politics. However, the 
pervasiveness of this single theme - whether or not it is correct - has perhaps produced 
historiographical distortion in our understanding of the period. The current study has little new to 
add to the consensus debate. While this is not to suggest that the subject is not an important one, 
its influence has perhaps been disproportionate. 
The other broad surveys of wartime politics were undertaken by Kevin Jefferys and J. M. Lee. 3 
However, Jefferys', too, is informed by the arguments surrounding consensus, specifically in 
disputing Addison's interpretations. The book does examine Conservative politics in greater 
depth than does Addison, but is not a focused study of internal Labour politics. Lee's is a study of 
the policy of the Coalition, but does not offer real analysis of the internal politics of the 
government or the political parties. Maxwell Schoenfeld's book on the Coalition concentrates 
entirely upon Churchill's direction of the war and diplomacy. 4 Of the two studies focused upon 
the Labour party, Stephen Brooke provides strong evidence for the party being disunited during 
the war years, demonstrating the existence of dissent at both the upper and lower echelons of 
Labour's structure. 5 The book is perhaps the work closest to this thesis, but there are important 
differences between the two which should be noted. Brooke illustrates some of the conflict which 
plagued Labour during the war, as well as going beyond party factionalism and examining the 
2 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London, 1975); Angus 
Calder, The People's War: Britain, 1939-45 (London, 1969). 
3 Kevin Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition andwartime politics, 1940-1945 (Manchester, 1991); J. M. Lee, 
The Churchill Coalition, 1940-1945 (London, 1980). 
4 Maxwell Philip Schoenfeld, The War Ministry of Winston Churchill (Iowa, 1972). 
5 Stephen Brooke, Labour's War: The Labour Party during the Second World War (Oxford, 1992). 
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wartime development of the policies which Labour would implement in government between 
1945 and 195 1. Brooke also details the continued ideological differences with the Conservatives 
and the importance of internal party debates about the nature of socialism and reform. It is, 
moreover, a contribution to the consensus debate, joining Jefferys in opposition to Addison's 
thes iS. 6 Where the thesis is distinctive from Brooke -and indeed from Addison and Jefferys - is in 
its specific focus on the significance of leadership politics and party factionalism. Attention to 
factionalism within all the political par-ties, or the government, is beyond the scope of the thesis, 
but it does set out to describe this aspect of Labour politics more fully than has been done in the 
past. This is particularly the case in its concern with the specifics of the party management 
strategy adopted by Attlee and the other leaders during wartime, as well as the strategies adopted 
by other individuals. The second examination of Labour between 1939 and 1945 was Trevor 
Burridge's monograph on the evolution of the party's foreign policy. 7 Uniquely, Burridge's work 
is not part of the consensus debate. In examining the perceptions of international affairs 
prevailing within Labour, Burridge links together the party's heavily studied foreign policy of the 
1930s with that of the 1945 Attlee government, and as such it represents perhaps the best study to 
date of Labour during this period. It offers insights into Labour's maturation on international 
affairs towards the hard-headed pragmatism of the period 1945 to 195 1, Burridge demonstrating 
the prominent role held by the Labour ministers in foreign affairs decision-making under the 
Churchill government. There are also short chapters on the wartime party in studies by G. D. H. 
Cole and David Howell, yet these are naturally brief and again analyse policy. 8 
A myriad of articles and other studies have been undertaken of popular attitudes, culture and 
particularly the 1945 election, while biographies of leading Labour figures do consider the war 
years at some length, although these tend to concentrate upon ministerial work and the 
government if their subject held office. 9 Even works on those who were not members of the 
Coalition focus largely upon policy disputes or causes such as the 'Second Front' campaign and 
6 Brooke, Labour's War, pp. 3-8. 
7 T. D Burridge, British Labour and Hiller's War (London, 1976). 
8 G. D. H. Cole, A History oflhe Labour Parlyftom 1914 (London, 1948); David Howell, British Social 
Democracy: A Study in Development and Decay (London, 1976). 
9 For a complete list see bibliography but, for example: Steven Fielding, 'The Second World War and 
Popular Radicalism: The Significance of the Movement away from Party', History, 3 (1995), pp. 38-58. 
Kevin Jefferys, 'British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War', The Historical Journal, 
30 (1987), pp. 123-44; Nick Tiratsoo (ed. ), The Attlee Years (London, 199 1); Isabelle Tombs, 'The Victory 
of Socialist 'Vansittartism': Labour and the German Question, 1941-45', Twentieth Century British 
History, 7 (1996), pp. 287-309. For biographies see Alan Bullock, The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin: 
Volume One, Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940 (London, 1960), and The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin: 
Volume Two, Minister of Labour, 1940-1945 (London, 1967); Trevor Burridge, Clement Attlee: A Political 
Biography (London, 1985); Bernard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait ofa 
Politician (London, 1973); Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London, 1982); and Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London, 
1985). 
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reconstruction. 10 While this is, in some respects, understandable, nonetheless aspects of Labour 
party history during the period have been relatively neglected, at least in terms of factionalism 
and leadership. Some recent, more nuanced work on the Conservatives has been carried out, but 
there exists considerable scope for wartime politics in Britain to be investigated afresh. " The 
thesis is thus concerned with some quite separate things than earlier studies, which tended to 
address different subjects or aspects of politics. Whereas existing literature on wartime politics 
has focused primarily on policy issues, this thesis differs in being specifically a study of 
leadership politics and party factionalism. Moreover, the 'high politics' approach which it adopts 
- an approach rather different to those taken by existing studies - perhaps offers a particularly 
valuable method of achieving this. 
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As noted above, the thesis' approach is 'high political'. By this the author means a specific 
interpretative approach, turning upon a particular reading of political behaviour, inspired by 
historians such as Maurice Cowling. 12 At its core, this methodology is grounded in the personal 
struggles between politicians as their clashing ambitions and strategies push them towards 
conflict. It sees this as representing the real motive power of politics, and questions the utility of 
historiographical approaches which look to 'ideological' conflict as explaining the struggles 
between politicians - seeing this as mistaking rhetoric for action. It also doubts the usefulness of 
sociological explanations, which concentrate on the ineluctable forces of class and social 
cprogress', in explaining the operation of the political world on a day-to-day basis - which is, of 
course, how its inhabitants exist. 
'0 See, for example, John Campbell, Nye Bevan: A Biography (London, 1987); Michael Foot, Aneurin 
Bevan: A Biography, Volume One: 1897-1945 (London, 1962); and Isaac Krainnick and Barry Sheerman, 
Harold Laski: A Life on the Left (London, 1993). 
11 D. J. Dutton, 'Power brokers or just 'Glamour boys'? The Eden group, September 1939-May 1940', 
English Historical Review, 118 (2003), pp. 412-24; Larry L. Witherell, 'Lord Salisbury's 'Watching 
Committee' and the fall of Neville Chamberlain, May 1940', English Historical Review, 116 (2001), pp. 
1134-66. 
12 Too often the phrase 'high politics' is diluted and taken to mean any study which focuses on people 'at 
the top'. Yet this is inaccurate. True 'high politics' is usually associated with the so-called 'Peterhouse 
school' and is much more closely focused with a specific conceptual base, stressing the pursuit of power 
and the autonomy of politicians in deciding what happens in politics day-to-day. Even some of those who 
have written about the approach have often missed the distinction between the two meanings of the phrase 
- see, for example, Steven Fielding, 'Just gossip and the greasy pole? The 'Peterhouse school' and the 
politics of modem British democratic history' (forthcoming) and Steven Fielding, 'Rethinking the 'rise and 
fall' of two-party politics' in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (eds. ), A Companion to Contemporary 
Britain, 1939-2000 (Oxford, 2005) pp. 351-370, where Fielding labels Ben Pimlott a 'high politics' 
historian. 
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'High politics' concentrates upon the location and possession of political power, and how it is 
contested. 13 It contends that political actors, in common with human nature, are interested 
primarily in themselves. This self-interest - defined as power-seeking behaviour - is entirely 
normal, and its influence over Labour party affairs should not be so surprising. The focus of the 
approach is the manoeuvring and intriguing between political actors as they attempt to expand 
their own position and influence, and undermine that of their rivals. Ambition is the most 
important single element here, for politicians naturally desire to secure themselves a more 
powerful and prestigious position orjob, whether in govemment or internally within a party. The 
fact that the role of ambition is so often subordinated within literature on twentieth-century 
British politics is a considerable historiographical failing, for to reduce the importance of 
individual ambition in determining action is to relegate the individual himself. The actions of 
politicians are shaped by a desire to secure some degree of power, or lay the foundations to do so 
at a future date. This emphasis on personal conflict, and the struggles which occur as the 
competing ambitions of politicians intersect, is the essence of this type of approach to political 
history. It considers the feuds between individuals which animate political action, the struggle for 
personal influence and ascendancy, and the strategies pursued by politicians in realising their 
objectives. Politicians - whatever their position in the structure of the modern party - seek as a 
rule to win power and influence for themselves. Hence political activity should be interpreted as a 
series of manoeuvres between individuals vying for authority. Political behaviour therefore 
consists of decisions and actions - some pre-planned, others spontaneous - conducted so as to 
effect an improvement in one's prospects and frustrate those of rivals. The arena in which this 
occurs is a highly fluid one: there is no clear line dividing what happens at formal meetings from 
a continuous but informal process of intrigue, speeches, discussion, and manoeuvre. Rather, the 
two combine together to create the environment in which political action occurs. The involved 
actors are all in a state of conscious - and permanent - tension and rivalry with one another. 
The analysis which follows is therefore grounded in painstaking attention to manoeuvre and 
rhetoric. Manoeuvre by one politician or group necessitates adaptation and counter-manoeuvre by 
the other relevant actors in the environment. The calculations of each involved actor alter the 
dynamics of this environment, ensuring that the subsequent decisions of all other protagonists 
must take into account the changed situation. The nature of the political environment is thus in 
flux, its parameters shifting constantly. The rhetoric employed by politicians - whether for an 
internal party audience or the wider public - is similarly utilised in this struggle for power relative 
to others. It is intended to be ambiguous, reassuring to certain audiences, or to secure strategically 
valuable ground and support. Whilst politicians may well believe what they say, they also use it 
13 The best description of the approach can be found in Cowling, Impact of Labour, pp. 1- 12. 
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as a means to project and advance themselves and their agenda, as part of an attempt to pursue a 
particular strategy or gain ascendancy over others. The nature of politics presents actors with the 
scope and discretion to engage in these contests. That the number of issues on which political 
actors have very strong views is inevitably small, and hence they are able to operate freely on 
most fronts, means that politicians, regardless of their personal leanings, are an inherently flexible 
species. Politics necessitates compromise, retreat and counter-attack, and the realities of the 
profession do not sit comfortably alongside an approach which suggests ideology as the crucial 
element. 
The struggles between political actors are, therefore, inevitably conducted in a highly 
opportunistic fashion. The issues which are fought over may have genuine resonance for the 
politician, but in the end are exploited as vehicles or platforms from which to bolster their 
position and undermine rivals. Politicians need to be willing to press home an advantage or 
abandon unprofitable positions in order to be successful. Thus, the issues which provide the 
ostensible basis for these conflicts are essentially means ofjustifying ambition and rivalry. 
Divergent instincts do exert considerable influence, in helping to push individuals towards one 
party, or a section of a party. Yet this influence is neither cohesive nor consistent - it informs, but 
it does not lead action. To assume that the internal environments of modern political parties, 
particularly the Labour party, are shaped by a simple and unending clash between ideologies is 
both an insufficient tool for the historian to use and inaccurate. 
Four important points about this approach should be made. Firstly, the 'high politics' approach 
has never previously been satisfactorily applied by Labour party historians. It may at first sight 
seem difficult to apply an interpretation which is based upon a rejection of ideology-centricity in 
politics, and which places emphasis instead upon personal conflict and ambition, to such a self- 
consciously ideological entity as the Labour party. The struggles within that party tend to be 
explained by historians as reflecting, and being motivated by, ideological differences, or tied to 
wider sociological themes. But in reality Labour conforms to such a methodology without 
difficulty, and this type of study - focusing upon a period of serious internecine strife which at 
first sight seems largely ideological in origin - is an ideal demonstration of the reality of political 
behaviour in an apparently 'ideological' environment. Far from contradicting it, the history of the 
Labour party therefore underlines the strengths of this approach. The politics of Labour ftinction 
like all other politics, and the thesis hopes to suggest the merits of challenging traditional 
assumptions about the writing of Labour history, and the development of alternative conceptual 
frameworks. 
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Secondly, because the methodology has so often been caricatured and misrepresented, it must be 
emphasised that 'high politics' does not deny the saliency of 'ideas' or 'causes' in influencing 
action. Politicians may, or may not, be influenced by them in a particular instance. The approach 
instead conjectures that ambition and personal conflict are the most important determinants of 
political behaviour, not 'ideas'. 'High politics' is concerned with how the competing interests and 
ambitions of political actors intersect and impact upon an environment which 'ideas' and 'causes' 
have an important role in shaping. 
Thirdly, while it could be argued that 'high politics' can be applied most readily to periods where 
circumstances are so fluid that politicians are free to conduct their private battles without 
significant constraint, and that the methodology becomes more problematic where circumstances 
- such as a national emergency - restrict freedom of action, such a suggestion would be, bluntly 
put, wrong. 14 In the final part of his trilogy Cowling focused on the impact of the dictators and 
demonstrated how personal conflict is continued in such an environment. 15 Philip Williamson has 
dealt explicitly with the relationship between 'crisis' and the 'high political' pursuit of self- 
interest. 16 This concept of 'crisis' had, in fact, been the one constant in British politics during 
recent years, already stretching back at least a decade by the time that war broke out. The 
language, and sense, of 'crisis' was the central rhetorical branch in the political world; long 
before war erupted, then, a widespread political and public atmosphere of constant 'crisis' 
existed. Politicians utilised this language for their own ends - it provided them with a 
justification, or a powerful moral reason, to pursue their agendas, as well as something to respond 
to. More than this, though, it is also perhaps evidence of a siege mentality on the party of mid 
century politicians, who had memories of a seemingly endless series of crises - over Ireland, the 
constitution, the First World War, economic chaos, democracy, the National Government, and so 
on. The notion of there being a 'crisis' was therefore so pervasive as to provide an environment to 
operate in, and an impetus for action; on the other hand, it was sufficiently vague not to pose any 
problems for self-interested politics. The language of 'crisis' provided such a useful, and, by 
1939, familiar, framework for political action that politicians did not encounter significant 
difficulties in playing that particular game. Simply because circumstances produce an emergency, 
and patriotism, duty, or other 'ideas' compel political figures to respond, does not mean that the 
laws which govern political behaviour cease to operate. Politicians are self-interested; ambition 
and rivalry with others for ascendancy will be their guiding star even if they are forced to focus 
" For the author's earlier work on applying it to Labour history, in conditions which were more 'open', see 
'The 'high politics' of Labour party factionalism, 1950-S', Historical Research (forthcoming, 2008), and 
the author's MA thesis, 'The Labour party and rearmament, 1950-55' (University of Leeds, 2004), from 
which that article is drawn. 
'5 Cowling, The Impact of Hiller. 
16 Williamson, National Crisis andNational Government. 
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simultaneously on 'the national interest' or similar causes. At the same time, asserting that self- 
interest is paramount does not mean, for example, that party ideologies or patriotism are 
irrelevant. This is the most flagrant misrepresentation of 'high politics'. The methodology is not 
so simplistic. Cowling and Williamson have demonstrated 'high politics' in an atmosphere of 
national crisis; the thesis attempts something similar, in the crisis of the Second World War. The 
war meant that politics was often narrow and restrictive, while the straitjacket into which Attlee 
and the other leaders forced the party ensured that opportunities to rapidly ascend the 'greasy 
pole' were sometimes limited. But that political actors still behaved in this way regardless - 
seeking personal advancement above all else, exploiting opportunities to that end as they 
occurred, and being driven primarily by personal venom towards one another - in fact only 
reinforces the validity of this approach. The real test of a methodology is surely not whether it 
works where circumstances are most fortuitous, but where freedom of action is much constrained. 
Fourthly, it is usually a feature of the 'high politics' field that, if understanding is to be 
comprehensive, the focus must be on as many individuals as possible, and all the parties 
simultaneously. Any attempt to restrict investigation to just one party will yield only a partial 
analysis. The research undertaken here seeks to concentrate upon individuals above all else and, 
as far as the limitations of space allow, examines a wide range of actors. But it is also admittedly 
concentrated on just one party, and it must be acknowledged that this would be a fair critique of 
the thesis. All that can be said in defence of the position adopted by the author is that, while 
accepting this, in filling in a major gap in Labour party historiography as well as, by implication, 
hoping to underline the problems of traditional approaches to the study of that party, and suggest 
the value of 'high politics' to Labour history, the thesis is seeking to accomplish something quite 
different. 
IV 
The thesis is structured as follows. This preface has sketched out the broad lines of conflict within 
the Labour party during the period, considered the existing literature and identified its 
interpretative approach. Chapter one details the central individual actors whose stories the thesis 
will pursue. Chapters two to seven analyse the course of Labour politics between 1939 and 1945, 
each chapter covering approximately a twelve month period. Chapters two and three demonstrate 
how the leadership group conceived and implemented their chosen course, fending off all serious 
challenges to their authority between 1939 and 1941. Chapters four and five show how dissidence 
worsened thereafler, and internal opponents were able to threaten the Labour ministers' control of 
their followers as the party descended into crisis. Chapters six and seven detail the leadership's 
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resurgence from mid 1943 and the march towards the post-war period, as the events described 
here reached their climax, and Attlee and Morrison contested the party leadership. A short 
concluding chapter follows. 
The thesis has employed a broad range of sources. These include official Labour party material - 
particularly the papers of the NEC, PLP and PLP Administrative Committee and annual 
Conference reports - the personal papers and correspondence of most of the protagonists, 
government papers, diaries, parliamentary debates (Hansard), newspapers and other sources. 
Wherever access and existence has allowed, it is centred upon original sources. The most 
important, and frequently used, are official party records. Reading a book by John Vincent, I was 
struck by his comment on the usefulness of the 'well-thumbed canon of Victorian political 
biography' for his top iC. 17 The biographers of the figures whose stories are analysed within the 
thesis had access to much information beyond the reach of the current author - for example, 
interviews with many of the participants in the events described within. As such, they, as well as 
other secondary literature, constituted a useful asset. Where existence has permitted, part of the 
analysis is also based upon examination of personal papers. Yet it is a matter of regret that the 
archival papers of many of the protagonists here are thin. This is obviously an uncomfortable 
break with the approach taken by 'high politics' literature. However, it is an unavoidable result of 
the decline of political correspondence which took place after c. 1940. As such the research also 
poses a question about 'doing' high politics - and writing political history in an accurate way - in 
periods after this aforementioned decline. These questions cannot be ducked. This research, in 
addition to telling a particular story about Labour party politics during the period, hopes to 
underline the fact that this is a debate which needs to be held. It proposes that the core of any 
viable analysis is examination of the things politicians say and do, and how these actors inter- 
relate. Hence, by studying what might be termed observable behaviour, it suggests that, if the 
conditions are right, an analysis of politics can be conducted even where some traditional parts of 
the 'high politics' approach become problematic. Much information about the past will obviously 
be lost with the decline of correspondence - plans, strategies, enmities and a whole array of rich 
information - but by close attention and careful mapping of the behaviour of politicians, the 
thesis suggests that sufficient information is still available for an analysis to be attempted. The 
question boils down to this: are we able to get a grip on the careers of these individuals? If it is 
possible, then the analysis is do-able; if not, then it probably is not. But the latter conclusion is a 
rather depressing one. Given that this collapse in political correspondence accelerated throughout 
the last century, as politicians saw each other face-to-face with greater frequency or picked up the 
telephone, this debate is an important one and is, at the very least, worth having. Moreover, in the 
17 John Vincent, The Formation ofthe British Liberal Party, 1857-1868 (London, 1966), p. 1 1. 
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opinion of this author, it is a debate which can only really be held by those interested in the 'high 
politics' approach. 
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Chapter one - The Actors 
Due largely to the position chosen by the Labour leaders, 'normal' politics ceased in 1939 and did 
not resume again until 1945. The struggle for power was increasingly conducted away from the 
public stage, both within the parties themselves and inside the government. But politics itself did 
not stop, nor did its nature change. The restrictive conditions of wartime put a premium on 
manoeuvre. This chapter describes the individual actors who exerted the most influence on 
Labour politics during the war. Given the situation facing the country, all but the most inflexible 
rebels were willing to give some degree of loyalty for a time. Yet, though the Coalition offered a 
major opportunity, the result was that the position of the leadership group vis 6 vis their followers 
quickly came under attack, for participation in the government enforced a degree of separation 
from the rest of the party. Attlee and his ministerial colleagues were thus compelled to walk a 
political tightrope. 
The thesis charts the inter-locking stories, the rise and fall, and career trajectories of a range of 
figures at different levels - and in different parts - of the Labour party. This section briefly 
describes the competing forces and individuals who shaped events. Strangely, considering how 
divided the party was, Labour was in fact probably less factionalised here than in its entire 
history. The internal schisms which have wracked Labour since its inception have often taken the 
form of organised factional conflict, but, here, the narrow circumstances of war restricted the 
scope for large groups. The only faction of significance was the leadership group. Yet though 
Attlee, Bevin, Dalton and Morrison worked together closely, even this group was far from 
homogenous. Consequently the weight of the analysis must be upon individuals instead. 
It was Attlee, more than anyone else, who was the primary architect of Labour's strategy. It was 
he who led Labour towards office and then oversaw a continual extension of the party's role 
within the Coalition, all the while working to keep his followers in line. It was a careful IY-crafted, 
subtle strategy. Few politicians would have possessed the skill to implement something so 
delicate. Yet considerable problems have arisen in interpreting his career which have never been 
satisfactorily resolved. His rise was both rapid and wholly unexpected. It is doubly difficult to 
understand given that he was widely seen as an ordinary, unremarkable man. Attlee had proven a 
competent if uninspiring leader in the thirties, managing the party effectively and shouldering 
huge burdens, while his committee-chairman manner disguised an adept manoeuvrer. He had 
made some bad decisions - particularly over foreign policy - but other than that was generally 
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sound. But though his position in the PLP was reasonably secure - underpinned by the firm 
support of the bulk of the union-sponsored MPs - nonetheless his power base across the wider 
party was limited, and remained so in 1939. Partly a product of the post-1931 weakening of the 
PLP, this also reflected serious concerns about Attlee's lack of charisma. His personality was 
small and flat, and he lacked the dynamism necessary to galvanise his followers. He had also 
made little public impression, and seemed weak, vacillating, and indecisive. Dalton famously 
perceived him to be a 'mouse', and there was a sense that he had become leader by default, with 
his rival Morrison arousing as much hostility as support and a lack of other candidates for thejob. 
While a competent manager, Attlee had failed to lead the party in any meaningful way. He had 
been unable to give it a direction -a pattern which was to be repeated when he became Leader of 
the Opposition again in 1951. 
However, Attlee's position was transformed during the Second World War. From 1939 until 
195 1, he was not only a manager but displayed a hitherto unseen ability to seize the initiative. 
When performing the usual work of Opposition, he performed poorly and tended to drift; but 
once within proximity to real power, Attlee could not have been more different. It is this 
dichotomy between the two phases of his leadership, there essentially being 'two Attlees', 
compounded by his lack of personality, which explains the common historiographical 
bewilderment at the Labour leader. For Attlee, the war was dominated by his attempt to impose 
his chosen order on the party. He implemented the strategy of 'constructive Opposition' and 
silenced clamouring for partisan politics, while biding his time and strengthening Labour's hand 
for the negotiation of a coalition. In doing so, he decisively imposed his authority for the first 
time. Satisfaction of views of his followers was not his priority. The efforts he devoted to that 
goal were a means to an end. Later, in office, he played the crucial role in balancing the 
competing demands of party and government. Seeking to retain his grip over the Labour party, he 
worked to preserve Labour's role in government against all the disaffection which it engendered, 
while also fending off Morrison. Attlee's wartime conduct reveals a figure more adept in the 
political black arts than perhaps any other politician of the era. He was also a skilled worker of 
the Whitehall machine and engineered a uniquely influential role in the Churchill administration, 
becoming the most important politician in the running of the home front. Attlee's outlook and 
personality sprang from a background of Victorian Christianity, and he was powerfully 
committed to notions of duty. The story examined throughout the thesis, then, is really Attlee's 
story. Examining his leadership style in action, it will suggest a way in which this most puzzling 
of politicians should be understood. Focusing upon the most critical period of his leadership, the 
thesis contends that Attlee was in fact capable of being authoritarian, aggressive, and intolerant. 
Highlighting his ruthlessness, it finds little evidence of the weak, retiring Attlee often imagined. 
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He was, moreover, the central figure in both of the primary power struggles described in the 
thesis: that between the leadership group and the mass of their party, and that between himself 
and Morrison. 
Morrison was Attlee's most formidable opponent for the two decades of his leadership. The 
party's most senior politician besides the leader, he was similarly central in the events described 
here, a dynamic force matched by few politicians of his generation. Widely assumed to be the 
heir apparent to Attlee's position, the ambition of seizing his job animated Morrison's career for 
twenty years. Bested by his rival in the 1935 leadership contest, four years on Morrison still 
burned with the desire to attain his objective. During this period, he exploited the circumstances 
of war in an attempt to achieve this. Temperamentally not dissimilar from Attlee, that did not 
preclude an intense competition between them. Moreover, Morrison possessed strengths that 
Attlee could not hope to enjoy. Where the leader was uncharismatic, Morison was an energetic 
and attractive figure, giving off an aura of natural leadership. Further, he was highly respected in 
the party for his obvious ability in governance -a proficiency which again contrasted with the 
more opaque skills of Attlee in that respect. Morrison was also, every bit as much as Attlee, an 
adept intriguer and plotter -a professional in the political arts. The heir apparent thus posed a 
serious threat to his rival's position atop the party. Involved in a new attempt to displace Attlee 
during late 1939, even when this was aborted Morrison spent the rest of the war preparing for a 
future challenge to his opponent. Crucially, in his role as Home Secretary, he enjoyed much 
greater public prominence than Attlee during the war. Only Bevin and Churchill matched his 
public stature. Further, as events make clear, the conflict with Attlee was in no sense an 
ideological one, despite some rhetorical window-dressing used in the latter stages of the war. 
Instead, it was purely a clash of competing ambitions - who was on top and who was not. From 
the outset, the struggle between the two men, as it was for many others, was as much about the 
contesting offuture power as it was over immediate authority. They engaged in a relentless 
search for advantage over one another, attempting to build up their own internal standing by 
being seen to do certain things, and heard to use certain kinds of rhetoric, as a means of 
undermining their rival. Morrison thus spent the period attempting to strengthen his own claim to 
the leadership and weaken that of Attlee. He did this by taking up a rhetorical position directly 
between the leader and the Labour party, and exploiting disaffection with Attlee's strategy, by 
posturing as a more aggressive champion of Labour within the Coalition - while in reality being 
the most draconian of all the Labour ministers against dissension. He was to pursue this tactic for 
five years. Encompassing the initial period in Opposition, the lifetime of the Coalition and finally 
that ministry's collapse and the general election of 1945, their conflict was the most important of 
all the struggles within Labour between 1939 and 1945. Sometimes overtly, sometimes via 
22 
shadow boxing, and adopting innumerable different forms, this rivalry dominated politics at 
Labour's upper echelons. 
But, like Attlee, Morrison also had weaknesses, and he would have to overcome significant 
obstacles if he was to become leader. The most problematic was the enmity of Bevin - an enmity 
which prompted the union boss to align himself with Attlee and form what amounted to an anti- 
Morrison bloc. Further, despite his willingness to exploit internal disillusionment, Morrison's 
refusal to tolerate opposition from the party to the leadership group's strategy, coupled with his 
frequently controversial decisions as Home Secretary, brought him into regular conflict with the 
rank-and-file. Morrison's natural leanings towards authoritarianism meant that he was quite 
willing to act as the Coalition's political trouble-shooter -a role which posed problems for his 
attempts to win backing of the party by putting him at odds with those he would have to persuade 
to support him. 
Bevin was, by some distance, the most powerful man in the Labour movement. Though as a 
union, rather than political, figure, he was only peripherally involved in the efforts of Attlee and 
the others during the first eight months of war, once Labour joined the Coalition, Bevin - with his 
gift for organisation - was the ideal figure to be tasked with directing the logistics of Britain's 
domestic war effort as Minister of Labour. He was in many respects similar to Attlee and 
Morrison (the latter especially), but had never been a 'political' figure and remained so 
throughout the war; always distrustful of professional politicians, viewing them as 'intriguers', he 
was concerned solely with the exercise of executive power and profoundly uninterested in party 
politics. The authoritarian Bevin was thus a paradoxically remote, but central, figure in the 
wartime party, having only hostility towards it but demanding unmitigated support. His power 
was most evident at the annual Conference, where his control of union bloc votes delivered 
victory after victory for the official line despite the growing anger of the party. Bevin was a 
frequent target for the attacks of those set upon overturning the leadership group's authority, and 
his notoriously short temper ensured he was usually provoked into a response that made the 
delicate party management efforts of Attlee still more difficult. That Bevin so distrusted 
politicians was at the root of his contempt for Morrison - the very embodiment of the career 
politician. The mutual loathing between the pair pushed Bevin towards Attlee and the formation 
of the axis between the two which dominated Labour politics until 195 1. Bevin perceived Attlee 
as being the only trustworthy politician. Though they had not been close during the thirties, once 
Labour joined the Coalition an unshakeable alliance - quite unlike any in recent political history - 
developed between them, entrenching and virtually institutionalising an internal balance of power 
that was to last until Bevin's death. Attlee joined with Bevin to balance Morrison and protect his 
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own role. Strangely, Bevin, the more obviously powerful of the two, had no interest in the 
position of leader and backed Attlee to the hilt. The union boss was concerned solely with the 
possession of what he would have considered real power - executive authority. He probably 
perceived Attlee as his 'lieutenant' - of which he had had several in the unions - who would keep 
the meddlesome Labour party in line while he concentrated on more important matters. Bevin's 
interests were thus focused in rather different directions from those of most politicians. Of course, 
that he despised Morrison for being a 'manoeuvrer', but failed to discern Attlee's own abilities in 
that regard, only underlines once again how the restrained personality of the leader could give an 
inaccurate impression of him. 
Dalton, Labour's policy Czar, was the most significant individual in the post-1931 regeneration of 
the party, straddling both the NEC and PLP, and constructing a powerful and influential position. 
He had taken the leading role in both mapping out a new course for the party and the factional 
conflicts of the period, engaging in a long and bitter feud with Stafford Cripps and expending 
much energy to reorient Labour foreign policy towards rearmament. But, like the other senior 
figures, his attitude was primarily determined by the need to construct a platform to enter 
government office. Dalton had spent eight years preparing for this, and, once within sight of 
power in 1939, like Bevin he became generally uninterested in the internal politics of the Labour 
party - he had climbed the ladder and intended to stay there. To some extent, Dalton thus 
disengaged from affairs within the party and left its direction to others. But he did remain a 
frequent plotter, heavily involved in the leadership intrigues of his ally Morrison. He had been at 
the centre of Morrison's efforts to become leader in 1935 and remained so here. The alignment 
between the two added a further dimension to relations within the leadership group - though 
Labour's Big Four were united on the necessity of keeping the party contained and focusing upon 
achieving their ambitions for high office, they were deeply polarised amongst themselves. As we 
have seen, the relationship between Attlee and Bevin amounted to an anti-Morrison alliance, and, 
by the same token, Dalton and Morrison formed an anti-Attlee bloc for at least part of the war. 
This division into separate camps on one of the most important issues facing them during the 
period - the future of the leadership - resulted in relations between Labour's senior figures often 
descending into undisguised power struggle. 
The key to the leadership's efforts to exercise control over Labour was the tactic they employed 
to do so: a quite specific and instrumental 'doctrine' established at the outset of war. Attlee, 
Bevin, Morrison and Dalton - as well as their allies and proxies - propagated and adhered to it, 
but it was the leader himself who assumed the critical role in formulating and applying this 
doctrine. It consisted of a combination of various forms of rhetoric intended to create the 
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circumstances for the leaders to retain the backing of their followers while maintaining their own 
authority. As the thesis will demonstrate, it included appeals to the party for national 'unity' and 
political 'responsibility' in the shadow of the national 'crisis', threats of the collapse of Labour's 
credibility if it was seen as unpatriotic, reassuring ideological gestures about the advance of 
socialism, and emphasis on the benefits that the Coalition would yield. It was backed by open 
authoritarianism when necessary. The leaders used this between 1939 and 1945 to control Labour 
through cajolery and threats, while permitting them to concentrate on their real agenda. It was 
therefore essentially a cover for them to pursue their ambitions. These tactics enabled Attlee and 
his colleagues firstly to divert tensions away from themselves and towards the Chamberlain 
ministry, and later as a means of shoring up the Coalition. While the individuals who constituted 
the leadership group each had their own specific aims and prejudices, they co-operated in 
recognising the opportunities presented by the war and joined in propagating this doctrine. This 
mixture of rhetoric and substantive action was the platform from which Labour's leaders sought 
to maintain their position, and from the beginning amounted to a bid to marginalise all internal 
opposition. 
However, individuals other than the core leadership group were also important figures during the 
period. The leaders had three particularly strong allies who they employed as proxies in their 
efforts to manage the party. These men were thus afforded central roles in the conflicts which 
followed. The deputy leader, Arthur Greenwood, is a relatively neglected figure, the promise of 
his early career never fulfilled and blighted by drink. ' But between 1939-45, particularly in the 
early stages of the war, Greenwood was of critical importance. In the initial months of the 
conflict, with Attlee ill, it was he who led Labour on the first stages of its journey. As will be 
seen, Greenwood was such a success that attempts were made to remove Attlee and replace him 
with his deputy, rather than with Morrison, in late 1939. The eight months of the 'phoney war' 
represented the high point of his career, Greenwood playing a crucial role in the strategy of the 
leadership group and securing a place in the War Cabinet when Labour entered office. But his 
war was a fluctuating one: performing poorly in the government, he was sacked by Churchill in 
1942 and became acting head of the PLP, leading the parliamentary party via its wartime 
Administrative Committee. This position placed him at the forefront of the worsening revolts and 
the challenges being mounted to the authority of the Labour ministers. Greenwood thus remained 
a major figure in Labour party politics throughout the war. 
' See Richard Whiting's entry for Greenwood in David Howell (ed. ) Dictionary ofLabour Biography, vol. 
XI (2004), pp. 83-91. There is no published full scale biography of Greenwood. 
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The two other individuals were Herbert B. Lees-Smith and Frederick W. Pethick-Lawrence. 
Relatively elderly at the outbreak of war, both had been competent front-bench figures for many 
years. Given the need for senior figures to divert their attention towards their plans for office, 
they needed to leave the day-to-day direction of the PLP in the hands of those they could trust. 
Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence fitted the bill perfectly, and, from September 1939, these 
previously middle-ranking MPs shouldered a huge burden as the de facto leaders of the PLP. 
When Labour entered office in 1940, Lees-Smith became acting head of the PLP and Leader of 
the Opposition - serving in the role until his death in December 1941 - with Pethick-Lawrence as 
his deputy. The two proxies were old friends and acted as a bulwark at the head of the party, 
navigating the tricky course of retaining Labour's loyalty to its representatives while appeasing an 
increasingly resentful PLP. After Lees-Smith's death, Pethick-Lawrence formed a comparable 
alignment with Greenwood. Tasked with vitally important roles, the three men were to be central 
to the struggles between the leadership group and their followers. 
11 
These figures were the key actors in guiding the Labour party along the path chosen by Attlee. 
But however subtle this strategy, the patience it necessitated dissatisfied much of the party, and 
internal conflict quickly broke out on a wide scale. By the middle stages of the war, the course 
chosen by the Labour ministers seemed on the verge of collapse, and the possibility of them being 
overthrown or abandoned by their followers a serious one. There were also, therefore, a number 
of prominent rebels who were the exploiters of Labour's anger and disaffection. These dissi dents 
were at the centre of, and often instigated, many of the crises which afflicted the party. Their war 
was dominated by efforts to expand their influence within Labour and put down markers for the 
future. These figures - most significantly Laski, Bevan and Shinwell - exploited the mood of 
disillusionment, and the power vacuum at the heart of the Labour party, for their own ends. 
Throughout the war, they sought to establish themselves at the expense of the Labour ministers 
and encourage rebellion - even to the point of hoping to derail the strategy of the leadership 
group, and take the party back into Opposition. The Labour ministers were subjected to constant 
attack by these rebels for failing to secure 'socialism' from the Conservatives and, invoking the 
language of 'betrayal', they became their most frequent enemies. They did not act in concert, and 
each of these individuals had their own specific set of objectives and enmities. Under the 
conditions of 1939-1945, everyone in the party who craved advancement was simply out for 
themselves. There was, moreover, little evidence of a substantive ideological component to their 
actions. Instead, sheer opportunism occasioned their activities. 
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At the beginning of the period, Shinwell seemed likely to prove the most significant enemy of the 
leadership group. He also appeared certain to secure a major role in the party both during and 
after the war. Popular with the rank-and-file due to his having defeated MacDonald for his seat at 
Seaharn in 1935, Shinwell was a skilled orator and unremitting critic of his leaders. By 1939 he 
possessed a strong position in the party, both in the PLP and via an NEC seat. But at the outbreak 
of war, this archetypal rebel suddenly altered his posture and immediately became a distinctly 
moderate figure, loyalist and supportive of the leadership. The reason for this was not patriotism, 
but careerism: he spent the first eight months of war preparing the way for attaining his most 
treasured ambition, to become Minister of Shipping in the coalition which seemed probable. But 
when he was not offered that post the following May, an embittered Shinwell reverted to type and 
became the most ferocious critic of his leaders, pursuing vicious personal vendettas against those 
who, in his mind, had frustrated his plans. For five years he then worked constantly to sabotage 
the Labour ministers' attempts to straddle the bridge between government and Opposition. 
Bevan, meanwhile, had been expelled from the Labour party with Cripps in January 1939, and 
even upon his return to the party in December at first remained a minor actor. He hardly seemed 
likely to become the most important rebel figure in the party and capture a platform which would 
permit him to tear Labour apart in the subsequent decade in his pursuit of the leadership. But in 
fact, at the outbreak of the conflict with Hitler, Bevan quickly began constructing what was, by 
1945, a virtually impregnable position, using the war as a vehicle to establish himself as the 
leader of a significant strain of opinion within Labour. To this end, this famous parliamentary 
orator- a master performer in the Commons chamber and a match for any political speaker of the 
1940s - picked fights with both the Labour ministers and virtually all other leading politicians of 
the period as well. Engaging in a series of bitter feuds with men such as Bevin, Churchill, and 
Morrison, Bevan established himself as the party's coming man, and acquired a standing which 
enabled him to lay claim to a senior position in the post-war Labour hierarchy. His control over 
the Tribune newspaper was a second crucial asset for his projection of himself and his agenda. 
Bevan - patterning himself after that other great rebel, Charles James Fox - was a constant thorn 
in the side of the leadership group, and occupied a platform from which he was capable of besting 
anyone in the party if he chose his ground carefully. By the end of the war, he had become the 
leading politician in Britain outside the government. This evolution, with its far reaching 
consequences, was one of the most remarkable aspects of Labour's war. Always more calculating 
and power-hungry than the ideological firebrand he depicted himself to be, to the ambitious 
Welshman, more than for anyone else, the Second World War was all about the future. 
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The socialist intellectual Harold Laski proved to be the Labour ministers' most troublesome and 
persistent opponent between 1939-1945. Even more popular than Shinwell, an 'insider' to the 
Labour machine rather than an 'outsider' like Bevan, and with a wide-ranging brief on the NEC, 
Laski was able to operate from a position of greater security than either. He entered into a 
rancorous personal feud with Attlee, which lasted throughout the war and instigated many crises. 
The Labour ministers found it almost impossible to face down their enemy decisively, for, not 
being a politician, he was largely immune from conventional punitive measures. As Laski worked 
against the strategy chosen by the leaders, he and Attlee quickly came to despise one another, and 
the dissident intellectual spent much of the period seeking to engineer the removal of the leader 
and his replacement by Morrison. Attlee, for his part, struggled to prevent Laski from upsetting 
his carefully chosen course. Laski also sought to make himself the motive power of the 
Executive, the role that Dalton had played in the thirties: he expanded his influence almost 
exponentially between 1939 and 1945, and, with his endless drive and enthusiasm, by 1941 posed 
a persistent threat to the Labour ministers' control of their party. Ensconced at the core of the 
Labour machine, Laski was unlike other dissentients. 2 Though his leaders could consistently 
outnumber him, no-one had more influence across the NEC as a whole. He used this to 
undermine their position and try to change Labour's political direction, favouring a much more 
aggressive strategy towards the Conservatives and eventually withdrawal from the Coalition. 
Moreover, unlike so many rebels, Laski did not suffer from a propensity for self-destruction. 
This, along with the leaders' vulnerable position between government and party, resulted in the 
NEC becoming for much of the period examined here little more than a battleground between 
Attlee and Laski. 
The danger posed by these figures was not necessarily that the Labour ministers could actually be 
overthrown but - more likely given the persistently hostile mood of the bulk of the party - they 
would succeed in mobilising sufficient support to make the balancing-act performed by Attlee 
and the other leaders untenable. Crucially, the nature of that balancing-act was such that Labour 
could not sustain the dramatic upheavals witnessed in other periods of the party's history - it 
would take much less dissension to upset the precarious efforts of the leadership here. 
Significantly, therefore, men such as Bevan, Laski, and Shinwell did not need to be strong enough 
to threaten an actual overthrow of the leadership in order to be equally as destructive. They did 
not even have to be successful at that in order to advertise themselves and bolster their credentials 
for the future. The leadership's strategy closed the rest of the Labour party off from immediate 
2 Laski was, in the words of Richard Cockett, 'probably the most famous academic in the English-speaking 
world'. Lest it be thought questionable that intellectuals are capable of playing such an active political role, 
an important corrective is supplied by Cockett's book Thinking the unthinkable: Think-tanks and the 
economic counter-revolution, 1931-1983 (London, 1995). The cited quotation can be found on p. 29. 
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advancement, freezing into place an internal hierarchy which would last while ever the Coalition 
did. The struggle of these dissidents, and other rebels, then, was not only about prosecuting 
personal feuds but to be in a position to break into the inner councils of the party when 
circumstances finally changed. 
Those described above represented the most important individual actors within Labour between 
1939 and 1945. But others will be encountered throughout the thesis as well. Ellen Wilkinson, the 
leader of the Jarrow marches, was a long-time rebel but also Morrison's most fervent supporter, 
and constantly involved in the intrigues over the leadership. Jim Griffiths was a man very similar 
to the leadership but, out of office, became a perpetual nuisance to the Labour ministers, 
reflecting the problems that they faced when the position of weakness they had imposed on the 
party eventually caused even those who normally supported them to revolt. Walter Citrine, 
Bevin's only peer as a powerful union boss, exercised influence at key junctures, as did Morgan 
Phillips, the party secretary, George Shepherd, the national agent, and a myriad of others. A 
substantial range of figures will therefore play a role in the account which follows, but those 
considered here represent the most significant of the competing players arrayed within Labour 
between 1939 and 1945. 
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Chapter two -'Power without responsibilitv" 
Between the summer of 1939 and May 1940, the Labour party's senior figures established a 
commanding political position by orchestrating and carrying into effect a precarious balancing- 
act. These men worked to continually strengthen their hand for eventual entry into a wartime 
coalition which, given the international situation, looked an increasingly likely outcome. They 
also sought to restrain their followers and subordinate the party to their own strategy of biding 
time, marshalling their strength and awaiting the right moment to enter office. In doing so the 
Labour leaders played a key role in the weakening of the Chamberlain ministry. The strategy 
implemented by the leadership group - representing the initial steps along the course they were to 
follow until 1945 - was to yield considerable benefits for the party in May 1940. This chapter 
will construct the first focused analysis of these events, examining the means by which Attlee and 
the other senior figures steered their course and sought to lever their way into office while 
simultaneously attempting to keep the Labour party itself in line. At the same time, this was 
further complicated by internal scheming for advantage and personal rivalries between the leaders 
themselves. 
There are therefore two components to the current chapter, and the analysis undertaken in the 
thesis as a whole. These were, moreover, quite separate here - it was only later in the war that the 
two would converge, bringing the different conflicts and strategies which shaped Labour's war to 
a decisive culmination. The first is examination of the strategy collectively employed by the 
leadership group. The difficulties facing them were considerable: Labour's strong personal 
antipathy for prime minister Neville Chamberlain was balanced by recognition that off-ice, 
achieved at the opportune moment, was the overriding objective. This, in turn, was matched by 
the necessity of adopting a public posture of patriotism and stridently 'responsible' conduct, 
while also being seen as sufficiently anti-Conservative by an internal Labour audience to retain 
the backing of their followers. The result was a strategy prosecuted through calculated posturing, 
subtle shifts of rhetoric and language, and a concerted effort to appease the disaffection within 
Labour's ranks about a course that seemed to revel in inactivity and simply waiting for the 
Conservatives to fail. Through this, Labour's leaders were able to exert a degree of political 
leverage out of all proportion to their limited parliamentary representation. The manufacture of 
this opportunity necessitated patience and recognition that only a Conservative rebellion could 
actually remove Chamberlain; but, as the chapter shows, the crucial point is how effectively 
Labour's senior figures, particularly Attlee, controlled and managed the party. It is an account of 
' Parts of this chapter appear in article form as the current author's 'The Labour party and the pursuit of 
office, 1939-1940' (under consideration). 
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Labour's transition from a position of weakness, having only achieved minimal electoral progress 
since the 1935 general election, to one of great strength. This, moreover, permitted them to exact 
a heavy price from the Conservatives upon finally consenting to protect their rivals' flank in 
entering the Churchill Coalition in May 1940. The fall of Chamberlain and Labour's powerful 
role in the eventual coalition were certainly not inevitable; but this does not take away from the 
success which resulted from the party being positioned as it was by its leaders and which has been 
repeatedly overlooked by historians. Previous accounts have concentrated upon Conservative 
party politics, and adopted a negative view of Labour's course during this period. In contrast to 
most existing literature, then - which sees Labour as drifting aimless ly for eight months with 'the 
worst of all worlds', until fortune gifted them a key role in office 2_ the chapter will suggest that 
this was not so, and in fact the party was embarked upon a carefully-crafted and deliberate 
strategy which could easily have come to grief. In this it makes a contribution to other recent 
historiography which has facilitated a more nuanced appraisal of the period. 3 
The second element is the personal competition andjockeying for position between these same 
figures, most significantly over the question of Attlee's leadership and the desire of many to see 
him replaced. At the point at which our analysis begins, during the first half of 1939, Labour had 
experienced less internal conflict than at any point since August 193 1. The most troublesome 
dissident figure in the party, Cripps, was expelled along with a number of his followers in 
January, his demise signifying the symbolic end to the divisions which had plagued Labour since 
MacDonald's defection. Yet there still existed a power vacuum at the heart of the party. Attlee 
shouldered huge burdens and managed the PLP admirably, but while he was officially leader he 
had not really 'led' the party anywhere. Instead, his period in charge had been characterised by 
drift, a perhaps inevitable consequence of his uncbarismatic personality and lack of dynamism in 
circumstances of parliamentary Opposition. The work of taking Labour forward had been done by 
others. Of the other leading figures within the party, they too possessed only a limited internal 
reach - Attlee's great rival Morrison was highly respected, but did not yet enjoy the support 
necessary to ascend to the leadership; Dalton had driven the NEC for years but possessed only a 
small personal following; deputy leader Greenwood was popular, but hindered by his taste for 
alcohol; and Bevin and Citrine were powerful union figures but lacked the same influence over 
2 For example, Addison, Brooke and Jefferys have all taken this view. 
3 D. J. Dutton, 'Power brokers orjust 'Glamour boys'? The Eden group, September 1939-May 1940', 
English Historical Review, 118 (2003), pp. 412-24; Larry L. Witherell, 'Lord Salisbury's 'Watching 
Committee' and the fall of Neville Chamberlain, May 1940', English Historical Review, 116 (200 1), pp. 
1134-66. 
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the political wing. Hence power at the top of the Labour party remained diffuse and, as will be 
seen, ripe for competition. 4 
The chapter will show how this situation changed over the period up to the formation of the 
Coalition in May 1940 - particularly in the transformation of Attlee. For the first time, he took 
hold of his party and moved it decisively in a direction of his choosing. In doing so he imposed 
himself on his followers to a greater degree than he had ever done previously. The period was the 
most crucial of Attlee's career for, though absent through illness from May until October, upon 
his return he emerged as a genuine leader for the first time. Though this often went unappreciated 
by his followers and contemporaries, the thesis will demonstrate the increasing centrality of 
Attlee's role and propose a new means of understanding this most puzzling of politicians. At the 
same time, others set out on their own courses. Of most immediate significance was Greenwood's 
being propelled to the highest stature he was to attain in his long career, and the plotting of Dalton 
and Morrison tojettison Attlee as leader. Even under conditions of national crisis, political actors 
remained self-interested beings, and the period in question offered significant opportunities for 
advancement. In the circumstances of war, outward loyalty was at a premium; anything else 
would have engendered accusations of undermining national unity. As a result, the ability of 
politicians to partake in their usual activity of seeking personal and party advantage became more 
difficult, and to some extent restricted. Yet, even within these confines and behind this facade, 
politics continued largely as normal. The nature of politics did not change because of the war. 
Rivals continued to snipe at one another; politicians still went about setting out their stalls for 
power and advancement; and senior figures still competed in high-stakes contests for superiority. 
The period opened with the beginnings of a major internal crisis over the leadership. Running 
parallel to this, the first indications of the party management strategy which the senior figures 
would adopt were seen at the 1939 annual Conference in May. Events that month initiated a 
realignment in the balance of power at the top of the party which would continue until the end of 
the year, laying the foundations for a renewed conflict over the leader's position. Attlee was 
4 It is a matter of regret that this aspect of the analysis is, for the current chapter at least, disproportionately 
dependent on a single source - Dalton's diary. This was due primarily to the destruction of the PLP records 
for 193841 by the Luftwaffe, as well as the fact that many other sources which will become significant 
later were not so here. This is a problem which has confronted all previous historians of the period, and, as 
a result, the examination of politicking at the top of the party in this chapter is more reliant on this one 
source than would be preferred. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that, as far as we can see, its account is 
not contradicted by the other sources that are available, and much of it is corroborated elsewhere (for 
example, in memoirs). 
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absent, ill with a prostate condition, for most of the period from May until October 1939. He still 
retained a guiding hand, but his temporary removal had the effect of necessitating changes in the 
day-to-day management of the party. Surprisingly, the most significant role was assumed not by 
the heir apparent, Morrison, but the acting leader, Greenwood. The Conference did not witness 
the public schisms of earlier years and, with a general election assumed to be on the horizon, 
outward unity was at a premium. With the continued deterioration in the international situation, it 
was here that Labour's senior figures put down their first public markers - for Conservative 
observers and their own followers - on the possibility of cross-party alliance. Though they did not 
set out fully along their new trajectory until the actual outbreak of war, nonetheless the basic 
position was in place by May. 
With Attlee ill, it was Greenwood who was tasked with defining Labour's stance. Bringing the 
Conference to a close, he commented on the possibility of Labourjoining a coalition in the event 
of war, asserting to the delegates that 'I will never, myself, if I were called upon to do, take office 
in any government that was not prepared to implement [the] Immediate Programme (Labour's 
1937 policy document)'. 5 Greenwood poured further cold water on the idea by stating that 'those 
people who would sell our principles to buy the uncertain support of Liberals and Conservatives 
are doing this great party no good. 16 While we should see Greenwood's speech in the context of 
its Conference setting, the stance adopted by the acting leader marked out a high price for 
Labour's co-operation - something Chamberlain would certainly be forced to pursue should war 
erupt. It was thus evidently intended for external consumption as well. The address represented 
the first glimpse of the strategy pursued by the leadership group until May 1940, staying out of 
the government so as to reap maximum advantage when the opportune moment to enter a 
coalition came. In declaring that Labour would not enter a cross-party ministry without the 
implementation of some of its key policies, the leadership were from the outset able to construct a 
distinctly advantageous bargaining position vis 6 vis the Conservatives. But his role as the leading 
spokesman for the party also initiated a sudden rise to prominence for Greenwood himself, and 
over the subsequent months he became a critical player in the political world. He ended the 
Conference amid cheering with a energetic electioneering speech: 'My friends, the fight is on! 
Soldiers, to your posts! Forward, to victory! 0 Despite possessing a limited internal power base - 
he was not a member of the NEC and was deputy leader only of the PLP, not the Labour party as 
a whole - Greenwood was pushed to the forefront from mid 1939 as acting leader, and rapidly 
5 1939 Labour PartyAnnual Conference Report (these are hereafter cited as LPACR), pp. 330-1. 6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
33 
propelled up the greasy pole. By the autumn he was in the ascendant and undercutting Morrison's 
prized status as leader-in-waiting. 
But, for the moment, the question of political strategy retreated into the background as Morrison 
exploited Attlee's illness to immediately launch a new plot to snatch the leadership from his rival. 
That war was widely thought to be inevitable, but 'politics' continued entirely as normal once 
their position on coalition had been marked out, is instructive. Morrison had apparently been 
preparing a move against Attlee throughout 1939, one newspaper labelling it 'an immense and 
far-tentacled intrigue' by his supporters, and earlier in the year the Sunday Express observed that 
Morrison's 'closest friends scurry around the lobbies at Westminster, there and here, to and fro, 
staking out his claim [for the leadership] ... their propaganda is meeting with some success'. 
8 
Drawn from across the party and temperamentally dissimilar, Morrison's supporters underline the 
significance of loyalty to individuals, not ideology, in Labour factionalism. His most active allies 
were Dalton and Wilkinson - two more different figures would be difficult to conceive. In June 
1939, with the leader out of the way, and with the possibility that Labour's poor prospects of 
winning a general election would generate sufficient disaffection with the incumbent to enable 
him to challenge and defeat Attlee, Morrison thus tried to seize his job and precipitated the first of 
two attempts that year to force a change of leader. This also began a pattern which was to recur 
throughout the war: attention by senior political figures to personal conflict and ambition despite 
the existence of 'crisis'. Dalton, loathsome as ever towards Attlee, was at the centre of both 
episodes, being determined to remove the uncharismatic leader. To a man like Dalton, determined 
to 'become the government' as Stafford Cripps observed, this was a fatal flaw. 9 Dalton's hostility 
to Attlee is evident from his lack of concern at the rumour that the leader might actually die from 
his prostate condition. 10 
Independently of this, though, it is clear that Attlee's position remained fmgile not only because 
of the actions of his rivals, but as a consequence of having made so little public impression. At 
the Conference, Bevin complained to Dalton about 'the weakness of [his] leadership', and Dalton 
recorded hearing that both Bevin and Citrine felt that a change of leader 'must be made'. " That 
Bevin held this view suggests that the union boss, like most others, at this time misjudged 
Attlee's skills. Bevin and Citrine apparently had little confidence in Greenwood either, and the 
8 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 245; Sunday Express, I January 1939. 
9 Unpublished Beatrice Webb Diary, 16 April 1937, cited Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, p. 234. '0 British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, Dalton papers, Diary, entries for '26h May 
1939 to 2 nd June 1939' (p. 267). Page numbers in brackets refer to where the source can be found in the 
published version of the diary, in Ben Pimlott (ed. ), The Political Diary ofHugh Dalton, 1918-40,1945-60 
(London, 1986). 
" ]bid. 
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former despised Morrison. 12 These signs of discontent confirm that the standing of the leader 
remained tenuous. For all his hard work in managing Labour since 193 1, it is obvious that by 
1939 Attlee's party was tiring of him, but also that no obvious successor was agreed. 
Following the Conference, Dalton began politicking to get rid of the leader, telling the influential 
Francis Williams, editor of the Daily Herald and another Morrison supporter, that 'I am prepared 
13 
to go to all lengths to get the right sort of change'. By 'the right sort of change', Dalton meant 
ensuring that Greenwood did not get the post; he told Williams 'a few things', about Greenwood 
and his supporters, whom Dalton referred to as 'the Masons' (Greenwood, along with numerous 
other Labour MPs, was a freemason). 14 Though details of Dalton's comments are unspecified, it 
seems unlikely they were complimentary. Williams then sent up a balloon for Morrison's claim to 
the topjob, writing in the Daily Herald that political leadership 'is at this moment shown pre- 
eminently in the commanding position in public respect which has been achieved by Herbert 
Morrison through the great qualities of courageous and imaginative leadership he has brought to 
15 16 
the control of London'. No mention was made of Attlee in the article. Shortly afterwards, the 
plot emerged into the open when Wilkinson published a newspaper piece expressing a lack of 
confidence in Attlee. 17 Wilkinson advocated that Morrison should replace Attlee, with Dalton, 
Greenwood and Cripps serving as his chief 'lieutenants' . 
18 But given Attlee's ill-health, this effort 
to remove him days into his absence was not well-received by MPs. Moreover, Greenwood and 
'the Masons' suspected it to be a preliminary to a strike by Morrison. 19 Considering his 
opposition, Greenwood's name began to be canvassed as an alternative nominee. 20 'His supporters 
apparently presented his candidacy in terms of 'indignation at this attempt to stab a sick man 
[Attlee] in the back', while, in Dalton's view, actually hoping that Attlee would 'retire on grounds 
of ill-health' and that Greenwood, not Morrison, would then replace him. 21 Dalton recorded that 
the Masons were 'going about, swearing that they would have Ellen's head on a charger' and 
22 denouncing the effort to impose Morrison on the PLP. The acting leader, apparently inebriated 
at the time, warned Wilkinson privately that he would push for her to be censured. 23 The attempt 
to unseat Attlee gathered pace when the chief conspirators met secretly behind the Speaker's 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Daily Herald, 3 June 1939. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Sunday Referee, 4 June 1939. 
"' Ibid. 
19 Pimlott, Dalton, p. 265. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Dalton Diary, 14 June 1939 (pp. 268-70). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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chair in the Commons on 12 June. 
24 Dalton urged Wilkinson, if she was attacked, 'to counter by 
spilling some Masonic beans' (again unspecified), as 'Greenwood and the Masons are a scandal', 
25 
and the episode offered 'a chance to expose them'. Quite what Dalton knew, or thought he 
knew, about Greenwood is unknown; but he obviously thought it a useful weapon. 26 Wilkinson 
agreed, while Morrison - determined to use Attlee's absence to fatally undermine his position - 
wanted to engineer 'an open discussion on the leadership' by the PLP. 27 
As it was, however, no contest actually occurred. Dalton heard through thejoumalist Maurice 
Webb - another Morrison supporter - that Greenwood was less concerned with winning the 
leadership than with stopping Morrison. 28 Greenwood was apparently 'terrified' of becoming 
leader amid such a grave international situation. 29 At the crucial PLP meeting on 14 June, Dalton 
and Morrison were both received coolly, a sign that their plotting had annoyed many. 30 
Wilkinson came in for heavy criticism from Greenwood and an 'angry and confused discussion' 
followed, in which Wilkinson - perhaps a proxy for Morrison in the eyes of the union MPs loyal 
to Attlee - was berated. 31 Coming under sustained attack, she made a poor defence and failed to 
Gspill [the] beans' on the Masons. 32 In the end, she was severely reprimanded, but narrowly 
escaped censure. 33 
Under the circumstances, if Morrison had publicly associated himself with her attack on Attlee it 
would quite likely have done him considerable harm, being seen as manoeuvring against a sick 
colleague. Consequently, he abandoned his closest ally altogether, saying that he knew nothing of 
the article before it was published and would have advised against it anyway. 34 He affirmed his 
loyalty to Attlee, and said he would support him in a vote of confidence. 35 Whether he would 
have adopted such a line if a leadership crisis had actually been provoked is questionable. Dalton 
observed that the affair had wounded Morrison, noting a 'certain hostility in the atmosphere' 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For ftirther information on the Masonic element within the PLP, see John Hamill and Andrew Prescott, 
'The Mason's candidate: New welcome lodge no. 5139 and the parliamentary Labour party', Labour 
History Review, vol. 71 (2006), pp. 9-4 1. 
27 Dalton Diary, 14 June 1939 (pp. 268-70). 
29 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Dalton Diary, 14 June 1939 (unpublished version). 
31 Dalton Diary, 14 June 1939 (pp. 268-71). The unpublished version contains slightly more information 
than the published account of the incident. 32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
-35 Ibid. 
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when he made his speech. 36 The heir apparent recognised, moreover, that any attempt to take the 
leadership was hindered by the fact that the existing composition of the PLP stacked the odds 
against him and that it would require an influx of new, non-union MPs before he could attract the 
necessary support. 37 This realisation of the unfavourable situation facing him in the arena where a 
leadership contest would have to be decided would, as we shall see, eventually push Morrison to 
change tack. But for the moment his position was weakened by the backfiring of this bid to unseat 
Attlee. Shinwell - who had been energetically reassuring Attlee that he was leading the way 
against any attempt to replace him, perhaps seeking preferment - moved a vote of confidence in 
38 
the incumbent which was carried unanimously, and the episode came to an abrupt end. While, 
as suggested above, Attlee's position clearly remained vulnerable and his style of leadership ill- 
suited to the normalities of Opposition, that he remained leader in spite of the disillusionment he 
engendered, and his absence from the centre of events, underlines the depth of his support among 
the union MPs. He held the backing of a majority of them so firmly that neither Morrison nor 
Dalton had even been able to engineer a contest. 
11 
With this initial bid to remove Attlee a failure, attention shifted back to events abroad and internal 
affairs receded in importance until the days preceding the outbreak of war. Nonetheless -these 
changes in the distribution of authority among senior figures - particularly towards Greenwood - 
continued. Simultaneously, however, the course chosen by the leaders of standing back and 
strengthening Labour's hand now had to actually be implemented as the international crisis 
developed. With Attlee still absent in August, it fell to Greenwood to lead Labour in the 
Commons and in its contacts with the govcmmentý and within days he achieved the highest 
stature he was to attain in his long career. He was, of course, long blighted by drinking, but in a 
brief three-month period from late August Greenwood offered a fleeting glimpse of his true 
capacity. Serving as the Labour liaison with Downing Street, he was in close touch with both 
Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, as the crisis gathered pace. A significant 
factor in Greenwood's rise was that Morrison, having already being stung by the PLP, was at this 
time taken up with his work on the LCC in preparing the capital for aerial attack. The acting 
36 Ibid. 
37 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 245. 
38 Dalton Diary, 14 June 1939 (pp. 268-70). Shinwell was 'raging' against Morrison, denouncing him as a 
'MacDonaldite in 193 P and 'whose capacities have been enormously exaggerated'. Shinwell favoured 
retaining Attlee and wrote to the indisposed leader that 'The one thing I want to let you know is that some 
of us are quite capable of looking after your interests while you are away. There is nothing you need worry 
about, keep that in your mind all the time' - cited Francis Beckett, ClemAttlee (London, 2007 edition) 
p. 152. 
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leader rose to the occasion, and along with senior colleagues sought to strengthen the 
government's resolve to resist Hitler. At a meeting of the PLP Executive in late August, 
Greenwood and Dalton advocated the strategy of simultaneously acting 'responsibly' in the 
national interest whilst leaving Chamberlain isolated by refusing to join the govemment. 39 This 
6 responsibility' constituted a rhetorical means of protecting Labour's flank from any charge of a 
lack of patriotism while simultaneously restraining the party, affording its leaders the scope and 
discretion to thereafter manoeuvre largely as normal. It thus represented the core of the party 
management doctrine which was now being created. It was agreed that no MP or trade union 
leader should enter into individual agreement with the government: any such initiative must be a 
collective decision, for this independence was crucial if Labour was to exert a pressure 
disproportionate to its parliamentary strength. 40 The PLP backed this decision. 41 That same day, 
Greenwood delivered a commanding performance in Parliament, leading for Labour in a debate 
on the international situation. He told the packed Commons that 'The war clouds are gathering. 
Europe and the world are in shadows. A terrible ... responsibility lies on the shoulders of him 
42 [Hitler] that lets loose the hounds of war'. Greenwood's oration was measured but direct, 
lambasting the appeasement policies of Chamberlain while emphasising that Labour would stand 
behind the government in resisting the dictators. 43 His conduct as acting leader had elevated 
Greenwood from the status of minor deputy to major national figure. 
At a meeting of the NCL the following day, the decision not to co-operate was supported. 44 Some 
wanted to publicise this, but Dalton, Citrine, and Lees-Smith successfully argued that Labour 
would appear unreasonable, regardless of whether it was the more adept course of action. 45 Three 
days later, as Chamberlain leaned towards appeasing Berlin once more, Greenwood entered 
another effective Commons performance in response. He attempted to force the prime minister to 
adopt a tougher stance by now publicly distancing Labour from the government, saying that 'as 
far as we are concerned aggression must stop now ... our determination ... is that these threats, 
46 
menaces and open aggression will come to an end'. Despite Greenwood's taking the reins, 
Attlee - still recuperating in North Wales - ensured that he retained a guiding hand over events at 
this crucial stage, staying in touch with Greenwood via telephone. His own support for 
39 Dalton Diary, 24 August 1939 (p. 283. ) 
0 NEC minutes, 2 September 1939; London News, October 1939. 
41 Dalton Diary, 24 August 1939 (p. 283). 
42 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) Fifth Series (Hansard), vol. 351,24 August 1939, cols. 10-14. 
43 Ibid. 
44 People's History Museum, Manchester, Labour party arcbive, NCL minutes, 25 August 1939. All official 
party records cited in the thesis are located in the Labour party archive. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Hansard, vol. 351,29 August 1939, cols. 110-16 (italics mine). 
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appeasement having long since dissipated, Attlee urged his deputy to pressurise Chamberlain to 
declare war, by now resolved that 'We've got to fight'. 47 
On I September, Chamberlain responded to Labour's tactical shift by formally inviting the party 
to join a coalition under him . 
48 Attlee told Greenwood to refuse the offer and, displaying his usual 
gift for sensing the mood of his followers, advised the acting leader not even to discuss it at 
length, so as to avoid raising any suspicions that it was being considered or that the leaders may 
'betray' Labour 
. 
49 Unsurprisingly, the PLP Executive followed this recommendation and 
unanimously rejected the offer. " Crucial in determining their course so far was thatý whilst Attlee 
and the other leaders were favourable to the notion of coalition and exploiting the war as an 
opportunity to secure office, they were adamant that they would not serve under Chamberlain 
personally, the man they considered responsible for the crisis. A strong mutual antipathy had long 
51 existed between Chamberlain and the PLP. Chamberlain, particularly, held a low opinion of the 
MPs on the other side of the Commons and their 'pathetic' leaders, and was far from shy about 
expressing this publiely. 12 Labour consequently reviled him. Attlee, in his own words, 'detested' 
53 the prime minister, who treated Labour 'like dirt'. This would comeback to haunt Chamberlain 
during what remained of his premiership. Labour MPs doubtless took a certain pleasure in the 
discomfiture of a man who they knew thought little of them, and there was a distinct element of 
revenge in the party's attitude, something that reached its crescendo with their final, fatal strike 
on him the following May. Further, to go in so soon would sacrifice Labour's leverage -a 
stronger bargaining position could be held outside the administration than bound within it. The 
party's stance was thus one of 'patriotic detachment', for a weak position in the government 
54 
would not be worth possessing. By staying out in this manner, Labour was not associated with 
the government's failures, affording it a credibility that could be exploited in coalition 
negotiations at a later date. 
47 John Swift, Labour in Crisis: Clement Attlee and the Labour party in Opposition, 1931-1940 
(Basingstoke, 200 1), p. 119. 
48 NEC minutes, I September 1939. 
49 Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 166. 
50 Dalton Diary, 6 September 1939 (p. 297). 
51 Ibid. 
52 See, for example, Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain papers, Chamberlain to Ida 
Chamberlain, 26 Feb 1938. Robert Self s editions provide abundant examples of his views. 53 Clem Attlee: The Granada historical records interview (London, 1967), p. 17. In the same interview, 
Attlee commented that 'I thought the man [Chamberlain] was no good. I thought he was absolutely useless 
for foreign affairs'. 
54 Being given the 'Secretaryship of State for Latrines' was Dalton's judgement on Labour's prospects at 
this stage - Dalton Diary, 6 September 1939 (p. 297). 
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Whether the leaders could succeed in restraining the Labour party while strengthening their 
bargaining position - the balancing-act which was now in the offing - remained an open question. 
The continued importance of personal conflict among the Labour leaders was again apparent, 
however, in that part of Dalton's opposition to Chamberlain's offer in fact stemmed from his 
continuing hostility to Attlee. Dalton asserted that one of the arguments against coalition was that 
55 'it is not as if our present 'leaders' were supermen capable of wielding vast influence'. Atajoint 
meeting of the NEC and PLP Executive on 2 September, Morrison took a significant role for the 
first time in introducing, and vigorously arguing, a motion that Labour notjoin the current 
government. 56 It is surprising that Morrison had not taken the opportunity offered by Attlee's 
absence to focus more attention upon his own leadership abilities. But given the crisis, he was just 
as concerned with governing London - where he had a serious task to perforin - as with party 
politics. Nevertheless, his proficiency as a political operator was still evident in that his motion 
was simultaneously a further blow to Chamberlain's position, whilst leaving the party free to 
enter another government in the future. The meeting decided that Greenwood should stress 
immediately to Chamberlain, and later in the upcoming Commons debate, the necessity of 
57 honouring the treaty with Poland. Labour was now advocating war. 
The following day, Greenwood followed both this, and Attlee's earlier instructions, by leaving in 
ruins Chamberlain's final cffort to avoid declaring war. The government's meek response to the 
invasion of Poland had brought no response from Hitler, and the prime minister seemed to be 
wavering towards further appeasement. Amidst much hostility to such a course in the House, 
when Greenwood got up to follow Chamberlain, the Conservative anti-appeaser Leo Amery 
famously shouted across to him 'Speak for England, ArthurP Greenwood entered a performance 
that has been described as the highpoint of his carcer. '8 He again distanced Labour from the 
government, saying that the party was 'perturbed' by Chamberlain's latest statement and 
demanded that Britain 'must march with the French ... the die is cast', refusing to afford the prime 
minister any room for compromise . 
59 Following this rebuff and with his options having run out, 
Chamberlain finally declared war the following day. 60 Conservative uncertainty and Hitler 
55 Dalton Diary, 25 August 1939 (pp. 2834). 
56 NEC minutes, 2 September 1939. 
57 NEC minutes, 2 September 1939. 
58 Whiting, 'Greenwood', Dictionary ofLabour Biography, p. 89. 
59 Hansard, vol. 351,2 September 1939, cols. 282-3. Cowling believed that Greenwood could have 
'destroyed' Chamberlain's position here. It is certainly conceivable, given the mood of the Commons, that 
if Greenwood had combined his focus upon the international situation with a sustained personal indictment 
of the prime minister and his foreign policy, anti-Chamberlain feeling across the political spectrum could 
have been galvanised to coalesce in early September in a way which ultimately did not occur. Cowling, The 
Impact offfitler, p. 345. 
60 The mood following the outbreak of conflict was not panic but relief. Dalton later recalled that his 
feeling had been 'war at last' - Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945 (London, 1957), 
40 
himself had combined with the Labour party in forcing him to do so. Greenwood had conducted 
his duties with great effectiveness in Attlee's absence, managing the Labour party for four crucial 
months, and his personal standing was now at its height. Such ajudgement is perhaps coloured by 
the gravity of the situation and Amery's emotive plea, focusing all resistance to Chamberlain 
upon Greenwood's shoulders. Yet this only confirms the manner in which Greenwood had 
embodied the mood of the political nation in the debate. Up to this pointý Labour's 'Big Four' had 
played a largely secondary role in attending to Labour's course. Bevin was uninvolved, not being 
an MP, while Attlee was ill. Further, as suggested above, Morrison does not feature heavily in the 
available documentary material; though it seems likely that he was closely involved in decision- 
making, his precise contribution is difficult to assess. He introduced the crucial resolution not to 
join a coalition with Chamberlain at thejoint NEC-PLP meeting, but did not speak in Parliament. 
Though Dalton was more visible at meetings than Morrison, what accrues from an examination of 
events thus far is an impression that it was Greenwood who acted as Labour's leading figure in 
61 
the days surrounding the outbreak of war. Moreover, in Dalton's not unbiased opinion, he was 
doing the job 'better than poor little Rabbit (Attlee) ever did' . 
62 In his contacts with the 
government performances in Parliament, and conduct at party meetings, Greenwood had carried 
out a difficult balancing-act, at once striking at the detested Chamberlain, whilst still defining 
Labour's position as being one of support for military action and setting out the party's stall for 
eventual coalition. 
Following the declaration of war, Greenwood immediately announced that Labour's conduct of 
Opposition would be 'constructive', a stance which underlined the party's patriotism while 
implicitly emphasising to Chamberlain the damage that would be inflicted to the government if 
Labour was provoked into a more active Opposition. Before British forces had fired a shot, then, 
Labour's leverage over the administration was extensive. Given how desperately Chamberlain 
wanted Labour to agree to enter a government of 'national unity' in order to protect him against a 
brewing Conservative rebellion, the longer the leadership group resisted the better their 
bargaining position became. It is here worthwhile to link their cautious positioning into that 
which was occurring at the same time within the Conservative party, and gave the efforts of the 
Labour leaders their context. There was nothing inevitable about the fall of Chamberlain, by any 
means: at the outbreak of war, he 'decapitated' the most prominent dissidents within his own 
party, by bringing Churchill and Eden into the government at the Admiralty and Dominions posts 
p. 264. Similar sentiments are expressed in Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan: A Biography, Volume One: 1897- 
1945 (London, 1962), p. 304, and Herbert Morrison, An Autobiography (London, 1960), p. 168; Also see 
Greenwood and Bevan in Hansard on 3 September. 
61 The role of Dalton may, of course, be exaggerated by his diary. Nonetheless the fact that Morrison had 
not been at the centre of events stands. 
62 Dalton Diary, 22 August 1939 (pp. 282-3). 
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respectively. 63 He was forced to do this by the fact that Labour's refusal to be co-opted compelled 
him to look elsewhere to protect his flank. The muzzling of Churchill and Eden, and the absence 
of serious military engagements, may have underpinned the resilience of Chamberlain's position, 
but the prime minister was still perceived as being vulnerable from the outset. Within his own 
party, Lord Salisbury's 'Watching Committee' of MPs and peers alone was almost half of the size 
of the PLP; along with the smaller Eden and Churchill groups, there were already more than forty 
Conservatives actively organised against the prime minister. Many were rebels because their 
opportunities for office were frustrated under Chamberlain. 64 The instability of government 
politics therefore bolstered Labour's position. It has been pointed out that, among 'informed 
people', the lifespan of the government was widely expected to be short; in other words, the fall 
of Chamberlain was always considered to be a distinct possibility. 65 The imperative for the prime 
minister to avoid Labour coming out energetically against him is clear; as a result, as soon as the 
conflict began, liaison arrangements were established between Labour and Whitehall 
departments. 66 
The policy of 'constructive Opposition' was at the core of the str-ategy pursued by Labour's 
leaders during the eight month 'phoney war'. It enabled them to depict themselves as patriotic 
and responsible while making a power-play; it also allowed them to demand loyalty and 
obedience from the party itself. Irrespective of the personal conflicts between them, the party's 
senior figures were in agreement on the way forward - and thus began the process of binding 
their followers within a political straitjacket. The second element of the party's chosen trajectory 
was the immediate negotiation by Greenwood and the government Chief Whip of an electoral 
'truce' for the duration of the war, so as to prevent partisan politics derailing national unity. In the 
event of by-elections, the party that previously held the seat would be unopposed by the other. 
Again, the perception of Greenwood as Labour's leading figure at this time is striking. Despite 
some dissension, he won the backing of the NEC for the policy. 67 In agreeing not to contest 
Conservative seats, the leadership had further strengthened Labour's hand - as shown by Attlee's 
stressing that the truce could be terminated at any time . 
68 This also helped to quell the internal 
63 Witherell, 'Watching Committee', p. 114 1. 
64 Paul Addison, 'Political change in Britain, September 1939-May 1940', Oxford D. Phil thesis (1972), 
P, 340. 
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-and-f discontent that accumulated over the issue Attlee asserted to the rank He that the truce had 
been 'forced upon us' by the war, intimating that he had not wanted it. 70 In reality, however, the 
agreement was another valuable bargaining chip. 
A clear party management strategy, and convergent plan to secure the leaders power at an 
opportune moment, was therefore developing. Much of the Labour party would doubtless have 
preferred vigorous Opposition, but the course plotted by its leaders reflected a more pragmatic 
reading of political realities, the danger facing the country, and a calculation of future advantage. 
If the leadership had permitted Labour to attack the administration's every initiative, they would 
have appeared unpatriotic. They were hence faced with the task of ensuring only 'constructive' 
Opposition, while retaining their freedom of action to move quickly if circumstances changed. 
This policy was adhered to until the formation of the Coalition, and has been described by Brooke 
as a 'stasis' . 
71 It was a combustible strategy which could easily have failed -a Labour revolt 
against this careful balancing of competing tensions was always a serious possibility - but one 
prosecuted with efficiency. Moreover, it was a consciously pursued plan, and, rather than simply 
drifting, the Labour leaders were indeed thinking about office, but they refused to join the current 
government and sought to maximise their strength in the interim. The strategy orchestrated by the 
leaders can be illustrated by quoting from some of the rhetoric they employed: in an anonymous 
Political Quarterly article by one of the leaders, Labour was advised to bide its time until the war 
situation exposed the government's failures to its own backbenchers, advocating a policy of 
72 
standing aside while the Conservatives 'committed suicide'. This article made clear that the 
leadership was playing a deliberate waiting game: the party's 'chief objective ... should 
be 
... the 
achievement of a position which can be exploited when hard facts compel the resignation of Mr. 
73 Chamberlain', whilst 'a frontal attack ... would be ... politically foolish'. From their language and 
behaviour, it seems apparent that the party's senior figures had carefully hedged their bets, 
adopting a position that enabled them to strike different poses to each of their three audiences: the 
Labour party, the parliamentary Conservatives, and the public. Their strategy was based upon a 
'studied moderation of language'. 74 Thus, even before May 1940, the party held a degree of 
influence much greater than its parliamentary representation would imply. The doctrine they had 
established, the type of language it used, and the things it demanded, was an instrumental one. 
69 There was constant opposition to it which persisted until its end six years later. Bevan, for example, 
denounced the truce as a 'voluntary totalitarianism' which would destroy Labour - Tribune, 26 January 
1940. 
70 Attlee papers, box 2, 'Your constituencies in wartime: An interview with the Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee', The 
Labour Candidate: Journal ofthe society ofLabour candidates (Winter 1939). 
71 Brooke, Labour's War p. 37. 
72 'Politicus', 'Labour and the War', Political Quarterly, 10 (1939), pp. 477-88. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hansard, vol. 351,21 September 1939, col. 1103. 
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1 75 The New Statesman described this as 'power without responsibility. Thiswas applied in a 
negative sense but, in factý precisely the opposite was true: Labour publicly behaved 'responsibly' 
whilst distancing itself from the government and preparing to exact a heavy price for consenting 
to enter a coalition. This state of affairs underlines the manner in which they exploited the 
opportunities of war to effect a realignment of the political environment. Labour did indeed 
exercise 'power without responsibility'. 
III 
Yet the fact that Labour's senior figures had imposed a particular course upon their followers did 
not mean that it went unchallenged. Very quickly, the first rebellion against their authority 
erupted over the question of 'peace aims'. This inaugurated a pattern which would be repeated 
until 1945: forced into inactivity, the restless mass of the Labour party would time and again seize 
upon all things symbolic as a means of airing their grievances. Moreover, with Attlee's continued 
political isolation, when he returned to his duties, the months of September-November 1939 were 
to represent the make-or-break period for his leadership. 
Greenwood had performed what Brooke terms an 'exemplary'job of leading Labour though the 
76 
crisis, and had been a more commanding parliamentary presence than Attlee. Consequently, in 
September, Dalton abruptly shifted his support away from Morrison and began agitating instead 
for Greenwood to assume the leadership, instigating a disruptive campaign which continued until 
November. In mid September, Dalton informed Greenwood that 'as things are, I am in favour of 
77 [you] being leader' and that Attlee was not 'big enough or strong enough'. He also told 
Greenwood that he would no longer back Morrison . 
78 The only explanation Dalton offered was 
that Morrison had 'sacrificed major things to minor things', which is presumably a reference to 
the latter's concentration upon the LCC . 
79 That Dalton was so fickle in transferring his support to 
Greenwood, who just months he denounced as a 'scandal', is evidence that his motivation was 
simply desperation to get rid of Attlee. Greenwood made no recorded comment on Dalton's 
proposal. It is doubtful be would have been even considering the possibility before his rise over 
the preceding months. Despite his new prominence, though, it seems unlikely that he could really 
have defeated Attlee, who retained the allegiance of the union MPs that had backed him four 
years earlier and protected him in June. It does not seem plausible that th e leader's support would 
75 Now Statesman, 4 May 1940. 
76 Brooke, Labour's War, p. 40. 
77 Dalton Diary, 18 September 1939 (pp. 301-2). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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have dissipated so far as to award his job to someone similarly lacking in charisma. Dalton's 
dismissive complaints again betray a failure to recognise Attlee's proficiency as a political 
operator -a proficiency that would soon be employed to isolate and embarrass both Dalton and 
Morrison. 
As it was, Attlee finally resumed his duties in late September. " Doubts persisted about his health, 
however, and some still wanted a new leader. He was thus faced with a situation quite different to 
the one he had left in May. Attlee's position was under serious threat and he was isolated. His 
sole advantage was provided by the fact that his detractors were divided as to who should replace 
him. In addition, upon his return he had to contend with the first internal split of the war. At the 
NEC meeting on 150' September, Laski circulated a memorandum entitled 'Labour's Peace 
Aims', advocating that the party publish a formal statement of what it hoped to achieve from the 
war. 81 Greenwood argued against this, whilst Dalton similarly sought to restrain Laski by moving 
a motion that the Executive publish a pamphlet containing various existing statements, and that 
Laski's suggestion be submitted to the International subcommittee to consider - an adept usage of 
Labour's institutional apparatus to bury the suggestion and a tactic which was to be employed 
frequently throughout the war. 82 Both the leaders and the TUC were reluctant to set out peace 
aims explicitly, aware that Labour could be restricted in its post-war policy. Nonetheless, the 
memorandum represented the beginning of a long effort by Laski to secure an official declaration, 
precipitating recurrent difficulties for the leaders. The peace aims question quickly became highly 
symbolic to a party frustrated by its political straitjacket. It thus developed into a combustible 
situation for a leadership group already embarked upon a precarious course. The leaders were 
wary of the rebellious Laski making electorally damaging statements, and thus insisted on the 
vetting of all documents worked on by him. 83 Attlee, Dalton and Morrison tasked themselves with 
this role. 84 The effort to keep Laski on a short leash, however, did not stifle the dissent that 
rapidly accumulated over the issue. 
In the Commons on 3 October, Attlee sidestepped the controversy, saying vaguely that 'we shall 
85 
require deeds, and not merely words, before we get any substantial basis for peace'. The 
following week, during a debate about the British refusal of German peace feelers, the leader 
finally acted to quell the dissension and adopted a position entailing rejection of a peace that 
allowed Hitler to keep his gains, whilst still refraining from any discussion of policy specifics. 
go He chaired the NEC meeting on the 29th -NEC minutes, 29 September 1939. 8' NEC minutes, 15 September 1939. 82 Ibid. 
83 NEC minutes, 15 September 1939. 
" Ibid. 
85 Hansard, vol. 351,3 October 1939, cols. 1862. 
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Attlee took a firm stance, telling the Commons that 'we must with resolution pursue this struggle' 
and that Hitler's word was 'utterly worthless' . 
16 It was an efficient performance in his bid to 
suppress the issue and reassert his disputed authority. On the same day, the unions decided they 
were now opposed to any elucidation of aims at all. 87 This was backed by the NEC and PLP 
88 Executive. The upper echelons of the Labour movement had resolved to close down internal 
discourse on the sub ect altogether. j 
Yet, within days, it became evident that the clamour would not subside, as almost forty local 
parties requested a statement of peace aims. 89 The NEC decided that Attlee should make a public 
speech on the matter, finally consenting to set out Labour's position, but agreeing that he should 
do so in as broad a sense as possible. 90 This speech was made on 8 November, and concentrated 
upon the kind of Europe that the party would like to see emerge, but remained suitably vague. 91 
Moreover, Attlee cleverly threw a sop to anti-militarist sentiment in giving no indication that a 
war might actually have to be fought. 92 It was turned into a pamphlet and published in December 
as Labour's Peace, 4ims. 93 The leadership also adroitly utilised Laski's popularity - he had 
topped the poll in the election to the NEC constituencies section at the Conference - to help bring 
their followers into line, tasking him with writing a separate pamphlet, emphasising in emotive 
language Labour's commitment to removing the conditions that facilitated the rise of Nazism. 94 
The leadership were more willing to be explicit about their intentions when they used the 
pamphlet to again publicly rule outjoining the Chamberlain govermnent. 95 Other than this, 
though, Laski's pamphlet remained unspecific. As his biographers have observed, it was 
essentially a balloon sent up by the leadership group, exploiting his popularity but committing 
them to no particular course of action. 96 Not for the last time, Laski's name was associated with 
their policies. These events underline once again the nature of the leadership group's employment 
of language and the doctrine they were constructing. The entire episode - from the initial attempts 
to restrain Laski, Attlee's speeches, and the eventual decision that they would have to say 
something - was all determined by an intention to appease a restless party while preserving their 
own freedom of action. 
86 Hansard, vol. 352,12 October 1939, cols. 568-70. 
97 Warwick University Archive, Trades Union Council papers, Trades Union General Council minutes, 12 
October 1939. 
8'NCL minutes, 20 October 1939. 
89 NEC minutes, 25 October 1939. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Burridge, British Labour andHiller's War, p. 33. 92 Ibid. 
93 C. R. Attlee, Labour's Peace, 4ims (London, 1939). 
94 1939 LPACR, p. 274; Harold Laski, The Labour Party, the War and the Future (London, 1939). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Kramnick and Sheerman, Laski, p. 416. 
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Though Labour's senior figures co-operated in ensuring their continued ascendancy, nonetheless 
events quickly reverted to the power struggles between them. The questions over Attlee's 
performance had not been resolved during the summer and now - with the situation complicated 
further by the sudden emergence of Greenwood - the conflict erupted again. The persistent 
uncertainty over the leadership was destabilising, and hence had to be resolved one way or 
another. Building for months, this challenge amounted to the crucial test of Attlee's position. The 
weakened leader either had to see off his enemies or face defeat. At the same time as Attlee was 
attempting to sidestep the peace aims controversy and re-establish his grip over his followers, 
Dalton's effort to replace him was gathering pace. The leader's effective curtailment - at least for 
the moment - of the peace aims issue had not silenced his critics. Moreover, as we have seen, in 
an atmosphere of national emergency his style of leadership was not appreciated by those who 
favoured a more dominating character at the helm. This culminated in a leadership challenge in 
November, orchestrated largely by Dalton, who, in his desire to remove Attlee, dragged 
Greenwood and Morrison into a poorly organised initiative which only had the effect of retrieving 
Attlee's position. Given the destruction of the PLP minutes, our main source of evidence for this 
episode is Dalton's diary, although much is corroborated in memoirs. With his increased standing 
and popularity, Greenwood now appeared to some the candidate best placed to defeat Attlee, and 
there was speculation in the press that he could win a leadership contest if one was held. 97 Yet 
even Dalton admitted that internal support for replacing Attlee had evaporated following his 
return, despite the fact that he remained 'much below even his own ... par'. 
98 Greenwood had, 
however, attained a new level of respect over the preceding five months. Dalton thus continued 
his bid to press the deputy leader to challenge Attlee, telling him that he was 'the only possible 
change', as well as expressing this opinion to numerous MPs in an effort to generate 
momentum. 99 Greenwood was, 'as usual, dilatory in decision' but the fact that he did not dismiss 
the idea suggests he was at least open to the possibility. 100 He was perhaps weighing his options, 
but his prospects were scotched in that no other prominent figure came out in support, and days 
passed with rumour and speculation spreading throughout the party, but no action taken. '01 
Although Dalton attempted to start a petition requesting Greenwood to run, this quickly 'petered 
out' - indicating once again a lack of enthusiasm for replacing Attlee. ' 02 
97 See, for example, News Reviaw, 19 October 1939. 
9" Dalton Diary, 'November 193 9' (pp. 311-13). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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The shift in Dalton's support was based upon a calculation that, due to Morrison's reduced role in 
recent months, the man widely considered the inevitable successor 'would not at this stage be in 
the running. ' 103 It does seem at least plausible that circumstances might have converged in late 
1939 to push Morrison into third place in a ballot. Greenwood was more popular than ever before, 
while Morrison had not been particularly visible. Moreover, Dalton himself was mooted as a 
candidate, which would certainly siphon off some support from Morrison's natural base. 
Nonetheless, the conversion of Dalton to Greenwood may not have been complete. He desired to 
get rid of Attlee and would back anyone who could accomplish this, but he was also amenable to 
the possibility of replacing Greenwood with Morrison at a later date. 104 Dalton, like Morrison in 
June, knew that the PLP as it was comprised - dominated by the union MPs that Attlee had won 
over during the Parliament of 1931-5 - simply would not elect Morrison, and therefore believed 
that there would have to be a substantial change in its membership before Morrison could ascend 
to the top. 105 The ramifications for the next sixteen years of Labour history if Morrison had come 
third, and hence would no longer have been viewed as the automatic successor, are readily 
apparent. 
But with Greenwood's inaction and the petition failing to generate momentum, it seemed that 
Dalton's efforts would come to naught. Yet, just as it appeared that there would not be a 
challenge after all, Alfred Edwards, a backbench MP, wrote to Dalton, Greenwood, and Morrison, 
asking them to permit their names to go forward in a contest. 106 Morrison was the only one who 
replied - Dalton and Greenwood did not, and perhaps silence would have been more astute on 
Morrison's part as well. His reply, though aimed at protecting his flank from accusations of 
disloyalty, effectively scuppered his chances before the election had even been declared. 
Attempting to retain his freedom of action to move in on a weakened Attlee, Morrison wrote that 
he personally did not want a ballot, but emphasised 'I should have to reconsider this if a contest 
were forced from another quarter'. 107 If Morrison had said no more, the continuing speculation 
may have precipitated a leadership election. As it was, the clumsiness suggested by his 
biographers, which affected him whenever he came close to reaching the summit of his 
ambitions, struck. In the letter, Morrison needlessly re-iterated that he reserved the right 'to 
accept nomination at any time'. 108 This was a mistake, betraying his object too readily. Most 
damaging to his chances of provoking a contest, however, was that he rather foolishly went on to 
comment that he did not feel 'that there is a general or substantial desire [in the PLP] to 
'03 Ibid. 
'04 Ibid. 
'05 Ibid. 
106 Dalton papers, 516 (3) (5), Alfred Edwards letter to Dalton, 9 November 1939. 
107 Dalton papers, copy of Morrison letter to Alfred Edwards, II November 1939. 
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reconsider the matter at thisjuncture5.109 He sent copies of the reply to Attlee, Dalton and 
Greenwood, but Morrison had effectively closed the door on a contest. His need to avoid the 
charge of plotting is obvious, but he had made a misjudgement nonetheless, effectively 
precluding any of the others making a move which would provide him with an opportunity to 
exploit. 
At the PLP on 15 November, it became apparent that all three potential challengers had been 
nominated against Attlee, probably by Edwards. 110 In the discussion that ensued, amid many 
'expressions of gentlemanly good will' - an indication that no one was prepared to make the first 
strike -Attlee took the initiative and moved decisively to outmanoeuvre his opponents. 
"' In an 
adroit display, he rose and stated that he did not regard an alternative nomination for the 
leadership as 'disloyal'. 112 Of course, once he had said this, any challenge would appear precisely 
that! The leader had acted effectively, if belatedly, to preserve his position. There was little sense 
in forcing a contest if Attlee could not be defeated, which, once he had called his opponents' 
bluff, seemed likely. Greenwood was surely aware that his internal strength was less than it 
seemed. More importantly, given Morrison's status as the assumed heir apparent, some MPs who 
actually favoured Greenwood might have switched to Attlee in order to stop Morrison, as they 
had four years earlier. Accordingly, Greenwood told the assembled MPs that he would withdraw 
his candidature. 113 
With Greenwood's retreat, there was no possibility of the other two candidates forcing a contest 
without provoking accusations of putting ambition before party and country. Even Dalton knew 
better than to close in on Attlee, and he and Morrison were left with little choice but to withdraw 
their names as well. ' 14 Attlee, then, had played a political masterstroke in seeing off his 
adversaries in such a fashion. The challenge to him had been aborted before a vote was even 
taken, for the statement that he would not consider alternative candidates disloyal put irresistible 
pressure on the three nominees to emphasise their loyalty. Moreover, having been absent for four 
months perhaps helped him to deflect the challenge, for the fact that he had not been at the centre 
of events meant that the onus was upon his enemies to force a contest. With their target absent, 
Dalton and others lacked a publicly-acceptable reason to trigger an election that would not be 
109 Ibid. 
110 Dalton Diary, 'November 1939' (pp. 312-13). Dalton's account suggests that he did not know 
beforehand that his name had gone forward. It seems likely the same could be said for Greenwood and 
Morrison. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Dalton, Memoirs, p. 281. 
113 Dalton Diary, 'November 193 9' (pp. 312-13). 
114 Ibid. 
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viewed as a simple power-grab. Through a combination of quiet skill and the misjudgements of 
his opponents, Attlee had ensured the security of his position once more. Having defeated the 
machinations of his rivals, Attlee was now free to direct the strategy of 'constructive Opposition' 
and concentrate upon Labour's crab-like movement towards office. His efforts over the next six 
months were to be focused upon the task of appeasing internal opinion while preparing to enter 
government when more favourable circumstances arose. On 16 November, the day after the 
aborted contest, the leader again imposed himself on his party, entering an impressive 
performance in Parliament in a debate on the war and acting to assuage Labour's discontent by 
calling for the beginning of planning for the eventual peace. ' 15 This new decisiveness represented 
something of a departure from his previous years as leader; with the whiff of office in the air, 
Attlee was now more than willing to take the Labour party by the scruff of the neck and haul it in 
the direction he saw fit. As such, it challenges many enduring perceptions of Attlee as being a 
weak figure. The success of the party's strategy throughout the 'phoney war' was Attlee's 
achievement more than that of anyone else. Morrison, by contrast, had once again failed to 
become leader. The next week he suffered yet another blow to his standing when, having angered 
MPs, he polled poorly in the elections to the PLP Executive. 116 The new strain on his relations 
with Dalton also did not assist in his continuing ambition to replace Attlee. If he was to do so, he 
needed the allegiance of as many senior figures as possible. Morrison had struggled to achieve 
this, and within a year his task would be made still more difficult by the entry of Bevin into 
Parliament, and the formation of the formidable (and essentially anti-Morrison) Attlee-Bevin 
alliance! 17 In backing away from an overt challenge, as he was to do on so many occasions 
between 1935 and 1955, Morrison had not possessed the courage - or was too astute - to cross his 
personal Rubicon. 
IV 
It is here appropriate to cast our analytical net more widely. Though, as we have seen, Labour's 
most senior figures played key roles during the first phase of the war, it must also be stressed that 
previously middle-ranking figures emerged to play a crucial part in the guidance of the party. As 
such they too assumed a central role. Greenwood, as already discussed, was the most important, 
becoming Labour's leading political figure from May 1939. Moreover, even upon Attlee's return, 
115 Hansard, vol. 353,16 November 1939, cols. 876-8. 
116 Greenwood's status was seemingly undamaged by the episode, but Morrison and Dalton were to pay a 
heavy price. In the elections to the PLP Executive held the next week, Morrison's position in the poll fell 
from first place (which he had retained since 1936) to eighth, while Dalton fell from third to tenth - David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000 (eighth edition) (London, 
2000), p. 152. 
117 Dalton did immediately scurry to try and repair his relations with Morrison, sending him a note which 
stated 'The way of earth shifters is hard in this political allotment and I am not inclined to do any more 
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he remained publicly more visible than. the leader, for example constantly pressing the 
government in the Commons. But of equal relevance, however, was the work carried out by Lees- 
Smith and Pethick-Lawrence. From the outset the two became the key figures in Labour's House 
of Commons representation and the day-to-day running of the PLP - being even more prominent 
than Greenwood in that respect - bearing considerable burdens and overseeing the transaction of 
parliamentary business. Thus, whilst more senior figures occupied themselves with the most vital 
task of navigating their way towards office, Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence stepped into the 
breach and got on with the job of keeping the party functioning and ensuring its acquiescence to 
that strategy. The roles played by the two have been overlooked by historians, but were to place 
them at the forefront of events in the PLP until Lees-Smith's death in 1941 and, in Pethick- 
Lawrence's case, until the end of the war. "8 They generally spoke in the Commons every day, 
usually several times, and though neither was a compelling orator they were well-respected and 
competent! 19 Taking on the leading role in running the party, Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence 
performed an important task which, from late 1939, effectively amounted to a system of dual 
leadership. The basis for the two men being left in charge of the PLP when the Churchill 
Coalition was formed thus quickly took shape. The two acted as partners, but Lees-Smith was 
seemingly the senior of the two; it was he who usually followed the government speaker in 
important debates. 120 After Attlee's return from illness, when the leader was not present in the 
Commons it was not his deputy, Greenwood, who led Labour in debate, but Lees-Smith. In the 
country, Lees-Smith and Pcthick-Lawrence possessed no real stature, and were not even 
important figures within Labour itself beyond the PLP. Neither was a member of the NEC. But, 
within Westminster, the two mattered. Performing the unglamorous and laborious parliamentary 
'donkey-work', their new role in managing the party permitted the leadership group to focus their 
energies elsewhere. 
But these were not the only middle-ranking individuals for whom the war created significant 
opportunities; another was Shinwell. Perhaps the most prominent rebel figure in the party at the 
outbreak of war, and who would go on to become the leadership group's most bitter enemy once 
they entered office, his career trajectory over the initial period described here is revealing both 
about political priorities and his subsequent feud with his leaders. In September 1939, Shinwell 
immediately ceased all his rebellious behaviour and instead became studiously moderate in a 
sudden about-turn. Even his vituperative feud with Dalton - the latter usually calling Shinwell 
1 'a The two men have received scant attention in the existing literature. For example, Addison, Brooke, and 
Jefferys have all virtually ignored them. 
119 Their speeches read as cohesive and well-ordered. Subjects that they spoke on in this period included 
emergency powers over local authorities, war damage compensation, pensions, mortgages, personal injury, 
trading with the enemy and many more. 
120 This was the case even when Morrison and Dalton were present. 
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'Shinbad the Tailor' in his diary -was restrained. However, this chameleon-like shift, and 
abandonment of the image of being an ideological firebrand, was motivated not by patriotism or 
crisis but simple ambition. Shinwell was angling for a role in the coalition which he believed 
would eventually be formed, and thus set about laying out his claim to a post. Thejob he sought 
was the Ministry of Shipping, an area close to his heart and in which he had considerable 
expertise. 121 Pursuing this role, Shinwell was the polar opposite of the public spokesman for the 
party's disaffection that he might be expected to have become, and instead set about servicing his 
ambitions - which he openly admitted were the driving force of his actions. ' 22 Shinwelljoined 
with Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence in doing much of Labour's work in the Commons. 
V 
Following the abortive contest, and with Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence overseeing much of 
the day-to-day work of the party, over the next three months Labour's senior figures began to 
undertake a concerted increase in the pressure they brought to bear upon the government. The 
party's conduct from late 1939 was thus rather different from that adopted during the first months 
of war. Its attacks became more frequent and aggressive, eventually precipitating a trial of 
strength once the fagade of co-operation with Chamberlain became impossible to sustain. Whilst 
this newly combative stance was partly influenced by internal problems, namely the need to 
appease a party disaffected with 'constructive' Opposition and military inaction, the tactic of 
targeting the government more openly was also determined by simple patriotism, and an 
inclination to force a confrontation with a prime minister they reviled. It was given impetus by the 
fact that 'things were turning increasingly against Chamberlain' in his own party, with 
Salisbury's group the 'prime agent' in creating disaffection with the prime minister. 123 Yet, this 
was still balanced by awareness on the part of Attlee that they could not move until an opportune 
moment presented itself. The leaders thus continued to bide their time, unashamedly exerting 
their leverage over Chamberlain, while accumulating political capital to be expended when 
circumstances were fortuitous. In the interim, they persisted in deflecting opposition from their 
ranks by making further denunciations of the government and presenting fresh policy initiatives 
along the lines of the peace aims declaration. 
121 See any Hansard index. Shinwell spoke on shipping on no less than seventy-two occasions between the 
beginning of the war and the formation of the Coalition. 
'22 Emanuel Shinwell, Conflict Without Malice (London, 1955), pp. 146-8; by the same author, I've Lived 
Through It All (London, 1973), p. 16 1. 
123 Cowling, Impact ofHitler, p. 373. 
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Leading for Labour in the debate on the Address on 5 December, Greenwood introduced an 
amendment assailing the Chamberlain ministry for its failure to organise 'to the full our human 
and material resources... [for the] effective prosecution of the war... and for the solution on the 
basis of social justice of the problems which will arise on the return to peace'. ' 24 The amendment 
was another attempt to extract concessions from Chamberlain. Moreover, in complaining about 
both the war effort and planning for peace, Greenwood's speech resonated as much with his own 
party as the prime minister, countering discontent by focusing on a pair of high-profile symbolic 
issues and clashing with the government over them. He charged Chamberlain with having 
dismissed reconstruction planning 'cursorily', and of being 'contemptuous' towards the subject 
while calling for the new, expanded role of the state to be made permanent, saying that 'there can 
be no going back' . 
12' This strategy of stressing the necessity of unity, and then brazenly 
requesting concessions, may not have been subtle, but it worked. The prime minister had little 
choice if he wanted the truce maintained. Such language was useful for emphasising Labour's 
independence while actually committing its leaders to no particular course of action. They had 
also threatened to oppose Chamberlain's attempt to prolong the life of the current Parliament., 26 
Earlier, Shinwell savaged the government's economic co-ordination, whilst explicitly making 
clear that he was posing the most difficult questions at the beginning of the debate so as to allow 
the government time to reply, further evidence that Labour expected to be granted considerable 
influence in return for not breaking with Chamberlain. 127 
But it was Attlee - now reinvigorated by the task before him, and with the advantages that his 
style of leadership would lend to its realisation - who took on the most central role in harassing 
the government. Yet he also confined his critique within certain boundaries and was careful to go 
that far and no further, ensuring that the party as a whole observed those same limitations. His 
Labour's Peace Aims pamphlet was published in December, and in January he made a well- 
received BBC broadcast in which he expertly pushed both sides of his agenda, justifying his 
position in terms of the need to destroy Nazism and advance socialism while - no doubt 
worryingly to Chamberlain - suggesting that heavy criticism of the government was the only 
route to victory. 128 Over this period, Attlee also frequently targeted the ministry in the Commons, 
attacking it over the decision to declare war on behalf of India without consulting that country, 
failures in social provision, inefficiencies in conscription, taxation, and economic organisation, 
124 Hansard, Vol. 355,5 December 1939, cols. 499-506. 
125 Ibid. 
126 HanSard, Vol. 352,17 October 1939, cols. 725-7. 
127 HanSard, Vol. 352,18 October 1939, cols. 905-20. 
128 The Listener, 18 January &8 February 1940. 
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and continued heavy unemployment. 129 He demanded that Chamberlain be 'ruthless' with 
inefficiency and declared that 'If the Ministers cannot get on with theirjobs then we must get 
other Ministers'. 130 The leader displayed little embarrassment in lambasting the government for 
failing to set out peace aims, the issue which be himself was busy attempting to dodge. 131 Attlee's 
assaults were fierce and piled further pressure on the govemment, while acting to counter the 
discontent within the party itself that his own strategy entailed. Using them to constantly chip 
away at Chamberlain, Attlee slowly but surely moved Labour into a strengthened position. 
Simultaneously, Morrison likewise worked to increase the intensity of Labour's public critique, 
becoming a weekly contributor to the Daily Mirror. He covered a diverse range of subjects, and 
32 his tone was decidedly partisan, mounting bellicose attacks on Chamberlain and his ministry. ' 
Though this should again be seen primarily in the context of the leadership group's attempts to 
both undermine Chamberlain and throw a sop to their rank-and-file, nonetheless Morrison also 
used the articles as a platform to begin traversing a private course which he was to follow 
throughout the war. Though this will be demonstrated more fully in later chapters, it is worth 
pointing out here. From 193945, knowing that an overt strike would not be well-received, 
Morrison's attempt to dislodge Attlee was predicated upon his efforts to establish an image of 
himself as more aggressive and partisan than his great rival. He consistently sought to improve 
his own position by producing speeches and writings denouncing the Conservatives and full of 
socialist rhetoric. In doing so, Morrison worked to enhance his popularity and standing by 
adopting a line which appealed to a party disaffected with the restraints into which the leadership 
- particularly Attlee - had placed it, implicitly flagging up the contrast between himself and 
Attlee, Labour'sjailor. In reality, of course, this was pure rhetoric; Morrison was as determined 
as Attlee that the party should be kept in line, and was ruthless in suppressing opposition. But the 
public posture adopted by the heir apparent from late 1939, and which became increasingly 
apparent as the conflict wore on, was to prove Morrison's most useful political tool. 
In February 1940, Bevin joined the fray for the first time by issuing a clear threat to the 
government that if Chamberlain imposed control of labour and wages, 'I will lead the movement 
129 See, for example, Hamard, vol. 355,29 November 1939, cols. 98-9 & 28 November 1939, cols. 16-25; 
vol. 356,16 January 1940, cols. 43-50,31 January 1940, cols. 1221-5, &I February 1940, cols. 1414-22; 
vol. 359,2 April 1940, cols. 44-7 &9 April 1940, cols. 509-10. 
130 Hansard, vol. 358,19 March 1940, cols. 1845-53 
13 1 Hansard, vol. 355,28 November 1939, cols. 16-25. He called peace aims an issue of 'vital importance' 
for it was the 'spirit' of 'free people' that represented the 'master weapon' which would win the war. 
132 See the Daily Mirror from November 1939-May 1940, but Morrison's most aggressive article appeared 
on 30 March 1940. 
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to resist this government' . 
133 As a non-politician, Bevin remained aloof from parliamentary affairs 
and had played little role in events thus far, but nonetheless given his power to engineer industrial 
unrest this threat probably frightened Chamberlain more than anything Labour had done thus far. 
Later that month, the leadership demonstrated their ability to hinder the government by flexing 
their political muscles and forcing thirty-divisions in a two-week period over the Old Age and 
Widow's Pension Bill. 134 
At the same time as the leadership were attacking the government more openly, they still 
reinforced their efforts to appease party opinion with another brazen assertion of their own 
authority. They ordered Labour's pacifists to refrain from publicly criticising the war, and 
employed the widespread disgust at the Soviet invasion of Finland in November as an instrument 
to further isolate anti-militarist sentiment. 135 The leadership thus used the hysteria to entrench the 
primacy of a new interpretation of geopolitics. Attlee and his colleagues played a central role in 
stirring up the agitation over Finland, but certainly did not take their own rhetoric literally, and 
were always opposed to intervention. 136 The move against the pacifists also represents another 
indication of the new confidence with which the Labour leaders directed the party. That they were 
able to move so openly against an important element among their followers suggests that they 
were now able to wield their power virtually unhindered. 137 
Even as they were concentrating on these efforts, however, the question of peace aims continued 
to persist into 1940, finally forcing the leadership to move to seal off this well of disaffection. To 
this end, the party's senior figures continued to try to formulate a suitably explicit statement on 
the issue, and the NEC International sub-committee accepted a draft by Dalton in late January 
1940, referring it to a special meeting of the ftill Executive. ' 38 The NEC, however, still could not 
agree on its contents. Attlee would not accept Dalton's draft on the grounds of unity, feeling it too 
133 Bullock, Bevin, vol. one, p. 644. He spent much of the first part of the war re-negotiating hundreds of 
existing industrial agreements to take account of the circumstances of war. 
134 See Hansard, vol. 358, between 21 February and 4 March 1940. 
135 Dalton condemned the invasion in the Commons as illustrating that democratic nations everywhere were 
coming under assault from totalitarianism, while Greenwood wrote an article criticising Moscow in the 
Daily Herald, and the paper declared that 'The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is dead. Stalin's new 
imperialist Russia takes its place'. The next day it compared Stalin to Genghis Khan. The NCL set up an 
Aid to Finland Fund, and termed Stalin 'Hitler's accomplice' - Hansard, vol. 355,30 November 1939, col. 
291; Daily Herald, 1,4 &5 December 1939; NEC minutes, 25 January 1940. 
136 The National Archive, Kew, FO 800/3 10, Halifax Papers, Noel-Baker to Halifax, 17 February 1940; 
TNA FO 800/3 10, Halifax Papers, Halifax to Chamberlain, 10 February 1940. All government papers cited 
hereafter are, unless noted, located at the TNA. 
137 More information on the fate of the anti-war movement in the party can be found in the present author's 
forthcoming article 'What is Happening in Europe? Sir Richard Stokes and British anti-Communism, 
c. 1939-1951'. 
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divisive. "9 He perhaps also felt little inclination to indulge Dalton given his instigation of the 
leadership challenge the previous November. The meeting resolved that Dalton, Laski and 
Morrison should immediately re-draft the statement . 
140 The NEC met again the next day to 
discuss the new draft, but Attlee remained unhappy, feeling it too aggressive compared to his own 
earlier document, Labour's Peace Aims. 141 Dalton was aggrieved, scathingly dismissing Attlee's 
statement as 'the classic entitled 'The Rabbit's Peace Aims". 142 This mutual antipathy among 
Labour's senior figures again raises questions about their direction of the party. There were 
evidently potent animosities between them, but they did function effectively in a collective sense. 
This achievementý together with their relations more broadly, has never been closely considered, 
amounting to an important deficiency in our understanding of the Labour party's most iconic set 
of leaders. Yetj in the event only D. N. Pritt voted against the new draft, those with reservations 
simply abstaining. 143 The peace aims controversy had dragged on for months already, and needed 
to be resolved; it was prudent to placate the party with some sort of statement. The NEC 
consequently accepted the draft and published it as Labour, the War and he Peace. 144 This 
emphasis upon using policy declarations, literature and other forms of rhetoric was at the very 
core of the leadership group's strategy. As will become clear below, their careful positioning and 
language during the preceding months, and reliance on speeches and declarations, was not a set of 
random statements, but a calculated bid to shape the environment. This document was an explicit 
signal of the ascendancy of the leadership group over their followers. It now made clear that the 
war would have to be fought while still seeking to appease uncertainty by suggesting that the 
conflict would lead to the spread of socialism. 145 Labour, the War and the Peace was more 
detailed than the previous Labour's Peace Aims, and the leadership were to encounter less 
opposition to their strategy once they had made this formal declaration. The leaders buttressed 
this with the organisation of almost forty conferences across the country on 'Peace Aims' over the 
period from Attlee's speech the previous November to the May 1940 Conference. 146 They 
continued with this campaign to counter the frustrations of their followers with other policy 
declarations as well, publishing a veritable flood of literature. In March, Attlee ordered an NEC 
draft on the domestic arena to be re-written, feeling it did not sufficiently stress the line that the 
war had accelerated the advance towards socialism. 147 On this occasion, he re-drafted it himself, 
and it was published the following month as Labour's Home Policy, the Executive intending it as 
139 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 'Middle of February' (p. 318). 
140 NEC minutes 6 February 1940. 
141 NEC minutes, 7 February 1940. 
142 Dalton Diary, 'Middle of February' (p. 318). 
143 NEC minutes, 7 February 1940. 
144 For the full text, see 1940 LPACR, pp. 188-90. 
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146 1940 LPACR, p. 24. 
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a 'comprehensive' statement of domestic policy. 148 The document became the basis for all the 
party's wartime initiatives, and the leader once again employed reassuring socialist language in 
affirming that 'there can be no return to the old order ... the occasion should 
be seized to Jay the 
foundations of a planned economy'. 149 Attlee determinedly fought within the NEC, and overruled 
his subordinates, for language which would resonate with party members, presenting the war as 
an opportunity. ' 50 
Similarly, Greenwood produced a pamphlet entitled Why wefight: Labour's case, declaring the 
necessity for the implementation of socialist planning if Britain's resources were to be utilized 
efficiently. 151 Dalton too played a partý writing a book, Hitler's war. before andafter. 152 This 
displayed to the full its author's pathological anti-Germanism, amounting to the most forceful 
statement of support for the war made by a member of the leadership group since the previous 
September. Laski was again deployed, unwittingly, to guard the flank of his leaders. He was 
tasked with writing another pamphlet, Is this an imperialist war?, his ability to argue in Marxist 
terms making him ideally suited to a propagandist role. ' 53 The pamphlet attacked the Communist 
line and supported the war. In a collection of essays edited by Attlee, Laski also contributed a 
piece championing the link between conflict and social rCforM. 114 The degree of control over 
Laski's involvement in official literature is apparent in that, when he wrote independently, his 
language was rather different, asserting in a New Statesman article, for example, that violent 
revolution might occur if reform was resisted, a line of argument to which Labour's leaders 
would never have assented. 155 In offering these largely symbolic statements to appease their 
followers, the leadership were free to concentrate on their real objectives: the opportunity to enter 
government. As such, their energetic efforts in policy formulation represented a profitable means 
of giving the impression of activity, even if these initiatives in fact amounted to little more than 
mere rhetoric. Aggressive attacks on the government in the Commons, particularly by Morrison, 
also kept the parliamentary party's morale up in early 1940.156 That this combination of literature, 
declarations, and public speeches was itself conceived by Attlee and the other leaders as being the 
substance of their strategy is apparent from the emphasis given to these activities in preparing 
148 NEC minutes, 20 March 1940. For the text of the statement, see 1940 LPACR, pp. 91-5. 
149 Ibid. 
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their report to the annual Conference. 157 Explicitly identifying these measures as the things they 
had spent the phoney war working on, this is clear evidence of how Attlee and the other senior 
figures conceived of their role. 158 The prominence awarded to this by the leadership group 
reinforces one of the central contentions of the thesis of the key role played by such activities and 
the way in which, far from an excuse for inactivity, they had been intended from the outset - to 
provide certain political landmarks to their followers and entrench the leaders' own agenda. As 
such, it underlines the importance of speeches and other calculated rhetoric as tools of party 
management, something commented on by Philip Williamson as the means by which politicians 
shape their environment. 159 
vi 
Having consolidated their grip on the party, Attlee and the rest of Labour's senior figures were 
well-positioned for what turned out to be the final period of the phoney war. Moreover, having 
recovered from a position of seemingly inexorable personal weakness, the months since his return 
had seen Attlee's leadership reinvigorated. In March 1940, it briefly seemed possible that the 
leaders might depart from their strategy, when the possibility arose of the Labour party entering 
the Chamberlain government after all, as rumours began to circulate that the prime minister had 
offered Labour three seats in a reconstructed War Cabinet. 160 At a PLP Executive Committee 
meeting on 9 April, the possibility ofjoining a coalition was discussed. 16' Morrison and 
Greenwood were in favour of going in, but Attlee, by contrast urged caution, and the rest were 
similarly opposed to accepting. 162 Dalton recorded that the mood of the meeting was thatý though 
the party shouldjoin a new government when the time came, to serve under Chamberlain would 
legitimise him. 163 It was decided that Labour should remain in Opposition for the time being but, 
if Chamberlain was removed, the matter would be immediately reconsidcred. 164 The architect of 
Labour's course as it gradually manocuvred to take part in a government was once again not the 
domineering Morrison or Dalton, therefore, but Attlee. There also remained the question of 
whether a special Conference would need to be called in the event of a decision to enter office. 
Greenwood advocated that the upcoming annual Conference be asked to empower the leadership 
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to make such a decision, but Dalton felt that to request this before a decision had actually been 
taken would create suspicion, fuelling fears that the leadership might 'betray' Labour. 165 
Typically, Attlee disagreed with both strategies, bluntly arguing that they should simply accept 
office on their own authority and then present their followers with a fait accompl i. 166 His stance 
demonstrates both a greater awareness of the location of power within Labour and the extent to 
which the leaders could simply act and then carry the party with them. It also reinforces the 
suggestion of Attlee's new decisiveness. The meeting agreed to the leader's suggestion. 167 
Morrison was aggrieved at the decision not to go in immediately, telling Charles Peake, a foreign 
office official, that most of the Labour frontbenchers were 'frightened of power' and would be 
unable to add drive to the government. 168 It has been suggested that Morrison favoured joining the 
government immediately because Chamberlain would regard him, rather than Attlee, as Labour's 
leading parliamentarian, presumably awarding him a more powerful position. 169 
But, shortly thereafter, the military situation altered irrevocably, as the phoney war ended with the 
German invasion of Norway in April. It became obvious that the period of biding time was over, 
prompting Labour's senior figures to increase their attacks - already straining at the limits of 
cconstructive' Opposition - even further. The Watching Committee and Eden's supporters - now 
led by Amery - began to move against Chamberlain, being in 'constant touch with one another', 
and the shift of Conservative support away from the prime minister did much to create the climate 
which brought him down . 
170 Thus, the determination with which the leadership had sought to 
retain their freedom of action vis 6 vis both their followers and the Conservatives began to bear 
fruit. That they had completely captured the political initiative in this contest to see who would 
blink first is reinforced by the complaints of Cuthbert Headlam, the Conservative backbencher, 
that 'The sooner some of these damned Labour people are made tojoin the Cabinet the better', 
while recognising the insurmountable problem that 'the Socialists won't serve under 
Chamberlain'. "' Attlee had established himself as the chief power-broker in British politics, and 
his str-ategy of manoeuvring into a position from which he could, if not blackmail the 
Conservatives, at least effectively dictate terms, had worked. From April, the leadership group 
therefore began to close in on the government. That month the Daily Herald ran a series of 
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articles by senior figures attacking the prosecution of the war. 172 At the beginning of May, as the 
British expedition to Norway foundered, Attlee told Dalton that the moment for action had 
arrived . 
173 However, despite his plotting with Churchill, and the Liberal, Clement Davies - who 
approached him on behalf of the Watching Committee - he still rebuffed the efforts of dissident 
Conservatives to persuade Labour to openly challenge the prime minister. 174 Attlee was resolved 
to resist their efforts to get Labour to make the first move. 175 If Chamberlain was to be displaced, 
Attlee knew, Labour could play a role, but the main challenge would have to come from his own 
party. The leader thus marshalled his own strength and forced the Conservative rebels to be his 
'advance guard' for the attack on Chamberlain. 176 Attlee read the situation better; there is no sign 
that he believed that the Conservatives would dissent from Chamberlain on a large scale, and he 
evidently intended that Labour should refrain from getting into close proximity to them until they 
did. More limited collusion was actively occurring, however. For example, at Churchill's behest, 
Morrison pushed the government to attack German shipping wherever it could be found, 
bolstering the arguments Churchill was advancing within the Cabinet, and bringing further 
pressure to bear on Chamberlain's prosecution of the war. 177 
As the British forces were evacuated from Norway, however, the prime minister finally became 
vulnerable enough to provoke his opponents to seek to remove him. Morrison called for 
Chamberlain's resignation in the press in 'the most bitter indictment' he had ever made, and, on 7 
May, Attlee led the attack in the famous two-day debate on the war. 178 Though it was Amery and 
Lloyd George who landcd the most damaging blows, Attlee openly called for Conservative MPs 
not to support the prime minister, affording government rebels a critical opening to act. 179 
Morrison's own speech so 'staggered' Chamberlain that the prime minister immediately made his 
fateful appeal for the support of his 'friends' -a personalising of the issue which quickly proved 
a mistake given the emergency facing the country. 180 It is clear that the Labour leadership were 
determined to see Chamberlain fall; yet, from the outset, they had wisely practised caution and 
adhered to their strategy, refusing to rush in and instead strengthening their own position. Given 
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the willingness of Morrison and Greenwood to go into government in March, this is again 
testimony to the patience of the leader himself. Attlee's view had always been that 'Chamberlain 
will have to go', but he ensured that the party properly prepared the ground for the achievement 
of their objectives, rather than prematurely going into either coalition or alliance with the rebel 
Conservatives at the first opportunity. ' 81 
Many accounts of the downfall of the Chamberlain government have been supplied elsewhere, 
and do not need to be reiterated here. Yet Attlee's deft leadership, guiding Labour through a 
dangerous and fluid situation, undermines the belief of many contemporaries that he was unsuited 
to being leader, as well as calling into question prevailing historiographical views of this period. 
An analysis of events since the beginning of the conflict conveys the impression that it was 
Attlee, more than any other figure, that was responsible for Labour's exploitation of the crisis and 
the opportunities of war. At a meeting of the PLP Executive on 8 May, there was disagreement on 
whether to force a division on the government's motion for adjournment, essentially amounting to 
a vote of censure. 182 But, as Addison has recognised, Attlee saw the opportunity to now 
consolidate with the Conservative dissidents and achieve a large anti-Chamberlain vote. 183 This 
offered the best prospect of forcing the prime minister's resignation, as well as a boost to 
Labour's potential strength in office if it now suddenly placed itself at the centre of events. 
Consequently, he argued in favour of a division, and was supported by the majority. '" Smart's 
suggestion that Attlee 'had to be prodded into displaying any killer instinct' thus seems difficult 
to sustain, and a misreading of the leader. '" Morrison, unsurprisingly, was similarly keen to 
effect a change in the political situation by dividing the Commons. ' 86 A minority, including 
Dalton and Pethick-Lawrence, were opposed, fearing that it would only entrench Chamberlain. 187 
Yet they were outvoted, and the ftill PLP backed the strategy. " It is unclear whether the decision 
to divide the House belonged primarily to Attlee or Morrison. Morrison later wrote that it was he 
who persuaded his colleagues to do so, suggesting that they were 'bemused' by the 'shock of the 
idea'. '8' Attlee, however, also claimed credit, asserting that his rival had in fact been reluctant. 190 
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Regardless, deprived of the support of many of his backbenchers in the division lobby, and with 
Labour having finally struck at him, Chamberlain's position was untenable. 191 While it is evident 
that his fate was sealed by the withdrawal of substantial Conservative support, the point is that the 
position which Attlee had crafted for Labour was a strong one. Rather than plunging into alliance 
with the Conservative rebels, the leadership group ensured that Labour stood back and let others 
make the first move. From the outset, the Labour leaders had refrained from expending their hard- 
won political capital. They may have had little choice in 1939 but to adopt a strategy based upon 
'wait and see', but that did not mean that they would play a weak hand so adeptly. Thus, the 
powerftil position that Labour received in May 1940 did not simply drop into its lap. This course 
could easily have come to grief, not least because of the resentment their caution engendered 
within the party. Dalton recorded that Labour was 'steadily hardening' to the idea of entering a 
coalition, and that the party would 'go in with both feet if [the] necessary personal demolitions 
192 [the removal of Chamberlain and his inner circle] are affected'. On 9 May, Attlee and 
Greenwood met the prime minister and were 'very rude' in yet again rejecting his overtures to 
join the government, the leader telling Chamberlain that 'our party will not serve under you, nor 
does the country want you'. 193 They did agree, however, to go to the annual Conference, then in 
session in Bournemouth, and ascertain whether Labour would serve under someone other than 
Chamberlain . 
194 'Until that moment he thought he could hang on', Attlee recalled. 195 Far from 
being 'puzzling', this itself, of course, wasjust another manoeuvre by the leader - as made clear 
above, Attlee had no intention of asking for permission from his party, and had decided weeks 
ago that he would simply accept office on his own authority whenever he saw fit. 196 
If the phoney war had not come to an end, the Conference would likely have witnessed a clash 
over the policy of 'constructive' Opposition. The disaffection within the party had been 
effectively contained but had not dissipated, and would no doubt have erupted. The rank-and-file, 
later vocal denunciations of Chamberlain were a case of selective memory, nonetheless this assertion is not 
consistent with any of the available evidence about Attlee's behaviour beforehand. Perhaps more Rely is 
that the possibility was simply discussed, and the leader's non-committal personality gave a misimpression 
to someone - See Laurence Thompson, 1940 (London, 1966), p. 86; also Smart, National Government, 
222. ý' Attlee later recalled his pleasure at seeing 'Conservative MP afler Conservative MP' abandon 
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193 See L. Thompson papers, Attlee to Thompson, 18 December 1964, cited Donoughue and Jones, 
Morrison, p. 273; Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 174. See also the Attlee interview with Williams 
on this in A Prime Minister Remembers, pp. 32-3, which follows this account almost exactly, as well as the 
Granada Historical Records Interview, p. 2 1. 
194 Attlee papers, 1/ 16, autobiographical notes. 
195 Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 174. 
196 Smart, National Government, p. 221. 
62 
keen to go onto the attack, remained hostile to the electoral truce. 197 Most significantly, one 
quarter of all resolutions submitted to the Conference were in opposition to the policy. '9' What 
the consequences of an open breach would have been are unknowable; as it was, the German 
attack was timely for Attlee and the others. The NEC decided unanimously that Labour would in 
factjoin a coalition, but only under someone other than Chamberlain! " This was the final blow 
to the prime minister, and whilst his downfall had been facilitated by his own backbenchers, it 
was Labour that finally forced him from office. The NEC also agreed that the Conference should 
be informed of the leadership's decision to enter the government, rather than a recommendation 
to do so, presenting the action simply for symbolic endorsementý not authorisation . 
200 This was 
the fait accompli that Attlee had advocated the previous month. Labour's leader clearly had few 
qualms about wielding his authority in such a manner, regardless of what his party thought. The 
Executive tasked him and Greenwood with returning to London to infonn the prime minister of 
the decision, and Chamberlain immediately resigned . 
201 Attlee then met with his successor, 
Churchill, and quickly agreed upon the distribution of offices in the new ministry. With two seats 
in a five member War Cabinet, the extent of Attlee's success in engineering a strong position for 
Labour in the Coalition is immediately apparent; moreover, this was a product of the strategy of 
biding time that he had advanced since the beginning of the war. While perhaps on the surface his 
direction of Labour gave an impression of inactivity, in reality it created the basis for a very 
favourable deal from the Conservatives. The other members of the leadership group had not 
played a central role in the formation of the government. Bevin was not present at Conference - 
although he told Attlee that he concurred with his decision - and Dalton and Morrison remained 
in Bournemouth. 202 Instead, the crucial decisions were taken by Attlee himself 
Some members of the NEC were reticent over entry, chiefly due to the fact that Chamberlain was 
to remain in the War Cabinet. 203 Morrison, particularly, was unsure, stating that he was not 
inclined to join the government after al 1.204 He told the meeting that 'this didn't sound like a 
government that would stand up any better than the last one' . 
205 However, Morrison's reluctance 
most likely stemmed from the fact that he was not in the War Cabinet, having been offered the 
Ministry of Supply. Dalton certainly believed that his prevarications stemmed from 
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disappointment at not receiving a more senior post. 206 Morrison was also anxious that his old 
enemy, Bevin, was to become Minister of Labour. He later wrote of the 'somewhat Napoleonic' 
Bevin that 'his weakness was jealousy of other people' . 
207 Morrison, however, 'expected' -or, 
more likely, hoped - that Bevin would encounter 'adversaries of a very different mettle' in the 
government than those he was accustomed to in the unions. 20' Apparently worried that Dalton 
would get a prominent position at his expense, Morrison had earlier tried to discredit his erstwhile 
209 
ally by spreading rumours that Dalton was pro-Italian. Morrison was undoubtedly angry; upon 
hearing that Attlee and Greenwood were to be in the War Cabinet and he was not, he complained 
that 'these aren't the right people to represent the party'! ' 0 As his biographers have observed, 
Morrison had wished for a different coalition . 
21 1 He hoped to be in the War Cabinet without a 
department, and later admitted that 'Supply was hardly a post to run after'. 212 Stung at being 
excluded from Churchill's inner circle, he therefore considered staying outside the government 
altogether. 213 Had he done so, Morrison would have been the party's sole senior figure not in 
office, a course that would have afforded him the opportunity to construct a formidable personal 
power base relative to the rest of the leadership group, creating an even more discernible division 
between the Labour ministers and the party than was ultimately to occur. Staying out of office in 
1940 therefore perhaps offered Morrison the best opportunity he was ever to have to weaken 
Attlee, being able to exploit disaffection with the Coalition and to ensconce himself as the most 
effective representative of Labour interests - something he was to attempt to do anyway. The 
route that Morrison could have taken, and the ramifications of such a decision, has been 
overlooked by historians. As it was, his instinctive desire to exercise power compelled him to 
disregard his reservations and accept Supply. If he had not, the history of the period, and indeed 
the shape of post-war politics, could have been very different. 
The NEC approved the substance of Attlee's negotiations with Churchill. 214 The following day, 
12 May, Attlee informed the assembled delegates of recent events, arguing forcefully the 
necessity of Labour taking part in the war effort. 215 Unsurprisingly, he framed this in terms of the 
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lif %216 advance of socialism, but made what was described as the 'speech of his e The Conference 
then endorsed the decision to enter the government by a majority of more than twenty-five to 
tWo. 217 It was a triumphant culmination to the course that the leadership had plotted almost a year 
before. Bevan - who had been re-admitted to the party in late 1939, and already established 
himself as a fierce critic of his leaders, with ceaseless talk of the need for Labour to seize 
Gsupreme power' and impose 'socialism' - opposed the decision, feeling the party had been 
'outwitted' in not extracting more offices from Churchill . 
218 Laski, on the other hand, was again 
put up by the leadership to represent their line, asserting to the delegates that Labour shouldjoin 
with the Conservatives in order to achieve reform. 2 19 As before, he was used as a shield and 
associated with the choices of people who he would soon vigorously oppose. Upon the formation 
of the Coalition, Addison has argued that the Conservatives were still much more powerftil than 
Labour within the government, holding fifty-two posts to Labour's sixteen. 220 Whilst it is true that 
Labour was poorly represented at the lower ranks of the administration, at the top they faced the 
Conservatives on almost equal terms, with two seats out of five in the War Cabinet. Moreover, 
Labour's most senior figures were on the whole somewhat weightier than the leading 
Conservatives, and would prove to be of superior quality. For all the rivalry among them, the 
party's leaders co-opcrated far more effectively as a group than did the Conservatives, who were 
now left fractured between eccentric Churchillians like Lord Beaverbrook and Brendan Bracken, 
and the discredited Cbamberlainites. With the Conservative party effectively in ruins, and Attlee 
having led his so adeptly, the Labour ministers constituted the strongest single faction inside the 
new government. This position was out of all proportion to Labour's wholly unimpressive 
parliamentary representation. 
Most of the party's key figures gotjobs, and its War Cabinet representatives, Attlee and 
Greenwood, wielded considerable domestic authority. 221 Attlee became Lord Privy Seal, 
Greenwood Minister without Portfolio. The latter's remarkable rise to War Cabinet member was 
thus complete. Bevin was given the Ministry of Labour, Dalton the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare and, as above, Morrison got Supply. Considering his standing, and the need for Attlee to 
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appease possible dissidents, Shinwell was an obvious choice for inclusion in the government. 
Both Attlee and Churchill were 'very keen' to have both of the most vocal potential 
troublemakers, Shinwell and Wilkinson, within the Coalition. 222 Wilkinson entered the 
government as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions, beforejoining her patron 
Morrison upon his move to the Home Office in October 1940. Shinwell's pickiness, however, 
wrecked his chances. Churchill offered him only the position of Under-Secretary of Food, not the 
Shipping post he craved. 223 Put out by the frustration of his ambitions, Shinwell impetuously 
refused to accept office at all. Despite his later statement that he had 'no bitterness', there is little 
doubt that he was angry. 224 His actions, and the change in his behaviour, since September were 
motivated by simple careerism; but with his ambitions in tatters, Shinwell immediately ceased his 
moderate behaviour and quickly became the most vitriolic opponent of his leaders. Launching 
endless attempts to destroy the Labour ministers' position over the coming years, Shinwell came 
to play a major role in the approaching internal struggle, as the entry into office, and consequent 
division - and diffusion - of power between the Labour ministers and their party threatened to 
derail Attlee's careful ly-crafted course. 
VII 
Labour's experience of the first months of war had been productive. The largely negative view of 
the period given by previous historical literature is unfair; far from the 'stasis' imagined by 
Brooke, the party had not drifted aimlessly during the phoney war. 225 It had instead pursued a 
calculated strategy. Hence, Jefferys' suggestion that Labour found itself with the 'worst of all 
worlds' in this period hardly rings true. 226 Even as subtle an analyst of manoeuvre as Cowling has 
missed the substance of Labour's strategy, seeing the period as 'a non-event'. 227 Subtle but 
profound political shifts had occurred in the British political landscape over the course of these 
eight months. Viewed in the context of Labour's tumultuous 1930s, from reduction to a 
parliamentary rump to a series of prolonged internal clashes, the period from the outbreak of war 
until the entry into government represented a triumphant climax for the party's leaders and an 
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affirmation of their position. Labour's political fortunes had been transformed; moreover, the 
leadership had worked together effectively, regardless of the differences that existed between 
them, in order to secure the greater prize of government off ice. This was especially noteworthy 
given that their strategy expounded the virtues of essentially doing as little as possible. That 
Labour retained its unity under such conditions is striking, and indicative of the success of the 
leadership's cultivation of the opportunity before them, placating their followers while awaiting 
an opportunity to strike at Chamberlain. Their employment of vague rhetoric to manage their 
party underlines the way in which political actors utilise symbolic language as a means to enable 
them to focus on their real interests. The problem of peace aims had been potentially destructive, 
yet had been deflected adeptly. Moreover, the apparent capitulation by the leadership to their 
followers on the subject in fact merely amounted to an enticing carrot to offer the party in 
exchange for continued support. The eventual declaration they gave did not commit Labour to 
anything specific. Simultaneously, in supporting the war at its outset and publicly adopting a 
posture of 'constructive Opposition' - intimating political restraint in the national interest - the 
Labour leaders were establishing a position that would be on record, to considerable benefit, for 
the future. Before fresh divisions could erupt, Germany had invaded Western Europe, and the 
leadership moved decisively - and, crucially, on their own authority - to dislodge Chamberlain 
and take power as members of a new government. 
Attlee, more than anyone, had been the central figure in achieving this. Labour's leader has 
always been an enigmatic figure to historians, and his abilities often overlooked. In fact, his real 
strength was that he was an excellent manager of his party. As John Swift has observed, 
'Labour's entry into the government on its own terms was a vindication of Attlee's leadership'. 228 
The thesis therefore ties in with recent literature which has seen Attlee as a more skilled leader 
than has been allowed in the past. 229 Never in its history had Labour wielded such influence as 
here. They possessed genuine power and leverage, but without bearing the responsibility when 
things went wrong - an enviable political position. The documentary material shows quite clearly 
that this is what Labour's leaders were thinking about during 1939 and 1940 - forcing the 
Conservatives into a comer, extracting an agreement from them on favourable terms, and all the 
while keeping their followers quiescent. They consciously and consistently awaited this 
opportunity; they did not simply drift in a political limbo for eight months. Their report to the 
1940 Conference confirms that Attlee and his colleagues conceived of their strategy in this way. 
Political conditions during the period were narrow and restrictive, and the facts of war meant that 
opportunities were more limited than usual. 'Constructive Opposition' further exacerbated this, 
228 Swift, Labour in crisis, p. 158. 
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increasing the need to be cautious in public declarations. But conditions were still wide enough to 
pen-nit skilful positioning. Attlee had made Labour stand back, increase its strength and let others 
make the first move. Throughout the period he had refiuined from expending his hard-won 
political capital without certainty of a return. The Labour leadership may have had no choice in 
the autumn of 1939 but to adopt a posture of 'wait-and-see', but that did not mean that they would 
navigate such a dangerous political reef so adeptly. The party could easily have revolted against 
the straitjacket they imposed on it. Eight months is, in political terms, a very long time, 
particularly to balance on a tight-rope under conditions of inaction and war. Playing a weak hand, 
the leadership group established a bargaining position strong enough to deliver a powerful role in 
the Churchill Coalition. 
Internal politicking also persisted, the most obvious example being the challenge to Attlee. As it 
was, the leader faced down his rivals, made them appear careerist and unscrupulous, and 
entrenched his own position. Escaping his isolation with this victory and outmanoeuvring his 
potential rivals, Attlee set about re-establishing his authority. Buttressed by his new boldness - as 
well as the fact that open contest for places during wartime would not be looked on kindly by the 
rank-and-file - the effect was to make any attempt to remove Attlee while ever the war continued 
much more difficult. Labour's senior parliamentary figures were engaged in a long episode of 
manoeuvre and probing of one another's position, an episode in which Attlee largely triumphed in 
November 1939, and in which he then spent the next six months consolidating his authority. But 
others sought advantage just as openly. It would seem, then, that the circumstances of war had not 
markedly altered the internal environment of the Labour party. It was only in the restraint shown 
in curtailing public attacks on one another, and to a lesser degree on the Conservatives, that the 
dynamic of Labour politics changed. 
The location of political action in the period is interesting. The NEC and PLP remained important 
institutional forums, yet the real core to the events outlined here was, in a sense, non-institutional. 
It was in the inherently elastic contest for power between the Labour leaders, Chamberlain and 
the Conservative rebels, that the centre of action should be seen. Moreover, this was a contest that 
none of the participants could actually drive. Only external, military, events could permit 
resolution of this struggle. As such, the real location of action in the context of the Labour party 
was the thought-world and calculations of the leadership group in awaiting a suitable opportunity 
to enter office. It was the decision-making of senior actors that constituted the driving force of 
Labour politics. Only here can be found the real crux of internal politics. But, at the same time, 
Parliament was also an important venue. While not the central arena, the Commons was a crucial 
one for Labour's performance as a party, being the place where the leadership strategy - and 
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indeed those of the prime minister and Conservative dissidents - would manifest itself. As such, 
there was an important role for the Commons in providing the environment in which manoeuvre 
and confrontation, already determined off-stage, would play out. 
Despite the success of the course they had chosen, the decision by the leadership to join the 
Churchill Coalition was something of a leap of faith. Labour had been in office in a minority 
twice before, and the prospect of again being buffeted by stronger opponents would not have been 
an attractive one. To enter into a coalition also posed other acute dangers. It was obvious that it 
would necessitate some degree of distance between those in the government and their followers. 
This distance could easily provoke a crisis, either of authority - over who controlled the party - 
or priority - what its leaders should perceive their role to be. Such a struggle could inflict damage 
to Labour on the scale of 193 1. Moreover, Labour had been divided over two previous coalitions, 
the Lloyd George ministry of the First World War and the formation of the National Government 
by MacDonald. From our contemporary perspective, we tend to view parties as enduring entities, 
in which internal divisions may occur but do not threaten its continued existence. But, from the 
perspective of May 1940, matters appeared rather differently. For the previous sixty years, back 
to the 1880s, politics had been marked by constant fluidity in the party system, with innumerable 
realignments and defections. In 1940, political parties did not appear to be enduring; quite the 
reverse. Yet Labour's leaders displayed little reluctance in entering the Coalition, despite the 
danger of being overpowered by the Conservatives or thrown over by their followers. They were 
motivated in large part, of course, by strong patriotism and the exigencies of the international 
crisis. Political co-operation was vital if the war effort was to be a success. But another crucial 
motive was ambition; the formation of the Churchill ministry offered a major opportunity for 
Labour and its leaders. That they joined the government indicated a deten-nination to pursue this 
opportunity. The entry of the leadership group into the Coalition, despite the dangers inherent in 
such a course, underlines the drive for power that resides at the centre of all political actors. That 
they would have refused the opportunity was inconceivable. It remained to be seen what they 
would make of it. 
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Chapter three - Office 
The previous chapter showed how Attlee fought and won two separate battles - to outmanoeuvre 
Morrison and retain the leadership, and to take the Labour party with him along a political path of 
his own choosing. The first year of the leadership group's membership of office was marked, for 
the most part, by the continued success of the strategy they had pursued. Though in government, 
their priorities and behaviour changed little. Acclimatising to office and with the war at its most 
critical stage, the Labour ministers were, despite these distractions, able to retain their internal 
ascendancy to a remarkable degree. Moreover, it was here that the true scale of the success 
engineered by Attlee and his colleagues became apparent. This chapter considers the period from 
mid 1940 to mid 1941 and the realignment of politics which took place. Most significant was the 
way in which the new Labour ministers were able to continue extending their power even further 
than that which they had secured in May 1940, across the entire apparatus of government, and 
completing the transformation in their political for-tunes which they had created in the shadow of 
the national crisis. Inside Labour itself, meanwhile, Attlee, virtually on his own authority, 
reconstructed the mechanics of the party to entrench this new order by imposing the pliant Lees- 
Smith and Pethick-Lawrence onto his followers as their acting leaders. But of similar importance, 
though, was that personal conflict among the leadership - which had dominated from May- 
November 1939, and influenced Attlee's reassertion of his powers - largely abated over the first 
year of the new administration. With a war effort to run, the existential threat to Britain from 
Germany, new jobs to be mastered, and Attlee's ascendancy resulting in a lack of opportunities 
for Morrison to challenge him, the attention of the protagonists was focused elsewhere - although 
this did not mean that such conflict ceased entirely. This chapter is thus rather different from the 
previous chapter, and those that follow. It considers the way in which the leadership group, 
reaping the rewards of their efforts during the phoney war, worked to continue along the 
trajectory they had pursued since 1939 of expanding their influence - this time in government - 
whilst maintaining their authority over the Labour party itself. 
Yet, that the first year of the Coalition was broadly a success, did not preclude the development of 
more worrying harbingers for the future. Disaffection with 'constructive' Opposition had been a 
constant feature of the phoney war, and this hostility to Labour's 'stasis' diffused at an 
accelerating rate once the party entered office. By 194 1, it was a potent threat to stability as the 
sheen of coalition began to wear off. This would eventually precipitate recurrent conflicts over 
Labour's direction. It is thus possible to detect the first signs of the crises which would dominate 
the period until 1945, in that, despite the success enjoyed by the Labour ministers, their entry into 
government engendered tensions across the entire party. The fact that its political leaders were in 
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power, but the rest of the movement was not, created inevitably divergent internal priorities and 
perceptions of the political world. The root of this was the conflict between the necessity of 
compromise and loyalty to the Coalition demanded by the Labour ministers, and the pressure 
towards independence felt by many of their followers. Even actors who were temperamentally 
similar to the Labour ministers were reluctant about many of their leaders' actions -a reluctance 
borne from these differing viewpoints and enforced separation between those who were in office 
and those who were not. It was here that the seeds of future, more open, conflict were sown. This 
chapter shows how this situation evolved. The chapter is divided into two halves - one which 
examines the period. to late 1940, and assesses the leadership group's collective improvement of 
their position in the new arena of government, and one which describes the resumption of internal 
conflict from early 1941. 
The immediate problem facing Attlee upon the assumption of office was the question of who to 
leave in charge of the PLP. There was an obvious imperative for the leadership to leave the 
parliamentary party in the hands of people they could trust to maintain loyalty to the new 
administration. If those given this task were prominent in their own right - if Morrison had stayed 
out of office, for example - the Labour ministers could have found their authority challenged, or 
even rejected. The prospect of a repudiation of the leadership group, and a consequent split, had 
always been a possibility during the phoney war, and would surely increase now that the Labour 
ministers were separated from the day-to-day running of the party. As it was, the dependable 
Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence were the ideal candidates to be entrusted with the role. Likely 
to be compliant to the decisions of the Labour ministers, they would make useful proxies. Thus, 
their exclusion from the government was not a slight, for they were tasked with even more crucial 
work instead. Though Attlee expressed to Dalton the view that Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence 
were too old for ministerial work, nonetheless it seems unlikely that the leader undertook 
negotiations for government off ices without a plan for who would be left to run and manage the 
PLP. ' The two veterans had proven themselves indispensable in recent months. The week after 
the formation of the Coalition, Attlee - again acting virtually unilaterally - took the decision that 
Lees-Smith was to become acting chairman of the PLP and Leader of the Opposition, with 
Pethick-Lawrence his deputy, prior to approval by the PLP and without discussions with other 
senior figures. 2 This implies that the leader simply made the choice on his own authority, and 
1 Dalton Diary, 18 May 1940 (pp. 12-3). Page references from Dalton's diary until the break-up of the 
Coalition refer to Pimlott's The Second World War Diary ofHzigh Dalton, 1940-1945 (London, 1986). 
2 Dalton Diary 20 May 1940 (p. 14), & 21 May 1940 (p. 17). 
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then impressed it upon his colleagues. The decision was then accepted by both the PLP Executive 
and the full PLP itSelf. 3 
The other component of the leadership's plan to maintain their authority became clear days later, 
when the PLP Executive voted to dissolve itself for the duration of the war, and recommended 
that an Administrative Committee be set up in its place. 4 Yet this was deliberately structured to 
preserve the internal ascendancy of the leaders: Lees-Smith was its head, and it consisted largely 
of Labour ministers - who were ex-officio members - and loyalist MPs. Attlee was to remain 
leader of the party, with Lees -Smith and Pethick-Lawrence put in charge of directing the PLP. ' 
This, then, represented in many respects a reversion to the original practice of a PLP chairman 
who directed Commons duties but lacked real personal power. Brooke has criticised Lees-Smith 
and Pethick-Lawrence as displaying a lack of 'rigour', arguing that there was a lack of 'effective' 
parliamentary leadership during the war. 6 But, surely, this was precisely the point. The 
Administrative Committee was apparently at first unelected, although the destruction of the PLP 
minutes makes this impossible to ascertain for certain. It was to consist of twenty-three members, 
including nine Labour ministers, six members of the old Executive who were not members of the 
government, and others who sat regularly on the Opposition front bench. 7 At the beginning of the 
next parliamentary session, annual elections were held, acting as an important gauge of party 
feeling. 8 
3 Ibid. Lees-Smith, interestingly, was a titular Leader of the Opposition only; though having to transact the 
business of the Commons and oversee the PLP, he did not receive the salary that came with the post, nor 
was he entitled to a secretary. It was instead Attlee who continued to receive the salary. In August, Lees- 
Smith complained about this to the NEC, which agreed to find him a typing assistant and pay him L100 per 
annum -NEC minutes, 21 August and 25 September 1940. 4 Dalton Diary, 21 May 1940 (p. 17). 
5 Ibid. See also R. M. Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition: The Role ofthe Leader of the Opposition, the 
Shadow Cabinet and Shadow Government in British Politics (London, 1973), pp. 410-11. Lces-Smith 
entered into talks with the Speaker of the Commons and Privy Councillors outside the government from 
other parties about the occupation of the Opposition front bench. It was agreed that the Administrative 
Committee (whether or not they were members of the Privy Council) and Privy Councillors not in office 
from the Conservative and Liberal parties would be eligible to sit on the Opposition front bench. This 
arrangement was to prevail until 1945, although it is unfortunately impossible to know how often 
Conservative and Liberal MPs actually did sit there. 
6 Brooke, Labour's War, pp. 73-4. 
7 See R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The distribution ofpower within the Conservative and 
Labour parties London, 1967 edition), Appendix D, pp. 664-5. 
8 Pethick-Lawrence topped the poll in the first election held in November (Lees-Smith, along with Attlee, 
was an ex-officio member), an indication of his strong internal position. Dalton came second, with 
Morrison, Alexander and Griffiths all tying for third. Attlee was certainly happy with the results, telling 
Dalton that 'the party generally knows what it is doing on these occasions'. See Dalton Diary, 13 December 
1940 (p. 119). 
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Besides Lees-Smith, Pethick-Lawrence and the ministers, the key figures were J. R. Clynes, 
Griffiths, Philip Noel-Baker, Shinwell, and Wedgwood Benn. 9 The Administrative Committee 
thus became the central institutional arena within the PLP, Labour MPs looking to it for authority 
and direction. Though the leadership worked diligently to control the PLP, their differing 
perspectives from others on the Committee posed subtle but problematic issues of party 
management. Despite being closely linked, the Labour ministers and the rest of the 
Administrative Committee were separated, in terms ofjobs, concerns and physical location in the 
House. The leadership group could hence no longer control the PLP directly - they had to do it 
1hrough the Committee, in alliance with others, who may or may not be amenable in a given 
situation. As a result, it is possible to identify three distinct structural components to the Labour 
party in Parliament between 1940-5: the ministers (including the core leadership), the 
Administrative Committee, and the PLP itself. This diffusion of power was the central feature of 
the fluctuating nature of Labour politics. On the other hand, that the Committee was a purely 
administrative body is underlined by its weakness in the seniority of its membership. Of the 
twenty-three members, only five had NEC seats; of these, three (Attlee, Dalton and Morrison) 
were ministers. The others were Noel-Baker and Shinwell. This makes apparent that whilst the 
Committee played a key role at Westminster, it did not constitute a power base more broadly. As 
such, it did not pose a threat to the Labour ministers in offering an alternative set of leaders. It 
would have been a simple matter to give the new head of the PLP and his deputy ex-officio 
membership of the NEC; that this was not done is telling. Considering Attlee's propensity for 
taking decisions without consultation in recent weeks, and the lack of evidence about any 
discussions on this reconfiguration, it seems probable that responsibility for this deliberate 
weakness should again be laid at the door of the party leader. 'o As he had so often since his 
engagement with the peace aims controversy, Attlee moved the pieces around the political 
chessboard in such a way as to reduce the prospect of a viable challenge to the Labour ministers 
developing from within the party. Griffiths later described the main function of the 
Administrative Committee as being to sustain the leadership in the government and protect their 
flank from internal attack - an accurate analysis of the manner in which the Committee was 
intended to operate. " 
Shinwell, fuming at his exclusion from the Ministry of Shipping and already reverting to his more 
customary manner as a result, was the sole member of the PLP Executive to oppose the new 
9 For a full list, see McKenzie, British Political Parties, pp. 664-5. 
10 NEC papers, Dalton's diaries, or any other source known to the current author, do not contain evidence 
of any debate on these changes as to how the parliamentary party should now work. The measures seem to 
have been imposed in one fell-swoop. 
11 James Griffiths, Pagesfrom Memory (London, 1969), p. 69. 
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arrangements. 12 With his standing recently boosted by accession to the NEC at the 1940 
Conference a fortnight earlier, Shinwell now possessed both a prominent platform and the desire 
to make use of it. Moreover, this opposition was predicated on apparent ambition to become 
Leader of the Opposition himself, in place of Lees-Smith, or at least to sabotage the Labour 
ministers' plans for a compliant PLP. At the meeting where the decision to appoint Lees-Smith 
was taken, 'Shinbad', according to Dalton, was 'in a state of nervous and egocentric volubility' 
and was 'even worse than usual'. 13 Savaging the proposed new arrangements, Shinwell 
complained at having to take the government Whip, but was particularly energetic in arguing 
against the idea that Lees-Smith should become Leader of the Opposition. 14 Whilst Dalton's 
loathing of Shinwell doubtless engendered bias, his view that Shinwell 'regards himself as the 
only possible leader' to replace Attlee, and was angling to get the new job himself, is certainly 
consistent with Shinwell's ambitions from the 1930s, as well as his bid to push himself to the 
forefront since September. " Shinwell advocated a more vigorous form of Opposition, with the 
Labour ministers excluded from the ruling body of the PLP, which would turn the Administrative 
Committee into precisely what Attlee intended it would not be - an alternate leadership group. 16 
The rejection of Shinwell's proposal, then, is less important than the fact that he had already 
determined upon engineering a wholesale challenge to the leaders' course -a course with which 
he had no quarrel until the frustration of his ambitions. When the rest of the Executive acquiesced 
to Lees-Smith's new position, 'Shinbad [leapt] from his seat and [rushed] from the room in a 
towering rage'. 17 After missing out on the Ministry of Shipping less than a fortnight before, 
Shinwell's efforts to stop Lees-Smith had now been rebuffed as well. Already embittered, his 
manner became one of constant and intransigent resistance to virtually everything his leaders 
did. 18 As this incident also makes apparent, neither the formation of the Coalition, nor the crisis 
on the continent, produced much shift in the nature of political behaviour, any more than the 
declaration of war the previous autumn. As Leo Amery commented around this time, 'However 
desperate the national crisis, men cannot help thinking of themselves'. 19 
The non-confrontational nature of the new political situation at the top, meanwhile, was struck at 
once, as Commons debates quickly became an occasion for mutual appreciation. The day after the 
12 Dalton Diary, 21 May 1940 (p. 17). 
13 Ibid. 
" Ibid; Dalton Diary, 23 May 1940 (p. 19). 
'5 Ibid. 
16 Ibid; Harris, Attlee, p. 180. 
17 Ibid. 
18 The fact that Shinwell offers no comments whatsoever on his bid to stop Lees-Smith becoming Leader of 
the Opposition in any of the three volumes of his memoirs is revealing. 
19 Amery Diary, 18 June 1940, pp. 625-6. 
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formation of the Committee, Attlee introduced an Emergency Powers Bill, and was faced at the 
dispatch box by Lees-Smith, who struck a note of conciliatory politics: 
I thank the Lord Privy Seal [Attlee] for his speech ... this is not the time for a lengthy discussion. It is a time 
for action and for showing that the House of Commons can be a completely efficient instrument in the 
conduct of the war. I have only to say that we [the Labour Opposition] will give the Bill all facilities. 20 
And so it continued. The speeches of Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence were deliberately 
minimalist and emollient, often offering no questioning or criticism whatever. But though this 
new posture, with Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence frequently seeming to be almost 
government spokesmen, would become deeply antagonistic to many as time passed, given the 
international situation, for the moment it aroused little animosity. The next day, Pethick- 
Lawrence made a long speech on the Limitations of Dividends Bill, again displaying a readiness 
to refrain from any critic iSM. 2 1 He discussed several parts of the Bill that were unclear - and then 
set out to the House how the Bill in fact already dealt with them satisfactori ly. 22 Ensconced atop 
the PLP and tasked with a critical job by the leaders, both Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence 
simply did not press the government with any degree of frequency. 
11 
Even though they were now in office and had consolidated their position at the head of the 
Labour party, Attlee and the Labour ministers nonetheless stuck with their tried-and-tested 
strategy. They ensured that Labour still looked 'responsible' to the wider electorate - Lees-Smith 
lining the party up behind the government's decision to reject Hitler's peace proposals in the 
aftermath of Dunkirk, for example - but this was, as before, just one part of their strategy. 23 From 
the outset, the Labour ministers were aggressive within the government in pushing their own 
agenda. Immediately upon the formation of the new ministry, Attlee and Greenwood confronted 
Churchill and 'expostulated strongly' against the inclusion of Chamberlain in the government. 24 
Though the prime minister's position vis d vis the Conservatives meant that any such move was 
impossible, he was nevertheless left 'shaken ... considerably' 
by the effort to compel him to drop 
25 Chamberlain. The Labour ministers thus continued to pursue their own personal vendetta 
against the former prime minister, and, by extension, both exacerbating the damage already 
20 Hansard, vol. 361,22 May 1940, col. 152. 
2' Hansard, vol. 361,23 May 1940, cols. 345-7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hansard, vol. 362,18 June 1940, col. 61; NEC Emergency sub-committee minutes, 18 June 1940. 
24 Amery Diary, II May 1940, pp. 614-5. 25 Ibid. 
75 
inflicted to the Conservative party and standing firm on a cause - the hated appeasers; - certain to 
win them credit among their followers. Around the same time, in an episode which suggests much 
about the centrality of self-interest and political strategising even in situations of dire emergency, 
they brazenly turned this into - or at the very least tacitly encouraged -a full-scale attack against 
the credibility of the Conservative party, playing a role in a vicious campaign begun following 
Dunkirk in which virtually the entire spectrum of the Labour movement - including the 
leadership themselves - repeatedly and publicly assailed the Chamberlain ministry in the press for 
betraying the country through its foreign policy, placing the responsibility for the crisis squarely 
on the shoulders of the former government. 26 There were obvious advantages for the leadership to 
pursue this line of rhetoric; moreover, in denouncing Chamberlain, they were by implication 
attacking the Conservatives as well, marking out valuable political ground with a brazen - and 
wounding - shot at their partners in office. 
Yet, in encouraging such attacks and defining a distinctive Labour position, the leadership 
quickly re-ignited cross-party tensions just weeks into the life of the new administration. 
Conservative MI's were angered by their coalition partners openly blaming them, Cuthbert 
Headlam observing that the electoral truce 'is only observed by one side ... every speech made by 
27 
the Labour people... is a party speech and is propaganda'. This attack by the Labour party, and 
especially by its leaders, on the record of the Conservatives is all the more revealing for its 
timing. That they had the time to observe, and indeed, in the first place, whip up, these party 
attacks for several weeks amid the blackest national emergency for centuries suggests much. Not 
only did politicking continue as usual, then, despite the confines of wartime and coalition, but it 
could have fatally damaged the new government weeks into its existence. It is clear that up to this 
point their holding of office was not accompanied by corresponding changes in how Attlee and 
the rest positioned themselves against their political opponents. Churchill, again shaken, was 
forced to insist to the Labour ministers that they cease their attacks . 
2' Though this plea did have 
an immediate effect on the leadership group, other assaults continued unabated with the 
publication of the famous Guilty Men book in jUly. 29 Only now did senior Labour figures make 
an effort to muzzle the criticism, Citrine denouncing the campaign as a thinly-veiled attempt to go 
back on Labour's entry into the government. 30 Bevan responded by calling for the TUC to rebuke 
Citrine, attacking the union boss as 'a political illiterate [who] raises not a flicker of interest in 
26 See, for example, Daily Herald, 27,28 May & 1,3,5 June 1940; Daily Mirror, 26,27 May & 5,6 June 
1940; Tribune, 3,7 June 1940. 
27 Headlam Diary, 31 July 1940, p. 215. 
28 Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 108. 
29 'Cato' (Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen), Guilty Men (London, 1940). 
30 Foot, Bevan, pp. 319-20. 
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anybody ... he should confine himself to his filing system'. 
31 Assaults emanating from the Labour 
party against Chamberlain and the Conservatives continued throughout the war; but, as 1940 
wore on, the efforts to suppress them at least reduced their intensity from fever pitch. For the 
Conservative party, though, the damage to its reputation was already done. What this 
opportunism suggests about the priorities of the Labour leaders, whose objectives seem to have 
still been primarily 'political' rather than 'national', is another matter. 
The image created is of Attlee and company gleefully dancing on the grave of a severely 
damaged Conservative party, amidst the worst military situation Britain had yet faced with the 
collapse at Dunkirk, the bombing of cities, the RAF fighting desperately in the skies above, and 
the Wehrmacht massing on the other side of the Channel. The Labour leaders, to change the 
metaphor, were enthusiastically shimmying their way up the greasy pole. There is nothing wrong 
32 
with this, of course; it is the nature of politics after all. But it should at least be recognised. The 
Labour ministers had earlier dug their collective heels in in May when James Maxton, the ILP 
leader - commanding all of three MPs - asked Churchill to recognise his party as the official 
Opposition . 
3' His biographer has suggested that the romantic Churchill - who fantasised of a 
grand parliamentary alliance anyway - may have acceded to the request, if not for the fierce 
hostility emanating from the Labour leadership, who no doubt knew that forcing their party into 
an effective 'fusion' with the Conservatives was going to lengths to which Labour would not go. 34 
But the leaders also had little incentive to give up the political double-dividend which they 
enjoyed by straddling government and Opposition. The leadership sought to assuage discontent 
among their followers in another fashion, in the form of holding out promised legislative 
achievements, a tactic they were to persist in - albeit not always successfully - until the break up 
of the Coalition. The question of precisely what Labour wanted to achieve from the war had been 
a potent issue throughout the first eight months of the conflict; 'to achieve high office' would 
perhaps not have sufficed as an answer. Now Attlee, angling for something of substance from the 
Coalition to give to his party, sought to head off fresh criticism in this direction by pushing within 
the government in mid June 1940 that the ministry: 
31 Ibid. 
32 The events are reminiscent (if less clear-cut, because the leaders seem to have started the attacks and then 
stepped back to watch the Labour party take them up) of the behaviour of Conservatives in September 1931 
during the financial crisis - see Williamson, National Crisis andNational Government, chapter eleven, but 
especially p. 401 & p. 412. 33 Gordon Brown, Maxion (Edinburgh, 1986), p. 299; Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition, p. 410. 34 Brown, Maxion, p. 299. Maxton also tried to get the Speaker to revoke Lees-Smith's privileges as Leader 
of the Opposition, unsuccessfully - See Hansard, vol. 361,4 June 1940, cols. 796-8,11 June 1940, col. 
1166, and vol. 362,18 June 1940, col. 61. 
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should put before the country a definite pronouncement on government policy for the future. The Germans 
are fighting a revolutionary war for very definite objectives. We are fighting a conservative war and our 
objects are purely negative. We must put forward a positive and revolutionary [statement of aims] 
admitting that the old order has collapsed and asking people to fight for the new order. 35 
Though such legislation was not likely to be implemented at the height of military crisis in May 
and June, nonetheless Attlee, as ever concerned with being the first to shape the environment, was 
beginning to put down the markers which he would use over the subsequent months. 
III 
The first few months of Coalition were marked by another major extension of the influence held 
by the Labour party's representatives in government, and their role in running the country. It was 
therefore here that the extent of the success they had manufactured during the preceding period 
became fully apparent. Labour's leader had cut an impressive figure during the phoney war. 
Moreover, in his negotiation of government places, Attlee secured strong Labour representation, 
and displayed a ruthless streak in dismissing Pethick-Lawrence and Lces-Smith as 'too old' and 
'too slow' for office respectively, whilst engineering for them to be left in charge of the PLP. 36 
Escaping the isolation and weakness which seemed certain to end his leadership little more than 
six months before, Attlee's adeptness as a political operator was at its apex in 1940. Once within 
the government he was faced with a new test, having to cope with huge and ever-increasing 
ministerial burdens while still retaining Labour party support for his decisions. As a minister, 
Attlee quickly became a formidable political figure - not through a domineering personality, but a 
quiet yet critical influence over the entire machinery of government. 
From the beginning of the Coalition, Attlee largely dropped from public view, particularly when 
compared with men like Bevin and Morrison, who became politicians of great national 
prominence. Hence, the complaints about the leaders' elusiveness, or that Attlee had a poor war, 
should be seen in this context. Yet this is to underestimate Attlee and neglect his strengths. For 
the rest of the war, he was a key figure in holding the Coalition together, reconciling 
Conservative and Labour opinion, and all the while simultaneously balancing the national 
interest, the imperative for his party to be 'responsible', and his own ministerial work. A founding 
member of the War Cabinet, Attlee's natural efficiency at committee work meant that he played a 
central role in that body, particularly in ensuring its tasks were carried out effectively and 
" Nigel Nicolson (ed. )Haroldfficolson: Diaries and Leiters, 1939-1945 (London, 1960), pp. 99-101; INIF 
1/849, minutes of the Home Policy Committee, 18 June 1940. 
36 Dalton Diary, 9-16 July 1940 (pp. 56-61). 
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meetings did not last for hours due to Churchill's tendency to talk for too long. He was 
unofficially deputy prime minister from May 1940 (and became so formally later), and was, 
crucially, the only man to serve (as deputy chairman) on all three of the key committees that 
directed the war: the War Cabinet, the Defence Committee, and the Lord President's Committee, 
the last of which Attlee himself pushed for the creation of, and was led by Chamberlain in name 
alone. 37 Moreover, though he did not assume the title, Attlee from the beginning informally acted 
as Leader of the Commons. 38 In the spring and summer of 1940, he immediately began clustering 
together an ever-increasing range of powers into his own hands and became the key figure in the 
direction of the home front . 
39 As a Churchill aide put it, it was widely recognised in Whitehall 
that, in cross-party conflicts, 'if C. R. A. [Attlee] digs his heels in, he will win' . 
40 From 1940 he 
made the Lord President's Committee 'the engine of government' on the home front, created in 
order to save the Cabinet's time .41 To all intents and purposes he directed it himself, making it his 
personal fiefdom; Chamberlain's fatal illness allowed Attlee to quickly circumvent him, and 
Anderson, who succeeded Chamberlain in the autumn of 1940, had little political standing. 42 
Attlee also chaired both the Food and Home Policy Committees, and sat on Greenwood's 
Production and Economic Policy Committee. " Free from departmental responsibilities, Attlee 
was able to roam freely across the entire field of governance. This wide-ranging brief facilitated a 
major expansion of Attlee's political reach. Labour's much-criticised leader, then, held a uniquely 
powerful position; it may have been very much a behind-the-scenes role, but no one was more 
powerful within Whitehall with the sole exception of Churchill. As Beckett has observed, while 
37 The members of the Lord President's Committee were Attlee, Chamberlain, Greenwood, Sir John 
Anderson (Home Secretary and in charge of civil defence) and Sir Kingsley Wood (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer). Attlee pressurised for this Committee from the moment he entered office to direct and co- 
ordinate the work of the individuals above, and within a month Churchill agreed. 
38 Harris, Attlee, p. 180. 
" For reasons of length and historiographical neglect the thesis is concerned primarily with the Labour 
party itself rather than the Coalition government, and hence events within that ministry and its workings are 
not focused upon here beyond describing the roles and influence taken on by the Labour ministers. 
However, those wishing to make ftirther investigations should see the papers of the War Cabinet, the 
Cabinet and the individual departmental ministries. CAB 65 (conclusions of the War Cabinet), 66 & 67 
(War Cabinet memoranda) 68 (reports by government departments), 69 & 70 (Defence Committee), 71 & 
132 (Lord President's Committee), CAB 118 (Attlee's files as deputy prime minister) as well as PREM 3, 
are particularly useful. 
"Cited Beckett, Attlee, p. 165. 
41 Harris, Attlee, p. 18 0. 
42 See CAB 71 & 132 (thirty-four volumes and 223 volumes and files respectively) for evidence on Attlee's 
role in running and directing the activities of the Committee. In October, when Chamberlain resigned, 
Attlee had the Lord President's Committee re-structured with new membership - himself, Bevin, Morrison 
(Home Secretary by this point), Greenwood, Wood and Sir Andrew Duncan (Morrison's successor at 
Supply) - and officially designated as a 'steering committee' with a wide-ranging brief to oversee 
economic organization and the general workings of Whitehall. As a result, the committee was utterly 
dominated by Labour. 
43 CAB 74 (Food), CAB 75 (Home Policy) and CAB 72 (Production and Economic Policy). 
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the prime minister focused on the military conflict, it Was Attlee who 'looked after the shop', 
effectively running the home front from the inception of the new ministry. 44 One biographer has 
noted the political 'iron' in Attlee's 'soul' that became apparent once he guided Labour into 
office, describing him as 'the greaser of wheels ... at the heart of the government'. 
45 It has been 
pointed out by Peter Clarke that Attlee's 'hero' was Lord Salisbury, for his understated but 'well 
on top of his job' style of leadership. 46 Immediately upon entering office, Attlee began an 
overhaul of the machinery of government, working alongside Greenwood. 47 They dissolved 
dozens of committees, centralised decision-making, reduced the ability of ministers to 'pass the 
buck' to others, and produced a considerable improvement in administrative efficiency. Given 
Churchill's lack of patience with such matters, in thus providing the drive and expertise, the 
achievement was Attlee's. This interpretation of his intention to ensconce himself at the centre of 
the web of government is reinforced by the fact that he was quick to get rid of a potential rival, 
when Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's adviser and powerful figure within the machinery of 
state, was eased aside during the review. Attlee said that 'He had a hand in everything, ran 
everything. We got rid of him at once' . 
4' This was ostensibly due to Wilson's links with 
Chamberlain, but, in abolishing his influence so eagerly, the Labour leader displayed little 
reluctance in dispatching a rival. 
An early example of Attlee's tactics in manipulating his role in government, and his desire to 
placate his followers while beginning to push for future social reform, was his pressure on the 
Coalition over the summer of 1940 for a declaration of post-war policy. As we have seen, he 
raised the issue initially in June, and persisted over the subsequent months. On 23 August, the 
War Cabinet relented and agreed to set up a War Aims Committee, with Attlee as chairman. 49 
Bevin was also a member. 50 This met for the first time on 4 October, and though it failed to make 
much headway in 1940 - Churchill feeling reconstruction planning to be premature - that the 
leader's agitation was successful reiterates the scale of Attlee's influence, as well as enabling the 
Labour ministers to make reassuring noises to their party. Viewed in the context of calls within 
the Labour party from Bevan and Laski for nationalisation and socialism, Churchill's agreement 
to the establishment of the War Aims Committee was an important victory. Despite the prime 
minister's resistance, the Labour ministers could hardly be said to have 'abandoned' Labour. 
44 Beckett, Attlee, p. 160. 
45 Beckett, Attlee, pp. 159-65. 
46 Peter Clarke, A Question of Leadership. Gladstone to Blair (London, second edition, 1999), pp. 196-7. 
47 This quest for efficiency Nvas done through the Lord President's Committee - see CAB 71 & 132 over the 
summer and autumn months of 1940. 
48 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, notes on draft autobiography, 1/16 fo 3. 
49 CAB 65, WM 220 (40) 3,23 August 1940. 
50 Ibid. CAB 21 contains the War Aims committee records. 
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Over the five years of the Coalition, the agitations of Labour's representatives were key in 
yielding significant legislative achievements. Attlee displayed an adroit ability in manipulation, 
knowing when to exact concession from the government, when to take a firm line with the Labour 
party, and when to strike several poses simultaneously. In doing so, he stumbled remarkably 
infrequently. Moreover, that he was able to do this over the course of five years without 
precipitating a schism within the government demonstrates once again his skill in managing 
people and guiding them in the direction he wished them to go - often without their knowledge 
that he was doing so. Despite the criticisms directed at him by contemporaries for his style, when 
Attlee's wartime role is examined afresh, it is here, in this period, that we can discern the true 
extent of his quiet ability in the political arts. 
After persuading Churchill to set up the War Aims Committee, Attlee's pressure was no doubt 
significant in the prime minister's acquiescence in December to the formation of a dedicated 
Reconstruction Committee. 51 Moreover, the previous month, Bevin had joined the fray by making 
a speech in Bristol emphasising the need for reform after the war. 52 His tone was sufficiently 
partisan to provoke Lord Londonderry to complain that 'I am frankly disturbed by Bevin's rise to 
power ... he is more than useful, but as a director of-policy I see nothing but disaster' . 
53 We 
should here identify a highly effective tactic employed by Attlee and the Labour ministers 
throughout the war, reflecting an astute awareness of their location with regards to both their 
followers and the Conservatives, as well as their realisation that Churchill could not do without 
them. The leadership group held office, but the Labour party itself occupied an ambiguous 
position between office and Opposition, taking the government Whip but still designated as His 
Majesty's Opposition. As such, the Labour ministers could afford to be relatively partisan in their 
behaviour, making speeches on the need for reform and pushing a Labour policy line within the 
Coalition, all the while knowing that as long as they were cautious, the alliance with the 
Conservatives would hold; as during the phoney war, it may have been readily apparent to 
Labour's partners what they were doing, but Churchill needed them. Until 1945, the Labour 
ministers repeatedly utilised a particular technique to secure concessions. They would agitate 
within the Coalition on a specific issue and push for the setting up of a committee to consider it, 
laying the groundwork within Whitehall; the NEC would produce a policy document which the 
leadership could then present within the government as a Labour demand, attempting to force 
Churchill's agreement. This tactic bore fruit with the War Aims Committee in August 1940 and 
the Reconstruction Committee in December, and was to bring further success in future. 
51 These records are in CAB 87. 
52 Londonderry to Halifax, 23 November 1940, cited Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 124-5. 
13 Ibid. 
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Moreover, Attlee and the rest of the ministers could protect their flank within the Coalition by 
drawing a crucial distinction between their own understanding of political realities and the 
irresponsible demands of their followers. Once again, then, the leaders had been able to persist in 
exactly the same type of tactics that they had used during the phoney war. Their recognition of 
the dangerous situation facing the country, and instinctive leanings towards the primacy of 
government, meant that they never pushed this line too far; but it does reflect a willingness on the 
part of Attlee and his colleagues to exploit their position for all it was worth. It would be an 
exaggeration to state that they still enjoyed 'power without responsibility'; but they undoubtedly 
had the best of both worlds. 
Upon becoming a member of the Churchill government and parachuted into Parliament, Bevin 
entered Labour's internal politics for the first time. He had never been an MP, or even sat on the 
NEC. Injoining the Coalition, his alliance with Attlee was quickly cemented, a partnership 
grounded in mutual respect, shared priorities, and a wariness towards Morrison. Bevin's 
biographer records that, when Attlee became leader, Bevin held his usual suspicions of him as 
'middle-class', and Attlee's foreign policy prevarications in the late thirties did little to endear 
him to Bevin. 54 However, once Bevin entered the government, he felt himself bound to Attlee. As 
Bullock writes, 'Attlee had the sovereign virtue, in Bevin's eyes, of being straight: you could rely 
, 55 on what he said . The two came to enjoy a genuine friendship. The backdrop to their new axis, 
of course, was their mutual feud with Morrison. This antipathy did not prevent either of them 
working alongside their old enemy - Bevin and Morrison retained a 'fagade of amiability', while, 
as we have seen, Attlee and Morrison could co-operate on many issues; but it was a source of 
recurrent confl iet. 56 By the formation of the Coalition, Bevin held an 'immovable prejudice' 
towards Morrison, viewing him as 'the politician personified', telling colleagues 'don't you 
believe a word the little bastard says'. 5' Further, lacking sympathy for the political wing of the 
Labour movement, * Bevin was even more determined than Attlee that the party be kept in its 
place. He did not have the slightest interest in an arena - party politics - that he regarded as little 
more than a game. Power, whether in government or in a union, the ability to make decisions, was 
what interested him. That was the only 'pole' that the single-minded Bevin was interested in 
ascending. But this was not trade union parochialism; far better than any other figure in wartime 
politics, Conservative or Labour, Bevin instinctively understood what really mattered. Attlee said 
of him that 
5' Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 113. 
5' Ibid. 
56 Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, pp. 117-8. 
57 Ibid. 
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Because of his own genius for organisation and his confidence in his own strength he did not fear -he 
embraced - power. Lord Acton's famous dictum in power probably never occurred to him. And if he 
agreed that power corrupts he would have said that it corrupted only the men who were not big enough to 
use it. 58 
With Bevin considering himself as a representative of the unions, not the Labour party, Attlee 
was seen by the Minister of Labour as someone who would keep the PLP in line and out of his 
way. Bevin never even sought membership of the new Administrative Committee. In his mind 
Attlee, the party leader, was probably Bevin's 'lieutenant', not the other way around. 
Nonetheless, their partnership worked, Attlee later remembering that his relationship with Bevin 
'was the deepest of my political life. I was very fond of him and I understand that he was very 
fond of me'. 59 
Given the organisational environment from which Bevin came, he expected the PLP to fall 
meekly in line behind the government, an attitude which provoked poor wartime relations with 
Labour MPs. Hence, Bevin's authority over the union movement - and within the machinery of 
government - was not matched within the PLP. Clashes between Bevin and Labour MPs were a 
regular feature of the next five years, for his bullying style failed to attract support, and he was 
flustered by their lack of discipline. As a result, the newest member of the PLP was feared and 
respected, but never loved. As Bullock observed, he was 'temperamentally ill-suited' to party 
politics, and 'government came more naturally' to him. 60 The power that Bevin exercised during 
the war was such that, within five months of the formation of the Coalition, he had been elevated 
to membership of the War Cabinet. He did not quickly find his feet in the Commons, however. 
Though a capable speaker outside Parliament, Bevin took a long time to acclimatise to the House, 
and was easily provoked by Labour opponents into bad-tempered exchanges. 
The Attlee-Bevin axis swung into action for the first time within days of the formation of the new 
government in May 1940. One of the greatest threats to the unity of the Labour movement - and 
something which could provoke a revolt against Attlee's entire strategy -was the task faced by 
the Labour ministers in reconciling the unions to the new emergency powers of compulsion and 
direction held by the state. The Emergency Powers Bill of May 1940 - introduced by Attlee 
himself - in giving the government the authority to direct any person to services required for the 
war effort, and take over any industrial establishment, could easily be perceived as a major 
58 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 150. 
39 Ibid. 
60 Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 99 & p. 107. 
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weakening of union power .61 Doubtless, Attlee's introduction of the measure was significant in 
securing its passage unmolested from the Labour side of the House, and it seems certain that 
62 Bevin applied similar pressure to the TUC. On 24 May, the Minister of Labour addressed a 
crowd of 2,000 union executives and made an appeal for national unity, emphasising the need for 
the unions to place themselves at the disposal of the state, identifying this as a 'test of our 
socialism'. 63 He was to employ such language frequently throughout the war. Psychologically 
accustomed to being obeyed, once out of a union environment, Bevin expected the union 
movement to do as he wished. To this end, he constantly pushed them to make concessions and 
be 'responsible'. This engendered difficulties in his relations with the unions, for, with his arch 
rival now in off ice, Citrine became all the more determined to exert the TUC's - and his own - 
independence. 64 The wrangle with the unions over the new powers to be wielded by Bevin 
continued for some months. In October, Attlee addressed the TUC himself, making similar 
appeals to those used by Bevin, with the language of national unity and responsibility the major 
rhetorical instrument again employed. 65 Precisely as he had employed his doctrine in the past, this 
posture afforded Attlee, and Bevin, a means to secure compliance while defining themselves to 
several different audiences as statesmen and not sectional politicians. Moreover, by the time 
Attlee made his speech, he and Bevin would certainly have been aware that the government may 
well need to introduce industrial conscription; yet, in his address, Attlee actually gave the TUC 
the impression that workers' freedoms would be preserved. 66 This was the Attlee-Bevin 'axis' in 
action: Labour's leader and the most powerful union figure in the country contriving to deceive 
the unions so as to avoid a public clash -a demonstration of their sometimes ruthless response to 
the difficulties of party management in wartime. 
Of the other most prominent Labour ministers, Dalton shared with Bevin a distaste for party 
affairs which was not to ease until 1944, and once in office spent his time thinking of the Labour 
party as little as he possible, immersing himself in office, and privately fantasising about 
67 
replacing Churchill. Interestingly, Attlee's position was further strengthened by the fact that 
Dalton's hostility towards him cooled somewhat following the efforts of the leader to secure 
Dalton a prominent ministry. Dalton recorded that Attlee was in 'good form' in his management 
of party affairs, as well as recording that the leader 'has made his selections and omissions for 
6' Hansard, vol. 361,22 May 1940, cols. 154-85. 
62 Ibid. 
63 The Times, 25 May 1940. 
6' Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, pp. 131-3. 
65 1940 TUC Conference Report, pp. 269-70. 
66 Ibid; Harris, Attlee, p. 183. 
67 Dalton Diary, 22 & 23 May 1940 (p. 19), 26 June 1940 (p. 48) 20 July 1940 (p. 66) & 12 November 1940 
(pp. 99-100). 
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government posts very well '. 68 Dalton relied heavily on Attlee over the next five years to shield 
him from the machinations of Conservative enemies such as Bracken. Whilst he remained 
favourable to seeing a change of leader, this improvement in relations was significant - though 
Dalton lacked little independent sway as a power-broker, his persistent willingness to ferment 
crises had made him a disruptive force. By the end of the year, Dalton described an evening the 
two spent together as 'extremely friendly'. 69 
Like Dalton, Morrison largely dropped from sight within Labour upon assuming government 
office, although in his case this was only temporary. Though he had not wanted Supply, Morrison 
worked to master the post and, like Bevin, was a more prominent public figure than Attlee. By 
July, Churchill wanted to bring Morrison into the War Cabinet, but retreated under pressure from 
1 70 the 'Tory machine', as the appointment would 'disturb the balance of the parties . Morrison was 
a major success at Supply, addressing serious administrative problems with characteristic flair. 
Consumed with the demands of off-ice, and with no suitable opportunities on the horizon, 
Morrison was, for the moment, compelled to forego efforts to displace Attlee. His neglect of the 
Labour party annoyed some - as had been the case in the autumn of 1939 - Citrine complaining 
that Morrison was 'much too entangled with his officials ... he'is disinclined to see people without 
them' . 
7' Nonetheless, Morrison did remain very much taken up with his own long-term career 
prospects and the question of the Labour leadership. Harold Macmillan, Morrison's Under- 
Secretary, said that whilst he worked under him, Morrison 'thought more about publicity than 
armaments'. 72 After just five months in the post, in response to the stress placed upon the country 
by the Blitz, and the perception that the personality of Anderson was too bland to inspire the 
necessary resistance, Churchill moved Morrison to the Home Office in October. For the heir 
apparent this was a career milestone; though he was not a member of the War Cabinet until 1942, 
Morrison quickly became one of the most powerful and prominent politicians on the home front - 
a prominence which stood in stark contrast to the obscurity in which his rival Attlee toiled. 
Morrison was to make a great success of this job as well, elevating him to a public stature greater 
than that enjoyed by any other Labour minister with the possible exception of Bevin - providing 
him with the ideal platform for a remarkable war and a long, often veiled, campaign to seize the 
leadership from Attlee. 73 
68 Dalton Diary, 18 May 1940 (pp. 12-3). 
69 Dalton Diary, 13 December 1940 (p. 1 19). 
70 W. P. Crozier interview with Beaverbrook, 24 August 1940, cited in Taylor, Offthe Record, pp. 198-9. 
71 Dalton Diary, 14 August 1940 (pp. 73-4). 
72 Simon Ball, The Guardsmen: Harold Macmillan, Three Friends and the World They Made (London, 
2004), p. 221. 
73 Morrison thus remained highly influential on the NEC, attending most of its meetings as well as those of 
the Emergency, Policy, Elections and International sub-committees. 
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Hence the best strategy open to Morrison, and the one he adopted, was to work to strengthen his 
own credibility and prestige within the party via partisanship and his public stature, whilst 
awaiting a suitable moment to strike. After dropping from view upon entering office, Morrison 
became taken up again with Labour party affairs by early 194 1, particularly the crucial task of 
attempting to define his position to an internal audience as being more representative of Labour 
opinion that the incumbent leader. Though circumstances necessitated patience, he therefore quite 
deliberately laid the groundwork for the future from early on in the lifetime of the Coalition. As 
will be seen below, he was to begin to push this line more forcefully during early 1941, 
humiliating Attlee amid the most contentious internal struggle since 1939, and re-igniting their 
feud. 
Greenwood, in contrast, was already struggling to cope with his ministerial work. Just a month 
after the formation of the new ministry, Dalton noted Greenwood's poor performance, describing 
him as 'very slow' and 'unimperative'. 74 Attlee, too, was soon 'dissatisfied' with his 'slowness 
and inertia' . 
75 This was an unfavourable contrast to his earlier conduct. The deputy leader's 
ministerial career, then, had already failed. Attlee's unhappiness was probably fatal for 
Greenwood's prospects, for, without his leader to protect him, he was to prove an easy target for 
those who wished to see him demoted. By December, he was being mooted as Ambassador in 
Washington, but this possibility was quickly dismissed - most likely because Churchill wanted 
someone more capable in that PoSt. 76 But, just two weeks later, Greenwood was the main victim 
in a reshuffle of the War Cabinet. He was moved from his chairmanship of the Production and 
Economic Policy Committee and shifted, largely as a sop to Labour opinion, to the new 
Reconstruction Committee, tasked with overseeing a study of post-war problems. 77 But 
Green%ýood's spectacular rise had come to an ignominious end. He displayed a visible 'lack of 
drive', and, though he was to remain a member of the War Cabinet, Labour's deputy leader was 
now in no way a leading figure . 
78 That Churchill did not take reconstruction seriously is clear'- 
the Reconstruction Committee did not even begin to meet until March 194 1, and did little of 
substance until 1942, when Greenwood was no longer in office. Greenwood was obviously too 
lacklustre for such an important job as oversight of the economic field; the committee over which 
he had presided instead became a Production Executive, directed by the altogether more 
formidable Bevin. The combined influence of the Attlee-Bevin 'axis' within the government then, 
7' Dalton Diary, 18 June 1940 (p. 42), &8 August 1940 (p. 72). 
75 Dalton Diary, 8 August 1940 (p. 72), 24 August 1940 (p. 77), & 13 December 1940 (pp. 119). 
76 Dalton Diary, 14 December 1940 (p. 121). Halifax was eventually sent to Washington. 
77 See CAB 65110, WM 308 (40), 31 December 1940. 
78 Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1941. 
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was now even higher, with both men holding multiple key posts. Greenwood, in comparison, was 
already finished, and he quickly entered into a steep decline from which he was never to recover. 
The impressive stint of 1939-40 had proven a fluke, and, after proposing something of a 
revisionist interpretation of Greenwood in the previous chapter, we are compelled to revert to the 
traditional historical judgment of him as a political failure. Though his position as deputy leader 
shielded him for a while, by late 1940 Greenwood's alcohol-induced inefficiency had effectively 
called time on his ministerial career. But this does not subtract from the fact that, overall, it is 
clear that the efforts of the Labour ministers in government were meeting with considerable 
success and - through the work of Attlee, Bevin and Morrison particularly - they established 
themselves as the most powerful group within the new ministry. 
IV 
But despite the consolidation by the leaders of their position, nonetheless as soon as they were in 
office the men who would become their most vehement opponents immediately exploited the 
removal of senior figures from the day-to-day running of the party. Shinwell, fuming as we have 
seen over not getting the Shipping post, became a venomous critic. Bevan set about establishing 
himself as the leading parliamentary opponent of the government and, in doing so, began to build 
up a position which would make him a major figure later in the war. Of most significance, 
however, were the activities of Laski. The influential and popular intellectual constructed a 
powerful institutional platform on the NEC, taking the leading role in its activities and eventually 
driving it single-handed. Combined with his alienation from the Labour ministers, Laski was to 
become their most troublesome internal enemy, and entered into a vituperative personal conflict 
with the normally unflappable Attlee which lasted until 1945. These rebel figures concentrated 
every bit as much as the leaders upon expanding their own influence, and became the leading 
articulators and motivators of disaffection. What made them so dangerous was not that they could 
threaten to themselves overthrow and replace the leaders but that their ability to seize hold of, and 
lead, the existing resentment towards the Labour ministers would threaten to derail the latter's 
careful ly-chosen course. 
Having failed to prevent Lees-Smith from becoming Leader of the Opposition in May, Shinwell 
spent the second half of 1940 becoming a persistent nuisance for the leadership, constantly 
opposing their choices. Most of these activities continued to take the form of simple personal 
conflict and feuds with his leaders. Shinwell and Dalton always despised one another, and their 
rows became a regular feature of PLP meetings. But he now also began to display much antipathy 
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for Attlee as well, Shinwell perceiving him as a weak leader . 
79 The most significant of Shinwell's 
feuds, though, was with Bevin. The skilled orator Shinwell exploited the Minister of Labour's 
frequent faux pas in the Commons, adopting a condescending tone and regularly embarrassing his 
opponent in bad-tempered exchanges . 
80 Shinwell's predilection for this has been termed 'Bevin- 
baiting', and their spats often dominated both parliamentary and party debates, Bevin considering 
him to be an 'undisciplined Jew'. 81 His disparaging manner towards the Labour ministers had the 
effect of both elevating Shinwell into their leading critic, as well as exacerbating the growing 
reluctance within the party to offer the meek acquiescence the leaders demanded. But this was not 
yet a powerful force in 1940, and, as a result Shinwell's attacks led to him being widely disliked, 
and in fact often only united the Labour party behind their representatives in government. In 
August, for example, after denouncing both Bevin and Greenwood in the Commons, he found 
himself reprimanded at a PLP meeting by unions MpS. 82 His vituperative manner eventually 
provoked Harvie Watt, Churchill's PPS, to approach Shinwell in the Commons tea-room and tell 
him that 'You know, the Chief (Churchill) has a lot of worry and trouble just now. He doesn't 
deserve to be annoyed and aggravated ... 
After all, you mustn't forget the PM has great military 
gifts. His ancestor was the Duke of Marlborough'. Shinwell responded with the acidic put-down 
that 'if military genius can be handed down like that, then I should be a good critic. My ancestor 
83 was Moses'. Nonetheless, while his attacks were for the moment largely unrepresentative, 
Shinwell had already established himself as the most fiery enemy of his leaders. 84 
Laski, similarly, began to agitate against the careful balancing-act performed by the leaders, 
taking advantage of his influence on the NEC to bring pressure to bear on the Labour ministers. 
In June, he produced a new pamphlet, The Road to Power, which the Executive refused to publish 
because it was too inflammatory, in which he called for complete nationalisation of all the 
85 
nation's resources. Shortly afterwards, Laski exacerbated the Labour ministers' awkward 
position by demanding the need for 'the enactment of at least a number of definitely socialist 
measures'. 86 Yet, though this, and other efforts, were contained effectively - for example, after 
calling repeatedly over the summer for extensive nationalisations, he received a severe drubbing 
at the NEC and left 'with his little tail between his little legs' - nonetheless his barrage of 
79 Shinwell, Conflict Without Malice, p. 150. 
'0 See, for example, Hansardvol. 364,7 August 1940, cols. 300-9. 
" This phrase is Slowe's. See Slowe, Shinwell, p. 203. Shinwell said of the Minister of Labour that Bevin 
disliked the fact that 'it was impossible to treat MPs like subordinate officials of Transport House' - 
Shinwell, Conflict Without Malice, p. 150. 
82 Dalton Diary, 14 August 1940 (p. 73). 
83 Shinwell, Conflict Without Malice, pp. 1534. 
84 For other examples, see Hansard, vol. 367,27 November 1940, cols. 231-50, and vol. 371,6 May 1941, 
cols. 784-92. 
'5 NEC minutes, 26 June 1940. 
86 NEC Campaign sub-committee minutes, 16 July 1940; NEC minutes, 23 July 1940. 
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requests, interventions and pushing of a line quite different from that of Attlee meant that, just 
two months after the formation of the government, dissension against the Labour ministers was 
already been heard both in the parliamentary party and the NEC . 
87 Even though tying up Laski's 
time in this way, tasking him with drafting documents and then simply re-drafting them to make 
them more acceptable, was an astute method of dealing with him, it did not deter him from 
persisting in his efforts, and he was not so easily contained for long. 
In October - in an assault given context by Churchill's refusal to give a statement of peace aims, 
and the lack of progress from Attlee's War Aims Committee - Laski launched an overt, and 
blistering, attack on the Labour ministers in the Daily Herald, under the headline 'An Open Letter 
to the Labour Movement'. 88 Asking readers to 'Demand War Aims' and appealing for Labour to 
extract concessions from the Coalition, Laski demanded 're-negotiation' of the terms on which 
Labour had entered the government by asking for the leadership to press for a publication of war 
aims as the 'title-deeds' to the Labour-Conservative alliance. 89 He also accused the party's 
representatives of 'betraying' the working-class in failing to lead a 'great rebellion' against 
capitalism and secure 'socialist measures' from the government. 90 Given that Laski had earlier 
described such rhetoric, when espoused by John Strachey, as 'the raving of a lunatic', it is 
possible that his new posture was simply an angry response to the constant snubs his NEC efforts 
over 1939-40 had received. This public critique of the 'failures' of the Labour ministers was the 
most open attack on them so far. In doing so, Laski defined his own position - to great benefit - 
as being an authentic representative of the party against a leadership who had betrayed it. The 
NEC immediately held a special meeting of the Emergency sub-committee to discipline him on 5 
November, and which Dalton characterised as being for the purpose of putting Laski 'on the 
mat'. 91 Laski was censured for his behaviour. 92 But this meeting also saw the igniting of the feud 
between him and Attlee that was to dominate NEC politics until the end of the war, as the two 
engaged in a vicious row about the record of the Labour ministers. 9' Laski had worked alongside 
Attlee as an adviser in early 1940, but this proximity encouraged a belief that such an 
uncharismatic figure, lacking 'an ounce of leadership', was not fit to hold Labour's top job. 94 This 
mutual antipathy triggered an effort by Laski to engineer the destruction of Attlee's credibility in 
the party's central arena, the NEC. Overt personal clashes were hardly characteristic of Attlee; yet 
87 NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 16 August 1940; Dalton Diary, 16 August 1940 (p. 74). 
18 Daily Herald, 21 October 1940. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 NEC minutes, 23 October 1940; Dalton Diary, 5 November 1940 (unpublished). 
92 NEC Emergency sub-committee minutes, 5 November 1940. 
93 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 5 November 1940 (unpublished). 
94 University of Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Alfted Cohn, 12 April 1940. 
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no-one matched Laski's ability to get under the leader's skin. Laski had been disciplined, but, in 
his public repudiation of the party's entire strategy, he had made a permanent enemy of Attlee. 
Moreover, the truce secured by his censure held for just five weeks, Laski returning to the attack 
in December with another public denunciation, this time in the New Statesman, in which he 
heavily criticised both the government, and the Labour ministers specifically, for the lack of 
sweeping social reform. 95 
Bevan, meanwhile, had played little part in events during the first stage of the war; this was to be 
expected - he was a minor politician, after all. But with the formation of the Coalition, he quickly 
took on a new role which, over the subsequent years, established him as a major figure in the 
political nation. Moreover, from May 1940, he was the most capable parliamentary critic of his 
leaders and the new government. Despite on the one hand strongly supporting the war - Bevan 
asked in Tribune of those who 'doubt what is their duty ... are you a traitor? ' - he nevertheless 
determinedly pushed his own line of rhetoric, heavy with criticism of the government's 
prosecution of the struggle. s6 This behaviour quickly brought him into conflict with many both 
inside and outside the Labour party. By the end of May, Bevan was already calling for the 
wholesale nationalisation of industry - the obvious flashpoint between the parties - and, having 
earlier criticised his leaders for not extracting more from Churchill, stepped up the intensity of his 
barrage still further in July, in asserting of the Labour ministers that 'in the realms of higher 
policy they have conspicuously failed'. 97 The next month, he was pressuring the government for a 
statement of 'revolutionary' war aims. 98 It was Bevan who led the first sustained parliamentary 
attacks on the new government, criticising the proposals for a new Emergency Powers Bill in July 
and accusing the Coalition of preferring to see 'a general system of martial law operating in this 
country', opposing the government in the first division since 13 May. 99 This persistent harassment 
- that summer, his attacks on the Coalition provoked an incensed Labour MP to challenge him to 
a fight - quickly built up the Welshman's position. 100 Moreover, as even Foot has accepted, many 
of Bevan's contemporaries 'attributed his performance to a diseased ambition', viewing him as a 
'malicious, frustrated... demagogue'. 101 Though he won few friends in the PLP - failing to get on 
the Administrative Committee in the elections in November - his profile was now high. In 
October, he authored a fierce attack on the leadership in Tribune, bemoaning their failure to win 
95 New Statesman, 14 December 1940. 
96 See, for example, Tribune, 24 May 1940. 
97 Hansard, vol. 361,30 May 1940, cols. 724-30; Foot, Bevan, p. 318. 
9' Campbell, Bevan, p. 98. 
9' Hansard, vol. 363,16 July 1940, cols. 116-21,144-48. 
"0 Foot, Bevan, p. 317. 
101 Ibid. 
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more concessions from the Conservatives and writing that 'Blind men are leading us'. 102 Though 
Shinwell was the more prominent parliamentary critic of the leadership during the initial stages of 
the war, Bevan quickly rose to prominence, albeit with the status of a 'national bogy man'. 103 
The wartime House of Commons was the ideal platform for Bevan to advertise himself. With his 
enjoyment of set-piece attacks in that arena, and dominance of Tribune as a regular outlet for his 
views, Bevan, like Shinwell, entered into a series of venomous feuds with most of the leading 
politicians of the period. On the Labour side, Morrison and Bevin were his most regular 
opponents. But, for Bevan's career, by far the most important was his conflict with Churchill 
himself. Begun in the summer of 1940, this feud immediately provided a major boost to Bevan's 
standing. It aroused yet more animosity, for he was often seen as a traitor, sneakily attacking the 
great war leader during a time of crisis. Yet on the other hand, feuds with prominent figures are a 
productive means of establishing one's own career, and there is little doubt that the confrontation 
was of great benefit for Bevan's long-term prospects. He was one of the few parliamentary 
orators able to debate with Churchill, and their confrontations were gripping. A constant thorn in 
Churchill's side and, unlike other anti-government figures, able to stand up to the prime 
minister's attacks, from mid 1940 Bevan's career was in the ascendant. His romanticism about his 
employment of the Commons chamber as a platform, a conscious sense of theatre, is clear from 
the fact that he saw himself as playing the role of Fox to Churchill's Pitt, modelling his conduct 
on the iconic eighteenth century rebel. 104 Bevan was one of the most calculating and power- 
hungry politicians of his generation; it is therefore important to probe beyond his rhetoric and 
recognise that, from the beginning, Bevan was projecting an image of himself. Just as much as for 
others, his rhetoric was instrumental in its purpose. The Commons, and his desk at Tribune, were 
the only arenas where he could seek to do this for the moment, given his limited standing in the 
Labour movement as a whole. But by utilising a certain kind of language, he was laying the 
groundwork for the future. He and these other figures were orienting themselves around the party 
itself, looking for power and influence in that arena - one quite separate from the concerns of 
their leaders. The public attacks made by dissentients such as Bevan, Laski and Shinwell in the 
second half of 1940 played an important role in re-shaping the atmosphere within the Labour 
party by encouraging open criticism for the first time, and articulating - and legitimising - the 
resentments felt by much of the party anyway. 
102 Tribune, II October 1940. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Foot, Bevan, p. 301. A study of Fox was one of the few biographies with which Bevan was intimately 
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The leadership group had acquitted themselves well in government. As we have seen, they were 
not only able to practise their skills in office and fulfil their ambitions, but pushed Labour 
interests as well. Within months of taking office, not only was state intervention and 'planning' of 
production more extensive than ever before, but the ministers - particularly Attlee - had almost 
surreptitiously acquired a unique level of influence within the machinery of Whitehall. This was 
the situation as it stood at the end of 1940. Addison's doubts about the position of the party's 
representatives seem difficult to sustain. 'O' Partly, of course, this was due to the damage done to 
the Conservative party - in which they themselves, along with Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, 
had played such a central part. But it was also due to the governing skill displayed by the 
contingent of Labour ministers. The individual quality of the Labour leaders was, for the most 
part, greater than that of the Conservatives. Their ability to follow this course was due in no small 
part to dependable allies in the PLP and on the NEC, men such as Lees-Smith, Pethick-Lawrence, 
George Ridley, Tom Williamson and James Walker. The months from the formation of the 
government until the end of the year thus represented another period of success for Attlee and the 
rest of the leadership group. Attlee's attempts to carefully position Labour had paid off. 
Moreover, they had persisted in virtually the same tactics as they had used in Opposition - 
preaching a doctrine which demanded acquiescence from the Labour party while ruthlessly 
imposing themselves on the Conservatives, securing major economic reforms, and still exploiting 
any opportunity to further undermine the credibility of the party which Churchill now led. One 
can almost see the prime minister fretfully complaining to Attlee about the socialist reforms 
introduced by his government, whilst the Labour leader professed sympathy and blamed it all on 
the demands of 'the party'. 
Yet a sea-change was to occur in Labour politics from early 194 1. The disillusionment with the 
continued inaction of the party, which had been building since 1939, finally erupted. With the risk 
of invasion now low, the political nation turned in on itself again. The result was a sudden 
reduction in the internal stability of the party, as the ability of the leadership group to impose their 
strategy declined. With their followers less willing to accept their diktats, Labour became gripped 
by indiscipline, and, for the next four years, internecine strife between leaders struggling - oflen 
in vain - to reassert their authority and a party widely resistant to it. This was at root a reaction 
against the joint demands for loyalty and inaction - with a resultant restlessness, boredom, and a 
tendency to fasten upon any prominent issues and turn them into a crisis about what Labour was 
'getting' from the government. In the minds of many, the party was getting very little indeed. 
Attlee's leadership had been inventive and often commanding. But it nonetheless had the effect of 
leaving much Labour opinion - both among MPs and the rank-and-file - exasperated. He still 
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failed to make much public impression. Traditional, critical, views of the leader are thus not 
without foundation. Whilst this may suggest an inability to discern that, though the government 
refrained from making socialist noises, it was in reality implementing much of Labour's policy 
agenda, this did not render the problems faced by the leaders any less acute. Their determination 
to exercise executive power put them on a collision course with those among their followers who 
sought to reject the compromises of coalition and pursue a more overtly aggressive strategy, 
believing that if Churchill would not implement 'socialism', it would be better if the government 
collapsed. Even those who were temperamentally similar to the leaders became resentful from 
1941 - revealing again the divergent priorities which are the result of different political vantage 
points. Existing in separate environments, the leaders and their party now saw things differently. 
The result was that Attlee and his senior colleagues were forced to spend the rest of the war 
reacting to crises in an increasingly problematic effort to keep the Labour party traversing the 
path they had chosen for it. 
V 
In early 1941, a series of internal struggles occurred in quick succession and made the period 
from January until May one of constant conflict. These crises also had the cumulative effect of 
precipitating a permanent change in the disposition of the Labour party. The first of these 
struggles occurred in January, after Morrison took the contentious decision to ban the Communist 
newspaper the Daily Worker in response to its 'seditious' activities in opposing the war. 
Favouring peace with Hitter and advocating 'revolutionary defeatism', the paper had been warned 
by the government in the summer of 1940 and, by December, Morrison was in favour of banning 
it. 106 Though the Daily Worker was widely loathed, the ban provoked a political storm within 
Labour on civil liberties grounds, and Morrison was subjected to attack over the issue for much of 
1941. Wary of damaging his all-important credentials through unpopular decisions, the Home 
Secretary attempted to deceive his party over the ban; he decided in favour of suppression some 
days before actually announcing it, but gave the impression to the NEC in the interregnum that 
the newspaper would not be banned. 107 Dalton said this was because Morrison 'did not trust some 
members ... and therefore felt he could not say much in front of them, except to try and put them 
off the scent'. 108 Yet this only protected him for a while: when the ban was announced Labour 
opinion reacted with fury, and Morrison was confronted by vocal opponents, including Bevan, at 
an inflammatory PLP meeting on 22 January. The Home Secretary unapologetically made a 
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robust defence and adopted a tough posture emphasising the need to suppress seditious 
publications, but this only antagonised his critics further. 109 The following week, Lees-Smith and 
Pethick-Lawrence defended the Labour ministers' flank by continuing to act as virtual 
government spokesmen, formally lining Labour up behind Morrison in the Commons and backing 
the need for 'measures [to] be taken against the habitual and persistent publication of material 
which is calculated to impede the national war effort'. ' 10 But Bevan, determined to confront the 
Home Secretary, put down a Commons motion opposing the decision, cleverly framing his 
argument not only as a defence of freedom - 'the government are winning the war against us' - 
but questioning why Morrison had not utilised legislation against sedition already available to 
him, instead employing powers meant to apply in the rather more dangerous circumstances of 
actual invasion. "' Combining oratorical flair with a grasp of detail, Bevan's speech may have 
been the most commanding parliamentary performance of his career to date, and Morrison's 
hostile response merely confirmed the Welshman's new status in the political world: 
If I wanted to find one distinguished member of the [Labour] party, who more than any other, has set aside 
the democratic decisions of the majority of his colleagues, I think I should choose him [Bevan]. Therefore 
his democracy is skin deep. He speaks of democracy for himself and not so much for the other fellow. 112 
Bevan led half a dozen Labour MPs into the division lobby. 113 Yet, though this registered only a 
small public revolt, and the NEC approved Morrison's decision in early February, nonetheless 
there had been widespread disapproval. t 14 Far from being a victory for the leadership group, the 
affair was so vitriolic that it exacerbated the more general sense of disappointment which was 
prevalent among Labour MPs. Morrison's strident resistance to all forms of criticism damaged 
the internal standing he was so concerned with cultivating. This first controversy thus inaugurated 
a pattern which was to recur until 1945, whereby Morrison's attempts to strengthen his position, 
and establish an identity for himself quite different from that of Attlee, were repeatedly 
undermined by his own decisions as Home Secretary, and unwillingness to be conciliatory when 
challenged. The Daily Worker controversy was the most bad-tempered public split since late 
1939, energising the declining willingness to offer unquestioning support. Further, it had been 
Bevan who articulated it most effectively: even before the row, he gave vent to these feelings 
when he bemoaned the leadership's direction of the party and declared in Trihune that 'It's Time 
Labour Kicked', charging that the Labour ministers had 'brought about no change of importance 
'09 Ibid. 
11D Hansard, vol. 368,28 January 1941, cots. 491-4. 
111 Hansard, vol. 368,28 January 1941, cots. 465-79. 
112 Hansard, vol. 369,28 January 1941, col. 516. 
113 Hansard, vol. 368,28 June 194 1, cots. 528-30. 
114 NEC minutes, 4 February 1941. 
94 
on the economic front'. '15 By February, he was agitating for the ending of the electoral truce and 
asserting that Labour MPs should not be bound by the government Whip. 116 In April, Bevan 
declared that the only explanation for the 'failure' of the Coalition was 'lack of political guts on 
the part of the leaders of Labour'. 117 
But the increasingly disillusioned frame of mind of the Labour party was more widespread than 
simply the posturing and self-advertisement of this ]one Welshman. Just days after the Daily 
Worker row, in February, an even more serious split appeared over the traditionally combustible 
issue of the means test. Back in the summer of 1940, Pethick-Lawrence suggested to Attlee that 
the removal of the much maligned test would offer sound evidence of the administration's 
integrity. ' 18 Attlee therefore worked to extract this measure from the Conservatives as another of 
his inducements for loyalty, and in the autumn it was announced that the household means test 
was to be replaced by an individual test. ' 19 This was initially warmly welcomed, but, when its 
precise form became clear as it went through Parliament in February 1941, the Bill sparked a 
fresh clash. 
In late January, Pethick-Lawrence, aware of the brewing revolt, asked the NEC to reiterate to 
MPs the need to support the Bill. 120 Though Shinwell opposed this, pushing the NEC to stress to 
the PLP the necessity of seeking the complete abolition of the test, Pethick-Lawrence's request 
was backed. 121 Yet the Bill ran into more difficulty when it was introduced to the Commons on 13 
February, when Bevan put down an amendment for total abolition and calling for a Labour 
revolt. 122 This prompted a fierce response by Pethick-Lawrence, who denounced the tactics of 
Bevan as a deliberate wrecking device to damage the Coalition by raising party tensions and 
blocking reform for years to come. 123 In a blistering attack, the vice-chairman accused the Labour 
rebels of only backing the amendment 'because they know in their hearts ... that [it] will be 
defeated', and charged that they wanted 'to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. They 
want to pose as champions of the oppressed while they are playing politics and doing their best to 
sabotage a great compromise solution'. 124 Pethick-Lawrence, for one, clearly recognised Bevan's 
game. Bevan, who had left the chamber, raced back upon hearing of the attack and flew into a 
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rage, calling Pethick-Lawrence 'stupid', appealing for support from the PLP, and asserted that the 
Labour ministers were already planning a special meeting to discipline him for daring to 
challenge them. 125 In the division, his amendment was defeated by 173 votes to nineteen - with 
sixteen Labour MPs following Bevan in voting against the government. 126 
The Labour ministers, along with most of the NEC and Administrative Committee, were furious. 
Twice in a fortnight, the party had suffered its most inflammatory internal clashes since the war 
began. Both of these, moreover, were over highly-charged issues about the competence of the 
Coalition, and hence it is apparent that Labour's willingness to refrain from public criticism 
because of the national emergency was dissipating. These public spats therefore highlighted the 
increasing distance which now existed between the Labour ministers and a substantial number of 
their followers -partly, it must be acknowledged, as a result of the leaders' reduced time for party 
matters. Concentrating so intensively on government, it would perhaps not be an exaggeration to 
suggest that, after the anti-Chamberlain propaganda of the previous summer, the leadership had 
taken their finger off the pulse of the Labour party - which they had previously monitored so 
closely - in the second half of 1940. Of at least equal significance was simply the passage of time 
and inevitable resentment at the 'stasis' into which the leaders had placed the party. Nonetheless, 
the Labour ministers had ceased to focus on the party itself, and, when they were forced to shift 
their attention back from early 1941, it proved impossible to prevent discord from taking hold. 
The day after the revolt, Chuter Ede warned Attlee that the rebels were attempting to bolster their 
position in anticipation of a counter-strike from the leaders and using the term 'MacDonaldism' 
to refer to the Labour ministers. 12' Bevan publicly stated that 'the present policy of the Labour 
party gives the party no work to do except to take poison'. 128 Ede recommended that they impose 
stringent discipline, but Attlee - perhaps wisely - chose not to make the counter-strike that Bevan 
was banking on, and opted to respond in another fashion. 129 Though Shinwell was rebuked on the 
NEC, the rest of the rebels escaped sanction. 130 Probably Attlee wanted to quickly move on from 
the dispute with the annual Conference on the horizon; drawing a line under the issue, then, 
signalled an effort to maintain unity. But the genie was now out of the bottle. For a year, the 
leaders had managed to obscure the existence of the gulf between them and the Labour party 
itself, but, by February 1941, this gulf was there for all to see and continually widening. 
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The stability of the leaders' balancing-act was hit yet again shortly afterwards by another conflict, 
this time instigated by a major new effort by Laski, and which inflicted considerable damage to 
the position of Attlee personally. Unlike the previous controversies, this was not a public row but 
one fought at the heart of the party's institutional machinery itself, on the leadership's supposedly 
secure power base of the NEC. Yet it was just as threatening in the prospect it raised of a 
repudiation of the doctrine which they had created, dragging Attlee into a dog-fight in defence of 
his strategy. Earlier in 1941, Laski had entered into a new struggle with the Labour ministers by 
marshalling opposition to the efforts of Middleton, the General Secretary, to cancel the annual 
Conference on the grounds of possible invasion in mid 1941.13 1 Laski suspected this to be an 
effort by the leadership and their allies to avoid giving a public platform to growing internal 
disaffection - certainly something they were to attempt to do later in the war - and charged as 
much at the NEC. 132 Expostulat ing strongly, he won the support of a majority of the Executive, 
and also wanted the NEC to compel the Labour ministers to give reports of their work in 
government to the Conference for consideration. 133 Laski also won support for his proposal that 
the NEC should submit policy resolutions to the delegates for decision. 134 This was something 
that the leadership - conscious of the dangers of being boxed in, or provoking more controversy 
by official commitments to x or y- was hoping to avoid, preferring an event without any policy 
formulation at all. 13' Laski's proposal was patently intended to stir up trouble and challenge the 
ministers' authority, due to the fact that the party's position between government and Opposition 
meant that any commitments could neither be implemented nor campaigned on. The episode 
constituted a clear warning of Laski's ability to play the leadership group's own game of 
bureaucratic politics against them. 
Emboldened by this success, just days later, Laski instigated the most sustained political battle of 
the war thus far - which also became a contest for personal ascendancy between himself and 
Attlee. He resurrected the peace aims row, in which he had been so central, by folding it into a 
wider indictment of the Labour ministers and outlining a full-scale alternative strategy. 
Submitting a new memorandum to the NEC, simply entitled 'The Labour Party', Laski asserted 
that Britain was approaching a 'turning-point' in the war, predicting that Germany would soon 
fail in her bid to bring the conflict to a quick end. 136 As a result, it was 'imperative' to consider 
the 'approach to victory and the use to be made of victory'. 137 Building on his earlier appeal for 
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'title-deeds' to the Coalition, Laski pushed for an open confrontation with the Conservatives on 
the subject of the future. Calling for a 'basic agreement upon fundamentals between parties in this 
country', his proposal represented another challenge to the policy of Attlee, and the most 
powerful yet, for any such cross-party agreement on specific measures would obviously be 
impossible. 138 Laski's 'fundamentals' were unlikely to prove acceptable to Conservatives. 
Evidently hoping to provoke a rejection of the Labour ministers' authority, Laski explictly 
charged 'the Labour leaders' with having 'secured nothing' from the Conservatives 'that 
industrial and political pressure could not have secured by what has been termed 'constructive 
Opposition' '. 139 Pouring scom on the record of Attlee personally, he also wrote that 'so far as I 
know, our representatives in the government have not asked for [assurances that the failure to 
implement social reform following the First World War] will not be repeated'. 140 Laski had not 
only declared open conflict on the entire strategy of his leaders, then, but seemed to have reversed 
his support for the Coalition. But the matter of these 'fundamentals' was where Laski 
concentrated his most devastating fire, demanding urgent action on 'reconstruction', and in doing 
so entrenching a new concept at the centre of the political lexicon for the next four years. 141 In a 
transparent attempt to protect himself after his censure the previous autumn, he concluded this 
attack with the ludicrous statement that 'nothing in this argument is in any way a reflection of the 
work of our leaders'. 142 The rebel professor proposed that a joint committee of the NEC, PLP and 
TUC be set up to co-ordinate action with the Labour ministers, who would then bring pressure to 
bear upon Churchill. 143 He wanted this committee to formulate policy and then pass it into onto 
the ministers, so as to make them 'fully aware of the principles by which we expect them to be 
guided' - in other words, an attempt to challenge the autonomy of the Labour ministers by 
bringing them firmly under the control of the NEC. 144 
With Laski having come out so belligerently against everything he had spent a year-and-a-half 
building, Attlee was provoked into another furious response. Before the NEC had even 
considered the document, Attlee wrote to Laski, criticising his proposals and implying that Laski 
-a non politician - failed to understand the reality of political manoeuvre. 145 The leader bluntly 
told him that 'the frontal attack with trumpets ... is not the best way to capture a position', and that 
pursuing a consensual approach with Labour's partners was more effective than making 
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demands. 146 Yet this only provoked Laski to redouble his efforts. He foolishly went behind the 
backs of the ministers and gave Churchill a commitment that he would push the NEC to continue 
the Coalition after the war, if the government made the necessary reforms - offering his enemies 
the chance to charge him with offering to sell Labour to the Conservatives if they had known - 
but apparently escaped discovery. 147 Instead, in an epic example of the Labour bureaucracy in 
action, in early February the NEC resolved to pass Laski's document to the Policy committee for 
consideration. 148 Thereafter, the leaders manipulated the NEC's committees to stonewall on it for 
two months. The proposals were simply moved back and forth, from sub-committee to sub- 
committee, until April. 149 Laski's conduct so antagonised Attlee that the Lord Privy Seal wrote to 
his opponent on I April and made it clear that he wanted no further contact, official or otherwise, 
with him. 150 This was, as in November, most unlike Attlee, but reiterates Laski's unique ability to 
aggravate his leader. To openly cut off a colleague is poor tactics for any politician, but for one as 
astute as Attlee is doubly surprising. That Attlee's normal air of unflappability - which, after all, 
was so impenetrable that it had produced so many complaints over the years - was disrupted in 
this fashion underlines the intensity of the feud that now existed between the two men. 
Yet, just when it seemed that Attlee would again come out on top through his delaying tactics, 
Laski took the step of appealing directly to the leader's rival, Morrison. 15 1 The Home Secretary 
constituted a formidable political shield for Laski. Moreover, as above, Morrison was keen to 
establish a certain image of himself as a means to bolster his claim to the leadership - especially 
in light of the damage he had suffered over the Daily Worker. In declaring his own view as being 
in favour of a push for reconstruction planning, and the party leader's as being in opposition to 
this, the heir apparent perhaps sensed in the Laski-Attlee exchange the opportunity to gain some 
political capital and manufacture an embarrassing blow to his opponent. The Home Secretary thus 
joined in with Laski's efforts energetically. On 21 April, he wrote to Middleton that 'I am a little 
uncertain as to how far consideration of .. economic and financial problems after the war' was 
being undertaken by the NEC, arguing the case for a special sub-committee to study 
reconstruction - Laski's proposal in disguise. 152 Given that Morrison was quite aware both that 
Greenwood was already engaged in this within the government, and of the internal dissidence that 
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could result if Labour went down this route - as well as his temperamental unwillingness to 
tolerate criticism - this can only be read as an effort to assist Laski in isolating Attlee. Middleton 
tried to block the Home Secretary, replying that work was already been carried out, but 
Morrison's unfriendly response was insistent, following Laski's assertions in arguing that 'I 
hardly think that the matters dealt with in your letter [about Greenwood's study] ... meet the point 
raised in my letter to you', and that 'In these circumstances, I should have expected that you 
would have placed the matter on the agenda' of the next meeting of the Executive (Middleton, 
pr . obably deliberately, had not). 'I shall therefore be glad if you will include the item'. 153 Two 
weeks later, Morrison reiterated to the NEC itself that Labour needed to actively prepare its 
policies for the end of the war. 154 The Home Secretary was deploying his influence and authority 
to ensure that he was seen as championing a populist line in the face of Attlee's public resistance. 
Suddenly intervening in a conflict in which Attlee had made his own prejudices very clear, 
Morrison thus employed properly for the first time the tactic which was to become his favourite 
weapon, creating a rhetorical divergence between his position and Attlee's where, in reality, no 
such division actually existed. It was an attempt to exploit the fact that Attlee had taken a stand 
and place himself directly between the Labour party and its leader. Morrison, of course, did not 
want to bring the Coalition down. What he did try to do consistently until 1945 was advertise his 
own credentials as a Labour stalwart, define his position as speaking for the party's soul, and, by 
extension, imply that Attlee did not. 
After Morrison's intervention, the NEC referred the matter once more to the Policy sub- 
committee, of which he himself was a member, a damaging blow to Attlee's authority. 155 In May, 
the Policy committee agreed to recommend to the Executive that a special sub-committee be set 
up, with Laski as secretary, to consider post-war problems and make recommendations. 156 This 
proposed body, the Economic and Social Reconstruction sub-committee, was then accepted by 
the NEC. 157 After a four-month struggle, it was a decisive victory for Laski and - quite visibly 
outmanoeuvred and isolated - an embarrassment for Attlee. The leader had publicly made a stand 
against Laski's challenge and been overruled for the first time since 1939. The affair also 
demonstrates that the contest for the leadership between Attlee and Morrison remained very much 
a live, if temporarily latent, issue. Given that Morrison had no instinctive sympathy with Laski's 
attempts to derail the government, his decision to intervene in defence of such a stance can only 
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be seen in the context of his rivalry with Attlee. He has been described as 'Not so much disloyal, 
as watching for a favourable opportunity to be disloyal'. 15' Unexpectedly throwing his weight 
behind a populist issue which Attlee made a great show of opposing - and on behalf of a proposal 
obviously calculated to cause problems for the Labour ministers - Morrison's intervention 
signalled the re-emergence of the rivalry between the party's two senior figures. After being 
roundly outmanoeuvred the previous year, the episode provides a demonstration of Morrison's 
ability to get the better of Attlee after all. 
Laski secured the leading role in the new investigation, a major job given the scale of the work 
involved. As his biographer has noted, this was one of the most ambitious projects ever 
undertaken by a political party. 159 Laski threw himself into new work on the new Reconstruction 
committee with enthusiasm, quickly setting up a further sixteen sub-committees. 160 In late May, 
he also took over the Labour party research department. 161 Moreover, he grew in confidence after 
his victory over Attlee, becoming even more active on the NEC itself and the other sub- 
committees on which he sat, putting forth a constant stream of memoranda, proposals and 
ideas. 162 He thus became the central figure in the overall running of the Executive. The dissident 
intellectual had been allowed onto so many sub-committees, and given so much work to do, as a 
means of controlling him; but now such prominence afforded Laski a secure base and the ability 
to utilise it to his advantage. Brooke has described him as being at the 'zenith of his influence. 163 
It afforded Laski potentially unlimited opportunities to harass the leadership group. Yet here, 
perhaps, is evidence of Laski's only limited success. The task was so big that it would occupy 
much of his time, and offered another method of keeping him busy. Further, his work did not 
actually commit Labour to anything, as the recommendations of the reconstruction study would 
have to go through the Dalton-chaired Policy sub-committee, before it even got to the NEC. 164 In 
addition, though Laski had the freedom to choose the other members, in practice restraints were 
imposed upon him when the Executive ruled some weeks later that representatives from each of 
the PLP and General Council would have to be included. 165 The hand of Attlee can perhaps be 
detected here, yet it is still clear that the party leader had suffered an embarrassing defeat in his 
specialism - bureaucratic politics - and made by Morrison to look unsympathetic to his 
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followers' concerns. Over an issue of great symbolic importance to the party, it was the biggest 
reversal Attlee had suffered since the outbreak of war. 
vi 
Given the reduced willingness of their followers to accede to their demands, in early 1941 the 
leaders returned to their efforts to mark out certain rhetorical landmarks for Labour with the now- 
customary emphasis on policy statements, official literature and partisan public speeches. Attlee 
himself made two major speeches on reconstruction in February and March 1941. In the first, at 
Tonypandy on 16 February, he again used the heady rhetoric of socialist advance, proclaiming 
that 'there can be no return to the post-war world', whilst the following month, in Glasgow, he 
stressed that 'Unity in the face of the enemy demands the suspension of party political strife, but 
this does not mean that people should give up considering political, social and economic 
questions, or that people should not publicly discuss, such questions and state various points of 
view'. 166 In March, the NEC published the pamphlet The Labour Party, the War and the Peace. 167 
This consisted of two memoranda that the Executive planned to submit to the 1941 Conference. 
Stridently pro-war and affirming Labour's 'determination to fight until Nazism and Fascism are 
overthrown', it rejected any notion of negotiated peace and emphasised that the leaders would 
'have no part ... in a policy of accommodation, and that the necessary prelude to a just peace is 
total victory'. 168 This statement, along with the original Bournemouth resolution in support of the 
Coalition, was to be used frequently by Attlee and the leadership to ward off dissent for the rest of 
the war. Yet the pamphlet also attempted to reassure the party, by offering numerous sops to 
Labour opinion: it again attacked the Chamberlain ministry, and stressed the need to 
'destroy ... the paradox of poverty', making detailed proposals for wholesale social and economic 
reform - which, naturally, paralleled remarkably closely what the, government was already doing, 
but simply under the alternate guise of 'socialism'. 169 
Just weeks later, in May 1941, the NEC published another piece of literature, Lahour in the 
Government: 4 Record ofSocial Legislation in War Time. 170 With the Conference due to take 
place the following month, the document self-evidently amounted to another effort to appease 
both Labour MPs and the rank-and-file in hopes of avoiding confrontation by drawing attention to 
the manifold successes of the party's ministers. This pamphlet was rather different from most 
166 Both cited in Labour in the Government: A Record ofSocial Legislation in War Time (Labour Party, 
1941). 
16' The Labour Party, the War and the Peace (Labour Party, 194 1). 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
"0 Labour in the Government: A Record ofSocial Legislation in War Time (Labour Party, 194 1). 
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other political publications of the era; rather than a relatively plain cover, the document was 
unusually professional and featured nine photographs on the cover of prominent Labour 
ministers, a presentational device conveying a sense of the authority wielded by these men. 171 
Reading it, one gets the clear impression that the leaders knew they were faced with a much 
changed, and less compliant, environment. Alongside the now-familiar denunciations of the 
Conservative governments, it stressed the role of the Labour ministers in Britain's resistance to 
Nazi Germany, and asserted that this resistance had been 'a triumph of government' in which the 
leadership group had played an 'outstanding' part. '72 Continually underlining both the ministers' 
contribution to the war effort, and the implementation of Labour policies they had secured, the 
document argued that while the Coalition, because it was a cross-parýy alliance 'does not always 
do what any one party would like', nonetheless 
Labour in the government has fullyjustified itself. Labour ministers hold key offices, and are taking a full 
share in the direction of the war effort. Clem Attlee, leader of the Party, shares with the Prime Minister the 
great responsibility of leading the country to victory and a successful peace. 173 
Such language constituted an open appeal for support, stressing the great influence that Labour 
now held. In keeping with this, eight-and-a-half of the pamphlet's fourteen pages were devoted to 
detailing legislation won by the Labour ministers from the Conservatives. 174 As during the 
phoney war, then, Labour's leaders were compelled to seek ways of buying their followers' 
support through the use of particular types of rhetoric. Using language to shape their environment 
thus remained central to the strategy of Attlee and his colleagues, but, no matter how much of this 
rhetoric they deployed, changes deep within the Labour party were clearly occurring by early 
1941, and starting to make themselves felt. 
But despite their increasing difficulties, the 1941 Conference was still another significant public 
success for the Labour ministers. Advertising their record in office, and placing great weight on 
two policy statements, 'The War' and 'The Peace', for the second consecutive year the leadership 
group received acclamation for their activities. 'The War' stridently affirmed the rectitude of the 
course Labour had chosen, Attlee making a strong speech in introducing the document, stressing 
the prospects for ultimate victory and discussing reconstruction. 175 As at the 1940 Conference, the 
Labour leader entered a balanced and effective performance in defence of the controversial 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 1941 LPACR, pp. 131-4. 
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trajectory he had plotted, emphasising the righteous 'cause of civilisation against barbarism'. 176 
Making clear the determination of the party to fight on until 'total victory', 'The War' was passed 
by a majority of more than 120 to one. 177 'The Peace', meanwhile, emphasised the need to 
implement socialism in the post-war era, and underlined Labour's legislative success in office. 179 
This too was passed by an overwhelming majority. ' 79 The centrepiece of the leadership group's 
Conference platform, then, was Labour's record in the Coalition; in pushing this heavily, and 
backed by union bloc votes, they deprived the recent dissension of a voice. Hence, despite 
Attlee's being unable to mark the first year in office with a crowning achievement in the form of 
announcing the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act - Churchill had refused, to budge - the period 
since the formation of the Coalition had unquestionably represented a successful continuation of 
the course they had plotted since the outbreak of war. "O 
Attlee also seized the opportunity to reassert himself against Laski shortly after the event, for, 
though his rival received a boost by topping the poll in the election to the NEC constituencies 
section, the leader nonetheless oversaw changes to the membership of Laski's Reconstruction 
sub-committee. '81 All members of the Policy sub-committee were henceforth to be made 
members of Laski's new body - placing Morrison in the awkward position of either having to 
endorse policies with which he did not really agree, or rebut proposals he affected to support. 182 it 
was thus Attlee's turn to manoeuvre. At the same meeting, Morrison abruptly resigned his 
membership of the Policy committee. 183 Why did he do this? The Home Secretary's explanation 
was simply that he no longer wished to be a member, and he would rather sit on the Elections 
sub-committee. 184 Yet, given that the Policy committee was the key arena for developing and 
advertising new ideas - so central to Morrison's plans - this seems a slim justification; the only 
obvious answer was that he recognised that Attlee had outmanoeuvred not only Laski, but him as 
well, and did not want to be placed in the position of undermining his own efforts to depict 
himself as Labour's champion. Attlee had played another political masterstroke. Being wary of 
having to repudiate the policies of his ally Laski on a committee which Morrison himself had 
been central in creating seems the only satisfactory explanation for a strange decision. This brief 
sequel to the Laski episode underlines Attlee's capacity to impose himself by playing the 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 1941 LPACR, pp. 60-5. 
179 2,413,000 to 30,000 - 1941 LPACR, pp. 143-7. 180 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, 2/2 folio 11, Attlee to Churchill, no date, but early 1941 
(subsequent references to the Attlee papers denote the larger Bodleian collection unless otherwise noted). 
181 NEC papers, Result of Conference ballot, June 1941. 
182 NEC minutes, 25 June 1941. See also NEC Policy Sub-committee minutes, 4 July 1941. 
183 NEC minutes, 25 June 1941. 184 Ibid. 
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bureaucratic game, regrouping after his defeat the previous month and managing to both tie Laski 
up in new knots and turn Morrison's own manoeuvres against him. 
Vil 
The leadership group's political strategy, orchestrated and implemented so efficiently during the 
phoney war, had been prosecuted with a similar degree of effectiveness during the first year of the 
Churchill Coalition. The convergence of three key factors - the skill of the party's leaders, 
recognition by a majority of their followers of the need to remain in office, and the less-than 
favourable progress of the war with Germany - had ensured that their high-wire balancing act 
was not fatally upset. As prior to their entry into government, they had sought to buy the support 
of their party with measures - both legislative and rhetorical - so as to permit them to continue 
down their chosen path. This is not to suggest that the Labour ministers did not believe in these 
measures, or the things they said about planning and reconstruction. But, as actors concerned with 
avoiding a challenge to their authority, such appeasement was a crucial element of leadership in 
the circumstances of cross-party alliance. Moreover, this was also a continuation of the tactic they 
had used between September 1939 and May 1940 to keep their party quiescent while attempting 
to engineer a seizure of power in a reconstructed ministry, and which they were to persist in 
employing as a means to ward off dissent until the break up of the Coalition in 1945. Little was 
changed as a result of the entry into office. In addition, the Labour ministers had exerted their 
influence across the whole of the governmental machine. Bevin was the key figure in organising 
the domestic war effort, Moi-rison held similar prominence on the home front, and the party's 
other representatives - with the obvious exception of Greenwood - were mostly well-ensconced 
in office. But, as so often before, it was Attlee who represented the key to Labour's exploitation 
of their situation. The leader possessed a unique degree of power within Whitehall, having 
entrenched himself at the centre of government. Further, in constructing the Administrative 
Committee, and entrusting the party to Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence, Attlee demonstrated 
his intention to keep Labour on a short leash. By engineering a situation where there were two 
relatively separate spheres within the Labour party - the NEC and the PLP - the leadership group 
ensured that they maintained their grip over their followers, remaining the only figures who had 
sufficient authority in these two arenas to exercise decisive influence in both. 
Yet, at the same time, however, storm clouds were gathering from early 1941. Disaffection was 
reaching worrying levels. Though isolated and largely unrepresentative for most of the first year 
of office, Shinwell, Bevan, and Laski were all significant manufacturers -and exploiters - of 
discontent. Moreover, they were now well-established, particularly Laski. Yet, to some extent, the 
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three were ahead of the tide of opinion within Labour; it was dissatisfaction among the ordinary 
rank-and-file towards alliance with the Conservatives and a government that refused to make 
socialist noises (even if much of its legislation was socialist) that was beginning to pose the 
greatest threat. This resided at the root of the sea-cbange of 1941. As a result, despite their 
balancing of competing tensions, the leadership group's newly-acquired executive power was 
wielded against a backdrop of deteriorating relations within the Labour party itself. Over time, 
this facilitated a situation in which multiple combustible elements constantly threatened to 
provoke an open revolt. Even Attlee could do little but attempt to manage these crises. Hence, 
whilst during the first year of office the party had largely supported its leaders, over the 
subsequent period the situation was to worsen dramatically. The outcome was a party racked by 
dissent for the rest of the war, continually kicking against the straitjacket of coalition, a persistent 
deterioration in the state of internal relations, and gradual weakening of the ability of the 
leadership group to impose their authority. A new, and vicious, attack by Bevan in Tribune just 
days after the Conference set the tone for what was to come: 
It is now clear to all ... that the Labour party under its existing leadership is ossified and may soon cease to 
be an effective political force. We deceive ourselves if we imagine that by a continuation of the present 
leadership ... can [Labour] ever be a vehicle by which socialism can be achieved ... [in the] leadership, 
pygmies have taken the place of giants. 185 
More dangerous times lay ahead. 
185 Tribune, 6 June 1941. 
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Chapter four - Decline 
The second year of the Churchill Coalition saw the Labour party descend into open internecine 
strife. The threats which had emerged during the first half of 1941 developed rapidly, weakening 
the standing of the Labour ministers, and provoking a series of sustained challenges to their 
authority. Fundamental changes in the stability of the party thus occurred, as the prospect of 
outright repudiation of Attlee's strategy became a serious possibility! Events since 1939 had 
established a problematic pattern for the leaders, in that their fragile position depended on 
keeping the Labour party both happy and Weak; but it now became impossible to do both any 
longer. This chapter examines the decline of the Labour ministers' ability to control the party and 
the series of conflicts which destabilised it. As the prospect of military defeat receded - bolstered 
by the entry of the USSR and USA into the war - unhappiness was finally given free rein. 
Resentment at the Coalition's perceived failure to implement socialism, and its inaction over 
planning for the future -a symbolic theme which was to be at the core of Labour party politics 
until 1945 - energiscd these changes, and gave the enemies of the leaders the means to attack 
them. The chapter describes how the situation evolved into a sustained effort by much of the party 
to break free from its restraints and by the leadership to prevent it from doing so. The goals of 
men such as Bevan, Laski, and Shinwell varied, from destruction of the Coalition to the removal 
of Attlee, but all constituted, and helped to motivate, serious threats to the leadership group's 
strategy. More worrying still, even those who were non-nally loyalist now became sympathetic to 
revolt. 
Despite the veiled struggle between Attlee and Morrison over NEC reconstruction planning in 
early 1941, from the middle of the year, and with the situation becoming ever more dangerous, 
the leaders were forced to co-operate to an unprecedented degree. For a time, their shared belief 
in the importance of the Coalition compelled them to set personal animosities aside and work 
together as the Labour party convulsed around them. This was not least because senior figures 
found themselves personally implicated in, and damaged by, these storms. With the political ship 
he had navigated in danger of being blown onto the rocks, the Labour leader set about working to 
make it all but impossible for his followers to break with his strategy. Therefore Attlee, as well as 
the other Labour ministers, embarked upon a path which would, in the period examined in the 
second half of the thesis, eventually lead them to support continuing the Coalition even after the 
war, and, in doing so, thus began steering the party towards longer-term alliance with the 
1 The papers of the PLP and the Administrative Committee from mid 1941 are available, being of 
considerable benefit to our ability to map the internal politics of the party during this period, and are an 
under-used resource. The Committee met several times a week, while the PLP usually met once a week. 
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Conservatives. This was the biggest shift in the British political landscape since May 1940, and it 
was again-the Labour leader that was at the centre of it. His rival Morrison, meanwhile, was faced 
with the outright collapse of his own standing in the party through a fresh row about his activities 
as Home Secretary. With victory a long way off, and the Conservatives resistant to either future 
commitments or further wartime reform, the leadership group now had little to offer the Labour 
party in terms of fresh legislative achievements. The huge extension of the powers of the state 
since 1939, and the influence exerted within the government by the Labour ministers, failed to 
appease party opinion. Further, whereas previously the leadership group had simply made vague, 
reassuring noises on this subject, their ability to so easily placate their followers diminished 
rapidly from 1941 as their willingness to represent Labour interests within the Coalition became 
suspect. The notion that the leaders were betraying Labour out of careerism spread widely. 
Confronted with the emergence of open conflict, the high sounding rhetoric and language used to 
retain the party's support earlier in the war was now replaced with more forceful measures. Yet, 
every attempt by the Labour ministers to shore up their position, and every 'victory' in turning 
back an attack, only exacerbated the situation as each crisis became more serious than the last. 
During 1939 and 1941, the Labour party had been largely united, at least in terms of common 
adherence to a particular strategy. From 1941 that all changed. 
I 
After the damaging rows of the first half of the year, the party's internal cohesion declined rapidly 
over the summer and autumn of 1941. Growing Labour party pressure to nationalise the railways 
- which had been increasing for several months - dealt a highly embarrassing blow to the leaders 
in the summer, when the party formally criticised the government for the first time. Responding 
to the agitation from their followers, Attlee and the Labour ministers fought stubbornly within the 
Cabinet for nationalisation of the industry, the leader personally pushing public ownership 
through the Lord President's Committee twice, only to be overruled by the War Cabinet. 2 Failure 
left them exposed, taken as another sign that Labour was getting very little benefit from its 
membership of the government. The NEC expressed its 'profound dissatisfaction', while Pethick- 
Lawrence broke with the government in Parliament by putting down a motion advocating 
nationalisation. 3 This was the first time that Attlee's efforts had been the subject of a formal 
statement of displeasure from the party; it constituted an embarrassment and demonstration of his 
2 CAB 71/3, LP (41) 104, 'The Railways and the War: Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal', I July 194 1; 
CAB 71/2, LP (41) 26, Lord President's Committee minutes, 3 July 194 1; CAB 71/2, LP (41) 29, Lord 
President's Committee minutes, 8 July 194 1; CAB 65/19, WM (41) 70, War Cabinet conclusions, 15 July 
1941. 
3 Attlee papers, 4/4, Middleton to Attlee, 3 October 1941; Hansard, vol. 374,22 October 1941, cols. 1805- 
12. 
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reduced ability to dictate to his followers. The leader's attempts to extract this appeasing measure 
from the Conservatives having been blocked, Attlee found himself exposed on the front - 
nationalisation - where the Labour ministers were most vulnerable. In this changing environment, 
the ministers were forced to rely more than ever on their allies and proxies as their own 
independent standing declined. Lees-Smith continued to act like a government spokesman (for 
example, after the loss of Crete, he simply shrugged off the German invasion, made no criticism 
whatever of the conduct of the war, and declared that Britain remained in a favourable position), 
and he and Pethick-Lawrence played an increasingly important role in winning backing for 
ministerial decisions at party meetings. 4 
That the Labour ministers had lost much ground since the turn of the year was reinforced when 
Bevan - who shortly afterwards became editor of Tribune - continued his efforts to mobilise the 
party against them, announcing that the columns of that newspaper would henceforth be used in a 
campaign for the purpose of 'revitalising' Labour in order to create a ground-swell of opinion. 5 
He also became increasingly obsessed with the notion of a 'Second Front' to relieve the USSR, 
pressurising the Coalition and the party leaders on this constantly - much to the discomfort of a 
government happy to let the Russians absorb the weight of German aggression. 6 The failure to 
send direct military assistance to Moscow became one of the most frequent complaints about the 
Coalition emanating from within the party. Bevan - continuing his tactic of parliamentary 
skirmishing - also made a series of significant Commons assaults on the leaders, openly attacking 
Attlee and Bevin for not delivering extensive nationalisation by charging them with failing 'a test 
of will and courage', accusing the Labour ministers of having an 'exaggerated sense of their own 
7 importance', and 'working against the public interest'. The Welshman also began to move 
against the Coalition itself, calling for the government to be 'wholly reconstructed'! Attlee and 
the ministers had hardly 'abandoned' Labour, as he depicted - in addition to pressurising on 
railways, Attlee and Bevin were agitating within the government on Indian reform, another 
traditional Labour cause - but this counted for little; it was how the leaders were perceived that 
'Hansard, vol. 372,10 June 1941, cols. 63-70. 
5 Tribune, 20 June 194 1. 
6 There is a large volume of Bevan-authored material on the Second Front in on Tribune, 4 July 194 1, but 
the theme recurred constantly throughout the year. Bevan's editorial pieces (he had previously been a 
member of the editorial board) were long and weighty, frequently up to 3,000 words. See also Hansard, 
vol. 3 74,23 October 194 1, col. 1977. This affiliation with the Russia movement apparently led M15 to put 
Bevan under surveillance in 1941 - Foot, Bevan, pp. 33 8-9. 7 Hansard, vol. 373,5 August 1941, col. 1844, & vol. 376,18 December 1941, cols. 2202-6. 
8 Hansard, vol. 324,23 October 194 1, col. 1972-82. Bevan's conduct led the Wesiern Mail to condemn his 
behaviour, describing him as a 'flamboyant egotist' and writing that 'every marmerism that he cultivates, 
every speech he delivers, even the expression he wears in the most familiar photographs, bears witness to a 
profound consciousness of his own superiority' - cited Foot, Bevan, p. 347. 
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was important. 9 These, and a multitude of other public rows, did much to create an atmosphere of 
hostility and non-compliance, and broke the earlier taboo against attacking the leaders while a 
war was being fought. Laski got to work on his Reconstruction prqjectý and began pressing the 
leadership group over the need not only for public ownership, but to implement extensive post- 
war reforms while the war was still taking place. Coupled with his heavy public criticisms of the 
Labour ministers via regular articles in Tribune, the Daily Herald, and the Nation assailing the 
leaders over national isation, as well as another broadside blaming Attlee personally for the lack of 
reform under the headline 'Don't Keep Us Waiting, Clem', Laski's efforts added to this now 
relentless chorus of disaffection. 10 In September, he even put forward another manifesto 
advocating immediate socialist reform and seeking a confrontation with the government. " In his 
fight with Attlee and the Coalition, Laski had continued his efforts of earlier in the year and was 
now set upon manufacturing an alternative course for Labour, having decided that 'the party has 
got to be made to stand up for certain vital principles, even against the loyalty of its leaders to 
Winston'. 12 That the Labour ministers' ability to reassure their dissatisfied followers was 
declining at a worrying rate is confirmed by the fact that Ede described much of the PLP as 
f JIOW. 13 distinctly 'restless' with the strategy they were being forced to 0 
H 
Faced with this growing willingness to question his leadership, Attlee tried a number of ways to 
strengthen the position of the ministers. Aware of the enthusiasm shown throughout the Labour 
movement over the Russian issue, and having been stung by the pressure of Bevan, Laski, and the 
Trihune 'Arius to Russia' campaign, Attlee reacted by publicly aligning himself with this populist 
cause - even though he profoundly differed from its foreign policy prescriptions - in a blatant 
attempt to tack back toward his followers. 14 As described in the previous chapter, Attlee 
recognised that permitting too great a distance to open up between the ministers and the party 
might prove fatal. Yet over the summer, with Churchill frequently abroad, Attlee was left running 
'Amery Diary, 27 June 194 1, p. 695; Bevin letter to Amery, cited R. J. Moore, Churchill Cripps and India 
(London, 1979), p. 47. 
10 See these publications throughout 1941, but good examples can be found in Tribune, 9 May 1941, and 
Nation, 22 March 194 1; Harold Laski, Great Britain, Russia and the Labour Party (London, 194 1); for 
Attlee's comments on some of Laski's literature, see Attlee papers, Attlee to J. Chamberlain, 2 December 
1941. 
11 NEC Reconstruction sub-committee minutes, 17 September 194 1. 
12 Cited Newman, Laski, p. 219. 
13 British Library, Baron Chuter Ede papers, Ede Diary, I October 1941 (pp. 18-9). Page references in 
brackets refer to the published version of the diary: Kevin Jefferys (ed. ) Labour and the Wartime Coalition: 
From the Diary ofJames Chuter Ede, 1941-1945 (London, 1987). 
14 For example, The Times, II July, 21 July and 14 August 194 1. 
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the country, and simply had less time to devote to Labour affairs at this crucial juncture. 15 
Nonetheless, many of his public statements came to concentrate upon the theme of applauding 
Soviet resistance to the German invasion, emphasising that vital assistance would be sent from 
Britain to Moscow, and the commonality of the struggle now facing the two countries in their 
16 'single fight' against 'the same enemy'. The leader declared that 'Britain does not regard the 
Russo-German fight in the east and the fight in the west as separate warsi. 17 Attlee also tried to 
return to reassuring his followers over the old issue of peace aims, warmly welcoming the 
Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in August, and emphasising that it offered 
the possibility of a new global order free from the spectre of power politics. 18 Yet the leader's 
employment of such rhetoric was now less effective in a party so widely disillusioned. The issue 
of what Labour wanted to achieve from the war again rebounded on Attlee at the TUC 
Conference the following month, when he was heavily criticised over the Coalition's failure to 
produced a formal statement of its aims, and was forced to defend the govemment's record in a 
hostile debate, making no apology and stressing that while he and the rest of the Cabinet took 
reconstruction seriously, they were nonetheless 'heavily engaged in seeing that the ship weathers 
the storm'. '9 Despite his efforts, the leader's attempts to win the support of his followers did not 
meet with the success of old, for the party could no longer be so easily bought off. Attlee was 
now fighting what was essentially a rear-guard action; whereas previously he had encountered 
minimal opposition, from mid 1941 all he could do was attempt to stay one step ahead and avoid 
major splits. It was not a task made easier by a public row in September between the two big 
beasts of the union world, Bevin and Citrine, over the Minister of Labour's powers, Attlee 
ordering them to drop the dispute before it proved 'gravely detrimental'. 20 
His efforts coming to little, in September Attlee largely abandoned conciliation, or at least added 
the tactics of the 'stick' to those of the 'carrot'. Faced with the precipitous decline of his ability to 
command the party, the leader sought instead to try and ensure that Labour would not be able to 
break free from the govemment even if it wanted to. Moreover, his decision to do so occurred 
15 Attlee's increased role can be gleaned from the Cabinet and War Cabinet papers and minutes; there are 
also hints in the Amery Diary. 
16 There are plenty of examples in the Attlee press cuttings file at the Labour party archive. See also PLP 
minutes, 25 June 194 1; NEC minutes, 30 July 194 1; Hansard, vol. 272,6 August 194 1, cols. 1973-8 1. 
Harris, Attlee, p. 189. 
17 Hansard, vol. 374,9 September 194 1, col. 150; NEC minutes, 30 July 194 1. 
18 Hansard, vol. 374,9 September 194 1, cols. 151-2. Amery, in contrast, called the Charter 'fluffy 
flapdoodle' - Amery Diary, 14 August 194 1, p. 7 10. 19 1941 TUCAnnual Report, pp. 110-12. 
20 Citrine complained of Bevin's powers to compulsorily direct skilled labour, and the Daily Herald threw 
its weight behind Citrine. After Attlee compelled both to restrain themselves, Bevin, amusingly, responded 
by insisting that 'a vendetta is foreign to my nature'. See Sir Walter Citrine, Two Careers, p. 95; Churchill 
College, Cambridge, Bevin papers, Bevin to Citrine, I October 194 1. 
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against a background of continuing - and worsening - opposition to the electoral truce, and 
hostility to Labour's inactivity at by-elections. 21 Attlee thus attempted to permanently cement his 
strategy, and entrench the party's membership of the Coalition, by trying to extend the truce even 
further. In doing so, he laid the foundations for a bid to prolong the alliance with the Conservative 
leaders beyond the end of the war. Thus, it is here that we should identify the initial indications of 
what would eventually evolve into a preference for a longer-term coalition, which became 
increasingly significant as the conflict wore on, and which Attlee was to fight for until the day the 
government collapsed. The leader approached Churchill and proposed that the truce and Coalition 
should now be backed by ajoint statement of support signed by Attlee, the prime minister, and 
22 Sinclair, for all government candidates at by-elections, regardless of their party affiliation. This 
was a more explicit proclamation of alliance than had existed hitherto, and amounted to a political 
'coupon' - although that phrase was studiously avoided. 23 Attlee was attempting to bind his 
followers to the government inextricably, or at least confirm the primacy of his own decision- 
making. It signified an effort to dam the growing disaffection within the party by establishing a 
formal appeal for unity as the norm for by-election contests - something the Labour party could 
only break with at its peril ?4 The measure also demonstrated the leader's willingness to confront 
his party with the prospect of electoral annihilation in order to keep it on the path he had chosen 
for it. Attlee and the Labour ministers had no intention of relinquishing the power they had won. 
Given the controversy over the truce which had persisted for more than two years, this was a bold 
departure, and not without risks - the 'coupon' concept had been an emotive issue since 1918, 
and Attlee seemed determined to tic the hands of his followers with a similar arrangement. It was 
the most significant attempt to alter the contours of the political world since the formation of the 
Coalition and, just as he had played such a critical role in re-shaping that environment during the 
phoney war, it was again Attlee who sought to instigate it. But that the leader made such an 
inevitably unpopular move underlines how far the disunity of the Labour party was now imagined 
to be threatening the ability of the leadership to stay upright on their tightrope. 
Unsurprisingly, Churchill agreed to the proposal immediately, and Attlee put it to the NEC the 
same day. 25 Yet, again unsurprisingly, it encountered resistance, with many, including some who 
were usually supportive of the leader, unwilling to countenance a more formal cross-party 
21 Evidence of complaints from the rank-and-file about the policy is plentiful in the NEC papers. See, for 
example, NEC minutes, 30 May 1941; NEC Organisation sub-committee minutes, 9 September 1941. 
22 Attlee papers, 2/125, Attlee to Churchill, 24 September 194 1. 
23 The phrase 'coupon' was never officially employed in official literature or public statements. 
24 Threats of what would happen if Labour was not seen as responsible were to be Attlee's chief means of 
enforcement for the next four years. 
25 NEC minutes, 24 September 194 1. 
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alliance . 
26 'Intense discussion' took place, and Shinwell was particularly vocal in arguing against 
Attlee's policy. 27 When a vote was taken, however, the measure was approved, albeit narrowly. 28 
Shinwell angered his enemies by warning that Labour would rebel, and there would be 'terrible 
repercussions' once it became known that the proposal had been agreed to by such a small 
margin. 29 This was taken to be a threat to reveal publicly how NEC members had voted, a 
violation of official rules, and earned Shinwell a rebuke on propriety. 30 
Nonetheless it is clear that, by the autumn of 194 1, Attlee was conducting a rear-guard, defensive 
policy, rather than one of offering positive inducements. It would seem that in the leader's mind 
the limits of appeasement had been reached and the struggle simply had to be fought out. His 
Gcoupon' also made apparent that, at least to the leaders of the British political nation, the 
Coalition was more than a marriage of convenience. The government was in fact a genuine 
alliance. It also demonstrates the scepticism and impatience with which political leaders had 
come to view traditional party politics. In the summer, Greenwood had declared that all members 
of the government wanted 'not merely to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, but to co- 
operate to theJullest measure in working together to restore the shattered fabric of our 
civilisation' -a statement which seems to hint at a post-war coalition. 31 Given this mindset, the 
basis for 'consensus' politics seems evident. Yet while Attlee's proposal offered a means of 
attempting to restrict the scope for Labour dissent - by threatening severe consequences for a 
break with the leader's strategy - at the same time it only antagonised the party. Forcing Labour 
even deeper into its alliance with the Conservative party was hardly likely to alleviate the mood 
of Attlee's followers. Moreover, the difficulty that he encountered in winning approval suggests 
that even the arena which had once been his secure powerbase, the NEC, was now reticent to 
accede to his orders. But the shift in his posture, with its accompanying outbreak of ill-will, 
indicates how dangerous the internal situation had become, and the imperative to shore up the 
leadership group's position by force. The measure signalled recognition that conciliation was now 
unlikely and other, more direct, means of preventing Labour from escaping its straitjacket had to 
be sought - even to the point of tacitly threatening it with electoral destruction. 
26 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 24 September 1941 (p. 286). 
27 Ibid; NEC minutes, 24 September 194 1. 
28 Ibid. The result was 13-10 in favour. Dalton was scathing, recording his contempt for those who 
continued to question the truce 'as though we had not moved beyond [that] debate' - Dalton Diary, 24 
September 1941 (p. 286). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 News Chronicle, 23 June 1941 (my emphasis). For a similar perspective from the Conservatives, in 
March 194 1, at a Conservative event, Churchill said that 'the ties of fdendships which are being formed 
between members of the administration ... will not be very easy to tear asunder' - Winston S. Churchill, The Unrelenting Struggle (London, 1943), p. 85. 
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The leaders did secure another, smaller, victory in late 1941, however, by torpedoing the 
credibility of their most adversarial critic. After his threat to reveal the scale of disagreement over 
the coupon, Shinwell immediately became a target for virtually all the Labour ministers. They 
were aided by the fact that his constantly offensive behaviour did Shinwell few favours among 
MPs, with whom his previously considerable popularity plummeted in the second half of 1941. 
Just days after the row over the NEC proceedings, he made a fierce public attack on Attlee and 
Bevin, and actually charged them with violating official Labour policy in failing to oversee the 
nationalisation of the mines ! 32 Attlee was furious, while Bevin made what Ede described as 'the 
best speech I have yet heard him make' in response. 33 A fortnight later, the rebel made the 
mistake of giving prior notice of his intention to push the PLP to confront the government over 
aid to Russia, resulting in a series of prepared public drubbings by Attlee, Dalton, and Lees- 
Smith, and he was humiliated in front of assembled WS. 34 The Administrative Committee 
denounced his efforts to undermine the leaders as 'disgraceful', and details of his behaviour were 
leaked to the press, causing Shinwell acute embarrassment and making clear publicly what had 
long been recognised in the PLP - that, since May 1940, he had been a grand-standing egotist. 35 
In the elections to the Administrative Committee, he was again humiliated by coming second 
from bottom of those elected - destroying his claim to speak for a substantial section of the party 
- while the next day it was A. V. Alexander, Labour's First Lord of the Admiralty, of all people, 
who flattened Shinwell once and for all, with a brutal assault in the Commons from which his 
position was never to properly recover. 36 By the end of the year, Shinwell's standing, and with it 
his long-term career ambitions, had been fatally weakened by the efforts of the Labour ministers 
to 'nail' their opponent and his own self-defeating behaviour. Shinwell's potential -which had 
seemed so promising during the previous two years - quickly atrophied, his claim to a powerful 
32 PLP minutes, I October 1941; Ede Diary, I October 1941 (pp. 18-9). 
33 lbid; Dalton Diary, I October 1941 (p. 288). Attlee leapt to his feet and shouted 'That's a damned lieP 
34 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 14 October 1941 & 21 October 194 1; Ede Diary, 14 October 
1941 (pp. 19-20) & 21 October 1941 (p. 2 1); PLP minutes, 15 October 194 1; Dalton Diary, 15 October 
1941 (pp. 294-5), 16 & 17 October 1941 (p. 295). 
35 lbid; PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 14 October 1941. 
36 PLP papers, 12 November 194 1. Ede and Dalton agreed that his low return was 'the best possible result', 
and when the results were read out and his name was not near the top of the poll, his expression 'became 
more and more grave' - Ede Diary, 12 November 1941 (p. 23); Dalton Diary, 12 November 1941 (p. 3 10); 
Hansard, vol. 376,13 November 1941, cols. 127848. In a lengthy barrage, Alexander denounced 
Shinwell's conduct, read out examples of speeches where he contradicted himself, and asserted that he 
'comes down again and again and stands at [the Dispatch] Box, frequently ... lashing himself into a fury, 
and indeed with a tremendously pontifical air as if he were the only person in the House who knew 
anything about any subject. I think the House will make the judgement that perhaps the hon. Member has to 
do something to salve his conscience with regard to not having joined in and accepted the offer of team 
work on behalf of his nation in the most extreme hour of her need'. The Commons was enjoying the 
demolition of Shinwell so much that when the First Lord was compelled to cease his attack with the end of 
the day's sitting approaching, Hansard records: 'HON. MEMBERS: "OH! "'. There was also apparently 
discontent with Shinwell in his constituency party at Seaharn - Dalton Diary, 19 November 1941 (pp. 316- 
7). 
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future role in ruins. Before long he was to be surpassed by Bevan as Labour's rising star outside 
the government. 
But the humiliation of Shinwell did not obscure the fact that the discontent which he had done so 
much to motivate was now a powerful force. In the same Administrative Committee elections 
where his fall from grace became apparent, the similarly reduced standing of the Labour ministers 
was also made abundantly clear. Non-ministers polled much better than members of the 
government - again underlining the dependence of the latter on their proxies - while the leaders 
were now so unpopular with MPs that the best performing minister, Alexander, could only 
manage sixth place. 37 Morrison, meanwhile, came in eleventh, indicating that his attempts to 
depict himself as a more authentic Labourite than Attlee had produced little reward so far, amid 
persistent ill-feeling about his censorship of the press. 38 It would perhaps be an exaggeration to 
say that the leaders were now held in contempt; but there is no doubt that by late 1941 they were 
not particularly revered. That proposals for the Labour ministers to be excluded from the PLP's 
governing body altogether -a potentially grave blow to their influence - were rejected is 
therefore less significant than the fact that they were heard in the first place. 39 Attlee's 'coupon' 
may have been important in demonstrating his refusal to be diverted, and hinting at a possible 
political ftiture, but it did little to stabilise the Labour party. Moreover, almost immediately, the 
dissension which had wracked the party was to erupt into open conflict. 
m 
Perhaps the defining moment in the increase of tensions camejust three weeks later, with the 
most serious crisis since the formation of the Coalition. Unsurprisingly, this was again centred 
upon control of industry, when Bevin's new powers to direct the labour force in the National 
Service Bill were not balanced by inclusion of nationalisation. At a party meeting on 2 December 
1941, Bevin was confronted by an Administrative Committee resolution declaring public 
ownership 'essential', but though he and Attlee had, as usual, fought within the Cabinet for 
national isation, they now adopted a show of solidarity with the Conservatives. 40 Resisting the 
complaints of MPs, Bevin even declared himself 'unconvinced' that nationalisation would have 
f-t. 4 any real bene 11 He and Attlee asserted that public ownership could not be enacted without a 
general election mandate, but, while Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence threw their weight behind 
37 PLP papers, 12 November 1941. Pethick-Lawrence and Jim Griffiths topped the poll. 
38 Ibid. 
39 PLP minutes, 12 November 194 1; Ede Diary, 12 November 1941 (p. 23); Dalton Diary, 12 November 
1941 (p. 3 10). 
40 PLP minutes, 2 December 194 1. 
41 Ibid; Ede Diary, 3 December 1941 (p. 28). 
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the leaders, it was obvious that Labour's hostility to the Bill was such that it would prove 
42 impossible to force the PLP en masse into the government lobby. Attlee made an 'ineffective' 
bid to persuade the party to support the Labour ministers, and drew comparisons between the 
activities of the rebels and those of the ILP during the second MacDonald administration, but 
some MPs had obviously determined to oppose the Bill come what may. 43 Ede felt that the 
hostility within the parliamentary party had become so severe that the dissidents - Bevan and 
Shinwell foremost among them - were attempting to 'kill' the Coalition, and feared that the 
government would collapse if these antagonisms continued, believing withdrawal of Labour 
support from the Coalition to be likely. 44 Churchill could certainly have plumped for a snap 
election if doubtful about the strength of Labour backing. 45 For the first time since 1939, then, the 
leadership group were in danger of losing control of events. Of course, whether the Big Four, or 
the rest of the ministers, would have left the Coalition even if called upon to do so by their MPs is 
debatable; Bevin, particularly, would have been resistant. The crisis accelerated when efforts by 
Lees-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence to broker a compromise came to naught, and a threat by Attlee 
that he would not go on in government unless the PLP backed him was seen through as the bluff 
it was . 
46 In the end, more than a third of the PLP abstained, while thirty-six Labour MPs - twenty 
percent of the total - rebelled and voted against the government in the Commons. 
47 Even more 
worryingly, as Brooke has noted, many of the rebels were the mining MPs who represented 
Attlee's natural base of support. 48 
The revolt was not as large as had perhaps seemed likely, but was nevertheless a serious blow. 
The Labour party was gradually reasserting its independence from the government. Further, with 
their authority so publicly repudiated by a large section of the party, the Labour ministers were 
compelled to co-operate with one another more fully than ever before. Their bid to persuade the 
NEC to warn the PLP to support the government was scotched by Laski, while the crisis was only 
finally resolved by a firm statement on discipline, read to the parliamentary party by Pethick- 
Lawrence and almost certainly drafted by Lees-Smith, which affirmed the need for adherence to 
42 Ibid; PLP minutes 2 December 1941. 
43 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 3 December 1941; PLP minutes, 3 December 1941; Ede Diary, 
3 December 1941 (pp. 26-9); Dalton Diary, 3 December 1941 (p. 329). Dalton thought there was 'much 
rebel activity in the wings'. 
44 Ede Diary, 3 December 1941 (pp. 26-9), &4 December 1941 (p. 29). 
45 It is, of course, possible that the romantic Churchill, with his dreams of grand parliamentary alliances, 
would not have called an election even if Labour became persistently rebellious, or MPs withdrew their 
support for the Coalition; but it seems unlikely that he would have neglected the opportunity to smash the 
Opposition party in such circumstances, or allowed Labour to enjoy even more of a double-dividend than it 
did already. 
46 Ibid; PLP minutes, 4 December 1941. 
47 Hansard, vol. 376,4 December 1941, cols. 1348-50; Ede Diary, 4 December 1941 (P. 29). 
48 Brooke, Labour's War, p. 83. 
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the Standing Orders and loyalty to the Labour ministers. 49 Appealing to the party's self-interest 
by warning of electoral calamity if Labour broke with the government, the memorandum stated 
that there was no legitimate reason for ever voting against the official line, and was followed in 
January 1942 by Pethick-Lawrence's tightening up of the Standing Orders. 50 These were more 
effective blows than the Labour ministers themselves - rapidly losing traction with their followers 
- had been able to land. Yet it was indicative of the mood of Labour politics, as well as leadership 
uncertainty that it would be accepted, that the warning was not actually put to a vote .51 An 
authoritarian rant by Morrison against the effort to disrupt the government - indicating the 
contrast between his efforts to undermine Attlee earlier in the year, and his true position now that 
the Coalition was actually in danger - only angered MPs, who complained of his 'Cockney 
52 
smartness'. A fault line had thus opened up between the Labour ministers and their followers, 
isolating the former to a worrying degree. It was the first time Labour politics had slipped into 
overt conflict since 1939. Oddly enough, however, these precise complaints were being aired at 
the same time within the Conservative party as well, Amery recording that 'the general feeling of 
restlessness about the government in our party [is] getting very acute ... because they did not feel 
53 
that there was anyone inside the Cabinet who stood for the Conservative point of view at all'. 
The similarity with the complaints emanating from the Labour party is striking, and indicates that 
the crux of the issue was that both of the parliamentary parties - the massed ranks of MPs who 
made up the political nation - were just bored. Further, as subsequent events in the first months of 
1942 would confirm, the rejection of the Labour ministers' authority on this most emotive of 
issues virtually destroyed their collective ability to dictate to their followers. They now wielded 
secure control over neither the NEC nor PLP. Bevan began advocating the break up of the 
Coalition, 'expecting' the alliance to collapse early in the new year, and some MPs were 'light- 
hearted' about 'bringing the government down'. 54 There is little doubt that the tide had turned 
against the leaders, and, by the end of 194 1, the taboo of not attacking the Labour ministers had 
been decisively broken with; finding themselves powerless to stop it, for the rest of the war the 
49 Dalton Diary, 8 December 1941 (p. 33 1); NEC minutes, 8 December 194 1; PLP Administrative 
Committee minutes, II December 194 1; PLP Administrative Committee papers, 'Confidential 
memorandum on Party Policy', no date, but mid-December 194 1; PLP minutes, 17 December 194 1. 
Pethick-Lawrence presided over the meeting because Lees-Smith was taken ill. 
50 PLP Administrative Committee papers, 'Confidential memorandum on Party Policy', no date, but mid- 
December 1941. 
51 PLP minutes, 17 December 1941. 
52 Ede Diary, 19 December 1941 (p. 36). 
53 4mery Diary, 18 December 194 1, p. 754. Amery went on that 'There [is[ considerable regret ... that Winston had been made leader of the party for it deprived the party of someone who could speak on its 
behalf to Winston and stand up to him'. Moreover, there was little love lost between most Conservative 
MPs and both Churchill and his deputy, the former 'glamour boy', Eden. They both neglected the party 
much more than did the Labour leaders, and indeed thought little of it in the first place. Moreover, 
Churchill's inner circle were long-standing eccentrics and despised by most Conservatives. 
54 Tribune, 5 December 194 1; Ede Diary, 19 December 1941 (p. 3 6). 
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leadership group was never again to enjoy the relatively secure position vis 6 vis their party that 
they had occupied between 1939 and 194 1. 
Moreover, before the year was even out, events in late December indirectly precipitated a series 
of even more destabilising internal disputes early in 1942, culminating in a bid by Laski to 
engineer the collapse of the Coalition and overthrow Attlee himself. The event which began a 
new cycle of fratricidal conflict was the seemingly unrelated matter of the death of Lees-Smith in 
December, a bitter blow to the embattled leaders . 
55 After allowing tempers to cool for several 
weeks after the National Service Bill rebellions, in January, Attlee - again largely on his own 
authority - had Pethick-Lawrence appointed his successor. 16 Immense pressure was brought to 
bear from what Dalton termed 'the machine' to ensure that no other names were put forward, and 
Wilkinson was 'bullied' into withdrawing the more independent Jim Griffiths' name . 
5' Yet his 
stint in thejob lasted only a matter of weeks, for, in early February, Churchill undertook a 
Cabinet re-shuffle and sacked the ineffectual Greenwood from the government altogether. While 
the fact that Attlee did not move to save Greenwood is telling, that the deputy leader's 
performance in office had been poor cut little ice with a party already suspicious of the 
Coalition. " Ede recorded that the mood of the PLP was one of fury. 59 At the next PLP meeting, 
Attlee took the chair himself and simply shunted Pethick-Lawrence aside and imposed 
Greenwood in his place. 60 
That the prime minister had dared to dispense with Labour's deputy leader provided yet another 
issue for the party to hit out at its leaders, even though many were sceptical about Greenwood's 
capacity to perform his new duties. 61 Yet the re-shuffle was hardly a weakening of the Labour 
55 For comments on his death and his performance as acting leader, see Ede Diary, 19 December 1941 
(p. 34); Dalton Diary, 18 December 1941 (p. 226); Hansard, vol. 376,19 December 1941, cols. 2270-1. The 
Lees-Smith press cuttings file at the Labour party archive contains useful material. Dalton described him as 
a 'first-class colleague ... his place will not be easily filled', while Attlee said he was someone 'we could ill 
S arel. 
5FPLP minutes, 21 January 1942. It was evident from the start that Pethick-Lawrence would be his 
replacement - Dalton Diary, 18 December 1941 (p. 336). 57 Ede Diary, 21 January 1942 (p. 40); Dalton Diary, 21 January 1942 (pp. 351-2). As Dalton noted, 
Griffiths was an ambitious young man who was frequently aggressive towards the government. As an NEC 
member, the job would also have enabled Griffiths - who on simple merit may well have been the best man 
for the job - to straddle the crucial institutional bridge that only the leaders (and Shinwell) currently 
occupied. 
"' There is no documentary evidence which suggests that Attlee made any attempt to save Greenwood, a 
conclusion shared by the leader's biographer. See Harris, Attlee, p. 195. 
59 Ede Diary, 25 February 1942 (p. 57). See also the PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 3 March 1942, 
where it was impressed upon Attlee the need for reconstruction planning to be continued and to resist 
Conservative attempts to bury the issue. 
60 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 26 February 1942; Ede Diary, 26 February 1942 (p. 58). 
61 Many members of the Administrative Committee were sceptical about Greenwood's capacity for work, 
Griffiths and Shinwell both emphasising to the deputy leader that if he took the role he would have to 
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party, otherwise seeing another extension of Labour's grip on the domestic front (Dalton became 
President of the Board of Trade, and Attlee formally deputy prime minister) and no sign of a 
Conservative reassertion. 62 Attlee was largely responsible for fresh progress on the Indian issue, a 
populist cause in Labour circles, in early 1942 as chair of the Cabinet India Committee, while he 
also vetoed Churchill's plan to make Beaverbrook Minister of Production and overlord of the 
entire economic front. 63 He warned the prime minister that Bevin would resign and the Labour 
party rebel en masse; the matter was promptly dropped. 64 From a rational perspective, the Labour 
party stood at the apex of its influence, and its leader remained the vital power-broker in British 
politics. The party had never before enjoyed such power as it wielded by the middle of the 
Second World War. But, strange as it may seem, this counted for little. Further, with the USA 
now in the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Attlee 
remained busier than ever, running the country in Churchill's increasingly frequent absences. 65 
With the time he could devote to Labour politics increasingly constrained, Attlee's most 
troublesome opponent, Laski, was able to exploit the perception of a serious diminution of 
Labour's influence to launch a fresh attack on him. A furious Laski argued that the re-shuffle, and 
the decision not to nationalise industry, signified the failure of Attlee's leadership, and, having 
already decided that a change of leader was necessary - telling his wife in late 1941 that Labour 
would make no progress 'until we blow Attlee up' - he now launched an overt effort to change 
the party's direction and dislodge Attlee from his position. 66 
Laski did this by trying to set an ambush for the deputy prime minister at the NEC meeting called 
to consider the re-shuffle, by writing to other members of the Executive beforehand - including 
Morrison - and questioning Attlee's suitability for the top job, as well as urging the necessity of 
finally resolving the 'leadership issue'. 67 He confided to his wife that he aimed to use the furore 
attend Parliament 'constantly' - suggesting doubts about his ability or willingness to do so. Ede Diary, 26 
February 1942 (p. 56). Greenwood was in fact to perform rather better in his new job, evidently prefening 
life as a big political fish in a small pond. 
62 Attlee also became Secretary of State for the Dominions, but this carried few departmental 
responsibilities, and the leader continued to act as a roving administrator. He was replaced by Cripps as 
Lord Privy Seal. 
63 Amery Diary, 27 February 1942, pp. 754-5; Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, pp. 54-5; CAB 91 
minutes and papers, November 1941 -March 1942 (there are also comments on Attlee's role in the Amery 
Diary throughout late 1941 and early 1942); see also Attlee to Churchill, 9 January 1942, in CAB 65/25 
WM (42), 8,12 January 1942; Attlee memorandum, 'The Indian political situation', 2 February 1942, CAB 
66/21 WP (42) 59; Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 194. 
64 Ibid. Thereafter a mutual loathing existed between Attlee ('a miserable little man') and Beaverbrook (an 
4evil man'). 
65 See CAB 65,66 & 67 from December 1941 to March 1942 for evidence of Attlee's vastly-increased 
ministerial role. He ran the country for a full month at the turn of the year alone while Churchill was in the 
United States. 
66 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Frida Laski, undated but late 1941. 
67 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Frida Laski, 1,2,3, &4 March 1942. 
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surrounding the dismissal of Greenwood as a means to precipitate the outright repudiation of 
Attlee's leadership and push for withdrawal from the Coalition . 
68 He intended to persuade the 
NEC to send a delegation to Churchill demanding Greenwood's readmission, and, if the prime 
minister refused - as Laski clearly hoped -'that gives me a chance of fighting [at the upcoming 
annual Conference] for our exit from the government' . 
69 Apparently deluding himself that he was 
some sort of king-maker, at the NEC Laski argued that the party's position in the Coalition had 
been fatally damaged and questioned as to why this had been allowed to occur -a barb 
unmistakeably directed at Attlee. 70 The rebellious academic then stirred up fears that the re- 
shuffle was an effort to exclude Labour from reconstruction planning altogether .71 Yet, for the 
moment at least, the Labour ministers managed to weather the attacks. The leader and Bevin, who 
went along to the meeting, vigorously defended their representation of the party, while Morrison 
- again being loyal with so much at stake - failed to move against Attlee. 72 In the end, the NEC 
expressed its 'concern' with the sacking, but no demands for redress were made. 73 
Days later, having failed to get the Home Secretary to strike at Attlee, a desperate Laski tried to 
persuade Bevin ('easily the most outstanding figure in the Labour party', 'a fighting leader' who 
should become 'the first man') and later even Dalton ('the only viable alternative' to Attlee) to 
74 move against the leader, only to be ignored by both. These efforts indicate not merely Laski's 
questionable political judgement, but also that his actions were motivated simply by blind 
personal hatred for Attlee. Their feud had now come to dominate Laski's career. But he did find a 
more productive angle of attack when he openly targeted Attlee in the New Statesman two weeks 
later, accusing the leader of failing to defend Labour's interests in the War Cabinet. 75 As he had 
earlier posited to his wife as the means to collapse the government, he then approached Churchill 
personally and demanded that the Coalition carry out a socialist transformation of Britain. 76 When 
the prime minister rejected this, as Laski anticipated, this provided him with the platform - and 
ostensible justification - he sought. 77 Days later, Laski submitted to the NEC a powerful ten-point 
indictment of the Labour party's entire political strategy since 1939, an assault directed at Attlee 
personally and evidently aimed at providing the basis for a decisive confrontation with his 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 NEC minutes, 6 March 1942. 71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Bevin, March 1942; Dalton Diary, 21 April 1942 (p. 413). Dalton wrote in 
his diary that 'this little fool lives in an unreal world of his own making'. 
75 New Statesman, 21 March 1942. 
76 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Churchill, 26 March 1942; Martin, Laski, p. 153. 
77 Hull, Laski papers, Churchill to Laski, 27 March 1942. 
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enemy. 78 What is remarkable is that his attacks had little, if anything, to do with the cited reason 
for them - the sacking of Greenw(xA. Though Laski asserted that 'no personal considerations [vis 
4 vis] Mr. Attlee' had informed his action, this was an obvious untruth, and fooled no-one. 79 In a 
bitter attack on virtually everything Attlee had done since 1939, Laski charged that the rank-and- 
file were 'gravely perturbed' by the 'drift' and 'inaction' that the leadership group had chosen, 
and declared that Labour was 'being dragged along at the tail of the Conservative party'. 80 
Stressing the 'failure' of the Labour ministers to secure legislative concessions, he stated that 'in 
return for a handful of social reforms, none of them fundamental in character, we are assisting the 
vested interests of this country'. 8' Laski also challenged directly Attlee's doctrine of party 
management, arguing that 'I do not think it is an answer to ... say that coalition government is a 
process of give and take. I suggest that on all the fundamental matters we do all the giving and the 
Tories do all the taking'. 82 He went on to demand that 'steps must be taken [to implement 
socialism] hLefore the cessation of hostilities'. 83 Now openly trying to provoke the collapse of the 
government, the memorandum proposed an end to the electoral trace, asserting that 'I do not 
think we are entitled to go on with Mr. Churchill' and called for the NEC to formulate a 
cminimum programme' which should be demanded from the prime minister, 'and then stick to 
that programme at all costs. If it be said that this risks the break-up of the govemment we must 
take that risk'. 84 
Laski had made the most overt challenge yet launched to Attlee and the direction of the party. 
Despite his ludicrous disclaimer that he was not attacking the leader personally, it was clear to all 
that this was in fact precisely what Laski was doing, the minutes of the NEC meeting where the 
proposals were discussed beginning with the simple statement that 'The chairman suggested that 
85 Mr. Attlee should give his views regarding Mr. Laski's Memorandum'. The leader responded to 
the assault with a similarly aggressive barrage of his own, as so often unable to maintain his cool 
demeanour with Laski. 86 In a powerful invective, Attlee accused his opponent of ignoring the 
'fundamental facts' of the situation, in that Labour was vastly outnumbered by the Conservatives, 
and hence wholesale 'socialism' was simply unfeasible. 87 Further, he asserted that there was no 
78 NEC papers, Laski memorandum, 'The Party and the Future', early April 1942. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
132 Ibid (Laski's emphasis). 83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 NEC minutes, 9 April 1942. 86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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clear public support for a 'socialist policy', and a wartime general election was impracticable. 
Pouring scom on Laski's proposition that the Conservatives should be confronted with a choice 
between submitting to blackmail or the collapse of the Coalition, Attlee again raised the spectre 
of electoral rout in warning that, if Labour pulled out of the government 'when things looked 
black', the party would be perceived as having run away from its duty, with 'disastrous' 
consequences in an election - 'we should be out of it'. 89 Just as he and Bevin had done in late 
1941, a defiant Attlee once again rejected the notion that formal nationalisation of industry was 
necessary, and declared that 'It [is] not true to say ... that Labour was doing all the 'giving' and the 
Tories all the 'taking'. The Tories [hold] the other point of view'. 90 
Attlee turned back Laski's attack, but only narrowly. The 'general feeling' of a divided NEC was 
that, though that there was much dissatisfaction with the government's measures, the break-up of 
the Coalition would be 'disastrous'. 91 As he had over the unpopular by-election coupon, then, 
Attlee - lacking any more sophisticated means of bribing his followers - had got his way, and 
seen off Laski, by an open appeal to the instinct of simple self-preservation. It is again worth 
reiterating that the relevance of all this to the Greenwood issue seems doubtful. Rather, the 
struggle had been a duel between Laski and Attlee over the party's course, with that issue simply 
exploited by the former as a means to strike at the leader he despised. However, though Attlee 
had succeeded in putting his enemy back in his box - before long, Laski, fuming at his failure to 
galvanise the party into a break with its leaders, was raging impotently at Attlee that 'If you don't 
want to give a lead, get out and give way to someone who will' 
-- 
nonetheless his victory was a 
very limited one. 92 The clash constituted a vicious attack on his leadership and, worryingly, one 
which clearly attracted considerable sympathy in the upper echelons of the party. Laski's assault 
thus demonstrates how vulnerable the position of Labour's representatives had become. With 
both the NEC and PLP increasingly uncertain about the Labour ministers' course, and the party 
gripped by a near-constant series of crises, for Attlee, it was a 'victory' in name alone. 
IV 
Things soon got worse for the leaders in March 1942, when a new crisis developed which acted to 
destabilise the already fragile Labour party even further. It is also worth re-focusing our 
interpretative prism slightly here, for this latest split was centred upon Attlee's great rival and the 
88 Ibid. 
"9 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
9' Ibid. 
92 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Frida Laski, 23 June 1942. 
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party's heir apparent, Morrison, over the employment of his repressive powers as Home 
Secretary. As a result it not only inflicted considerable fresh damage to the authority of the 
leadership group as a whole, but also to Morrison personally. Attlee's rival thus remained centre- 
stage in party affairs, though not quite in the way that he would have wished. Despite his high 
public profile, the period 1941-2 had witnessed little progress for Morrison's ambition to usurp 
Attlee. Having spent much of 1939-40, and parts of 1940-1, attempting to dojust that, in the 
period analysed in the current chapter his fortunes stood at a low ebb, frustrated in his efforts to 
prepare the way to become leader by a lack of opportunities. Moreover, the controversies aroused 
by some of his actions as Home Secretary - particularly the suppression of the Daily Worker, and 
willingness to censure the press - still hindered him, as evidenced by his significantly reduced 
support in the 1941 elections for both the Administrative Committee and the NEC. This fall in 
popularity did not augur well for a man dedicated to becoming leader, particularly with Attlee 
himself arousing profound disillusionment. Moreover, the mood of crisis which was afflicting the 
party was not predicated upon hostility to Attlee specifically, but the leadership group as a whole, 
both depriving Morrison of the possibility of exploiting this situation and forcing him to co- 
operate with the other leaders. He was even compelled to forego efforts to rhetorically cleave 
Attlee away from the party, to which he had devoted energy in the past, and join with his rival in 
resisting the challenges to the Labour ministers' ascendancy. 
Now the position of the heir apparent was weakened further, when Morrison employed his 
powers against sedition, under defence regulation 2D, to wam the mainstream Daily Mirror to 
93 
cease undermining 'national morale' in its published output, or face severe consequences. The 
threat provoked much opprobrium within Labour's ranks, the Home Secretary becoming the 
subject of vilification far worse than during the Daily Worker episode a year earlier. 94 But 
Morrison refused to back down, lest it be thought that he had 'surrendered to the Bolshies'. 95 
Bevan immediately launched into a feud with Morrison that would last thirteen years, by trying to 
put down a Commons motion opposing the decision - amounting to a vote of censure on the 
Home Secretary. 96 He hawked it around Labour MPs, asking for their support to give the 
leadership another bloody nose. 97 But though the Administrative Committee relented to pressure 
from the leaders by quickly denouncing Bevan's efforts as 'intolerable', a third of Labour MPs 
voted in favour of his censure motion at a party meeting. 98 The Welshman had successfully stirred 
93 CAB 65/25, WM 32 (42), 9 March 1942; CAB 65/25, WM 35 (42), 18 March 1942. 
94 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 24 March 1942; Ede Diary, 25 March 1942 (pp. 66-7). 
95 Morrison interview with W. P. Crozier, 28 May 1942, cited Taylor, Offthe Record, p. 322. 
96 Ede Diary, 25 March 1942 (pp. 66-7). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid; PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 24 March 1942; PLP minutes, 25 March 1942; Ede Diary, 
25 March 1942 (p. 67). 
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up a hornet's nest. In a debate on the freedom of the press in Parliament on 26 March, which 
turned into the biggest Commons set-piece attack since the fall of Chamberlain, Bevan - who had 
ostentatiously stayed away from the PLP meeting, presumably in order to ensure that his 
confrontation with Morrison was a public one - humiliated Wilkinson, the Home Secretary's 
closest ally, and then crossed swords with Morrison himself in an explosive encounter. 99 Both 
men manoeuvred for support in a vicious exchange, hurling insults at one another and attempting 
to undermine the credibility of the other. Bevan assailed the Home Secretary for insincerity in 
being so determined to defend 'national unity' when it was something he had shown little concern 
with when himself using the Daily Mirror as a platform to undermine the Chamberlain 
government, reading out embarrassing excerpts from Morrison's articles. 100 The rebel declared 
that 'I do not like the Daily Mirror, and I have never liked it. I do not like that form ofjournalism. 
I am sure the Home Secretary does not take that view. He likes the paper. He is taking its 
money'. 101 
Morrison fired back that Bevan's friend Michael Foot was currently working for the offending 
publication, but Bevan challenged Morrison to be as personal as he liked: 'As far as I am 
concerned, I do not mind how direct the right hon. Gentleman is, because in this matter, the 
harder the hitting the better I like it. But the right hon. Gentleman will not be able hit back as hard 
as I can hit him'. 102 In a devastating attack on the Home Secretary, Bevan - the lone Fox - then 
went on: 
I [am] suggesting that the right hon. Gentleman in his writings in the Daily Mirror did many things which 
he is now accusing the Daily Mirror of doing ... He is the wrong man to be Home Secretary. He has been 
for many years the witch-finder of the Labour Party. He has been the smeller-out of evil spirits in the 
Labour Party for years. He built up his reputation by selecting people in the Labour Party for expulsion and 
suppression. He is not the man to be entrusted with these powers because, however suave his utterance, his 
spirit is really intolerant ... The right hon. Gentleman exorcised with bell, book and candle from the Labour 
Party a gentleman who has now been taken into the War Cabinet (Cripps) ... It is a shameful record. 
103 
Morrison was apoplectic and, fending off constant intedections from Bevan and Shinwell, 
targeted the Welshman in response, caustically calling Bevan 'comrade', deriding him as 
'thoroughly irresponsible', and pointing out that Bevan attacking him for writing for the Daily 
Mirror was hypocritical as 'My hon. Friend has written, I believe, for the Daily Express, the 
99 Ibid; Hansard, vol. 378,20 March 1942, cols. 2247-92. 
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Evening Standard, and other organs of enlightened opinion'. 104 The Home Secretary then exposed 
the fagade of Bevan's position by charging that there had been 'considerable manoeuvres' among 
the rebels to ensure that the government's offer to hold a division was rejected, and embarrassed 
Bevan by implying that he had shirked the opportunity for a vote because he knew that in reality 
he could command little support. 105 But though the balance of the argument perhaps lay with 
Morrison, it was Bevan who had landed the most damaging blows, portraying the Home 
Secretary as a repressive dictator. Coupled with the unpopularity of many of his other decisions, 
the episode inflicted severe damage to Morrison's standing in the eyes of the Labour party, and he 
was subjected to fierce press attack. 1 06 
it was yet another destabilising outbreak of discontent. It was, moreover, deeply wounding, and 
humiliating, to Morrison personally. As his biographers observed, 'it was not a happy experience' 
for the Home Secretary. 107 For all the earlier efforts to mark out his own credentials as leader, his 
popularity had fallen significantly during the preceding twelve months, and the episode reinforced 
both the contradictory nature of Morrison's tactics in pursuit of Attlee's job - his determination to 
win the support of the party, but caring little for what it thought - and that, though he enjoyed a 
more public role than his rival, this was in an office that rarely produces popular decisions. Yet, 
while Attlee would perhaps not have been particularly worried by a blow to the standing of his 
leading rival, in the present climate any adverse vote would be seen as a vote against Labour's 
membership of the Coalition, and he was forced to vigorously defend the Home Secretary at the 
PLP. 108 In addition, in getting the better of Labour's leader-in-waiting, Bevan's strategy of 
staying away from the PLP meeting had been vindicated. In choosing the time and place of their 
encounter this also again reinforces the perception of Bevan as an attention seeker. A 
commanding performance and demonstration of his abilities at parliamentary harassment, the row 
confirmed Bevan's rapid emergence as the PLP's most prominent rebel figure in the wake of 
Shinwell's self-destruction. 109 
The leaders had suffered a series of public schisms with their followers over four long months of 
internal strife, precipitating the collapse of Attlee's efforts to keep internal tensions low. The 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
'06 Morrison was denounced by The Times, Manchester Guardian, News Chronicle and even the Daily 
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result was a state of open conflict. The situation in early 1942, it must be noted, was unfavourable 
all around, with the Japanese on the rampage and Germany once again on the offensive. Political 
and public morale sunk very low. The pervasive mood of disenchantment in the party should thus 
be seen in this context of a renewed sense of 'crisis'. ' 10 The willingness of the Labour party to 
obey its leaders was now questionable at best. The seriousness of this situation was reinforced 
around the same time, when a fresh bid to remove the Labour ministers from the Administrative 
Committee altogether was made by a backbencher, and Bevan, Shinwell, and Griffiths, among 
others, spoke in favour of reversion to traditional Opposition. ' 1' Attempts were made by senior 
figures to argue against the suggestion, Morrison warning of the dangers of the party dividing into 
two camps, and Pethick-Lawrence threatened that if Churchill sprang a 'coupon' election only 
Labour's representatives in the government would survive, but these were largely ineffective, and 
it was only an intervention by Greenwood - who followed Attlee in now no longer basing his 
arguments on high sounding principles but simple self-interest - that persuaded the NEC and 
Administrative Committee that the status quo should be maintained. ' 12 The deputy leader warned 
that both national unity and 'Labour's future' would be 'gravely imperilled' if the PLP formed an 
'Opposition'. 113 With their authority so repeatedly rejected, the party openly dissatisfied, and their 
prestige low, from early 1942 the collapse of the leadership group's balancing-act through mass 
revolt seemed a real possibility. This was a position which could hardly have been more different 
to that of a year earlier. Only common sense, and the blunt truth of Attlee's doctrine - 
responsibility or electoral annihilation - was preventing the party from casting off its restraints. 
With the annual Conference - sure to be the scene of more disorder - approaching, in April, 
Attlee attempted to respond forcefully to the increasing likelihood of rebellion against the 
Coalition. As a result, he resumed his efforts of the previous autumn to force the Labour and 
Conservative parties closer together, giving further indications of his developing views on 
coalition. Yetý in doing so, the leader committed what was perhaps his biggest blunder of the war 
to date, for in his determination to protect the government's flank he picked an unnecessary fight 
with his followers. After a wave of by-election defeats for the government in early 1942, there 
was a sense within the party that Labour should be placing itself at the head of this tide of anti- 
Conservative feeling. Some local Labour parties opted to defy the truýe and assist Independents; 
110 Ede feared that if these crises continued, an 'alternative government' named in the House on 12 March 
by the Conservative, Captain A. S. Cunningham-Reid, and including Shinwell, Griffiths, Clem Davies, Earl 
Winterton, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, and Sir Roger Keyes, would actually start to be taken seriously - Ede 
Diary, 17 March 1942 (p. 64). 
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by March, the Coalition had lost two by-elections where this occurred. ' 14 A worried Attlee 
returned to the issue of the truce and now went even further than the joint 'coupon' he had 
secured the previous October. ' 15 His new measures represented another effort to entrench the 
Coalition as a feature of the British political landscape, at least until he, not his followers, decided 
otherwise. In early April, he proposed to the NEC that speakers from the Labour party should 
now actually be able to appear on Conservative platforms at by-elections, and vice versa, to speak 
in support of the government candidate. 116 While this proposal makes patently clear the leader's 
refusal to permit his party to derail the government, Attlee was widely seen to have given even 
loyalists a clumsy poke in the eye. 117 The result was a very public fight to the finish in the 
approach to the Conference as he attempted to impose the new policy. 
Though he secured the backing of other Labour ministers, when put to the NEC the proposal 
sparked another fierce row. "s Dalton's view was 'Are we in favour of the government or not? 
Are we in favour of the war or not? If the answer to both questions is yes ... how can we refuse to 
support a member of the government, who happens to be either a Tory or a Liberal, against an 
opponent of the warT, but, after an energetic defence of his proposal, Attlee did again manage to 
procure the support of a majority of the Executive for the measure. 119 Yet this success quickly 
turned out to be still not enough for the leader; despite heavy criticism from Laski and others, as 
well as a myriad of rank-and-file protests, Attlee ignored the opposition and pressed on even 
further, determined to take Labour even deeper into the cross-party alliance as a means of 
preventing its escape. 120 With this policy in hand, in early May Attlee now proposed still more 
extensive intervention on behalf of Conservative and Liberal candidates. 12 1 He was assisted by the 
fact that the NEC Elections sub-committee - through which by-election policy was directed - was 
comprised, besides Attlee himself, of Shepherd (the National Agent), Middleton (the General 
Secretary) and the miners' James Walker, all of whom backed his latest proposal. 122 The leader 
thus turned the sub-committee into his personal instrument. On 13 May, it recommended to the 
NEC that Labour henceforth adopt a formal policy of giving official backing to all government 
114 NEC Elections sub-committee minutes, 27 March 1942. 
115 Attlee had in fact made fresh efforts to strengthen the truce immediately after the National Service Bill 
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candidates at by-elections. 123 This was a significant extension of his 'coupon' policy, and even his 
efforts of the previous month, where he had wanted to have the option of backing the candidates 
of other parties; now he wanted to enshrine a firm obligation to do so. Moreover, it was to be 
Attlee's Elections sub-committee, not the NEC itself, which would determine the form that 
intervention in each case would take. 124 Under the plan, the sub-committee would be able to 
compel the local Labour party to employ its machinery in support of the government candidate. 125 
Evidently, then, the leader did not see the splits within the party as any reason to divert from his 
tried-and-tested methods of manoeuvring his followers into a position where they had little choice 
but to follow him; rather, Attlee redoubled his efforts. 
The deputy prime minister, and the other senior figures as well, had now moved away from a 
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mere truce and towards much stronger emphasis on their alliance with the Conservatives. 
Moreover, not only was Attlee throwing in his lot with the Conservatives, but he was demanding 
from his party not simply passive, but active, support for the Churchill government. Short of 
dissolving the parties, it is difficult to see what more explicit signal Labour's leaders could have 
given of their unwillingness to permit disruption of the status quo. The extent of their 
commitment to the alliance they had crafted, as well as their growing impatience with divisions 
along conventional party lines, could not be clearer. Coupled with the statements by both Labour 
and Conservative politicians on the strength of their partnership cited earlier in the chapter, the 
mental direction in which the country's leading politicians were travelling is clear. Yet Attlee's 
amended proposals were a step too far for most of the Labour party - the earlier version had been 
contentious enough - and, when the NEC considered the plan on 22 May, just three days before 
the opening of the annual Conference, it was rejected. 127 A formal stance of supporting 
Conservatives was seemingly too much. 128 But, despite this, the party leader was not defeated yet, 
for with the Conference imminent Attlee had the advantage that an official position of some sort 
had to be formulated, and quickly. As a result, the NEC tasked the Elections sub-committee with 
redrafting its recommendation and, days later - with the Conference actually underway - Attlee 
submitted a virtually identical proposal, with the added caveat that the 'views' of local parties 
would be taken into account. 129 Whether this amounted to a significant shift is questionable. But 
with the Conference having begun, the NEC needed a policy, something which no doubt 
123 NEC Elections sub-committee minutes, 13 May 1942. 
124 Ibid. 
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126 Dalton certainly backed the new stance, as did Morgan and Shepherd. There is no indication of 
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adopted by the latter at Conference, this supposition seems likely to be accurate. 127 NEC minutes, 22 May 1942. 128 Ibid. 
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encouraged Attlee to cynically resubmit his original idea. This time the NEC accepted the 
proposal, and instructed the Elections sub-committee to begin implementing it, authorising 
stringent disciplinary sanctions of disaffiliation or 'reorganisation' against local parties which 
violated it. 130 The NEC also affirmed Labour's support for the electoral truce. 131 
In spite of needlessly picking a fight - the number of by-elections where local parties broke the 
truce was sustainable, and Attlee could have waited until after the Conference to suggest the 
measure - the Labour leader had won through. Every bit as much as his manoeuvring and careful 
positioning during the phoney war, if we examine Attlee's posture from 1942 to 1945 it is 
possible to identify a consistent strategy in his attempts to bind the party into its alliance with the 
Conservatives in an all-party government. Whether he had already come to favour extending the 
lifetime of the Coalition is impossible to ascertain, but, as we have seen, others were certainly 
thinking along these lines. At the very lcastý he was keeping all of his options open, and post-war 
coalition was indeed soon to become his preference. Attlee's latest unilateral initiative 
represented an important success, securing a formal policy of positive intervention on behalf of 
Labour's coalition partners and an additional means of protecting the ministers' membership of 
the government with measures which were dangerous to publicly dissent from, and further tacit 
threats of electoral rout. Attlee had managed to place his party in a position where it was virtually 
impossible for it to break with the course he had chosen without the risk of shattering its political 
credibility. 
V 
Of course, the prospect of being routed did not mean that the Labour party would cease its efforts 
to escape these restraints. Despite Attlee having secured the measures he sought, the Conference 
was a difficult event, a public demonstration of the weakened position of the Labour ministers 
and the conflicts which now gripped the party. The hostility of recent months was unleashed, and 
a similarly antagonistic event was not to be witnessed until the notorious 1952 Conference at 
Morecambe. Attlee made a strong speech to open the event, calling for a return to unity and 
warning that 
We have had two years of working in this government, and there may be some who think that we have now 
turned the comer in this war and can afford to return to party strife ... They make a great mistake. In 
partaking in this government we necessarily had to work with those who do not share our views ... We 
"0 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
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cannot dictate to others the acceptance of our socialist programme ... in the give-and-take of 
government ... you have to work by agreement. 
132 
His arch-rival Morrison - giving the first of several notable wartime Conference performances - 
joined with him, the two old enemies again working together to shore up their position. 133 
However, the Home Secretary did little to mollify the delegates with an uncompromising attack 
on discontent fully in keeping with the 'witch-finder' image depicted by Bevan: 
The main point that is worrying delegates is that Labour ministers ... are not getting all their own way. 
Anybody who says we are not getting any of it is really talking nonsense ... The fact is that this party is 
never happy when it is in government. It is not happy with Labour in this government, because the Party 
has got too much the mind of perpetual opposition, because it has too much of the perpetual minority 
complex, and because some of you have too much of the perpetual inferiority complex as well. 134 
This was astonishing, an open attack on the party by the man who styled himself as its leader-in- 
waiting. Rather than attempting to bridge the gap between the Labour ministers and the party, 
Morrison had revelled in it, displaying his combative instincts to the full. Morrison, however, was 
displeased at being put in this position, complaining to ajoumalist that 'I have to do all the dirty 
work [of defending the official line) on these occasions. Really it's Attice'sjob, not mine, but 
they put it to me ... when there's a really nastyjob 
like this I have to do it'. 135 He ascribed the 
party's instability to Attlee personally, blaming him for 'too much soft leadership in the past'. 136 
The leaders did make substantive efforts to appease their followers with their keynote policy 
statement on reform, Yhe Old World and the New Society, which had been written by Laski but 
re-drafted to actually make its proposals more detailed -a clear indication of their desperation to 
find a position which would resonate with the rest of the party. 137 Though it still stopped short of 
calling for reform during the war itself, it did represent a significant shift by the leadership in a 
willingness to be more expliCit. 138 This signified their recognition of that fact that, if support was 
to be retained, they would have to offer more concrete declarations of intent. As a result, for the 
first time they broke with the practice of making reassuring, largely vague pronouncements. The 
Jocument was adopted unanimously. 139 
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Yet these proposals were populist and hence hardly likely to precipitate a new round of conflict. 
The difficulties facing the Labour ministers in maintaining the backing of the rank-and-file 
instead became apparent elsewhere, when they sustained several severe public humiliations. 
Morrison again came under fierce attack for his suppression of the Daily Mirror and, in a vitriolic 
debate, his manner towards the delegates earlier in the Conference proved a mistake. 140 A new 
attempt to censure him was put forward and defeated by the humiliating margin ofjust 13,000 
votes. 14 1 This was a very narrow result. Moreover, for the Home Secretary himself, it constituted 
yet another major blow and acute embarrassment, having come dangerously close to being 
censured by the party he intended to lead. Given his usual popularity with the rank-and-file, it 
was a double indictment. The internal standing of the Labour ministers then hit rock bottom in the 
election to the NEC constituencies section, when Laski, Shinwell, and Griffiths topped the poll, 
and Morrison fell to sixth out of seven elected. 142 An even more damaging rebuff came, however, 
in the crucial debate on the maintenance of the electoral truce. This amounted to a referendum on 
membership of the Coalition itself. The disappointment with the government was given free rein 
in the debate that Laski had earlier identified as the means to overthrow Attlee. 143 Bevan made a 
fiery denunciation of Attlee's co-operation with the other parties, while local delegatesjoined 
with several major unions - the MFGB, NUDAW, NUR and AEU - in opposing continuation of 
the truce and calling for a return to open party conflict. 144 Morrison made another stem defence of 
the official line, but the scale of the internal conflict within the Labour movement was now 
clear. 145 In the end, the Conference voted to maintain the truce, but only by another humiliating 
majority ofjust 66,000 VoteS. 146 As a vote on the leadership group's strategy over the preceding 
three years, it was hardly a ringing endorsement. Labour was now divided between those who 
wanted to end the Coalition and those who wanted to continue it; moreover, many of those who 
backed the leaders were themselves profoundly disillusioned, and there was no guarantee that 
they would continue to do so for long. The defection of several unions with large bloc votes was 
especially worrying. Fifteen months of crisis had ended with the leadership group almost toppled 
from their tightrope. They had come within less than 70,000 votes of overt repudiation of the 
Coalition, something which would have provoked a very difficult test of loyalty for the Labour 
ministers, and makes clear how fragile support for the core of Attlee's strategy - membership of 
the government - had become. The Conference had seen the leaders suffer the most damaging 
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rebuffs they had yet been subjected to, and the Labour party was now in a state of undeclared 
civil war. The success of Attlee and the others in securing a powerful position in office, and the 
extension of state power, counted for little with a party left bored by theirjoumey. Though defeat 
- which might have brought down the Coalition, or precipitated a formal schism - had, for the 
time being, been averted, by mid 1942 the position of the leadership group was more tenuous than 
ever. 
vi 
The phrase 'what a difference a year makes' could hardly be more appropriate. Whereas the 
initial eight months of the war had seen Labour willing to be quiescent, something largely 
duplicated in the first year of office, the second year of cross-party alliance had seen an explosion 
in opposition to both the government and their own leaders. Attlee and the Labour ministers were 
clinging on, the attacks they had suffered evidence of the fact that their strategy was increasingly 
rejected by a party restless and no longer having to worry about the prospect of a cross-channel 
expansion of the German Reich. By the middle of the war, the possibility of a decisive schism 
between them and their followers, in the form of the party crossing effective 'red lines' for the 
Labour ministers, looked a very real one, with all their attempts to steady the ship coming to 
naught. Further, as the chapter has slýown, Attlee's ability to impose his authority was now 
uncertain, and the leadership compelled to set their personal animosities largely aside. Only 
common sense and a will to political survival were preventing wholesale revolt. It is certainly true 
that disaffection would not precipitate a schism if it did not translate into outright rejection of the 
leaders and government, and, as a result, the Labour ministers still retained their positions. But 
the party had stared into the pit at the annual Conference, while the leaders' grip on the 
parliamentary party was particularly weak. 
Though symbolic questions of 'nationalisation', 'reconstruction', 'the future', and 'peace aims' 
exerted much influence, there is in fact surprisingly little evidence of much of a coherent role for 
ideology, or wartime radicalisation, in these conflicts. The above phrases werejust that, phrases, 
and the party's protests lacked much in the way of specificity or substance. There is little clear 
evidence of detailed thought within the party about those issues which so moved it. It can instead 
be suggested that the conflicts were largely about simple boredom and the powerlessness to 
which Attlee had condemned the Labour party in 193940. The concern of the primary 
dissentients seemed more to lie with the prosecution of personal vendettas or self-advertisement, 
as analysis of when and how they agitated, and the things they seemed concerned with, would 
suggest. Moreover, these people were now openly favourable to ending the Coalition. While 
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alliances between parties invariably produce disappointment, it is not perverse to suggest that the 
leadership were in fact victims of their own success; they had seized the reins so tightly, clustered 
power in their own hands so effectively, that the Labour party was left not only bored but 
deprived of much in the way of an identity. Its leaders, Attlee chief among them, plainly thought 
of it as a troublesome charge on their time. Attlee had devoted himself not to mollifying Labour, 
which presumably he now realised to be impossible, but to corralling the party into a closer bond 
with the Coalition. His measures again emphasise his willingness to drag the Labour party with 
him and make it conforin to his choices. Despite the difficulties of this period, the events of 194 1- 
2 thus again rebut the image of a collegiate, indecisive leader, and his willingness to bully, 
coerce, and cajole his followers is clear to see. The leader's moves towards strengthening the 
Coalition, which, if they had not already, were to soon evolve into a plan to avoid a return to 
political independence once the war was over, constituted the most significant development in 
politics since the fall of Chamberlain, and would have a major impact on the course of Labour 
politics for the duration of the conflict. But it also reinforces the closed nature of the political 
nation, and, crucially, how far senior actors now perceived their interests as lying with each other 
rather than with their respective parties. Harold Macmillan observed that 'all the symptoms are 
developing which marked the end of the Asquith coalition (a coalition of parties) and the 
formation of the Lloyd George coalition (a coalition of personalities)' . 
147 Attlee's by-election 
'coupon', and his decision to commit the party to support all government candidates, signalled his 
determination to preserve and deepen that alliance against Labour pressure. 148 
A precipitous decline had thus occurred in a previously well-ordered situation. That the leaders 
had been able to thwart these feelings for so long, and manoeuvre their way into such a powerful 
role in the interregnum, had been a major advance; but it did nothing to lessen the problems 
which confronted them now. Further, this situation was to barely improve for the remainder of the 
war. Attlee, already a relatively unpopular leader, had antagonised his followers deeply, while his 
great rival Morrison had twice only narrowly escaped formal censure. The tightrope that the 
leadership had chosen to walk in 1939 was looking dangerously frayed, and, with his followers on 
the verge of turning against him, Attlee's party management skills were to be put to their most 
severe test in the months ahead. 
147 Cited in Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 494-5. 
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Chapter five - Crisis 
This intermingling of crises and questions about the future was not to decline in significance over 
the subsequent year, as the continued anxiety about the Coalition, fears that the Labour ministers 
were failing to capitalise on a national mood which was swinging away from the Conservatives, 
and the emerging possibility of post-war alliance exacerbated the discontent confronting the 
party's leaders. New and damaging outbreaks of restlessness - over the progress of the war, coal 
and the Beveridge report - aggravated Labour's instability. As seen in the preceding chapter, the 
law of diminishing returns meant that, the more the leadership called for 'responsibility', 
'patriotism', and 'patience', the less effect it had. The disillusionment of the party towards its 
leaders which had erupted in 1941-2 now reached its crescendo. 
Attlee and his colleagues thus found their position continuing to weaken, at the head of the 
Labour party but struggling to actually direct it. Moreover, as during the previous twelve months 
where they had been forced to rely on their political proxies, now they were thrown onto the 
power-brokers of last resort of the Labour movement, the trade unions. Recurrent struggles 
between a disaffected party and a resolute leadership group culminated in the revolt over the 
Beveridge report, the biggest schism of the war. By 1942-3, the leaders were at best able to 
muster ad hoc party managementý responding to events as they occurred. Any concerted strategy, 
such as had been pursued during the early stages of the war, was now impossible: The Labour 
ministers continued to try to balance the tensions under which they lived, but Attlee, Morrison 
and the other leaders were also willing to dig their heels in and fight vigorously against their 
followers. Labour politics thus became increasingly adversarial and, finding themselves 
powerless to arrest this, or broker a compromise, the leaders were forced to turn implacable. 
Besides examination of these crises, this chapter will also consider a series of incidents in which 
real opportunities were on offer and which demonstrate the divergent roles played by individuals 
in collectively giving substance to this account of the Labour party's internal politics between 
1939 and 1945. Labour had never been in this position of political power, having previously only 
been in office for two short spells. Such sustained access to power, and influence over legislation, 
constituted a shock to the system of the party, and posed problems and presented opportunities its 
members had never had to deal with. This underlines and binds together'the two core elements of 
the thesis - one an analysis of party management, leadership control, and opposition to this, and 
the other a story about individuals. Each is only viewable, and comprehensible, through the lens 
of the other. The key actors within Labour politics played the political system with which they 
were confronted in distinctive ways - those inside it played it by running it; others played it in an 
attempt to establish themselves sufficiently to be brought within it; some sought to establish a 
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new system. The fact that people still behave in this fashion, even when their options are in many 
cases limited (for some, there were few immediate opportunities to climb the 'greasy pole') 
serves to underline the value of this interpretation of the political world. Crucially, the period also 
saw a return to personal conflict between the leaders themselves, something which would then 
dominate the final two years of the war, as the Attlee-Morrison rivalry was at last fought out. This 
re-emerged in Morrison's new efforts to prepare the way to become leader. Attempting to rebuild 
his damaged position, he sought to exploit his high public stature and seize key internal levers. At 
crucial moments in the chapter, this'was central, particularly in the response to Morrison's 
plotting of his most implacable enemy, Bevin. Attlee, meanwhile, sought ways to re-establish his 
own authority over the party. He also worked to throw up new obstacles to the destruction of the 
Coalition, and began to move stealthily towards the possibility of continuing the government after 
the war. 
I 
The issue of nationalisation erupted into another clash just weeks after the Conference over the 
government's new proposals for the coal industry, as embodied in Dalton's White Paper! The 
President of the Board of Trade had extracted the measures through the teeth of Conservative 
opposition. Yet his proposals nevertheless fell short of the 'requisitioning' of the mines that the 
Labour ministers had fought for as an alternative to nationalisation; the White Paper instead 
proposed a system of dual control between mine owners and the state. 2 Greenwood 
enthusiastically welcomed the policy in the Commons and, employing heavily the language of 
socialism, stated that the White Paper attacked the 'vested interests' of the coal industry who 
worked against the 'public interest', contrasting this with the patriotism shown by the miners. 3 
But the effort to line Labour up alongside the government was upset by Griffiths, who made an 
aggressive speech calling for outright public ownership, while Bevan declared coal a 'test case' of 
the ministers' influence. 4 At the annual Conference, Arthur Deakin, Bevin's replacement at the 
TGWU, had further shaped Labour's attitude in ways unfavourable to its ministers by putting 
down a motion calling for nationalisation of coal, a resolution passed by both the NEC and the 
Conference delegates despite the protests of the leadership. 5 Though an amendment that 
1 Hansard, vol. 379,7 May 1942, cols. 1451-78. 
2 See Dalton Diary, 21 May to 6 June 1942 (pp. 43745). 
3 Hansard, vol. 379,7 May 1942, cols, 1475-85. 
4 Hansard, vol. 379,7 May 1942, cols. 1550-59; Tribune, 22 May 1942. 
5 1942 LPACR, pp. 118-20. 
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explicitly called for nationalisation even if it meant the break up of the government was defeated, 
the prevailing mood of the Labour party was clear. 6 
As the proposals made their way through the Commons the following month, with the feeling 
being that the government had 'sold-out' the miners, the prospect of another large Labour 
rebellion seemed credible, and Dalton's threat that the ministers would be compelled to resign if 
7 not supported by Labour MPs cut little ice. In the end, a revolt was indeed averted and the 
leadership's position preserved - but only in a manner which underlined the limits to their 
authority and dependence on others. The trade unions were more welcoming than the political 
wing to the White Paper, perceiving it as a beneficial step forward, particularly in the setting up 
8 
of an official wages body and a National Coal Board. Union pragmatism and willingness to 
accept incremental reform was therefore crucial, and the NCL backed the govemment, formally 
giving a lead to the rest of the Labour movement to do the same. 9 The Labour ministers were thus 
saved from the wrath of their followers by the intervention of the unions. At the NEC, the NCL's 
position proved decisive, and the Executive, reversing its earlier position, voted to give support to 
Dalton's proposals. 10 Bevin declared that the miners would 'miss the chance of a lifetime' if the 
White Paper was not implemented, while Greenwood argued that, as the miners' union had 
accepted the proposals, Labour MPs could hardly reject them. " 
In June, at ajoint meeting of the NCL and Administrative Committee, heavy union representation 
and 'overwhelming' support for the policy put further pressure on the PLP to fall into line, Will 
Lawther and Arthur Homer speaking forcefully to that effect. 12 Eventually, MPs reluctantly 
agreed to abide by this. 13 In the Commons, Bevan alone strongly opposed the government's 
proposals (declaring them 'unworthy of the nation' and terming Bevin's powers 'fascism'), and 
the White Paper was approved by 329 votes to eight. 14 It was an important reprieve. Moreover, 
the Labour ministers had pushed for the White Paper in the first place because they thought it 
cvery important' to 'give something to the [miners]' and the restless Labour party on 
'psychological grounds', offering further evidence of the way in which the party's senior figures 
saw themselves as operating, and the fact that many of their initiatives within the government 
6 Ibid. 
7 Tribune, 5 June 1942; Dalton Diary, 4 June 1942 (p. 454). 
8 NCL Coal sub-committee minutes, 5 June 1942. 
9 Ibid; NCL minutes, 6 June 1942. 
10 NEC minutes, 8 June 1942. 
11 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 20 May & 21 May 1942 (pp. 440-3). 
12 Administrative Committee papers, minutes ofjoint meeting of NCL and Administrative Committee, 8 
June 1942. 
13 PLP minutes, 10 June 1942. 
14 Hansard, vol. 380,11 June 1942, cols. 1269-1302,1346-50. 
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remained carefully-calculated by attention to the mood of their followers. 15 Given the buffeting 
they bad been subjected to almost constantly since 1941, it is doubtful that their authority could 
have survived a full-scale revolt over this most totemic of issues. In the end, the pressure of the 
trade unions proved critical, and a potentially decisive clash was avoided. 16 But this had little to 
do with the efforts of Attlee and the others, however, who, as far as the documentary evidence 
reveals, had been unable to muster any coherent response. They were instead saved by trade 
union willingness to accept a formal role for the state in running the mines. 
Confronted with this alarming loss of the political initiative, over the summer of 1942, Attlee and 
the leadership were compelled to pursue ways of re-establishing their position. For a full year 
they had found themselves with only a limited ability to influence events; now they sought to 
place themselves back in the driving seat. That the leaders did so during the period when the war 
reached its most disastrous phase is indicative of their fear for the continued tenability of their 
positions. Yet Attlee also persisted in his manoeuvring to strengthen the Coalition against those 
who wanted to destroy it and, in doing so, ensure that Labour's political future was dependent on 
his judgements alone. 
Within days of the end of the Conference in late May, Attlee sought to capitalise on his victories 
for the new position on the truce by attempting to consolidate total control of the policy in his 
own hands, and remove the influence of the party altogether. Having given no intimation of his 
thinking just days earlier, Attlee now proposed that the NEC's method of administering the by- 
election 'coupon', whereby the Executive authorised him to issue the signed statement on a case- 
by-case basis, would lead to 'undesirable conclusions [being] drawn' if candidates did not receive 
endorsement in a timely fashion . 
17 Attlee - or at least the Elections sub-committee which he 
dominated - then proposed that the leader himself should be assigned authority to act as he saw 
fit. 18 Attlee's criticisms therefore represented a convenient smokescreen to gain personal control 
of the policy. Having already clustered oversight into the Elections committee rather than the 
NEC itself, this latest measure - like the others proposed out of the blue - enabled the leader to 
further marginalise critics and deprive them of a voice. Moreover, Attlee was creeping his way 
towards a position where, by establishing certain political norms of non-opposition for the other 
15 Dalton Diary, 27 May 1942 (pp. 446-7). 
16 In late June, as the coal row neared its end, another spat blew up when some MPs supported an ILP 
amendment in favour of nationalising the mines. Greenwood and the Administrative Committee, believing 
they had already navigated the party away from being shipwrecked on the issue, were incredulous, and 
some were in favour of expelling the rebels altogether. After assurances of future obedience were offered, 
however, the controversy died down - PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 23 June 1942; Ede Diary, 
23 June 1942 (p. 80). 
17 NEC minutes, 27 May 1942. 
18 NEC minutes, 7 July 1942. 
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parties, an environment would be created in which political co-operation would be consolidated 
and he himself would be free to take the crucial decisions about the Coalition. He had certainly 
reduced the possibility of the Labour party being able to break with the truce while the war 
continued. Moreover, as above, though it was not yet clear at this point, a consistent intellectual 
trajectory can be identified between these attempts to protect the coalition and later attempts to 
preserve it. The proposal was accepted by the NEC, and Attlee thus secured the ability to plough 
on with his adherence to coalitionism, unfettered by the need to constantly persuade and win the 
acquiescence of his followers. 19 
But the leaders, in alliance with their remaining supporters, also undertook measures which were 
more likely to prove conducive to appeasing their antagonised party than Attlee's defence of the 
Coalition. It was, in fact, Greenwood who took the leading role in this, suggesting in June to the 
NEC that a way to lift the party's mood would be to revive the tactic of publishing a battery of 
official literature and new policy statements . 
20 These measures had earlier proven valuable in 
mollifying anxieties about inaction and 'stasis' by giving an impression of activity. Greenwood 
appealed to the Executive for the 'immediate issue' of 'directives on policy' for the 'guidance of 
the movement'. 21 He proposed an energetic new strategy of policy statements and pamphlets on 
Labour's ideas for the post-war period, as well as reiterating the success it was experiencing in 
power. 22 The deputy leader also wanted this new raft of measures to include lengthier, more 
substantive booklets to be produced (the publisher was to be Penguin) as well as increased 
publicity via the BBC, and fl, 000 was allocated to producing a propaganda film about the history 
of the party. 23 Just as these methods had been employed earlier in the war, they were again 
explicitly intended as a tactical device to emphasise that the Labour party was not atrophying and 
its leaders remained energetic in advancing its concerns. 24 Further, Greenwood called for Percy 
Cudlipp, the editor of the Daily Herald, to henceforth be invited to attend NEC Campaign sub- 
committee meetings, so as to facilitate greater publicity for the work of the Labour ministers, as 
well as outlining similar arrangements with Reynolds News and other Labour and Co-operative 
newspapers. 25 As had been the case between 1939 and 1941, it was a deliberate attempt to reshape 
the political environment through employment of a certain kind of rhetoric and activities. These 
tactics, therefore, still consciously represented the core of the party management strategy 
19 Ibid. 
20 NEC Press, Publicity and Campaign sub-committee minutes, 16 June 1942. 
21 Ibid. It was quickly agreed to publish a pamphlet entitled Labour in War Time, on the advances in social 
? ýlicy secured by the ministers and their role in running the country. 
2 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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practiced by the leaders and their subordinates. Cudlipp proved amenable, and suggested that the 
Daily Herald'was not being used to its maximum potential' as an organ for the official line. 26 He 
also intimated that he would be 'serviceable' to diverting pressure away from emphasis on reform 
during wartime and towards future reform instead, as well as concentrating more upon the war 
effort itself. 27 Cudlipp asked for 'early guidance' to co-ordinate thiS. 28 The NEC agreed to 
Greenwood's proposals to change the mood of the party, deciding to set up a standing committee 
to be led by Greenwood, Citrine and Cudlipp, which would in future determine the 'publicity' 
treatment of the issues facing Labour. 29 This episode can be seen as offering important insights 
into the true nature of political leadership and party management, with leaders suddenly deciding 
they had better chum something out in order to keep their followers happy. It also raises questions 
about how important policy-making - as divorced from politics - really is; given the perception 
of parties as essentially policy-creating machines, this point is potentially significant. 
In some respects, the new acting head of the PLP was playing a similarly important role to that 
which he had carried out between the summer of 1939 to May 1940. He was certainly 
reinvigorated by leaving office, Ede recording his view that Greenwood was very good in his new 
job and skilled at handling meetings. 30 However, we should also strike a note of caution about the 
alcohol problems Greenwood continued to suffer; Dalton, for example, noted that he turned up to 
a dinner with an Australian Labour politician 'half-squiffed' and 'quite deplorable'. 3' He later 
wrote of the deputy leader that 'it used to be said in Whitehall ... that 'the poor old chap couldn't 
even sign his name after midday". 32 The personal effectiveness of the head of the parliamentary 
party aside, though, these new tactics, coupled with a decision to restrict speeches at PLP 
meetings to five minutes (which would not apply to the Labour ministers themselves, however) in 
a transparent bid to undercut the platforms of the rebel orators who troubled them, as well as an 
increase in meetings of the Administrative Committee, and later a ruling that all Commons 
motions had to be passed to that body first for approval, demonstrate that, by the su mmer of 1942, 
the leadership group, rather than retreating, had in fact dug their heels in and were mounting fresh 
attempts to rebuild their primacy over the party ?3 
26 NEC Press, Publicity and Campaign sub-committee minutes, 14 July 1942. 
27 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
3('Ede Diary, 9 June 1942 (p. 77). 
31 Dalton Diary, 12 May 1942 (p. 435). 
32 Dalton Diary, 15 June 1943 (p. 607). 
33 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 7 July 1942; PLP minutes, 8 July &II November 1942; Ede 
Diary, 12 November 1942 (p. 107). If a motion was put down against the decision of the Administrative 
Committee, disciplinary sanctions, including expulsion from the parliamentary party, was threatened. 
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These efforts to bolster the authority of the leadership were, however, quickly challenged by a 
threat to the Churchill govemment's very existence following further military disaster in the fall 
of Tobruk. After the British defeat, Churchill's personal fortunes, and those of his govemment, 
reached their nadir, and it seemed that even with the United States in the war the Axis powers still 
could not be defeated. The Conservative dissidents, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne and Admiral Sir 
Roger Keyes, took the opportunity to move against the prime minister by putting down a 
Commons motion of no-confidence and questioning the govemment's ability to direct the war. 34 
This provoked much disagreement as to how Labour should react. Some saw it as an. opportunity 
to consolidate with Conservative rebels and strike at the very foundations of the govemment, 
while to the Labour ministers the issue was yet another crisis for persuading their followers to 
continue backing the Coalition. Bevan, scenting blood, argued in favour of the party aligning 
itself with Wardlaw-Milne and Keyes, while a strong speech by Attlee against any collusion with 
the censure attempt had little impact, the PLP only backing the call to oppose the no-confidence 
35 motion by a mere three votes. A major rebellion by both Labour and Conservative MPs seemed 
to be in the offing, and even Bevin now doubted whether the govemment could survive this 
convergence of military and political crises. 36 
Several days later the leaders tried to shore up support at another PLP meeting, Attlee and Bevin 
defending the government's ability to direct the war, stressing that victory would come now that 
the USA had entered the conflict and making appeals to patriotism. 37 It also became evident here 
how formidable the Attlee-Bevin axis could be when deployed in anger. Attlee gave what Ede 
described as the most forceful speech he had ever heard the leader make, asserting that Labour 
could notjust naively censure the prime minister individually, for it was the Cabinet - and hence 
the Labour ministers - that was collectively responsible for the prosecution of the war, and thus to 
censure the government would be to censure their own leaders . 
38 Attlee also pointed out that it 
was he, not Churchill, who had been in charge when Tobruk fell, the prime minister being away 
in Washington . 
39 The party leader outmanoeuvred those sympathetic to the censure by demanding 
that the PLP vote there and then on whether they would support or oppose Wardlaw-Milne's no- 
34 Ede Diary, 24 June 1942 (p. 81); see also Hansard, vol. 381,1 July 1942. 
35 PLP minutes, 24 & 25 June 1942; Ede Diary, 24 & 25 June 1942 (pp. 81-2); Dalton Diary, 25 June 1942 
(p. 460). 
36 Churchill College, Cambridge, AN. Alexander papers, 6/1/3, Bevin to Alexander, 21 June 1942. 
37 Ede Diary, 30 June 1942 (p. 82); PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 30 June 1942. 
38 Ede Diary, 30 June 1942 (p. 82). 
39 Harris,, 4ulee, p. 199. 
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confidence motion. 40 Bevin also weighed in with a speech that 'shattered' the rebel position, 
warning the PLP to 'watch' those among them who 'ran with this gang [the Wardlaw-Milne 
group] %4 1 He charged that the Conservative rebels wanted to force Labour from office - 
intimating that those MPs who supported them were betraying the party. 42 He then threatened that 
the leadership would deal with them 'drastically'. 43 This was one of the few occasions since 
Bevin had become an MP that the full force of his dominating personality was on show for all the 
PLP to see, Labour's most powerful figure rolling straight over the dissidents. His demolition of 
the rebels aroused much enthusiasm, and, in the vote forced by Attlee, the PLP now voted 
overwhelmingly to oppose Wardlaw-Milne. 44 It was a major reassertion of the Labour ministers' 
authority. 
This success was reinforced when the crucial Commons debate on I and 2 July - potentially the 
most dangerous moment the government had yet faced, and reminiscent of the fall of 
Chamberlain - saw the rebel position descend into farce when Wardlaw-Milne and Keyes made 
the blunder of advocating that the Duke of Gloucester be made Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces; this was 'very ill-received', particularly because the theme of the argument was that 
the Duke was 'the least mental' member of the Royal Family. 45 Though Bevan launched a furious 
attack on Churchill that was perhaps his greatest speech of the war, in the end only eight Labour 
MPs rebelled for a vote of twenty-five against the Coalition's 475.46 
Despite the small scale of the revolt, the PLP's governing body was furious, particularly as Bevan 
had indicated that he would fall into line. 47 Ede thought it ludicrous that any Labour MP could 
vote with those who saw Beaverbrook as an alternative prime minister and wanted to dismiss both 
Morrison and Bevin. 48 Greenwood was tasked with interviewing Bevan, but that the Welshman 
again attracted so much individual attention confirms that he was now emerging as a major 
40 PLP minutes, 30 June 1942. 
41 Ede Diary, 30 June 1942 (p. 82). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid; PLP minutes, 30 June 1942. 
45 Hansard, vol. 381,1 July 1942, cols. 22447; Dalton Diary, I July 1942 (p. 462). 
46 Hansard, vol. 3 81,2 July 1942, cols. 52741,6 10. Bevan, in the highpoint of his parliamentary 
skirmishing, charged that 'The country is now more concerned with the Prime Minister winning the war 
than with his winning a debate in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister wins debate after debate and 
loses battle after battle. The country is beginning to say that he fights debates like a war and the war Re a 
debate. ' He also asserted that Churchill did not grasp the nature of modem war, stating that he conceived of 
war 'in medieval terms ... as if it were a tourney', before making another plea to launch an immediate 
second front - where he hoped the landing forces would be accompanied by MPs! Foot had argued that it 
was here that Bevan 'stepped into his place as a debater of the first order, the only living rival to Churchill 
in the parliamentary art' - Foot, Bevan, p. 377. 47 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 7 July 1942. 
48 Ede Diary, 4 July 1942 (p. 84). 
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political figure in his own right - perhaps not in a party sense (as evidenced by his lack of impact 
in Administrative Committee and NEC elections), but in Parliament, and the wider public 
consciousness. 49 Unlike Shinwell and Laski, Bevan had orbited on the outer edges of the Labour 
party solar system like a rogue comet, but he was now moving rapidly inwards - insofar as he 
could not be controlled. 
Yet this unexpected success quickly proved to be another false dawn, as Labour was gripped, just 
weeks later, by another rebellion, the biggest since the party entered office, and then a further 
outbreak of rancour between Attlee and his enemy Laski. The revolt occurred over the 
government's new proposals for pensions, perceived by Labour opinion to be a gratuitous slap in 
the face by not including a commitment to a flat-rate increase. Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence 
wanted the PLP to support the government, and concocted with Bevin the obvious fix that if he 
would give assurances in the Commons that the matter would be looked at afresh the following 
year, a Labour amendment calling for a larger increase in the basic pension rate would be 
withdrawn. 50 Yet this stance was at odds with the general tenor of MPs, and even when Bevin 
gave the arranged assurances the PLP refused to back Greenwood on the floor of the House. 51 
Shinwell would not let the amendment be withdrawn, and forty-nine Labour MPs went into the 
lobby against the government, while only fifty-seven voted with the Coalition - twenty of whom 
were members of the ministry anyway. 12 Three members of the Administrative Committee also 
joined the rebellion, and the rest of the parliamentary party abstained. 53 This was the largest revolt 
by Labour MPs since May 1940; in spite of the recent attempts by the leadership group to reassert 
themselves, it is clear how tenuous their control remained. Ede heard the view that this latest 
schism would signal the end of the truce, while, at the Administrative Committee, the PLP 
Secretary, Scott Lindsay, and Shinwell had to be physically separated when the latter argued that 
Greenwood and the rest of the Committee had violated the agreed line by backing the 
government. 54 Greenwood was seething at the defiance of his authority, threatening that he would 
have to 'consider his position', and the ministers warned that such revolts could trigger the 
collapse of the government. 55 
49 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 7 July 1942; Ede Diary, 14 July 1942 (p. 86). 
50 PLP minutes, 23 July 1942; Ede Diary, 23 & 29 July 1942 (pp. 87-8); PLP Administrative Committee 
minutes, 28 July 1942. 
51 Hansard, vol. 382,29 July 1942, cols. 641-61; Slowe, Shinwell, p. 197. 
52 Ede Diary, 30 July 1942 (pp. 88-90). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ede Diary, 29 July 1942 (pp. 87-8), & 30 July 1942 (pp. 88-90); Slowe, Shinwell, p. 197; PLP 
Administrative Committee minutes, 30 July 1942. 
5.5 Ibid; Ede Diary, 30 July 1942 (pp. 88-90). 
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Following this public break between the Labour party and the government, the Commons was 
kept in recess as much as possible over the summer and autumn of 1942, meeting only fifteen 
times between August and November. But the sense of crisis within the party raised its head again 
shortly afterwards, with the outbreak of a fresh clash inside Labour's institutional machinery 
between Attlee and Laski. As in their past feuding, Laski's hostility towards the leader took the 
form of a vicious attack which prompted Attlee to explode. Between July and September 1942, 
Laski published a series of articles in Reynold's News which were scathing in their criticism of 
the Labour ministers, employing provocative language and hurling public accusations of betrayal. 
To cite merely a few examples, Laski stated that the Coalition was doing 'less than their 
elementary duty' in not implementing socialist reforms, and took aim at the party leader directly 
in suggesting that 'No one ... can point to any serious effort by Mr. Attlee to make the 
idea of a 
partnership with the people a conscious part of the Prime Minister's PoliCY. 56 Under the headline 
'Leaders are Paralysed' Laski absolved Greenwood and the PLP of responsibility for the current 
difficulties, charging instead that 'paralysis' had 'settled down like a blight' on the Labour 
ministers. 57 
The articles precipitated a furious response. The NEC Organisation sub-committee unanimously 
agreed that they were 'reprehensible and deserving of censure' . 
58 Laski then aggravated this by 
publishing another article in which he again argued in favour of demanding reform from 
Churchill via the explicit threat of ending the Coalition. " His language seemed intended to 
antagonise his adversaries - and it succeeded. When the NEC met on 23 September, the 
leadership were incredulous, wanting to see Laski publicly demolished for his attempts to turn the 
party against thern. 60 Laski, rather than being a troublesome but internal nuisance was in fact - as 
evidenced by the frequently public nature of his assaults on Attlee, the audience he reached as a 
political columnist, and his consistent topping of the polls in the NEC elections - their chief 
public enemy as well. The Executive agreed to hold a special meeting to 'consider the powers [of 
the NEC]' - an obvious allusion to the possibility of expulsion . 
61 Certainly, Dalton felt that the 
union boss Sam Watson wanted Laski out of the party altogether. 62 
56 Reynold's News, 12 July 1942. 
57 Reynold's News, 9 August 1942. 
58 NEC Organisation sub-committee minutes, 18 August 1942. 
59 Reynold's News, 6 September 1942. 
6') NEC minutes, 23 September 1942; Dalton Diary, 23 September 1942 (P. 494). 
61 NEC minutes, 23 September 1942. 
62 Dalton Diary, 23 September 1942 (p. 494). 
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That the Labour ministers had decided to carpet Laski once and for all is reinforced by the fact 
that Bevin, not a member of the NEC, was invited to attend the special meeting on 12 October. 63 
Described by Dalton as the 'inquest into the misdemeanours of Laski', this and another meeting 
on 28 October were the major confrontations between the leadership and their accuser. 64 They 
have been described by Laski's biographer as 'the stuff of high drama', witnessing a protracted 
demolition of the rebel figure. 65 Attlee and Bevin led the counter-attack themselves, provoking 
Laski to reveal his effort to persuade the Minister of Labour to challenge the leader, as well as 
denying the principle of collective responsibility and claiming that he had a 'right' to appeal to 
the wider Labour movement if the NEC would not listen to his criticisms of Attlee, who he had 
ccompletely lost confidence' in. 66 But this was a mistake, and his loyalty was consequently called 
into question. 67 Watson and other union figures now definitely favoured expulsion, and Shinwell, 
perhaps fearing that he would be next, wasted little time in telling Dalton his view that Laski 
4 68 ought to be expelled'. However, just when it seemed that Attlee would give Laski a decisive 
bludgeoning, at the last moment the attempt to do so was suddenly frustrated by Morrison. 69 
Labour's heir apparent entered the fray and restrained the assault by Attlee, Bevin, and Watson by 
advocating a conciliatory middle course, emphasising that while Laski's criticisms were 'more 
public than was desirable', he did not want to 'muzzle' Laski, and simply asked Attlee's b9te 
noire to give an undertaking not to attack the leaders through the press in the ftiture. 70 Laski 
agreed, pledging to only make personal critiques within the confines of the NEC, and he escaped 
a bid to expel him by thirteen votes to four. 71 It seems likely that Bevin and Attlee were two of 
those who opposed Morrison's solution. 72 Morrison had frustrated the efforts of Attlee and Bevin 
to deal with their enemy. The Minister of Labour was furious at the failure to get rid of Laski, 
continuing to berate him after the vote had been taken. 73 
Why did Morrison, a natural opponent of dissent, impede the efforts of the leadership group and 
union figures to permanently squash Laski? Certainly, Morrison bad reasonably good personal 
relations with Laski, but the Home Secretary was ruthless in opposing the efforts of rebels to alter 
63 NEC minutes, 23 September 1942. 
64 Dalton Diary, 12 October 1942 (pp. 500-1). 
65 NEC minutes, 12 October 1942; Kramnick and Sheerman, Laski, p. 444. 66 NEC minutes, 12 October 1942; Dalton Diary, 12 October 1942 (pp. 500- 1). 
67 Ibid. 
68 NEC minutes, 12 October 1942; Dalton Diary, 23 September 1942 (p. 494) and 12 October 1942 (pp. 
500-1). 
69 NEC minutes, 28 October 1942. 
70 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 28 October 1942 (p. 509). 
'11 NEC minutes, 28 October 1942. 
72 Ibid. The others were probably Watson and F. J. Burrows; Burrows had seconded Watson's attempt to 
qt the NEC to consider expelling Laski. 
3 Ibid. 
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Labour's course. The most credible explanation is that it was of benefit to Morrison if Attlee 
failed to expel his most recalcitrant critic and re-establish his authority. Thus, while he remained 
unwilling to brook challenges to Labour's position in the government, to suddenly step in here on 
Laski's behalf was in fact consistent with both Morrison's past and future response to a certain 
kind of dissent. It may have been politically astute in the context of his long-term ambitions, but it 
was also dangerous. Morrison was certainly taking a gamble in playing both sides. Yet he had 
used Laski as a Trojan horse against Attlee eighteen months before, and he now protected the 
leader's biggest critic once again. As Brooke has observed, it was no coincidence that Laski was 
an energetic supporter of Morrison's July 1945 leadership challenge. 74 Moreover, the Home 
Secretary was already in the process of restarting his campaign for the leadership. That same day, 
Wilkinson relayed to Dalton the news that her patron, having been consumed with the demands of 
office since 1940, was now once again in 'running order' and 'taking much interest in wider 
questions', particularly the future of the Labour party. 75 
It is therefore almost certain that the Home Secretary was thinking along these lines when he 
blocked Attlee and Bevin's moves to expel Laski. The fulfilment of his ambitions would require 
the destruction of the leader's position, and it cannot have escaped Morrison's attention that Laski 
was well placed to assist in this. The Home Secretary also received a significant boost to his 
public prestige in November, when he was appointed a member of the War Cabinetý replacing the 
discredited Cripps, and entering the government's inner circle. He was now on a par with Attlee 
76 
and Bevin and, as his biographers have noted, Morrison's 'star was shining'. Along with the 
Minister of Labour, he far surpassed Attlee as a national figure, and was probably the most 
recognisable Labour politician in Britain. 77 The Home Secretary had, therefore, turned his 
attention back to the task of winning the leadership, and was doing so from a much improved 
position. His popularity with the PLP had also recovered . 
78 Holding one of the country's key 
offices, matched only by Bevin and Churchill as a public figure, and perceived as a man of action 
and dynamism, Morrison occupied a strong platform for the campaign to replace Attlee which 
would dominate the rest of his war. Given the near-collapse of his position earlier in the year, this 
74 Brooke, Labour's War, p. 98. 
75 Dalton Diary, 28 October 1942 (p. 5 10). This 'interest' was clearly intended in the context of the 
leadership, Wilkinson making clear that she was still in favour of seeing Dalton as Morrison's deputy. 
76 Morrison's promotion was warmly welcomed by the press - see, for example, Daily Express, 23 
November 1943, Reynold's News (which called him 'about the best administrator we have 
discovered ... since Lord Haldane), 29 November 1943, and The Times, 26 November 1943; Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 313. 
77 Labour published a pamphlet of his recent speeches, under the title The Spearhead ofHumanity, in late 
1942 - NEC Campaign sub-committee minutes, 17 November 1942 and 19 January 1943. 78 His standing had much improved since the previous year; in the elections for the Administrative 
Committee, Morrison climbed to fourth place in the poll - PLP papers, 'Results of Ballot for 
Administrative Committee', 21 October 1942. 
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turnaround was even more remarkable. Not for the first or last time, Morrison rebounded with a 
vengeance, and the question of the leadership was to bubble beneath the surface of Labour 
politics until 1945. 
ifi 
The pensions and Laski affair, meanwhile, did little to assist party stability, as was seen when 
fresh attempts to remove or reduce the Labour ministers' membership of the Administrative 
Committee in September and October were only narrowly defeated, Greenwood's casting vote 
maintaining the status qUo. 79 Stacking the Committee with ministers was key to the leadership's 
ability to win acquiescence, but the fact that most of the party's pool of talent were already 
ministers, and removing them would lead to the Administrative Committee consisting of only 'a 
poor rabble', counted for little against the mood of hostile Labour MPs. 80 Morrison reacted 
furiously against the principle of a weakening of ministerial representation -a rather different 
type of stance from his position when frustrating Attlee several weeks before - but though the 
leaders had responded more forcefully in recent months, displaying some of the tactical versatility 
which characterised their conduct earlier in the war, their ability to control their followers 
evidently remained tenuous at best. 81 The true scale of this power vacuum became clear when the 
biggest single crisis to affect the political nation between 1940-5 blew up at the end of the year, 
over the government commissioned study on reconstruction planning, the Beveridge report. 
The schism which had been threatening for two years - between those who were within the 
government and those who were not - thus finally occurred. The Labour party's view on the 
report was one of expectation - expectation that the government would agree to implement it. Yet 
Labour's sense was that the government did not take post-war planning seriously. On 10 
November, Laski communicated to his wife his view that Attlee's leadership was in danger over 
the issue of reconstruction, for he had been vigorously attacked at the PLP on the issue. 1ý2 Shortly 
before Beveridge was released, Pethick-Lawrence moved a motion in the Commons that the 
government take 'the necessary legislative and administrative action to implement 
[reconstruction] without delay' . 
83 Even Greenwood dismissed the idea that 'post-war planning 
should be relegated to post-war days'. m The deputy leader thought it sustainable for there to be 
79 Ede Diary, 7& 30 September 1942 (pp. 94,97-8); PLP minutes, 30 September 1942; Dalton Diary, 30 
September 1942 (p. 498). 
"0 Ibid. 
"' Ede Diary, 30 September 1942 (pp, 97-8). 
82 Hull, Laski Papers, Laski to Frida Laski, II November 1942. 
83 Hansard, vol. 385,1 December 1942, col. 1043. 
84 Hansard, vol. 385,1 December 1942, cols. 1043-54. 
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intense division on reconstruction without it harming the government; as was soon to become 
85 
clear, this was pure fantasy. While it was inevitable that an issue such as reconstruction would 
excite Labour, even Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence publicly nailed their flags to this mast. 
When the Beveridge report was finally published in December, it was seized upon by the entire 
spectrum of 'progressive' opinion in the country as a blueprint; though Beveridge himself was a 
Liberal, the report lit a fire under the Labour party, and became nothing less than a national 
phenomenon, tapping into a mood of hope for the future after the privations of war. 86 Bevan 
demanded in Tribune that the government accept Beveridge, and placed the onus upon the 
leadership to ensure this was done, writing that 'we hope ... that the Labour party and the trade 
unions will go all out for adoption [of the report] ... it is now in Labour's hands' . 
87 The following 
week, Bevan exploited the mood of optimism which accompanied the turn of the military tide at 
El Alamein by advocating the break-up of the government and a return to conventional party 
politics, arguing that the Coalition had now served its purpose and Labour would be in a stronger 
position outside it. 88 
Yet the government refused to be swept up in this popular feeling, and was unwilling to 
implement the Beveridge proposals during wartime on grounds of cost. This was deeply resented, 
whether or not it reflected financial realities. The Labour ministers were thus implicated in a 
posture which failed to reflect the acclaim given to the report, and the spectre of betrayal was 
raised once again. This was undoubtedly misplaced, for they had fought determinedly for a 
warmer reception from the government. 89 But they found themselves in an exposed position 
nonetheless. On 15 December, ajoint meeting of the NEC and Administrative Committee 
welcomed the report as 'a great advance in the social services', identifying it as the basis for post- 
war reform, and the NCL expressed a similar view. 90 The objections of Attlee and the Labour 
ministers about the impossibility of implementation during the war were overruled, and a motion 
passed that the NEC and Administrative Committee 'accepts the emphasis of [the report] upon 
the importance of giving effect to the general policy ... before the end ofthe war'. 
91 Rebuffed by 
the NEC, this was a major slap in the face for the leadership group, and further evidence of their 
lack of control over the different sections of the Labour movement. It was quickly exacerbated 
85 Ibid. 
86 Within three hours of its publication, 70,000 copies had been sold. Weeks later, an opinion poll showed 
that 88% of the country supported its implementation - Harriet Jones, 'The Conservative party and the 
welfare state, 1942-1955' (unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of London, 1992), p. 70. 
87 Tribune, 4 December 1942. 
88 Tribune, II December 1942. 
89 There is much material on the arguments and debate within the government in CAB 65,66 & 67 from 
November-December 1942, as well as CAB 71 & 87 (the Reconstruction committee). 
90 PLP papers, minutes ofjoint meeting of NEC and PLP Administrative Committee, 15 December 1942; 
NCL minutes, 17 December 1942. 
91 Ibid (my emphasis). 
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when the NEC tasked the PLP with 'improving' the scheme when it was debated in the 
92 Commons, in effect giving MPs formal license to harass the government. The reluctant stance 
adopted by the Coalition thus put the leadership group at odds with every institutional arm of the 
Labour movement - the NEC, PLP, TUC and Co-operative movement. This was the most 
dangerous gulf between the Labour ministers and their follower's yet to occur. 
Entirely isolated, the clamour against Attlee and the other ministers persisted into 1943. 
Moreover, out of the blue, a new desire to remove ministerial influence from the PLP's governing 
body suddenly surfaced, and, in this mood of hostility, a majority of the Administrative 
Committee now decided that, at the next annual election, the ministerial representation would be 
93 
cut to just five, barely twenty percent of the membership. This was a severe blow to the already 
precarious ability of the leadership to direct their MPs, and sure evidence of the degree to which 
Beveridge had turned the tide against them once more. In early February, with it becoming clear 
that the approaching Commons debate on Beveridge was to be the scene of a major confrontation 
between the PLP and the government, the Administrative Committee moved further away from 
its ministers in agreeing to put down a motion in the House expressing Labour's wholehearted 
94 
support for the report and demanding that it be implemented without delay. Greenwood, sensing 
the likelihood of a major split, did not want to vote against the government but it seems doubtful 
that anything could have stoppeda mass revolt. 95 
With the Labour ministers caught helplessly between the Conservatives' reluctance and the PLP's 
fury, the threat of a withdrawal of their party's support for the government now loomed. It was 
also possible that Churchill could be provoked into dissolving the Coalition and fighting an 
election. The leadership group thus desperately intensified their efforts to secure a more 
enthusiastic response from the Coalition. Morrison, particularly, was vigorous, agitating within 
the government on the issue. As Addison has observed, the Home Secretary therefore emerged as 
96 
the leading champion of Beveridge, pressurising the Coalition for a pledge to adopt the scheme. 
Yet, as will be seen more fully below, in associating himself so closely With the report, Morrison 
was also continuing a new personal campaign of partisanship and appealing to Labour opinion in 
a way quite at odds with his reactionary attitudes towards dissent. The explanation for this is 
again that, to the Home Secretary, there was obvious political capital to be had in establishing 
himself as the report's most ardent supporter. In late January 1943, he circulated a Cabinet paper 
92 PLP papers, minutes ofjoint meeting of NEC and PLP Administrative Committee, 15 December 1942. 
93 The precise date of this is unclear, as the records do not seem to have been preserved. See Administrative 
Committee papers, untitled memorandum, circa mid December 1942-mid January 1943. 
94 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 10 February 1943. 
95 PLP minutes, 27 January 1943; Ede Diary, 27 January 1943 (p. 117), & 17 February 1943 (P. 120). 
96 Addison, The Road to 1945, pp. 222-3. 
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on Beveridge in which he asserted that 'finance is within very wide limits a handmaid of policy', 
and argued that the report 
represents a financial burden which we should be able to bear, except on a number of very gloomy 
assumptions. I can see no need to make or act upon such assumptions. I should certainly not like to have to 
expound or defend them to a nation bearing the full burden of total war. 97 
For Morrison to agitate on Beveridge was, for the moment at least, a win-win situation. Yet he 
was not the only figure to put pressure on the prime minister. With the Commons debate 
imminent, Attlee too fought to secure last-minute concessions, submitting to Churchill a lengthy 
memorandum: 
I doubt whether in your inevitable and proper preoccupation with military problems you are fully cognisant 
of the extent to which decisions must be taken and implemented in the field of post-war reconstruction 
before the end of the war. It is not that persons of particular political views are seeking to make vast 
changes. These changes have already taken place ... My contention is that if .. it is not possible ... to have a 
general election ... the Government and the House of Commons must be prepared to take responsibility not 
only for winning the war but for taking the legislative and administrative action which is thought necessary 
for the post-war situation. 98 
Like Morrison, Attlee was pressing for agreement to implement the reforms during the war. The 
Labour leader called for the Coalition partners to co-operate in agreeing to 'carry through 
measures which the course of events and public opinion [demand]', arguing that this 'was 
certainly my understanding when I joined the government'. 99 But, though this had some effect, 
Churchill giving a pledge to implement what he called 'Beveridge-type' reforms after the war, 
this was not enough to conciliate a PLP determined upon a break with the government. 100 
On 16 February, the first day of the critical Commons debate, the government's primary speakers, 
Kingsley Wood and Sir John Anderson, gave 'inept' performances and failed to emphasise the 
changes that the Labour ministers had extracted. 'Q' Appeals for loyalty from Attlee and Morrison 
- the Home Secretary once again shifting his position, and fighting energetically against the party 
97 CAB 65/18, WM 10 (43) 2, Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 20 January 1943. 
98 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, 2/2/7-8, Attlee to Churchill, no date, but mid-February 
1943. 
99 Ibid. 
100 PRO, CAB 65/35, WM 29 (43), 15 February 1943; Hansard, vol. 386,16 February 1943, col. 1678. 101 Hansard, vol. 386,16 February 1943, cols. 1615-29; Dalton Diary, 16 February 1943 (p. 553). This may 
have been because 'ninety percent' of Conservative MPs, including Churchill, were fiercely hostile to the 
report - Harmut Kopsch, 'The approach of the Conservative party to social policy during the Second World 
War' (unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of London, 1970), p. 109. 
149 
when the Coalition was under threat - as well as Greenwood, had no impact, and, at Griffith's 
instigation, the PLP 'overwhelmingly' opted to force a division and make its opposition to the 
government clear, prompting Bevin to launch into a bitter rant against his own party and declare 
that, in the words of one observer, 'this is not the kind of treatment he has been accustomed to, 
that this is not the way they do things in the unions' and that he would 'refuse to go on'. 102 
Morrison again tried to secure new concessions from Churchill, while Attlee 'fought like a tiger' 
against the prime minister, but to no avail . 
103 The Labour ministers were in no-man's land 
between the Coalition and what they saw as the 'completely irresponsible' Labour party, the PLP 
seeming to take perverse delight in declaring war on the government of which they were 
members. '04 The ability of Attlee and the others to continue to straddle the bridge between party 
and office was in serious doubt. The leaders were now fighting for their political lives, Beveridge 
having become the embodiment of all the internal tensions which were a by-product of the path 
chosen by Attlee four years earlier. 
Griffiths was cheered by the PLP while moving the anti-government amendment. 105 Already 
compelled to undermine his recent efforts to prepare for a challenge to Attlee by showing 
solidarity with the government, it fell to Morrison - who was widely perceived as the 
government's political trouble-shooter - to wind up the debate on behalf of the Coalition, 
mounting a last-ditch defence of the Churchill ministry's policy. 106 Though he himself was 
'profoundly dissatisfied' with the resistance of the Conservatives - and doubtless at having to 
struggle against the MPs he was so keen on cultivating - Morrison came out fighting on behalf of 
the Coalition in what Ede described as the best speech he had ever heard the Home Secretary 
make. 107 Even Attlee admitted that 'Morrison was first class'. 108 The Home Secretary reiterated 
the official line that such extensive post-war financial commitments were impossible to enter into, 
warning the party that their amendment would 'raise constitutional and parliamentary issues of a 
serious order', a clear and unsubtle reference to the potential break-up of the Coalition. 109 In a 
102 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 16 February 1943; PLP minutes, 17 February 1943; Ede Diary, 
17 February 1943 (p. 120); National Library of Wales, Griffiths papers, D3/20-1, draft autobiography; 
Dalton Diary, 17 February 1943 (pp. 553-4). Yet Bevin's manner was so venomous that that it only further 
weakened the Labour ministers' position. The backbencher George Barries replied and, as Dalton recorded 
in his diary, 'turns them all against Bevin, saying that if anyone threatens to resign because they are 
unwilling to accept the view of the majority, that resignation should be accepted. This is loudly cheered'. 
Also Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 230. ' 
103 Dalton Diary, 17 February 1943 (pp. 553-4). 
104 Ede Diary, 18 February 1943 (pp. 121-2). 
105 lbid; Hansard, vol. 386,18 February 1943, cols. 1964-75. 
106 Hansard, vol. 386,18 February 1943, cols. 2030-50. 
107 Ede Diary, 18 February 1943 (pp. 121-2). 
108 Bodleian library, Oxford, Attlee letters to Tom Attlee (this collection was acquired subsequently to, and 
is kept separate from, the main Attlee papers), Attlee to Tom Attlee, 22 February 1943. 
109 Ede Diary, 18 February 1943 (pp. 121-2). 
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tremendous performance, Morrison spoke for over an hour, covering the details of the report at 
length and stressing that the Coalition had broadly accepted the plan; it was simply a matter of 
timing. "O Dalton felt that if Morrison's speech bad been made on the first day 'I am quite 
sure ... there would have been no crisis at all'. 
"' Yet, in the end, even he was unable to shore up 
support from the Labour benches, and in the division, in what Attlee described in typically 
understated fashion as 'not a good show', ninety-seven Labour MPs revolted against the 
government, joining with other rebels in registering of vote of 119 against the Coalition's 335.1 12 
Only two backbenchers voted with the government. 113 This was by far the largest rebellion of the 
war. The gulf of collective Cabinet responsibility which separated the leadership group from their 
followers was now unbridgeable. Even more damaging to the leaders, since the PLP had fon-nally 
resolved to do this, their action was not in fact a revolt; rather, the real rebels were the Labour 
ministers themselves. Despite their best efforts, Attlee and the Labour ministers had been publicly 
rejected by the great bulk of their MPs, and the size of the adverse vote against them seemed 
certain to deal a fatal blow to their position and the Coalition. Attlee bemoaned to his brother that 
'I fear our people cannot ever understand when they've won'. 114 The report had been viewed by 
the Labour party not only as a route to 'Eldorado', as Churchill described it, but an indication of 
the influence of the Labour ministers within the government. ' 15 They had failed on all counts. 
With partisan feeling at its height amid the worst political crisis since May 1940, many felt the 
collapse of the Coalition to be imminent. " 6 
Attlee, Bevin and Morrison were all indignant. 117 At a private meeting of the ministers, an 
'incandescent' Bevin wanted to demand that the party either expel or publicly acquit him. 118 Yet 
the PLP was hardly likely to back down, and his threat to resign was leaked to the press, further 
entrenching the divides! 19 The Home Secretary, meanwhile, denounced the PLP as a 'suicide 
club' that would rather have a romantic defeat than victory. 120 Dalton, however, was more 
sanguine, believing that despite of the scale of the revolt, while ever the annual Conference 
110 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 18 February 1943 (pp. 554-6). 
111 Ibid. 
112 Hansard, vol. 386,18 February 1943, cols. 2050-54; Attlee letters to Tom Attlee, Attlee to Tom Attlee, 
22 February 1943. 
113 HanSard, vol. 386,18 February 1943, cols. 2050-54; Ede Diary, 18 February 1943 (pp. 121-2). 
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115 CAB 66/33, WP 18 (43), 'Promises about Post-war Conditions: Note by the Prime Minister', 12 January 
1943. 
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117 Dalton Diary, 22 February 1943 (p. 557). 
118 Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 232. 
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backed the Coalition, the government would not collapse. 121 He argued that the NEC could not 
reverse a decision of the Conference, and hence the leaders should Simply Sit tight. 122 Whilst this 
judgement on the leadership's ultimate strength was in many respects sound, nonetheless a call 
from MPs, at least, to withdraw from the government was now certainly feasible. Other ministers 
wanted the NEC and Conference to 'protect' them from the PLP. 123 Though the rest of the 
leadership were far more anxious than Dalton, the general view was that, despite their isolation, 
they should hold their course. 124 It is indicative of the priorities, and enjoyment of office, of the 
Labour ministers, that there is no evidence whatever of any consideration of leaving the 
Coalition. More concerned with the horizons of government than the limited ones of party, they 
had no inclination to bow to their followers. Whether the Labour ministers would have remained 
in office and defied their party if the NEC or Conference had similarly lost confidence in them, or 
if the PLP actually called for withdrawal from the Coalition, is unknowable; but it is a reasonable 
suspicion to hold that they would have. At the very least, the extent to which they were willing to 
stand firm against the party in support of the government of which they were members had been 
answered. 
The day after, 23 February, Attlee told the Administrative Committee and PLP that they had 
placed the ministers 'in a very difficult position', while Morrison gave the assembled MPs a stem 
I, 25 rebuke, reiter-ating his view that Labour was akin to a 'suicide club. But Greenwood seemed 
'paralysed' and unable to control the PLP as the dissension continued to rage unchecked, 
Shinwell openly advocating that Labour should now 'abandon' its leaders - in other words leave 
the Coalition - while Bevan, rather fantastically, threatened to launch a rival party. 
126 At the NEC, 
the Labour ministers suffered an even bigger humiliation when attempts to win even the backing 
127 of the Executive also proved unsuccessful. Attlee made a lengthy speech, empbasising once 
again that the position of the ministers had been 'very adversely affected', and that the Coalition 
was simply being cautious. 128 The leader called for it to be remembered that Labour was in a 
national, not party, government and hence 'it could not be expected that the full Labour policy 
would be acceptable in its entirety to the other ... parties'. 
' 29 Dalton backed him, and called if 
necessary for a special Conference to decide the issue - where no doubt trade union bloc votes 
121 Dalton Diary, 22 February 1943 (p. 557). 
122 Ibid. 
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would be employed to deliver a firm mandate. 
130 However, a majority of the NEC still flatly 
refused to budge, and the Executive reaffirmed its support for the immediate implementation of 
131 Beveridge. Yet, most damaging of all, an attempt by two of the remaining loyalists, James 
Walker and George Ridley, to propose a motion that, despite the split, the NEC still retained 
confidence in the Labour ministers was defeated by the overwhelming margin of thirteen votes to 
four. 132 This brazen refusal to back the leaders further antagonised Bevin, who was by now 
apoplectic. 133 Having already demanded that the PLP either back down or expel him, he now 
pushed Deakin to disaffiliate the TGWU from the Labour party altogether, a course the latter 
unsurprisingly rejected. 134 The affair permanently soured Bevin's relations with the PLP. He thus 
announced that he would no longer attend PLP meetings, saying that he refused to play 'the party 
game'. 135 It would be more than a year before he recanted. With even the NEC's support for the 
leadership group rejected by a majority of more than three to one, Labour's representatives in the 
government to be seemed on the verge of formal repudiation. 
Yet politics is about people; parties need people to run them. Even at the moment of their greatest 
vulnerability, the Labour ministers ultimately remained at the head of their party and ensconced 
in office. At the same time as the NEC was re*ecting them, the leadership at last received a boost 
when the TUC unanimously passed a resolution expressing full confidence in the Labour 
ministers. 136 Moreover, the unions were only with difficulty persuaded from passing another 
resolution condemning the PLP for its behaviour. 137 Similar speeches were made by union 
representatives at the NCL, and that body also offered its support. 138 As over the coal crisis the 
previous year, the schism saw the Labour ministers and the trade unions aligned against the 
political wing. The union stance was at root about the implications of Beveridge for traditional 
trade union prerogatives and, defending their territory, the unions thus once again rode to the 
rescue. This endorsement was the public symbol that the ministers needed, the guardians of the 
Labour movement confirming that they had not betrayed it. Yet, as much as any declaration of 
support by the TUC or NCL, the survival of the leaders was because, in the last resort, there were 
no candidates to replace them with, no matter the opinions of the PLP, NEC, NCL and TUC. 
Almost all of Labour's impressive figures were in office; who could their followers put in their 
place? For all the legitimate sense of crisis, then, the Beveridge episode also paradoxically offers 
130 Ibid. 
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a demonstration ofjust how secure the position of the leadership group was between 1939 and 
1945: a direct result of their success in party management and of the settlement that Attlee had 
constructed during the 'phoney war', shackling Labour so tightly as to render the leaders 
essentially irremovable. 
With the backing of the unions, the Labour ministers then went onto the offensive. Attlee was 
tasked with conveying to Middleton that if anyone were to make the NEC's refusal to support 
them public, they would call a special meeting of the Executive and demand a similarly public 
vote of confidence. 139 It was now the leaders who were making threats, with the prospect of 
electoral annihilation, and the Labour party being perceived by the country as having 'run away' 
as in 193 1, again heavy in the air. This posture afforded Attlee and the rest of the leadership 
group their best chance of facing down the challenge, refusing to surrender quiescently and 
instead coming out fighting. Bevin and Dalton both favoured a special Conference to crush the 
rebellion decisively. 140 The Minister of Labour even advocated that such a Conference be asked to 
vote on a motion of no-confidence in the NEC itself, launching into another diatribe about the 
'political side' . 
14 1 Bevin also believed that the whole episode was a 'double conspiracy' aimed at 
not only bringing down the government but removing Attlee from the leadership. 142 Presumably 
he suspected Morrison was behind it all - Dalton, for one, thought that was what Bevin was 
suggesting - but this was hardly a fair assertion, given how vigorously Morrison had fought 
against the PLP. 143 But the point is that even this crisis, as so often before, was again instinctively 
interpreted through the lens of personal enmities. In the end, the Home Secretary weighed in and 
sought to damp down the splits, proposing that unless reports of the NEC's action appeared in the 
press, the Labour ministers should take no further action. 144 It having earlier seemed likely that 
the government would fall, in the end, politics moved on and the conflict simply lay 
unresolved . 
145 The Labour leaders had survived. 
IV 
With the Beveridge revolt fresh in their memory, the leadership wasted little time in turning their 
attention back to the question of political alignments and, in particular, the long-term future of the 
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Coalition. Moreover, with military victory now increasingly likely - if still a long way off - the 
issue of 'the future' took on a new and increasingly potent significance. The shape of post-war 
politics thus moved to the top of the political agenda from the spring of 1943, not least in the 
minds of Attlee and the other Labour leaders. The crisis over the report had, on the most obvious 
level, perhaps intimated the need for a return to traditional party politics; yet it also leant itself to 
another interpretation, that the issues facing government were now so important that it would be 
both dangerous and potentially impossible to pass legislation to deal with them without all-party 
agreement. If the recent storms were the shape of things to come, this could hardly have been an 
enticing prospcctý not least in comparison to the amiable co-operation with other political leaders 
experienced by the Labour ministers in the Coalition. In addition to their own inclinations, this 
146 
was a development informed by a string of by-elections in early 1943. Reconstruction featured 
heavily in these contests, with Independents pledging allegiance to Beveridge, and Common 
Wealth, a pseudo-Labour party, making significant headway. 147 Addison is right to identify this 
spate of electoral contests as amounting to a return to the cut-and-thrust of partisan PolitiCS. 148 
Like reconstruction, then, the ftiture of the Coalition and Labour's post-war independence - or 
lack thereof - became central. 
In late March, Churchill broadcast to the nation on post-war policy and put down markers for 
maintaining the alliance by making reference to the possibility of continuing the Coalition after 
the cessation of hostilities. His statement aroused much political excitement, both in support and 
horror. After the broadcast, Morrison and Dalton met to discuss the issue, agreeing that the 
Coalition could continue, apparently indefinitely, with a general election held with candidates 
from all three parties designated as 'Government' candidates. 149 This was self-evidently a 
ccoupon' election, and a programme for a prolonged arrangement. The parties would run 
candidates against each other but stand on one common manifesto, simply varying their policy 
emphasis. 150 Dalton had apparentl y been in favour of such a scheme for some time and - as 
subsequent events would confirm - Morrison, who was afraid of a 'Khaki' election, was also 
favourable. 151 This planning reinforces the suggestion that the notion of long-term alliance was 
far from an outrageous one. To what degree they had a genuine desire to stay in harness with the 
146 For example, there were six in February alone. 
147 By 1945, Common Wealth had won three parliamentary seats at by-elections, and won a substantial 
proportion of the vote at others. 
148 Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 225. 
149 Dalton Diary, 24 March 1943 (pp. 569-70). Dalton's account gives the impression that he suggested the 
idea, and Morrison agreed. However, it should be noted that this was the precise plan advocated by 
Morrison over the subsequent period, while Dalton seemed more flexible. Perhaps Dalton suggested it and 
Morrison appropriated it; perhaps Dalton's account is slightly misleading, and the plan was in fact 
Morrison's. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid; Dalton Diary, - 16 February 1943 (p. 553). 
155 
Conservative leaders, or were motivated by tactical calculations to avoid electoral defeat, is 
impossible to know; they may well have been open to remaining allied with the Conservatives 
regardless, but Dalton observed of the scheme that 'something like this may be the only way 
OUt%152 Whatever their personal preferences, to the leadership group the continuation of the 
Coalition seemed both a political necessity and an opportunity. 
As noted at the beginning of the present chapter, most of the Labour party felt its ministers to be 
squandering a golden opportunity to establish Labour as the dominant party by exploiting the 
unpopularity of the Conservatives. The prevarications of its ministers were thus doubly 
frustrating. The leadership group, however, took a very different view. They were strongly 
attached to the Coalition and determined to preserve it while ever the war continued. Moreover, 
as described above, at least some of the ministers already wanted to maintain the government into 
the post-war period, and there is no sign that any of them were actually against that notion. It is 
unknown if Attlee, for his partý had already come to this view. It is similarly uncertain if he had 
wanted to continue the alliance with the Conservatives from the start, or whether he had 
originally favoured a return to political independence. But it certainly became his position. 
Though these conflicts will be more critical later in the thesis, it is worth introducing here the 
calculations, and available policy options, which came to so dominate the remainder of the war. 
As to precisely why Attlee came to support extending the Coalition is similarly uncertain. It was 
widely feared, especially between the Labour ministers, that a return to political independence 
would only permit Churchill, as a victorious war leader, to smash the party in a Khaki election. 
The prospect of heavy defeat and a return to Opposition cannot have been attractive. But some 
were inclined to remain in harness with the Conservatives regardless, both 'in order for the peace 
to be worthwhile', and because of the genuine affinity which had developed between Labour and 
Conservatives colleagues. 153 Coalitionism and loyalty to their partners were thus powerful 
influences. Simple preference for power over Opposition was also significant. Other concerns 
included that Churchill might spring a 'coupon' election -a fear that Attlee's own by-election 
'coupon' made plausible - with the result of either annihilating the party or rending it in two, 
between those who wielded the 'coupon' as members of the government and those who did not. 
Some wished to remain in alliance for a fixed period to allow Churchill's victory aura to 
dissipate, while some seemed to be amenable to carrying on indefinitely. 
A full range of tactical possibilities therefore existed in political discussion and at the forefront of 
the minds of politicians. Coalitionism as a force in its own right may have been airbrushed out of 
152 Dalton Diary, 24 March 1943 (pp. 569-70). 
153 Ede Diary, 6 April 1943 (p. 132). 
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common historical perceptions of the Second World War, rooted in a romanticism about the 
parties coming together to meet a national emergency and then separating amicably, but in reality 
this is a caricature! 54 These fears, calculations, preferences, and anxieties featured heavily in 
what we can discern of the decision-making and mindset of the Labour leaders. It is unfortunately 
impossible to determine which motivated Attlee himself. For all the Labour ministers, however, 
the stance they adopted was one based upon a calculation of self-interest (or survival) - as 
demonstrated by the constant weighing of options over the next two years - even if their views on 
the most prudent course varied. 
The entire core leadership group - Attlee, Morrison, Bevin and Dalton - thus quickly came to 
favour maintenance of the Coalition after the war for a significant period of time at least. Whilst 
the fears of electoral rout were undoubtedly significantý that alone cannot account for the general 
division of the party into two broad camps on this issue, between leaders - who wanted to 
maintain the cross-party alliance - and their followers - who did not. The coincidence between 
favouring continuation of the Coalition and also being a member of the government was marked, 
to say the least, something which indicates the significance of their personal attachment to office 
and colleagues. The Churchill Coalition had offered an opportunity for the leaders to exercise 
power, practice their skills, and fulfil their ambitions. By the same token, not only was the rest of 
the party restless in its straitjacket, but many were more inclined to bask in the easy adulation of 
the Labour movement itself. Yet it also cannot have escaped the attention of prominent anti- 
coalitionists, any more than it did the leaders, that if the government continued they would never 
have the opportunity to enter the party's inner councils. Some of the most vocal dissentients - 
men like Griffiths, Bevan, and Shinwell - would probably be in a much more influential position 
if not frozen out by the stasis of coalition. The problem of 'the future' therefore moved alongside 
reconstruction as the central issue in Labour politics for the remainder of the war. The question 
even came to eventually provide the ostensible substance of the final struggle for the leadership 
between Attlee and Morrison over 1944-5. These divergent positions about the post-war period 
would therefore divide the Labour party much more completely than even the Beveridge report, 
eventually subordinating all other internal politics to that issue. Though these conflicts will be 
more critical later in the thesis, it was here, in the spring of 1943, that the preferences of the 
Labour leaders first became clear. 
154 There seems to this author a subtle, but quite teleological, or at least romantic, historiographical notion 
that the politics of the 1914-18 war were, in common with that conflict, a destructive and negative force 
(messy, for want of a better word), while those of the 1939-45 war were, like the war itself, ajust, positive 
and constructive politics, founded on an intention to tie party politics into a political statement about the 
outcome of the wars themselves. This may be an attractive literary device, but seems problematic. In fact 
the cross-party alignments of the two wars were not as different as this image would imply. 
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When the matter of Churchill's speech was raised at the NEC and PLP on 24 March, the leaders 
attained a minor success when, 'quite amazingly', there was broad agreement by the Executive 
that to say anything publicly at such an early stage was unwise -a view to some extent replicated 
even at the PLP. 155 Attlee warded off criticism from the usual rebels, and Greenwood refused to 
accept a motion that Labour explicitly rejected a future 'coupon' election. 156 Besides this, there 
was little in the way of the violent reaction which might have been expected. Perhaps this was 
due to the fact that the party remained more exercised by the aftermath of the Beveridge clash, or 
that victory in the war with Germany was still a long way off; Dalton, though, suspected it to be 
because their followers realised 'how completely' Churchill would dominate the political 
scene. 157 A belief in the near-invulnerability of the prime minister was to be important in the 
calculations of the Labour leaders up to - and beyond - the eventual collapse of the Coalition. 
Two weeks later, Attlee addressed the PLP at length on 7 April on the post-war election and 
Labour's status as an independent party. 158 In an adept performance, which remained vague and 
inoffensive, Attlee avoided declarations which would inflame the situation. But nonetheless be 
began, unmistakeablY, to cautiously lead Labour down this path, arguing that it was sensible to be 
'entirely uncommitted and [remain] free' to take a decision on coalition or independence when 
the right time arose. 159 Attlee also claimed that the Labour ministers had no preference as to the 
6political composition' of any future government. 160 The leader was striking a more conciliatory 
pose than that which he had adopted during the crises of recent months, the issue offering the 
ministers a profitable symbolic means of emphasising their loyalty to Labour and tethering 
themselves to the party once again, while simultaneously making the possibility of continuing the 
Coalition an acknowledged option. Indeed, given that many of the Labour ministers had already 
come to favour maintaining the alliance with Churchill, their public posture was somewhat 
disingenuous. Attlee argued that no-one could know the circumstances which would prevail at the 
end of the war, and hence commitments were foolhardy -a line which offered the leader another 
argument to deploy now and then utilise in the future as a reason for continuing in office. 161 His 
route was circuitous and incremental, keeping all his options open while being clearly 
sympathetic to the Coalition. The PLP accepted the statement, Dalton recording that there had 
been a visible improvement in the mood OfMpS. 162 Moreover, Attlee also released his statement 
on the option of extending the Coalition publicly to the press, something which reinforces the 
155 Dalton Diary, 24 March 1943 (pp. 569-70); NEC minutes, 24 March 1943; PLP minutes, 24 March 
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156 lbid; Ede Diary, 24 March 1943 (p. 130). 
157 Dalton Diary, 24 March 943 (pp. 569-70). 
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suggestion of an attempt to prepare the political ground for a bid to continue the government. 163 
Language and instrumentally-employed rhetoric remained Attlee's most valuable weapon. 
Regardless of the agreement to avoid commitment, though, the Labour party at large was 
certainly fiercely opposed to any retention of the cross-party alliance; Attlee had only 
successfully courted support by appealing to the party's survival instincts. Further, the leaders 
were quite clearly treading carefully, attempting to avoid the party detecting the plans which at 
least some of them had developed, so as to avoid the explosive revolt which would be the 
inevitable consequence. The privately discussed schemes of Morrison and Dalton, for example, 
were not mentioned to the PLP as far as can be ascertained, but they provide strong evidence of 
what the leaders were thinking. Attlee's case is less clear cut, his characteristically impermeable 
mind compounded by a lack of documentary evidence, but if he had not come to favour continued 
coalition already he soon would. For the moment, there was no sense in affording their followers 
the time to marshal opposition. Despite these qualifications, however, the agreement still 
constituted an important step for Attlee, building on his efforts to consolidate the government the 
previous year. Giving an impression of loyalty, fealty, and non-commitment, and imploring the 
party not to afford the Conservatives the means to wreck Labour's credibility, the leadership 
group, long ago seduced by the Coalition's promise of office, were once again ingratiating 
themselves with their followers while being fully determined to strike out in their own direction. 
After experiencing his most trying moments of the war in recent months, and being in serious 
danger of being abandoned by the party altogether in April, Attlee, as so often before, not only 
survived but turned things to his advantage. 
V 
It is here appropriate to briefly refocus attention to the last months of 1942, in order to trace the 
development of Morrison's latest bid to fulfil his career ambitions. Having signalled when 
impeding Attlee's moves against Laski in October of his intention to renew pursuit of the 
leadership, Morrison immediately began prosecuting a new strategy. At the heart of this were 
fresh efforts to expand his personal credibility and depict himself as a more active and partisan 
representative of the party than his rival. Nailing his flag very publicly to the populist mast of 
reconstruction which became so important in the build-up to the release of Beveridge, the Home 
Secretary not only fought determinedly within the government for a more enthusiastic response to 
the report but heavily pushed the issue outside the government, in the public sphere, as well. 
Much of this, of course, was a product of his natural commitment to the reforms contained within 
163 Dalton Diary, 7 April 1943 (pp. 575-6); The Times, 8 April 1943. 
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it, but there was also obvious political advantage to be gained. Morrison began his campaign in 
November, with a series of major public speeches on reconstruction over the next three months to 
packed public meetings across the country, ranging as far afield as London, Newcastle, Swindon 
and Nottingham. '" In pushing the reconstruction agenda so aggressively against the backdrop of 
the Beveridge phenomena, Donoughue and Jones have noted that Morrison 'undoubtedly' saw the 
benefits of the campaign for his prospects of seizing the leadership. 165 Hence, in contrast to 
Attlee's determination not to rock the Coalition boat, Morrison displayed no such qualms. The 
Home Secretary thus established himself as the party's leading champion of Beveridge and 
advocate of post-war utopia. His speeches were aggressive, highly partisan, and ranged widely, 
encompassing such subjects as social security and economic and industrial reorganisation, 
166 imbued heavily with the language of socialism, and calling for major reform. This was a line 
somewhat at odds with the caution of Attlee and the other leaders. Morrison was to continue this 
for over a year, himself describing the purpose as being 'to stir things up a bit'. 167 The clamour 
within Labour over the report presented undeniable opportunities to win the affections of the 
party by portraying himself as an attractive leader. The heir apparent thus began to use 
reconstruction to mark out a distinctive personal identity for himself and, as he had in the past, 
positioned himself politically, rhetorically, and stylistically directly between his rival and the 
Labour party. The divisions which emerged in late 1942 and early 1943 between the party and its 
ministers, particularly the embattled Attlee and Bevin, offered an opening which Morrison took 
full advantage of. The Home Secretary was no doubt aware that his personal standing was much 
greater than that of the leader. Beaverbrook conveyed to him the opinion that 'Churchill apart, 
you are today by the far the biggest figure in the country'. 168 Of the leadership group, he was 
certainly the most popular figure with the party - and probably the country as well - his 
dynamism having pushed him far ahead of Attlee. 
In late 1942, the heir apparent also resurrected his alliance with Dalton, the latter keen to secure 
Morrison's support within the government for his policies on the post-war period. Dalton 
indicated to Morrison that he would still support him in a post-war challenge to Attlee, and the 
Home Secretary was soon treating Dalton as a 'close ally' once again. 169 Morrison also began 
attending meetings of the NEC and its sub-committees with greater regularity. Though he 
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somewhat undermined all this preparation by being the government's most forceful defender 
when the Coalition was actually under threat in February, Morrison nonetheless remained in a 
strong position, and, as part of his pursuit of the leadership, he decided to stand for the party 
treasurership at the upcoming 1943 annual Conference. His personal base of supporý the London 
Labour Party, nominated him for the post in January 1943 . 
170 The treasurership carried with it an 
ex-officio seat on the NEC and all its sub-committees, a powerful instrument in extending one's 
influence across the Labour movement and something MacDonald and Henderson had 
successfully employed in the past and pursued for the same reasons by Gaitskell eleven years 
later. The vacancy was created by the death of George Latham, and, as Morrison's biographers 
have observed, it is difficult to believe that he did not know of the LLP's nomination 
beforehand 
. 
17 ' He wanted the post as a public affirmation of his standing and credibility - 
particularly valuable at a time when Attlee and the rest of the leadership were generally 
unpopular. 172 
Persisting in these tactics, in March Morrison pushed at the NEC for the upcoming Conference 
debate on reconstruction to be 'lifted to the highest possible level' - hardly a sign of wanting to 
avoid partisan controversy - and he was centrally involved in the drafting of the leadership's 
keynote policy statement for the annual event, 7he Labour Party and the Future. 173 He also 
initiated ajoint initiative by the Labour ministers to produce a Cabinet paper on reconstruction, in 
another attempt to bring the government around to a more favourable view. 174 The Home 
Secretary drafted it himself and his influence was the strongest in its tone and contents, pushing 
heavily for a commitment to specific reconstruction measures as a matter of priority. 175 
Of course, this attempt to portray himself as a more authentic representative of the Labour party 
than Attlee was in many respects mere presentation, most obviously in his being perfectly 
amenable to a continued curtailment of his party's independence after the war and advocating 
holding what amounted to a 'coupon' election. Morrison let his guard down on his true views in 
May 1943 in an interview with W. P. Crozier, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, when he 
revealed that 'I hope there won't be an election immediately at the end of the war. I don't want an 
election for twelve months at least after the end of the war'. 176 The Home Secretary also argued 
170 London Labour party papers 9177,25 February 1943, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 327. 
171 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 327. 
172 Ibid. 
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161 
that the Coalition could continue afier an election in which the parties stood on ajoint 
'Government' manifesto, but each campaigned from a particular angle, and set out the details of 
such an arrangement. 177 He told Crozier that Labour's recent revolts were 'stupid', and that the 
party was 'mucb better' in Opposition and needed to be 'educated for governing' - not the 
language of someone keen to return to traditional party politics. 178 Moreover, he attributed the 
internal difficulties to a perpetual 'crisis of leadership', an unsubtle barb at Attlee, and implied 
179 
that his rival was not up to thejob by charging that there was a 'lack of leadership'. Morrison 
later asserted to Crozier that 'the bulk' of the Labour party 'don't in the least understand the 
political position', believing that they would sweep to victory in a general election, when, in fact, 
the Conservatives held all the cards. 180 Morrison's enthusiasm in early 1943 for continuing the 
Coalition seems clear, as does his antipathy towards the Labour party itself. Morrison's posturing 
in his speeches, and carefully-chosen sabotage of Attlee's leadership efforts since 1941, were 
mere rhetoric and easy point-scoring. Like Attlee, the Home Secretary was keeping his options 
open - building up his position in his campaign to become leader, but with no inclination to give 
the party what it wanted, in the form of independence, when he did. But the image of partisanship 
was nonetheless a powerful one and, coupled with his natural dynamism and ministerial 
prominence, played an important role in pushing the heir apparent ever higher up the 'greasy 
pole'. By the early months of 1943, Morrison possessed a fon-nidable battery of political 
weapons. 
vi 
Although Morrison's prospects appeared promising, in the approach to the annual Conference 
there is little doubt that the leadership group as a whole remained in a tenuous position. Their 
success in having the option of future coalition open to them was a long-term prospect and did 
nothing to alleviate their immediate difficulties. A new outbreak of discontent in May, over the 
government's pensions proposals, saw another substantial revolt and a warning from Attlee that, 
having caught the rebellion bug, the party was 'heading for ruin'. 181 Dissent remained in the air - 
Shinwell proposed rescinding the right of ministers to vote at party meetings, Laski produced a 
177 Ibid. Morrison also tried to get Crozier to stress in the article the damage that would be inflicted to 'the 
fortunes of the Party' if he was removed from the NEC, as would happen if he failed to win the 
treasurership. Crozier responded by actually publishing in the article a full transcript of Morrison's request! 
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scathing new book critiquing the entire direction of the party, while he, Bevan and Shin, %vell were 
all openly sympathetic to CPGB affiliation, and even Sam Watson, the miners' official, backed 
affiliation, although this had more to do with MFGB politics than actual conviction. 182 Attlee 
fumed at an Administrative Committee report which stressed the necessity of exploiting the anti- 
Conservative swing at by-elections, telling Scott Lindsay that it read like the report of an 
Opposition, and the party was told that its basic unity was in 'grave danger'. 183 
The 1943 annual Conference, held in Westminster between the 14 th and 18 th of June, therefore 
seemed certain to be a critical test of the leadership's authority. Given recent events, it was 
perhaps likely that the event would be the scene of revolts worse than even the previous year. The 
Conference also saw a return to overt inanoeuvre and conflict between the leadership themselves 
as Morrison's bid to seize the treasurership precipitated a new round of intrigue, his recent efforts 
to push himself forward having re-animated dormant rivalries. The clash thus heralded a return to 
the personal struggles between the senior figures which had been largely set aside since 1941, and 
these conflicts - at root about Morrison's pursuit of the leadership - were now to dominate 
Labour party politics for the rest of the war. The contest for the treasurership gripped the 
Conference, as an election which Morrison had expected to win easily turned out to be in fact 
much more difficult. He found himself facing challenges for the post from Greenwood and the 
mine-workers' union figure, W. Glenvil Hall, provoking intense politicking as the event opened. 
Morrison deeply resented Greenwood's decision to stand against him, perceiving it as a personal 
challenge. 184 Having anticipated a painless victory, suddenly the stakes could not be higher. 
Morrison's fulfilment of his ambitions depended on stimulating an aura of legitimacy; yet, while 
if he won he would possess the means to dominate the NEC, if he lost he would also lose his 
membership of the Executive altogether, being unable to stand in the constituencies section 
election. Dalton, once again acting as Morrison's lead canvasser, worked tirelessly to secure 
union bloc votes, as well as ensuring that Morrison's winding up speech in the debate for The 
Labour Party and the Future was timed to give him a boost in the ballot. 1 85 Yet, though each of 
the three candidates were to be backed by unions of various sizes, it looked immediately that 
Greenwood, not Morrison, would have a clear majority over the other two. 186 
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Central to this reversal, unsurprisingly, was Bevin. Though refusing to attend the Conference in 
protest against the party's treachery over Beveridge, Bevin ranged the huge bloc vote of the 
TGWU behind Greenwood in an attempt to prevent his enemy from securing such a prestigious 
platform and symbol of power. 187 Bevin, of course, despised Morrison to begin with, but the 
Home Secretary's campaign over reconstruction had only exacerbated this, and Bevin suspected 
that he was somehow behind the Beveridge revolt. The Minister of Labour recognised Morrison 
to be manoeuvring himself into a position which he could exploit as a springboard to challenge 
Attlee. 188 Determined to scupper the Home Secretary's plotting, Bevin therefore aligned the 
TGWU with the deputy leader, no more than a 'cardboard member' of the union, in the contest . 
181 
With the constituency parties factored in, Dalton calculated that Greenwood would poll 1,074,000 
votes, compared to Morrison's 79 1,000 and Hall's 470,000.190 Hall's candidature was significant 
for Morrison as, if the contest went to a second ballot - which remained unclear because the rules 
had still not been finalised, even as the Conference opened - it seemed certain that his sole 
backers, the miners, would switch to the Home Secretary after Hall's elimination, permitting 
Morrison to trump Bevin and capture the post. 191 Certainly the miners' leaders, Watson and 
Lawther, compelled to support Hall for internal reasons, were in reality eager to back Morrison. 192 
The party thus descended into the old-fashioned intriguing, deal-brokering, and vote-counting of 
the type in which its leaders had not been able to indulge during the crises of recent years. Dalton 
engineered an emergency session of the NEC to discuss the issue by having Lawther put pressure 
for a meeting on Middleton and A. J. Dobbs, the NEC chairman. 193 Laski, too, worked to assist 
Morrison, by introducing a motion in favour of a second ballot. ' 94 Alerted to what Morrison's 
supporters were trying to do, Greenwood and his own union allies on the NEC - James Walker, 
W. A. Robinson and George Dallas - were 'in ftill force and in full cry', trying to shout down 
everyone else and arguing vigorously against the motion. 195 When a vote was taken, the 
Executive was tied, eleven votes to eleven, but Dobbs torpedoed Morrison's campaign in using 
his casting vote against Laski's resolution, and the proposal for a second ballot was defeated. 196 
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After all his efforts to Jay claim to the post over the preceding six months, the Home Secretary 
had apparently been impeded at the last hurdle. Having initially seemed that he would be in a 
position to dominate the Executive, Labour's leader-in-waiting was thus faced with outright 
removal from the NEC until he could stand again at the 1944 Conference. But neither he nor 
Dalton gave up, and the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, already intense, thus reached fever- 
pitch, as Morrison tried desperately to overtum the result. Dalton attempted to encourage Lawther 
to disregard the ruling and actually raise the question on the platform in the Conference hall prior 
to the vote, hoping that a direct appeal to the rank-and-file would provoke an irresistible clamour 
for a second ballot. 197 But Lawther was resistant, feeling that the NEC had sealed their defeat and 
that to defy the decision by re-opening the issue in front of the delegates would only provoke a 
backlash. 198 Even Dalton's desperate badgering of one of Lawther's mistresses was to no avail. 199 
MorTison, for his part, was 'indignant' at the way the contest was to be conducted, telling Dalton 
that this was the third time 'they' had engineered his defeat - the other two cases being the 1935 
leadership election in favour of Attlee, and in 1936 when he was bested by Middleton for the post 
of general secretary. 200 By 'they', he was obviously referring to the unions. The mutual contempt 
between Morrison and Bevin thus yet again cost the Home Secretary dearly. Moreover, Bevin's 
intervention underlines the fact that, even during his spat with the PLP, he remained capable of 
exercising a decisive influence over Labour party affairs. The Home Secretary's carefully-laid 
plans in ruins, one historian has observed that Bevin had 'cooked [Morrison's] goose'. 201 Ede 
attributed responsibility for the scotching of Morrison's victory to the Minister of Labour 
personally. 202 Seeing the entire episode as a calculated effort to retard his growing strength, 
Morrison disregarded Lawther's warning and determined to provoke a public row in front of the 
delegates 'if it can still be arranged', making clear that he was quite prepared to go to the brink 
against his enemies and ask the Conference delegates personally for a second ballot. 203 
That day, Morrison entered another virtuoso oratorical perfon-nance in the debate on The Labour 
Party and the Future. Attlee opened the debate with a competent speech, but Morrison wound it 
up with a brilliant display of his platform abilities. 204 His speech was again much more aggressive 
in tone than that of the leader, following the official line on reconstruction but not showing the 
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same caution. 205 In contrast to the leader, his language was bombastic and distinctly socialist: 'we 
must have the public ownership of the natural monopolies; we must have the socialization ... of 
those restrictive monopolies of capitalism ... we are going to be triumphant at the expense of our 
2 207 
enemies in the field'. 06 The speech received a thunderous ovation. Morrison had once again 
very publicly advertised the differences between him and Attlee. His biographers have described 
it as 'a moment of triumph', Morrison appearing 'an authentic national leader'. 208 Making one of 
the great Conference performances, a symbolic culmination of months of effort, Morrison's 
charisma and assiduous manoeuvring since late 1942 had secured him an unprecedented level of 
internal popularity, and a higher public and political stature than ever before. 
Yet, the next day, this was all thwarted by union bloc votes. With the effort for a second ballot 
having failed, Greenwood won the election, attracting 1,253,000 votes to Morrison's 926,000, 
and Hall's 5 19,000.209 Morrison had done better than the 79 1,000 predicted by Dalton, and swept 
the board with the local parties - another indication of his effectiveness in attracting the rank-and- 
file over the preceding months. 2 10 For all his popularity, though, Bevin and the trade unions had 
proven decisive. Morrison raged to Crozier that he had only been defeated because of Bevin. 211 
He later said that Greenwood attracted support as a 'sympathetic testimonial for past services 
rather than a vote of confidence for future work', while Dalton recorded that 'the public will not 
take well the election of Greenwood and the defeat of Morrison. It will strengthen the view that 
we are badjudges of ability in the Labour party'. 212 
Morrison's huge advance since 1940 bad been publicly checked, and the Home Secretary 
removed from the NEC altogether. On the other hand, it would soon prove to be a far from 
cataclysmic blow. Morrison remained much more visible than Attlee as Home Secretary, was 
undeniably dynamic, in his element as a minister, and pitched himself as a partisan figure. As a 
resu% we should be careful not to exaggerate the significance of the election. It did not reverse 
the progress he had made over the previous months, most importantly in his series of acclaimed 
public speeches, nor the fact that he was now one of the most senior politicians in the country. 
Rather than losing this particular election, the real problem for Morrison was Bevin. It was this 
that posed the greatest threat; indeed, most of Morrison's problems were centred upon this one 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid (emphasis mine) 
207 Evening Standard, 14 June 1943. 
208 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 327. 
209 1943 LPACR, p. 140. 
210 Dalton Diary, 13 June 1943 (p. 604) & 15 June 1943 (pp. 606-7). 
211 Morrison interview with Crozier, 2 July 1943, cited Taylor, Offthe Record, p. 370. 212 Morrison, Autobiography, p. 23 1; Dalton Diary, 15 June 1943 (p. 607). 
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implacable enmity. As the Home Secretary had first asserted after the abortive leadership contest 
of November 1939, his career progress was perpetually frustrated by union domination of the 
party; he identified even then the necessity of expanding the PLP to include more non-union 
sponsored MPs. Of course, he still might have won anyway if the party had not been in so 
militant a mood after the Beveridge crisis, with the non-ministerial figures of Greenwood and 
Hall attracting backing that may otherwise have gone to him. The Home Secretary, resilient as 
ever, therefore immediately declared that he intended to continue his efforts regardless, stepping 
up the intensity of his public statements and speeches: 'The lines of policy should be clearly laid 
down, and no one else [is] doing it'. 213 Over the preceding period, he had begun to tie together the 
numerous contentious issues about the post-war world which were animating the Labour party - 
over Beveridge, reconstruction, the economy, industry, and party politics - into a distinctive 
sectarian rhetoric quite at odds with the ethos of coalitionism of Attlee, and established himself as 
a champion of each of them. Exploiting Labour's anger over these subjects, and playing to the 
party's expectations, Morrison was to continue to undermine the leader's efforts to defuse 
tensions. His core strategy thus remained unchanged, and hence, despite the election defeat, his 
long-term prospects remained favourable. Within months, moreover, Morrison was to 
demonstrate once again his quite formidable powers of resurgence. 
Though the Conference witnessed a return to conflict amongst the leadership, the annual event 
also - and rather unexpectedly - was in fact a major success for the Labour ministers, affording 
them the public mandates they needed to rebuild their authority. Given that the Conference had 
seemed likely to witness a potentially decisive confrontation, this was doubly surprising. Thus, 
while dissent had reached a crescendo in recent months, the leaders were now able to regain 
control of their party to a significant degree. On the 130'. the day before the event opened, the 
NEC agreed that Attlee should 'intimate' to the delegates that a special Conference would be 
called at the end of the war to decide Labour's ftiture. 214 This was largely meaningless in itself, 
and did not preclude efforts by the leadership to decide the issue themselves, but it did act to 
reassure the party. Most importantly, however, the Conference gave numerous important 
mandates for the Labour ministers' line. This was vital for their credibility and served to 
underline how effectively they had managed to ride out the recent crises. The Labour Party and 
the Future emphasised the necessity of continuing the electoral truce, warning that the public 
would look with hostility towards any party which opted for 'the short-term satisfaction of 
partisan PolitiCS5.21 5 Attlee told the delegates that they could not naively end the truce while 
213 Morrison interview with Crozier, 2 July 1943, cited Taylor, Offthe Record, p. 370. 214 NEC minutes, 13 June 1943; 1943 LPACR, p. 127. This was accepted by the delegates without a vote. 
215 1943 LPACR, pp. 7-9. 
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remaining in the Coalition, it being impossible to conduct by-elections 'on a kind of limited 
liability'. 216 The leader was robust in defending the Labour ministers' position, telling them flatly 
that he 'would not accept' the ending of the truce: 'The government must act collectively. Every 
member must take responsibility for all its actions or get out ... the 
fact remains that a vote for the 
ending of the electoral truce is a vote for ending this government'. 217 After yet again threatening 
the disastrous consequences of a break wi th his strategy, continued support for the truce was 
reaffirmed by the overwhelming margin of 2,243,000 votes to 374,000.218 This was a crushing 
defeat for opponents of the ministers, particularly considering how narrow the vote on this same 
issue had been the previous year. Laski was once again employed to great effect by the ministers 
as a vehicle for their own policies; though he himself was favourable to negotiations with the 
CPGB on affiliation, he was put up to introduce the NEC's stridently anti-Communist statement 
'The Communist Party and the War: A Record of Hypocrisy and Treachery to the Workers of 
Europe', and affiliation was defeated by 1,95 1,000 votes to 712 '000.219 An attack on the ministers 
for their speeches and votes on Beveridge was defeated by a majority of two to one, while 
'Labour's Plan for Reconstruction' did include an affirmation that Labour 'welcomes and 
applauds' the Beveridge report, and 'strongly advocates ... the speedy preparation of the necessary 
legislation', but that the leadership line had ultimately prevailed is clear from its declaration that 
the scheme 'should be ready to put into operation afier the war'. 220 
Contrary to all expectations, the Conference was thus the scene of a public renaissance for Attlee 
and the rest of the leadership group. They were able to reassert their authority and, after two years 
of conflict, bring the Labour party back under their control. They bad managed to see off their 
internal adversaries, won multiple mandates on key issues, and been publicly reaffirmed in their 
management of the party. The ministers had even been acquitted for supporting the government in 
the Beveridge rebellion. Despite the unhappiness of the preceding two years, then, Attlee's 
doctrine still held, and the leader's attempts to box the party in since 1939 - with the language of 
'responsibility', duty, office, and threats of electoral destruction - had proved their worth. The 
Conference sent a signal to the Labour party that, whatever the sense of continuing 
disillusionment, the course plotted by the leadership group simply could not be changed. The 
Labour ministers utilised this victory to achieve a significant lessening of tensions over the 
216 1943 LPACR, p. 127. 217 Ibid. 
218 1943 LPACR, p. 134. 
219 1943 LPACR, pp. 150-1,159. 
220 1943 LPACR, p. 142; NEC papers, confidential memorandum by Central Committee on Reconstruction 
Problems, 'Labour's Plan for Reconstruction', for presentation to 1943 Conference (emphasis mine). 
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subsequent period. 221 It represented a public restoration of the leaders' fortunes, and a 
demonstration of the fact that it was they, and they alone, who directed the Labour party. 
VIE[ 
The twelve months which had passed since the 1942 Conference had seen the dissent which 
threatened to topple Labour's leaders both reach its highpoint and then retreat. The recurrent 
conflicts which had wracked the party constantly since 1941 had not abated, and, for a time, the 
positions of Attlee and the other ministers were in serious doubt. This culminated in the 
Beveridge rebellion, the most serious political schismsince May 1940, and which saw most of the 
Labour movement turn fiercely against its ministers. With even the NEC registering its lack of 
confidence in them, in the end it was only the shield of the trade unions that halted the attacks on 
the leadership. Yet, ultimately, the Labour ministers managed to retain their positions at the head 
of the party and remain in office as well. Less skilled leaders who had failed to bind their 
followers as carefully as Attlee had done would probably have been brought down. However, the 
Coalition survived and was now virtually certain to be maintained until the end of the war at least. 
The period had also seen Morrison restart his leadership campaign, working vigorously to take 
advantage of his rapidly increasing public prominence. But Attlee, and the other leaders as well, 
also began the most difficult party management task they had yet attempted, preparing for a bid to 
prolong the Coalition into the post-war period. Carefully extracting continued coalition as a 
formal option from his followers, it was this, more than any other issue, which was to shape the 
rest of Labour's war. 
The recurrent crisis which had wracked Labour since 1941 could be seen, through a conventional 
interpretative framework, as indicating the ascendancy of a distinctive left-wing and ideological 
agenda within the party, provoking a series of conflicts against ideologically-opposed leaders. Yet 
this seems difficult to sustain, at least depending on how we understand 'ideology'. There was 
little, if any, significant debate within the party about political ideas or philosophy, and given the 
closed nature of the wartime body politic, the value of sociological explanations for 
22' Bevan immediately complained in Tribune about the TUC's domination - or perhaps simply the fact 
that the trend of TUC voting was in opposition to his position - and argued that the Labour movement 
should be broadened into a 'Federation' of similar entities, which would include the PLP, the unions, local 
parties, the ILP, CPGB, the Common Wealth Party and radical Liberals. Bevan wrote of the union 
delegates that they 'might just as well have been attending a darts club ... for all the Socialist intelligence they have displayed', charging the trade union leadership as being 'bovine, inert and irresponsible'. He 
stated that the bloc votes turned the Conference into a 'monstrous farce', and that the unions were 'no 
longer paying affiliation fees to the Labour Party. They are paying its burial expenses' - Tribune, 18 June 
1943. 
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understanding the Labour party civil war is similarly doubtful. Certainly the protagonists, broadly 
if simplistically definable as the leaders and the party, nailed their flags to different masts: duty, 
patriotism, and service on the one band, and symbolic causes and a socialist comfort blanket on 
the other. Yet neither position - particularly, and fatally for this mode of explanation, the latter - 
was well-developed. It simply was. Moreover, the type of thing that one set of the protagonists, 
the Labour ministers, were doing was the ideological embodiment of exactly what the vast 
majority of their critics would have wished to do in similar circumstances, or been ovedoyed to 
see implemented. As the thesis has described, the Labour ministers, for their part, were 
committed to achieving a Labour agenda by stealth. Little ideological water therefore separated 
the two sides; yet their followers opposed them, often vigorously, regardless. Put in its most basic 
way, the people who were criticising the Labour ministers were their ideological bedfellows. 
Most of the opposition to the leaders came from the parliamentary party. This was an entity 
comprised of old-guard, loyalist figures, dominated by pragmatic trade union MPs entirely 
ideologically aligned with the leadership. Yet it was dissension from this arena that posed the 
biggest threat to the stability of the party. An ideological explanation for the conflict may be a 
convenient way to describe an adversarial politics, but when the conflicts of 1941-3 are 
considered in this way it does not withstand scrutiny. The party's opposition to the leadership was 
instead a symptom of powerlessness, frustration, isolation from the centre of events, and inability 
to actually do a great deal. The causes which provoked controversy - reconstruction planning, 
pensions, coal, Beveridge, and so on - were all traditional and fundamental, if not elemental, 
Labour causes; it was natural that a bored and disaffected party would take'them up. This was 
true of even the leading dissentients, who themselves tended to be drawn by personal vendettas or 
self-advertisement. The documentary sources provide far more evidence of boredom, hostility, 
and resentment towards the Labour ministers than suddenly inflexible principles. Plain 
disaffection ruled, not ideology. For the PLP it was a reflection not of ideological conflict, but the 
fact that it was these MPs who were on the front lines, carrying out the stultifyingly boring duties 
that Attlee had sentenced them to. Despite their ideological affinities, then, this outcome was in 
fact not unnatural. As a result, the internecine struggle which had gripped Labour, and threatened 
the collapse of support for the leaders, was in reality simply a consequence, and demonstration, of 
Attlee's success in constraining his followers. 
Personal interests, and attention to one's own position and rivalries, always remained foremost in 
the minds of the individual protagonists. Laski had launched his assaults to try and fatally weaken 
Attlee; Shinwell had made a point of suggesting that Laski should be expelled, fearing a move 
against himself, and so on. At the height of the Labour party's worst internal crisis for years in the 
Beveridge revolt, amid fears that the collapse of the government was imminent, Bevin 
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instinctively interpreted this as an attack directed by Morrison against himself and Attlee. In this 
case, such a proposition seems impossible to sustain, but it is very indicative of the priorities of 
political leaders. The Minister of Labour similarly recognised Morrison's partisanship not as a 
sudden anxiety over what Labour was getting from the Coalition, but calculated posturing for 
rather different purposes. The treasurership election - the critical dispute in reigniting active 
conflict at the top of the party - was shaped by Morrison's attempt to seize a powerful position 
and Bevin's attempt to undercut his legitimacy. Labour politics had therefore remained driven, on 
the one hand, by a fight to preserve or overthrow the leadership group's strategy, and, on the 
other, by personal enmity and ambition. With the struggle against the Axis powers now sure to be 
won, the issue of 'the future' came to exert a magnetic pull on Labour politics for the rest of the 
war. The conflicts which would dominate the final two years of the period had now emerged; it 
remained only to be seen how they would be played out, as the struggle over who would lead 
Labour into the post-war future - Attlee or Morrison - at last erupted. 
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Chapter six - Renewal 
Following the victory at the 1943 Conference, the leadership group moved to consolidate a new 
sense of equilibrium. The challenges to their authority since 1941 had reached a high watermark 
in the period preceding the annual event, but, having secured a fresh mandate, Attlee and the 
other leaders swiftly seized the opportunity to impose themselves on the party once again. This 
section of the thesis considers how they sought to do so, simultaneously improving relations with 
the party while entrenching their own positions. Most significantly, Attlee led an attack to destroy 
the power base of Laski on the NEC, and Dalton resumed his role as Labour's policy Czar. 
Aiming to re-establish their grip over the Executive, the leaders undertook serious policy 
formulation for the first time in four years in an attempt to both appease the party and prepare for 
the post-war future. The period from mid 1943 until mid 1944 thus saw a resurgence by the 
Labour ministers as the constant crises which had buffeted them ebbed in intensity. Though they 
were still to encounter serious obstacles to their authority, nonetheless their efforts to retake the 
initiative afforded them, particularly Attlee, a renewed degree of control. Away from the public 
stage, Attlee also continued intriguing over the future of the Coalition and whether to try to 
rel-nain in alliance with the Conservatives once the war ended. The Big Four went to considerable 
lengths to keep that option open, while avoiding revealing to the rest of the party their plans. 
But though the ministers were able to strengthen their hold over the direction of the party, Labour 
remained very much in flux. Most significant were events affecting the leaders themselves, as a 
developing fracture between the senior figures fundamentally altered their relations. Morrison had 
been publicly weakened by defeat for the treasurership, but while he redoubled his efforts to lay 
the groundwork to become leader, he found himself increasingly isolated. Though Bevin had 
always backed Attlee, from 1943 even Dalton moved away from Morrison. Moreover, the 
defining feature of the period was the renewed ascendancy of Attlee over his party, taking control 
of its course more effectively than at any point since 1940. Even more threatening to Morrison's 
ambitions was the new damage he suffered to his internal position in late 1943 as a result of his 
decisions as Home Secretary. His popularity among the PLP again collapsed amid the biggest 
internal crisis since Beveridge, and, in consequence, Attlee seemed destined to retain his position 
atop the Labour pyramid. While the leadership group continued to co-operate - at least for now - 
in managing their party and adhering to Attlee's wartime doctrine, nevertheless they began to 
move into two separate camps. This division, primarily over the question of who would lead 
Labour once the war was won, was to play a decisive role in the final stages of the war and 
signified a polarisation of politics at the top of the party around that issue. The period described in 
the current chapter saw major developments elsewhere. After finally relenting to alter the 
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composition of the Administrative Committee, the authority of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence 
in fact quickly became severely tested. Comprised of political lightweights and with the influence 
of the Labour ministers largely removed from the core governing team, those charged with 
leading the PLP became unable to impose discipline on their followers - much to the benefit of 
those who would seek to exploit this. The positions of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence thus 
entered a decline which continued until the end of the war, as the PLP began a slow slide into 
chaos. Eventually, institutional splits were to open up between the trade union and political wings 
over the crisis that followed. In contrast, Bevan reached the highpoint of his wartime career, 
continuing to shimmy up the 'greasy pole' at an astonishing pace. By the end of the period 
examined in the present chapter, the ambitious Welshman had established himself as the most 
important non-leadership figure within the entire Labour party, defeating the best efforts of his 
enemies to expel him, and staking a claim to be admitted into Labour's inner circle after the war. 
The Labour ministers took immediate advantage of their Conference victory and used it to 
quickly strike at their enemies while they were still off-balance. ' Within days, the leadership 
reasserted themselves and sought to regain control over the party. Moreover, the hand of Attlee 
can be detected quite clearly in the subsequent endeavours. These efforts were targeted chiefly at 
Laski. For years, he had been able to drive the NEC virtually single-handed in much of its work, 
and posed a repeated threat to the maintenance of the leaders' line. Reinvigorated by the 
Conference, they now moved to challenge Laski's influence, and in two bold moves reminiscent 
of their highly efficient control of the party during the first stages of the war, the leaders took 
steps to again bring control of the levers of internal power within their own hands. They were 
assisted in this by the fact that most of the NEC - which the leaders had experienced so many 
problems in controlling - now seemed to recognise the necessity of combating the revolts. 2 
Without prior warning, two days after the Conference, the NEC agreed that no member of the 
Executive would henceforth serve on more than three sub-committees (with the exception of 
.3 Attlee, Greenwood, and the chairman George Ridley as ex-officio members) This was a move 
obviously aimed at Laski. Given the disregard shown by the rebel professor for his censure the 
previous autumn, it is hardly surprising that his enemies took the opportunity to strike against 
him. The blow deprived Laski of his wide-ranging brief, fatally weakening his scope to contest 
' NEC minutes, 23 June 1943; NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 21 July 1943; Dalton Diary, 21 July 
1943 (p. 619). 
2 In the subsequent period, the minutes reveal the NEC to be rather more loyalist. The Labour ministers had 
less difficulty winning the backing of comfortable majorities. 
3 NEC minutes, 23 June 1943. 
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the direction of the party. But this coup d'dtat was just the start of the Labour ministers' 
reassertion of themselves. At a meeting of the Policy sub-committee in July, the leadership group 
set about exploiting the emotive nature of the reconstruction issue - which had proven so 
dangerous to them in the past - as a means to actually strengthen their position. 
4 This question 
had offered a platform for the opponents of the Labour ministers to repeatedly challenge their 
authority. Now they cynically turned it to their own advantage, by suddenly accepting the 
criticism and declaring that, as reconstruction was so critical, responsibility for it should be left to 
them personally. 5 
After pressure from the senior figures, the NEC thus resolved that the Central Committee on 
Reconstruction - chaired by Shinwell, and dominated by its creator, Laski - should be 
'liquidated' and its work brought within the main Policy sub-committee instead - presided over 
by Dalton. 6 This was an adroit exploitation of the party's demand for action, and Laski's 
influence was seriously reduced for the second time. Recognising the power that the issue, and 
language, of reconstruction had for a party bound by the restraints of coalition, Attlee skilfully 
changed position and used it to reinforce his control. The focal point of tensions in a party bound 
by a myriad of restraints had become continuous discussion and theorising over 'the future', and 
what those within Labour wanted to do with the party and the country. Like any astute politician, 
7 Attlee and the others said whatever they thought it sensible to say. Without prior indication of 
what they were intending, they had struck at Laski's powerbase twice and retaken the initiative on 
the NEC. Fresh off their unexpected Conference success, Attlee and the rest of the leaders had 
manufactured opportunities to inflict crippling blows to their opponents on the NEC. Few of 
Attlee's manoeuvres since 1939 were so brazen. Two weeks later, in another fit of rage, Shinwell 
resigned from the Policy committee altogether. 8 With Laski the sole significant rebel actor 
remaining, Dalton recorded that it was now 'not a bad bunch of chaps'. 9 
Exploiting the favourable circumstances in which the leadership found themselves had been an 
astute move by Attlee. As had been the case since 1939, he displayed a decisiveness which was 
very different from his public persona. From serious vulnerability just months earlier, the position 
of the Labour ministers had been transformed. The once-powerful Laski, in comparison, deprived 
of his old influence, was reduced to the status of being little more than a nuisance. In August, 
4 NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 21 July 1943. 
5 Ibid. 
6 NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 21 July 1943; Dalton Diary, 21 July 1943 (p. 619). 
7 This phrase is Cowling's - The Impacl of Labour, p. 4. ' NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 5 August 1943; Dalton Diary, 5 August 1943 (p. 624). 
9 Ibid. 
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only the fact that he was suffering a nervous breakdown saved him from a possible attempt at 
expulsion after he again attacked Attlee in the press. 10 
This renewed degree of control over the crucial points of Labour's organisational machinery 
again afforded the leadership free rein in deciding party policy. From mid 1943, serious policy 
development was undertaken for the first time since 1939, replacing the 'gesture' policies which 
had prevailed since. Though purely rhetorical efforts to appease a Labour audience continued, 
more substantive policy was now formulated as well, signifying a discernible shift in the priorities 
of Attlee and his colleagues. As described above, the dual factors of the need to avoid the crises 
which had beset the ministers since 1941, and that victory in the war with Germany was now 
assured, meant that the issue of 'the future' exerted an ever-increasing influence. Dalton was the 
most significant figure in developing the new policies, thus taking on an important role in the 
party for the first time since entering office. Important in the expansion of his influence was that 
Morrison was off the NEC, and hence the only other member who was also a departmental 
minister was Attlee. The Policy sub-committee had been Dalton's personal instrument before, and 
in 1943 became so again. " Moreover, while not a formal member of the Cabinet committee on 
Reconstruction, Dalton attended its meetings regularly as President of the Board of Trade, and 
was also chairman of the NEC Post-War Finance sub-committee formulating new economic 
proposals, affording him access to a wide range of information. 12 Most of the key figures - i. e. 
bright young men - behind Labour's 1930s intellectual regeneration were involved in assisting 
him, many of them simultaneously working within the government and civil service. The most 
important were Gaitskell, Jay and Durbin. 13 Others who played a role included Pethick-Lawrence 
and the Cambridge economist Joan Robinson. 14 Bringing control of the reconstruction programme 
into his own hands, Dalton set his 'post-warrior' team to work developing PoliCY. 15 He thus 
became, in some respects, a more significant figure than he had been even in the 1930s, his access 
to office allowing him to fulfil his role as a self-styled 'expert', and his reach on policy-making 
expanding exponentially. He later observed that 'no-one at present ... seems capable of drafting 
10 Laski wrote an article in the Washington Post criticizing Attlee. He declared that the Labour party was 
fully aware that if it allowed the 'uninspiring' Attlee to lead it into an election it would be smashed - 
implying the necessity of removing him as soon as possible. Laski also denounced the control of the party 
facilitated by the union bloc vote as a 'brake' on Labour's progress - reproduced in the Daily Telegraph, 3 
August 1945. He was censured yet again. 
11 NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 21 July 1943. Dalton resumed his chairmanship at this meeting. 
12 See the minutes of the NEC Post-War Finance sub-committee, and Dalton's own unpublished diary for 
accounts of some of its many unofficial gatherings at restaurants and the like; CAB 87/10; see also CAB 
124/276; CAB 124/748. 
13 Dalton Diary, II January 1944 (p. 698), & 'Saturday 4 th to Sunday5 th ' March 1944 (p. 718). 
14 NEC Post-War Finance sub-committee minutes. 
's Pimlott, Dalton, p. 395; Pimlott attributes the phrase to Dalton, but no source is cited. 
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anything except Me% 16 In the autumn, Dalton published a pamphlet entitled Full Employment and 
Financial Policy, Labour's most important policy document since the InInjediate Programme. 17 It 
announced an intention to retain wartime controls, as well as to stimulate purchasing power in 
order to maintain full employment. 18 At the same time, Dalton kept one eye on the wider 
electorate by emphasising that this would not be doctrinaire; the priority would be economic 
management. 19 Thus, for the first time since 1939, Labour's policy making became more than 
mere rhetoric. 
This reinvigoration of Labour's machinery is not to suggest that the leadership abandoned the 
tactic of vague measures which were chiefly useful for reassuring their own followers. This 
continued in parallel with their more substantive efforts. Just a week later, Attlee began to 
establish the Organisation sub-committee as a fiefdom of his own, submitting to the NEC a 
memorandum outlining proposals for an intensive scheme of 'Party activity' intended to bring the 
leaders and the wider party back into alignment . 
20 This would primarily take the form of public 
rallies to espouse Labour policy. 2 1 The Organisation committee was relatively simple to use as an 
instrument of this sort; besides Attlee, Greenwood, and Ridley, its members included Dobbs - the 
former NEC chairman, and staunchly-loyalist figure - as well as Griffiths, and Wilkinson, who 
22 
would both be amenable to such activities. Moreover, under Attlee's plan, speakers were to be 
'assisted' by 'notes prepared in the office' - an obvious attempt to keep debate running along 
23 
predetermined lines. It was also decided that this flourish should be matched by releasing a new 
range of literature: 'The Labour Party and the Future' was to be published as a pamphlet, while 
ten additional pieces were planned. 24 Not only had Attlee overseen a successful strike at the 
enemies of the Labour ministers, then, but the new efforts to revitalise the party underline the 
leaders' improved internal position. 
Foreign policy offers an ideal view of the Labour party's wartime development and its evolution 
into a real party of government. It can be pointed to here to reiterate the renewed ascendancy of 
the ministers. Further, foreign affairs was one of the few areas in which their assertions were not 
largely symbolic. Because - and particularly under the circumstances of war - foreign policy was 
16 Dalton Diary, 5 April 1944 (p. 734). 
17 Hugh Dalton, Full Employment and Financial Policy (Labour Party, 1943). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 NEC papers, 'Policy Campaign' memorandum, 28 July 1943. 
21 Ibid. 
22 NEC papers, 'Report on sub-committees', 23 June 1943. 
23 NEC papers, 'Policy Campaign' memorandum, 28 July 1943. 
24 NEC Campaign sub-committee minutes, 20 July 1943. These were to include health, housing, the 
minimum wage, worker's control, The New World Order and The Story of1he Labour Party. 
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such a serious matter, the leaders' natural concerns with governance and guiding the machinery of 
the state shone through much more readily. Domestic policy was something that they had proven 
themselves willing to play 'party politics' with, utilising it as a too]; but their position on foreign 
affairs was, usually, quite different - although the exceptions of brazenly utilising the Soviet 
invasion of Finland in 1939, and the collapse of France in 1940 to lambast the Conservatives, 
should not be forgotten. Almost immediately after the Conference a new question arose over 
foreign policy, specifically Labour's posture on German war guilt. The question of whether it was 
just the Nazis, or the Germans as a whole, that were responsible for the war had been a nascent 
21 issue for some years, but always relegated in significance to more practical concerns. In mid 
1943, however, the problem became increasingly potent. In Tribune, Bevan made a passionate 
critique of the Allies' policy of seeking unconditional surrender from Berlin as well as the 
strategic bombing of Germany, as did the pro-fascist Labour backbencher Richard Stokes, whose 
position Dalton scornfully described as being that 'Germans are all good chaps'. 26 Meanwhile 
Dalton, anxious as ever about the perpetual threat of the Hun, distributed a memorandum arguing 
that Germany would still pose the major problem after the war. 27 He was so concerned by the 
possibility of a resurgent threat that he advocated Britain should be prepared to do a bilateral deal 
with Moscow if the US commitment wavered, asserting that Russia could be given a free hand in 
the east in return for helping to keep down the Germans. 28 The NEC had wanted to avoid a debate 
on such a combustible issue at the Conference, particularly given the flames of the other 
rebellions that the Labour ministers were busy struggling to extinguish, and decided to not discuss 
the matter . 
29 Yet, in the Conference hall, the chairman, Dobbs -who favoured a tough policy- set 
off an argument regardless, with talk of indefinite occupation, 're-education of the Nazif led 
youth', and expressing the hope that the militaristic Germans would not be treated as leniently as 
they had in 1918 . 
30 Despite the Executive's reticence, a hardline resolution was put forward and 
passed by 1,800,000 votes to 700,000.3 1 This would indicate that the bulk of the party now 
viewed all Germans in less than conciliatory terms. 
25 The best account of these debates can be found in Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War, chapters 
five, nine, ten and eleven. 
26 Hansard, vol. 386,11 February 1943, col. 1512; Dalton Diary, 13 June 1943 (p. 603); Tribune, 21 May 
1943. For more on Stokes, see the current author's forthcoming entry in the Oxford Dictionary ofNational 
Biography. 
2' Dalton papers, subject files 15-27, 'Post-War Aims of the Labour Party'. 
28 Ibid. 
29 NEC minutes, 13 June 1943. 
30 1943 LPA CR, pp. 116-7. 
31 1943 LPACR, pp. 176-8 & 184-6. 
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In late July, Attlee - who took a similarly firm position - was appointed chairman of a new 
Cabinet committee to consider the structure of post-war Europe. 32 Morrison and Bevin were also 
33 
members. The deputy prime minister was determined that Germany should be permanently 
weakened, and supported Bevin's proposal that the country be broken up into its constituent 
states . 
34 The Labour ministers were more anti-Germanic (and indeed anti-Soviet) than most 
leading Conservatives, as well as being politically weightier than the Conservative members of 
the committee - Anderson, Lyttelton and Lord Woolton. Attlee's attitude to post-war Europe is 
best demonstrated by a memorandum he submitted in July 1943 . 
35 He cut through the endless 
debating about how to administer Germany by arguing that details were insignificant compared to 
the overriding necessity of effective military and societal occupation and extirpating the most 
36 
aggressive elements within Germany, the Junkers. He advocated dividing the country into zones 
of occupation as a precursor to total dismemberment. 37 The Labour ministers took a tough 
position on Germany, and one on which they enjoyed the backing of the mass of their party. 
Thus, despite the continued protests of men like Stokes and Bevan, the issue provoked little 
controversy. By early 1944, Dalton's The International Post-War Settlement explicitly committed 
Labour to a harsh peace alongside an alliance with the US, Russia, and France to keep down 
Germany in the future. 38 As Burridge has observed, Dalton gave the leadership a virtual free hand 
in foreign affairs, jettisoning the meaningless platitudes of the pre-war era and shifting towards 
traditional realpolitik . 
39 This series of victories indicates something of a sea-change in Labour 
politics from mid- 1943, and once again points to the strengthened internal position that Attlee and 
the other senior figures were able to construct that summer. Faced with the prospect of being 
overthrown by the party just months earlier, Attlee had manoeuvred the leadership group into a 
commanding position once again. 
ii 
Simultaneously, however, changes began to occur in the dynamic of the core leadership group. 
This was to have a major impact on the struggle between Attlee and Morrison, and precipitated a 
32 These records can be found in CAB 87. See also PREM 4/30/1. 
33 CAB 87. 
34 CAB 87/65,22 July 1943. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid; see also CAB 66/39,21 July 1943. 
37 CAB 87/65,22 July 1943. 
3' The International Post-War Settlement (Labour Party, 1944). 
39 Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War, p. 119. Bevan protested in Tribune that a new Quadruple 
Alliance would repeat the mistakes of Versailles, the New Statesman called it 'an obvious cover for Tory 
power-politics', and Stokes published a pamphlet condemning the policy - Tribune, 28 April 1944; New 
Statesman, 29 April &6 May 1944; The Parliamentary Peace Aims Group, Labour and the Post-War 
Settlement (London, 1944). 
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fundamental realignment in relations between the Big Four, eventually entrenching a division of 
Labour's senior politicians into two opposing camps. Attlee and Bevin had always been allied 
together, while, hitherto, Dalton was close to Morrison. Yet from 1943 this changed. Though 
Dalton had resurrected his alliance with Morrison in trying to secure him the treasurership, he 
now began to move away from the Home Secretary, and gravitated instead towards the orbit of 
Attlee and Bevin. Occasioned by the need to co-operate with Bevin by his work at the Board of 
Trade, Dalton became deferential to him in the view of Pimlott, no doubt hoping to enlist the full 
support of the Minister of Labour for his policies on post-war industry. 40 By September 1943, 
Dalton held the view that Morrison was 'not very good' when it came to offering support within 
the government, while Bevin had a much superior grasp. 41 Within a year he was describing Bevin 
42 43 
as 'by far my best ally'. Dalton also improved his relations with Attlee as well. With Morrison 
hostile to the leader, and Bevin uninterested in PLP and rank-and-file politics, Dalton became 
Attlee's closest intriguer in managing the party and planning for the future. " Yet his new 
proximity to the Attlee-Bevin axis also produced a concurrent, and this time permanent, 
deterioration in his relations with Morrison. This division of the leadership into two camps would 
dominate their relations until the end of the war. Behind the fagade of new policy initiatives and a 
restored sense of calm, a power fight had broken out at the upper echelons of the party, instigated 
firstly by Morrison's campaign to lay claim to the leadership in the wake of the Beveridge affair, 
and then Bevin's counter assault to prevent him winning the treasurership. On one side were 
Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton, while, on the other Morrison stood alone - with the Minister of Labour 
evidently more than happy to fight the leader's battle for him. 
Morrison, meanwhile, came out fighting in response to the manoeuvres directed against him over 
the treasurership. Immediately after his Conference defeat, the Home Secretary was as good as 
his word in continuing to push his reconstruction agenda and proclaimed desire to 'stir things up' 
through a vigorous personal campaign, arguing publicly and more aggressively than ever in 
favour of extensive planning for the future, and attempting to build on the efforts he had launched 
in the approach to the event . 
45 The tone of Morrison's public addresses in the six months after the 
Conference was so partisan that Churchill f6ared for the stability of the government. 46 Ede 
observed that Churchill and Morrison were very alike, both possessing 'no real grounding 
40 Pimlott, Dalton, p. 373. 
41 Dalton Diary, 9 September 1943 (p. 637). 
42 Dalton Diary, 6 July 1944 (p. 764). 
43 Dalton became much less disparaging towards Attlee, as can be gleaned from his diary. 
44 The two met alone quite regularly and held discussions about planning for the future. 
45 See, for example, The Times, 28 June 1943; London N", s, August 1943; Morrison interview with 
Crozier, 22 October 1943, cited Taylor, Offthe Record, p. 383. 
46 Morrison, Autobiography, pp. 232-3; CAB 65/36, WM 144 (43), 21 October 1943; Dalton Diary, 2 
November 1943 (p. 663). 
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principles' besides ambition. 47 Moreover, Bevin's removal of the Home Secretary from the NEC 
amazingly did not inflict the damage to his position that had been intended. Though Bevin 
frustrated Morrison's assiduously-cultivated plans, the result was simply to make the feuding at 
the top of the party more overt. The Minister of Labour's attack on his position therefore led the 
heir apparent to increase his efforts to encircle Attlee and await an opportunity to dislodge him - 
testimony to Morrison's powers of survival and refusal to be beaten, powers he would badly need 
over the coming year. As Home Secretary, he retained a high profile, while his controversial 
speeches and status as the most partisan and 'party-political' of the nation's leading politicians 
further elevated him in the public eye . 
4' He continued to act as the government's parliamentary 
trouble-shooter in set-piece Commons debates . 
49 Moreover, he still possessed important anchors 
via his positions in the government, the LLP, and the PLP, from which he could resist the 
Minister of Labour. The Daily Express declared Morrison's rise to be 'the outstanding political 
event of the last three years'. 50 Perhaps Bevin had not 'cooked his goose' yet after all. 
But his rival Attlee continued to assert his own authority within both the Labour movement and 
the Coalition. The degree of renewed control enjoyed by him and the rest of the ministers is 
illustrated by the fact that a fresh dispute over the perpetual problem of the Trade Disputes Act - 
which would certainly have resulted in another schism earlier in the year - inflicted little, if any, 
damage to the position of the Labour ministers. " Citrine, though readily acknowledging the 
difficulties in trying to repeal the Act, was coming under pressure from the TUC to renew his 
efforts, and in the summer entered into consultations with the political wing to see whether 
anything could be done. 52 At an NEC meeting with the General Council, Griffiths, Laski, and 
Shinwell argued in favour of trying to compel Churchill to accept repeal, but Attlee deftly 
outmanoeuvred them by reiterating that the Labour ministers had 'entered the government on the 
basis of fighting the war, with the approval of the whole movement; they never expected to be 
53 
able to carry through [Labour's] party programme'. He argued that changes in trade union law 
would have to be made according to the needs of the war, and bluntly stated that it was difficult to 
47 Ede Diary, 15 June 1943 (p. 137). 
48 Morrison was a regular feature in the press via his position at the Home Office. Beaverbrook's 
newspapers gave him perhaps as much coverage as Labour publications. The most effective means of 
getting an impression of his public stature is to look in the Morrison press cuttings file at the Labour party 
archive. 
49 An example of this was that, on one occasion, Morrison bested more than a dozen dissidents single- 
handed, without assistance from the government benches, in a lour deforce and powerful advertisement of 
his prowess, on the annual renewal of the Coalition's emergency powers - Hansard, vol. 391,15 July 1943, 
cols. 452-6,489-508. 
50 Daily Express, 15 October 1943. 
51 NEC papers, joint meeting of the NEC, TUC General Council and PLP Administrative Committee, 8 
June 1943. 
52 ]bid. 
53 Ibid. 
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connect the Trade Disputes Act with the struggle against Hitler. 54 Attlee declared that the real 
question was whether to pull out of the Coalition or get on with the job, a line which held sway 
with the majority. " 
The thesis has demonstrated that since 1941 Attlee had moved, incrementally, towards 
strengthening the Coalition and retaining the option of continuing it into the post-war period. 
Considering the lifetime of the Coalition as a whole, we can identify clear lines of continuity in 
Attlee's posture on this issue, the sheer consistency of which strongly implies that this was his 
preference. He had continued to keep all the balls in the air and retain all options but, as past 
events would suggest and subsequent events would confirm, Attlee's behaviour from 1941 to 
1945 is suggestive of his preferences and raises doubts about his commitment to post-war 
independence. In September, when discussing post-war politics, Dalton suggested to Attlee that 
the best strategy would be to delay a general election for as long as possible, as well as to ask 
Churchill to address the PLP personally on the need for continued unity. 56 Dalton was concerned 
that Labour would be routed in a Khaki election, but feared it would be difficult to persuade their 
followers to acquiesce to such a course, holding the view that Labour 'are great experts ... at 
suicide' . 
57 Dalton also gleaned from Halifax that it was well-known within the government that 
both Morrison and Bevin were similarly thinking along the lines of maintaining the Coalition - 
Morrison with his 'coupon'-like scheme for an agreed electoral platform, and Bevin feeling that 
he could persuade the TUC to back continuation if Churchill agreed to repeal the Trade Disputes 
Act. 58 Each of Labour's Big Four was thus, in one form or another, seemingly set upon 
continuing the Coalition into the post-war period and avoiding an election for as long as possible. 
Whether Attlee and Bevin sought to entrench the Coalition as a permanency of British political 
life as it seems that both Morrison and Dalton wanted to do, or whether they simply hoped to 
prolong the ministry long enough to avoid facing Churchill at the height of his powers, is unclear. 
The lack of unambiguous evidence on Attlee's views until the end of the war should not obscure 
the fact that his behaviour between 1941 and 1945 consistently pointed in that direction, 
suggestive of the attractiveness of all-party government over independence and possible 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. Attlee managed to hold this line and the matter was allowed to drop, despite the efforts of some to 
re-ignite the controversy - NEC minutes, 23 June 1943; NEC papers, joint meeting of NEC and the PLP 
Administrative Committee, 19 August 1943; NEC papers, joint meeting of NEC, PLP Administrative 
Committee and TUC General Council, 19 August 1943. 
56 Dalton Diary, 14 September 1943 (p. 638). 
Ibid. 
Dalton Diary, 16 September 1943 (p. 640); CAB 65/40 WM (43) 140, confidential annexe to War Cabinet 
minutes of a meeting of ministers (Churchill, Attlee, and Bevin, 13 October 1943). Bevin was fiercely loyal 
to Churchill, and the latter later put Bevin's willingness to continue the Coalition down to their shared, 
romantic, conception of the ideal course - Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, volume VT 
Triumph and Tragedy (London, 1954), p. 514. 
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Opposition. Dalton toldjournalists that he wanted to win the next election, and 'this could not be 
done if the Labour Party arranged for a due] between itself and the present Prime Minister while 
he stood at or near the highest pinnacle of his fame'. 59 
Nevertheless, the problems inherent in a bid to persuade Labour to remain in the Coalition are 
clear, particularly in light of the impact of Common Wealth and the national mood for social 
reform. The continued hostility of the party on this question, as well as its sheer restlessness, 
stacked the odds against the leadership group. That the discussions on the future were so cautious 
and secretive itself indicates scepticism about the attitude of their followers towards maintaining 
the cross-party alliance. Labour, even more than the Conservatives, would be loath to accept a 
further curtailment of independence. As a result, Attlee was to try to avoid making clear his 
position through obfuscation until the very end of the war. In October, Bevan exploited the fact 
that military victory was assured to again argue that the Coalition had done its job and should 
disband immediately. 'o While Labour had backed away from the chasm it had peered into over 
Beveridge, it seemed likely that any attempt to remain in office would precipitate a mass revolt. 
After all, whatever sense of restraint was now to be found within Labour was predicated largely 
upon an expectation that the current state of affairs would not last forever - something Attlee had 
implicitly encouraged in recent months. An attempt to perpetuate that status quo would be by far 
the most difficult attempt to corral the Labour party that he and the other senior figures had yet 
contemplated. 
On the other hand, however, Attlee was undoubtedly in the ascendant in 1943. Running parallel 
to the reassertion of his authority was his succeeding Anderson as Lord President in September, 
another extension of Labour's power in the government. 61 Having informally been the leading 
figure on the domestic front for the previous three years, Attlee now became so officially. 62 The 
ability of the Labour ministers to straddle the bridge between office and party was thus improved 
as their influence over the key arena of reconstruction planning grew. Attlee was backed on the 
Lord President's Committee by Bevin and Morrison, all three redoubling their efforts to contest 
Conservative control, and argued forcefully that the government should make plans for post-war 
reconstruction based on a reasonable judgment of the country's finances at the termination of 
59 Dalton Diary, 27 September 1943 (p. 645). 
60 Tribune, 22 October 1943. 
61 CAB 65/40, WM (43) 140,14 October 1943. 
62 The Lord President's Committee, as emphasised in earlier chapters, was the key committee in the 
running of the home front. It was worth reiterating that, at this point, Attlee now held the other roles of 
deputy prime minister, member of the War Cabinet, and a member of virtually every Whitehall committee 
(on both domestic affairs and the war itselo that mattered. 
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hostilities -a somewhat different stance to that which had prevailed hitherto. 
63 Slowly but surely, 
they began to win incremental concessions from the Conservatives, Attlee's wide-ranging 
Whitehall influence combining with the domineering personalities of the other two to great effect. 
The advantage in this long-running intra-government battle therefore began to swing towards 
Labour. In October, the efforts of Attlee, Bevin, and Morrison forced Churchill to give ground, 
the prime minister asking Attlee for a list of major projects on which he felt action was urgently 
required. 64 The leader pointed to exports, unemployment, and the transitioning of industry and the 
armed forces from a war-footing once peace was secured. 65 Churchill, outflanked, circulated to 
the Cabinet on 14 October a memorandum which underlines how far momentum within the 
government had shifted: the prime minister explicitly acknowledged that these issues necessitated 
that action 'must be taken now, whether they involved legislation and whether they are 
controversial or not'. 66 It was another victory for Labour, and affirmation of the success that 
could accrue from Attlee's quiet working of the mechanisms and committees of Whitehall. 
Now more than ever, the Labour leader, via his positions as deputy prime minister, Lord 
President, and with membership of so many committees, was able to set the domestic agenda. Just 
weeks later, Churchill was compelled to agree that a Minister of Reconstruction should be 
appointed, with a seat in the Cabinet, and the work of the Reconstruction committee given 
priority. 67 Moreover, Attlee, Bevin, Dalton, and Morrison were all members of this increasingly 
powerful body, and as a result the Labour ministers dominated this too. In many respects, the 
latter stage of the war was the period of Labour's greatest influence. With Churchill consumed by 
diplomacy and the Conservatives atrophied, Attlee, backed by the other representatives of his 
party, was able to impose a distinctive Labour agenda. 68 Earlier in the conflict, the Labour 
ministers had won concessions, yet still been repeatedly frustrated; but, from 1943, it was they 
who set the agenda, and it was all Churchill and the Conservatives could do to act as a brake. In a 
6' Attlee flatly told Churchill that he would make his case on issues when he pleased and was not concerned 
with the reaction of the Conservative party - CAB 65/40, WM (43) 140, confidential annexe to War 
Cabinet minutes, 14 October 1943. 
64 CAB 65/40, confidential annex to War Cabinet minutes, memorandum from the Prime Minister to the 
Cabinet, 14 October 1943. 
61 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Churchill wanted Beaverbrook to do thejob as his 'hatchet man' in the words of Attlee (Lord Attlee, 
'The Churchill I Knew', in Churchill by his Contemporaries: An 'Observer'Appreciation (London, 1965), 
pp. 19-20) but the Labour leader refused and threatened the Prime Minister that Bevin would be furious if 
the appointment was made. Bevin had already warned 'The Old Man' that he 'wouldn't stand' Beaverbrook 
getting in his way, prompting Churchill to promise 'He won't interfere with you'. Churchill eventually 
agreed to appoint the Conservative, Lord Woolton, instead - Dalton Diary, 29 October 1943 (p. 660), I 
November 1943 (p. 663), 2 November 1943 (p. 662), 3 November 1943 (p. 663) and 10 November 1943 
(p. 667). See also CAB 87. 
6' The minutes and papers of the Reconstruction committee convey a distinct sense of Labour dominance 
and intense activity. 
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note to Attlee which he never sent, Churchill complained that there was 'a solid mass of four 
socialist politicians of the highest quality and authority' dominating by their 'force and power' -a 
statement which confirms the extent to which Attlee had manoeuvred the prime minister into a 
comer. 69 All the Coalition's initiatives on post-war planning, large and small, were directed 
through the Reconstruction committee. 70 The political pendulum also swung in Labour's favour 
over the German question - Attlee secured the establishment of a new committee on Armistice 
Terms and Civil Administration, with himself as its chairman . 
71 Believing that the Germans 
'brought the war on themselves', Attlee used it drive the government even further down the path 
toward a punitive peace, and his blueprint for the occupation of Germany became the basis for the 
72 policy of all three Allied nations. This shift in the balance of power within the Coalition, and its 
ramifications for government priorities, was another asset for Attlee in managing the relations 
between the ministers and the Labour party itself, and an unmistakeable sign that they had 
recovered from the nadir of their fortunes reached earlier in the year. 
In contrast to the leaders - who had conciliated the party without any real shift in the correlation 
of forces within Labour - the changes to the Administrative Committee quickly provoked a 
weakening, and eventual collapse, of central authority in the PLP. When the new elections were 
held in November 1943, and the number of ministerial members reduced to three, there was no 
mass breakthrough by rebel forces, but simply a replacement of senior figures with loyalist 
backbenchers . 
73 The alteration thus initially seemed a success - Shinwell's position was now so 
weak that he lost his seat altogether, Bevan still could not get elected, and Griffiths and Morrison 
topped the poll. 74 The PLP's governing body therefore remained dominated by figures unlikely to 
stray too far from the line adopted by the Labour ministers. Dalton felt that the election had gone 
'astonishingly we] p. 75 Yet Ede displayed a surer grasp of the consequences when he noted that 
the candidates were a 'poor loti. 76 Far from maintaining the status quo, these changes to mollify 
internal anger about 'government control' in fact badly affected the stability of the party. The 
cream of the Labour party's talent were virtually all ministers, and hence the Committee was now 
stacked with loyalist but mediocre figures. As a result, Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence's task 
of controlling the party was to become markedly more difficult, and their influence almost 
69 PREM 4/88/1, unsent note to Attlee, 20 November 1944. 70 The minutes of the Cabinet and War Cabinet confirm that all such initiatives were passed on for final 
7 approval 
from the Reconstruction committee. 
7 CAB 78/28, General Series 49. 
72 The plans developed by Attlee were presented by Churchill to Roosevelt and Stalin, and adopted, in early 
1945. The quote is from Harris, Attlee, p. 21 1, but no source is cited. 
73 PLP papers, 'Ballot for Administrative Committee', 10 November 1943. 
74 Ibid. The result confirms Morrison's still immensely strong position among MPs, despite his defeat at the 
hands of Bevin and the improved strength of Attlee. 
7' Dalton Diary, 10 November 1943 (p. 667). 
76 Ede Diary, 10 November 1943 (p. 152). 
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immediately entered into a steep decline. Lacking the membership of all senior Labour 
parliamentarians, the Administrative Committee appeared a less authoritative entity, and MPs 
lacked incentives to take it seriously. The diminution in ministerial representation, moreover, 
constituted yet another degree of institutional separation of the leadership group from their 
followers. Now more than ever, the two existed in separate boxes. 
III 
This thesis has analysed the response of Labour's leading actors to events amid very narrow 
political circumstances. While some of these responses were necessitated by the efforts of others 
to enhance their own strength via engineering confrontation in an environment in which the 
language of 'crisis' was an acceptable, constantly-used, and quite conventional political too], 
others were crises that simply broke over them as events occurred. The events of November 1943 
were of the latter variety, as the worst split since the Beveridge report developed just days after 
the Administrative Committee election, culminating in further - and this time severe - damage to 
Morrison's position. The crisis was provoked by the decision to release the fascist leader Sir 
Oswald Mosley from prison, and the focal point of the turbulence was the man who authorised 
the release - the Home Secretary. Once again, Morrison's role as the government's trouble- 
shooter came at the cost of publicly bearing the weight of unpopular policies and, animated by his 
unwillingness to tolerate dissent, willingly accepting damage to the popularity he had expended 
so much effort in cultivating. The inherent tension between the way in which Morrison conducted 
himself, and the realisation of his career long-term ambitions, is self-evident. 
Mosley's ill-health led doctors to believe that he might develop complications and die; though 
initially reluctant, in mid November, Morrison decided to free him from prison and place him 
under house arrest. 77 In his memoirs, he put the pressure to release Mosley down to the latter's 
78 'class friends', a barb at Churchill, who had raised the case the previous month. Regardless, the 
decision to release Britain's most notorious fascist was ill-judged, provoking a huge amount of 
hostility within the party and across the country. Bevin was absolutely incredulous, making his 
opposition known publiCly. 79 His biographer has even argued that it was this incident, more than 
any other, which crystallised his hatred for Morrison. 80 But this was merely the beginning of what 
77 PRO, CAB 65/35, WM 156 (43), 17 November 1943; Annexe CAB 65136, WM 163 (43), 29 November 
1943. 
78 Morrison, A utobiography, p. 22 1. 
19 Bevin papers, Brendan Bracken to Bevin, 30 November 1943. Bevin briefly considered resigning from 
the government in protest. Bracken managed to talk him around by appealing to Bevin's strong personal 
loyalty to the prime minister. 
so Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 287. 
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Donoughue and Jones termed the 'biggest storm of Morrison's wartime carcer'. 81 The crisis 
rapidly accelerated out of control: Bevan denounced 'collaborationist Labour leaders', mass 
protests were held across the country, sacks of letters attacking Morrison were received at the 
Home Office, and there were violent clashes outside Parliament between police and two thousand 
protesters while he was making a speech explaining the decision. 82 Though the Commons gave 
Morrison an ovation, and sections of the press labelled his performance 'a great political 
triumph', nevertheless an even more serious problem than the fury of the British people was the 
lasting odium of the Labour movement towards the decision. 83 Bevin's union, the TGWU, 
immediately passed a resolution deriding it as 'an insult to the people in the fighting services', 
while other unions - the railwaymen, engineers, miners and the General and Municipal -joined 
the public attack on the heir apparent. " It is not difficult to again detect the hand of Bevin and 
Morrison's other enemies in the union world here. 
Before his speech in the Commons, Morrison had argued his case at the Administrative 
Committee, where Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence kept a lid on the crisis, and 'the general 
feeling' was that the matter must not be pursued 'too far', i. e. to encourage the PLP to mount an 
assault on the Coalition. 85 But then the NCL actually issued a statement explicitly disassociating 
itself from Morrison, and ordering that its constituent bodies - the NEC, TUC, and 
86 Administrative Committee - re-examine the issue. Morrison came under sustained attack at the 
NEC, but, no longer being a member, could not go to defend himself, and was forced to rely on 
the ineffectual Wilkinson to make his case. 87 She made an impassioned plea, but Dalton wrote 
that was 'too publicly emotional about her Chief . 
88 Dobbs - who had played the key role in 
scotching Morrison's bid for a second ballot in the treasurership election - introduced a resolution 
denouncing the Home Secretary's decision, which was passed by an overwhelming margin of 
thirteen votes to one. 89 That same day, the TUC backed the denunciation of Morrison's actions, 
with almost every member of the General Council launching personal attacks on the Home 
81 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 304. 
82 Daily Express, 19 November 1943; Hansard, vol. 393,23 November 1943, cols. 1428-33; Foot, Bevan, 
r; 461. 
Daily Express, 24 November 1943; The Times, 24 November 1943; Evening Standard, 23 November 
1943. 
84 Daily Express, 19 November 1943 & 24 November 1943; 7-he Times, 20 November 1943; Manchester 
Guardian, 22 & 26 November 1943, Daily Telegraph, 23 November 1943, Daily Mail, 25 November 1943. 
" PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 23 November 1943. 
8' NCL minutes, 24 November 1943. 
87 NEC minutes, 24 November 1943; Dalton Diary, 24 November 1943 (pp. 674-5). Dalton described it as 
'a bloody awful day'. 
" Ibid; NEC minutes, 24 November 1943. 89 Ibid. 
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Secretary. 90 Morrison had been censured by two of the three central bodies of the Labour 
movement. Moreover, Attlee cleverly stood back and refrained entirely from any public 
involvement whatsoever in the crisis. 91 With Bevin and the union world uniformly hostile, and 
Dalton similarly opposed to the release, Morrison found himself severely damaged and 
completely isolated. 
In the space of less than a week, Morrison had gone from a demonstration of strength in the 
Administrative Committee elections to being faced with the collapse of his internal position. The 
only arena which had not yet censured him was the PLP. Fighting for his political life, on 25 
November Morrison went to the Administrative Committee before facing the wrath of the full 
party meeting, but, even on the former body - which Greenwood had controlled effectively prior 
to the NCL's declaration of war against the Home Secretary - his ability to bridge the divide was 
limited, and a motion to censure him was defeated by just one vote. 92 Moreover, it was decided to 
push for a full Commons debate into the matter. 93 This sudden change in the attitude of the 
Committee confirms the new inability of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence to wield suzerainty 
over it. At what had become a make-or-break PLP meeting, Bevan - in an example of the first 
form of 'crisis' described above - tried to hijack the row and fold it into a wider indictment of all 
Labour ministers by arguing that, because the bouts of conflict between the party and the 
Coalition were now so embarrassing, the only solution was to call a special Conference to suggest 
that Labour withdraw from the government. 94 The proposal, perhaps unsurprisingly, was not even 
95 considered. Greenwood again tried to avoid a split with a compromise resolution which 
expressed 'concern' at Mosley's release but stopped short of criticising it, and supported 
Morrison's freedom to take hard decisions. 96 But yet another amendment which called for censure 
and a motion of no-confidence in the Home Secretary to be put down in the Commons was also 
introduced, while Attlee still avoided involvement. 97 Moreover, by now the TUC, NEC, and the 
MFGB were all calling for Mosley to be re-interned, providing further ammunition to the attempt 
to censure the heir apparent. 98 In an increasingly desperate fight with the bulk of his own party, 
the Home Secretary found that the union MPs, particularly, were against him. 99 
90 TUC General Council minutes, 24 November 1943. 
9' Attlee avoided any involvement in party or NEC meetings, and in the Commons. 
92 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 25 November 1943. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ede Diary, 25 November 1943 (pp. 154-6). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid; PLP minutes, 25 November 1943. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ede Diary, 25 November 1943 (pp. 154-6). 
99 Manchester Guardian, 25 November 1943. 
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Characteristically, however, Morrison did not retreat but mounted a vigorous defence, arguing 
that the Mosley affair was a judicial decision and brazenly declared that no amount of trade union 
pressure would change his mind. 100 In the critical PLP vote, he managed to escape formal 
censure, but only by eight votes. 101 Morrison had stared into the abyss. It is doubtful that there 
would have been any way back for him from a censure by MPs. Greenwood's non-committal 
resolution was then passed by sixty-one to fifteen. 102 Yet, though the PLP had resolved that it 
would not disavow him - leading Dalton to believe that the Home Secretary might 'get away with 
it after all' - nonetheless the two censures he had received, and the large number of MPs who 
voted against him, was shattering to the leadership credentials and prestige of Labour's second 
man. 103 Moreover, a group of recalcitrant MPs, including three members of the Administrative 
Committee, responded by defying the decision and put down the motion of no-confidence in the 
Commons regardless, indicting Morrison's actions as being deliberately 'calculated to retard the 
war effort'. 104 The heir apparent had spent a year vigorously intriguing to replace Attlee, only to 
suffer the humiliation of almost being censured by the MPs he would have to convince to back 
him. The episode was a dramatic reversal of his fortunes. His unwillingness to let the 
treasurership defeat deflect him, and decision to adhere to his strategy of being even more 
aggressive in his pursuit of Attlee's job, had placed him in a strong position. Yet the Mosley crisis 
pushed Morrison's standing to rock-bottom. More damaging than either the treasurership episode 
or the Daily Mirror controversy, Morrison's attention to his long-term interests was again 
undermined by his concern with duty and quite unapologetic authoritarianism. 
As the Commons confrontation between the Home Secretary and his critics approached, the 
atmosphere became even worse. The Daily Express wrote that it would be a mistake if Morrison's 
career were to derailed by the issue, as 
The Labour Party cannot in fact do without him. He stands head and shoulders above all other Labour 
leaders, and when in due course the Party secedes from the Coalition to fight its own political battles it will 
need his leadership and personality if it is to make any real impression on the mind of the electorate ... 
if the 
Labour Party were to demote him and put him on the shelf .. 
it would be making a disastrous mistake. 105 
100 Ede Diary, 25 November 1943 (pp. 154-6). 
101 PLP minutes, 25 November 1943. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Dalton Diary, 25 November 1943 (pp. 675-6). 
104 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 30 November 1943. The three were J. Parker, George Dagger, 
and G. Woods. See the debate in Hansard, vol. 395,1 December 1945. 
'05 Daily Express, 26 November 1943. 
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While the Beaverbrook newspaper took great delight in backing Morrison to the hilt against the 
press baron's nemesis Bevin - asserting the 'need' for Morrison's 'leadership' of the party, for 
example - nevertheless this support did nothing to alter the mood in the Labour party itself. 
106 
Dalton thought it 'quite on the cards' that Morrison would have to resign if more Labour MPs 
voted for the rebel amendment than against it. 107 The growing political divorce between the two, 
and Dalton's parallel move towards Attlee and Bevin, is evident from a lengthy rant in his diary, 
in which Dalton declared himself to be 'wholly in sympathy' with the opposition to Morrison's 
decision. 108 
However, with the crisis now threatening Labour's hard-won stability, the vote of no-confidence 
compelled Attlee - who, to judge by all the available documentary evidence, had hitherto stood 
entirely aloof while his rival suffered blow after blow - to finally enter the fray. 109 He warned the 
PLP that the rebel amendment, if passed, would have wider ramifications beyond the Mosley 
issue. ' 10 Attlee was faced with the situation that, if restless MPs concluded that they could get rid 
of Morrison in a pique of disaffection, they might well try to do the same again. The leader 
therefore deployed calls for 'responsibility' to bring the party to heel, moving not so much to 
protect Morrison as to preserve the position of the Labour ministers as a whole. "' Further, it was 
obvious that the damage to Morrison's succession prospects had already been done. The PLP was 
almost unanimously hostile to his rival, while Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence had difficulty 
even getting the Administrative Committee to order the party to oppose the rebel amendment. 112 
But Attlee's timely intervention did the trick, and a majority of the PLP at last consented not to 
support the no-confidence motion, albeit narrowly. 113 
Morrison compounded the crisis by his manner in a long and vitriolic debate in the Commons. 114 
In a bellicose display, he even got into a row with Greenwood - who was supporting him - and 
publicly targeted his own party, in what was rapidly descending into an open conflict between the 
Home Secretary and the entire Labour movement. 115 Morrison denounced the individual sections 
106 Ibid. 
107 Dalton Diary, 30 November 1943 (p. 677). 
log Dalton Diary, 25 November 1943 (pp. 675-6). 
109 PLP minutes, I December 1943. 
110 Ede Diary, I December 1943 (p. 157); PLP minutes, I December 1943. 
111 Ibid. 
112 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 30 November 1943. 
113 Ibid; Dalton Diary, I December 1943 (p. 677). 
114 See the debate in Hansard, vol. 395,1 December 1943. 
115 Hansard, vol. 395,1 December 1943, cols. 456-76. Greenwood formally brought the PLP out in support 
of the government, but he could not avoid engaging in a spat with the prickly Morrison after saying that 
Mosley had been released because of his social position; if he had been 'John Jones', according to 
Greenwood, he would still be under detention. Morrison was incredulous, leaping to his feet, threatening 
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of the movement which had attacked him - the NCL, TUC, PLP, and NEC - and suggested that 
they were following the agenda of the CPGB. 1 16 That Morrison, the calculating political 
manoeuvrer, would respond in this fashion underlines how bitter the confrontation had become. 
Naturally combative, Morrison refused to yield and simply went onto the attack. He turned the 
accusation about toadying to Mosley because of his social class back on his detractors by arguing 
that the Labour party only opposed the release because Mosley was an aristocrat, eagerly 
reminding Labour MPs that Mosley had once been a member of the PLP, the ILP, and the 
Conseryatives: 'The only people who come out of it clean are the Liberals'. 117 It was another 
commanding performance, Morrison giving as good as he got, and, in the division, the vote of no- 
confidence was defeated by 327 to sixty-two. 118 One newspaper compared Morrison's oratorical 
mastery of the Commons to that of Churchill. 119 Yet little more than half the PLP followed the 
government into the lobbies, while six of the fourteen members of the Administrative Committee 
rebelled as well. 120 It seems reasonable to conjecture that this weakened disciplinary situation was 
a direct result of the undermining of the authority of the Administrative Committee. Ede 
sardonically recorded that things were now so bad that those who actually obeyed official 
decisions would soon have to apologise for doing S0.121 Both he and Morrison also suspected that 
Bevin was behind the mass rebellion by union MPs, in addition to the union denunciations, as he 
could surely have brought his authority to bear in order to mitigate the revolt. 122 The crisis thus 
ended with a public, yet empty, victory for the Home Secretary. His reftisal to be challenged had 
gravely damaged his position and, by late 1943, the leadership looked beyond his reach. 
Intriguingly, Attlee's private views were in fact supportive of Morrison; he had written to his 
brother that 
We are fighting for the British idea of the supremacy of law and against the conception that an Executive 
can keep anyone in quod they don't like. How often have not you and I heard old Blimps talk about 
damned Labour agitators causing strikes and how they would like to imprison or shoot the swine ... The real 
test of one's belief in the doctrine of Habeas Corpus is not when one demands its application on behalf of 
one's friends but of one's enemies. 123 
his critics, and challenging them to 'put themselves in the chair of the Home Secretary ... and face themselves with the file on his table'. 116 Ibid. 
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118 Hansard, vol. 395,1 December 1943, cols. 475-8. 
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That the party leader so strongly backed Morrison's release of Mosley in private, but did not enter 
the fray publicly until the very end, emphasises the overriding importance of self-interest in the 
minds of our characters, and the fact that at core of Labour's war was a series of personal 
conflicts and strategies. 124 It also reinforces Attlee's adept grasp of risks and rewards; remaining 
uninvolved, he was able to watch Morrison's standing plummet as he faced a hostile Labour party 
alone and bore the brunt of the crisis himself. Attlee had no incentive to intervene until the crisis 
threatened the stability of the entire party. One of the insuperable problems for Morrison was that 
he frequently carried the can for the government - sustaining severe blows to his own position - 
in a way that his great rival, buried away within the warrens of Whitehall, simply never had to. 
Morrison's damaged standing was exacerbated several weeks later when his attempts to fix things 
for his protdgd Maurice Webb -a correspondent for the Daily Herald - to become the new party 
general secretary, when Middleton retired, ran aground. 125 The Home Secretary had, of course, 
sought the post for himself in the thirties, only to be frustrated by union bloc votes and lose out to 
Middleton. He now tried once again to bring this powerful internal lever under his control, but 
Bevin was, as usual, hostile to the way in which Morrison continually sought to strengthen his 
power across Labour's institutional structure, and victory went instead to the unions' candidate, 
Morgan Phillips. 126 
IV 
Following the Mosley fiasco, anxiety within the party grew still further during the first half of 
1944, as the government suffered defeat at high profile by-electionS. '2' There was a sense that 
Common Wealth was racing ahead and Labour was not adequately exploiting the mood for social 
change. But, probably even more important, was the persistent decline in the cohesion of the PLP. 
In January, Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence began trying to repair the damage done to their 
authority. The acting leader wrote to Middleton and requested that, where MPs voted in the 
124 According to Churchill, Attlee had backed the release during the Cabinet discussions - Winston S. 
Churchill, The Second World War, Volume V. Closing the Ring (London, 1952), p. 636. 
123 Evening Standard, 27 November 1943; interviews with Sir William Lawther, Mrs L. Middleton, Lady 
Phillips and Mrs D. Robinson, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 33 1. 
126 NEC minutes, 22 March 1944; Dalton Diary, 22 March 1944 (pp. 725-6). 
127 Most damaging were the Conservative defeats at Skipton and West Derbyshire in January and February 
1944 respectively. At Skipton, Common Wealth sent an election team and hundreds of agitators to press the 
case of their candidate, who won handsomely - See Angus Calder, 'The Common Wealth Party 1942- 
1945' (unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of Sussex, 1968) (two volumes), volume 11, pp. 223-71, for the 
best account of the contests. At West Derbyshire, Common Wealth again played a role in getting an 
Independent Socialist elected in a Conservative constituency described as a 'remarkable feudal survival' - 
Calder, The People's War, p. 552. 
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Commons contrary to the official decision of the PLP, they be dealt with by the NEC itself. 128 
This was a clear admission of weakness. 129 It effectively acknowledged that he and Pethick- 
Lawrence now lacked the means to keep MPs under control. It also weakens the credibility of the 
traditional notion that, during the war, power within Labour swung away from the NEC - where 
it had resided during the thirties - and back towards the PLP. In fact, the latter body remained 
chronically weak. As noted earlier in the thesis, the real centre of gravity was therefore not 
institutional, but the leadership group themselves: they were the only ones able to simultaneously 
occupy the key arenas of the NEC, the PLP, and high office. Free to operate in all three 
environments, the party's senior figures wielded options open to nobody else. But Greenwood ran 
into trouble when Wilkinson became the new NEC chairman after the death of George Ridley, 
with Laski as vice-chair. Ede recorded his view that 'if the Labour party can survive these two 
appointments it must be indestructible'. 130 Laski responded to Greenwood's request by moving 
that it be refused. 13 ' He also advocated that ministers be barred altogether from voting at the PLP 
and Administrative Committee. 132 This was frustrated, however, by agreement that the matter 
should be considered at a joint meeting of the Executive and the parliamentary party's governing 
body. 133 
Greenwood pressed on, and tried to present a fait accompli on discipline, by adding a new clause 
to the Standing Orders which proposed that any member of the Administrative Committee who 
voted contrary to the PLP decision in the Commons would be ejected from the Committee. "' Yet 
his MPs failed to reach agreement on it; several meetings precipitated only rows, and Bevan 
declared that he considered himself free to ignore the Standing Orders. 135 In the repeated inability 
of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence to win backing, the botched manoeuvre only offered a 
public advertisement of their weakness. 136 At the joint NEC-Administrative Committee meeting, 
Greenwood finally saw some success when Wilkinson, after an intervention from Morrison - the 
main victim of the recent indiscipline - accepted the argument that 'ultimate responsibility for 
discipline rests ... not on the [PLP] but on the [NEC]'. 
137 Whether this amounted to anything 
substantive remained unclear, but that a dissident figure such as Wilkinson was keen to re- 
establish discipline was doubtless due to the damage suffered by her patron. Her proximity to the 
128 PLP Administrative Committee papers, Greenwood to Middleton, 20 January 1944. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ede Diary, 27 January 194 (p. 166). 
13 1 NEC minutes, 26 January 1944. 
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136 Ibid; PLP minutes, 16 February 1944. 
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Home Secretary pushed Wilkinson increasingly away from her inclinations towards rebellion 
during the war: she had resigned from the Tribune editorial board, defended Morrison's ban on 
the Daily Worker, and backed the release of Mosley. 138 Further, as will be seen, from 1944 
Wilkinson became a prominent figure in the evolving internal fray, using her new position to plot 
unremittingly on Morrison's behalf. 
Despite the continuing breakdown of discipline in the PLP, in February Attlee enjoyed more 
success when he began to push publicly his plans for the future of the Coalition. As we have seen, 
the leader had been determined to retain the option of continued alliance and, whilst too sensible 
to instigate a civil war by trying force a commitment at this early stage, Attlee obviously felt it 
prudent to begin preparing the ground with the end of the war now conceivable. To this end, 
Attlee issued a typically crafty personal flyer to the entire Labour movement, which at first sight 
gave strong intimations of post-war independence, but, in reality, mentioned nothing explicit, 
calling merely for the recruitment of new members, while implying Attlee's real intentions in 
stating that 'the Labour party is playing a great part in winning the war. It must be no less active 
in building a peaceful world ... to establish it 
demands the same self-sacrifice, self-discipline and 
devotion [already shown] i. 139 
Arranging a two-day session between the NEC and the Labour members of the War Cabinet, 
Attlee now tried to take the important step of having the possibility of remaining in harness with 
the Conservatives formally open. 140 The leader was still moving incrementally, almost 
imperceptibly, trying to reach his destination over many steps rather than just two or three. The 
previous year he had fought for the party not to rule out the option of post-war coalition; now he 
wanted agreement that the possibility was actually open. The difference may seem slight but, in 
reality, constituted a significant shift in position. He was hindered somewhat in that Bevin refused 
to attend, not trusting the duplicitous political wing not to leak the secret consultations to the 
press, and, the day before the meeting, Shinwell - presumably guessing what Attlee was planning 
- tried to undercut him at the NEC, and frame the shape of the discussion, by criticising the 
electoral truce and proposing that 'the [NEC] consider the possibility of a general election taking 
place within the next eighteen months and take appropriate measures to determine the party 
138 Betty D. Vernon, Ellen Wilkinson, 1891-1947 (London, 1982), pp. 191-3. In contrast, Morrison thought 
so little of his most fervent supporter that he did not even mention her in his memoirs! - Morrison, 
Autobiography, p. 336. 
139 NEC papers, copy of Attlee flyer, February 1944 (my emphasis). The flyer bore a photograph of the 
leader and began to employ a certain rhetoric - the need to play a central role in building a new world - 
which would be used to attempt to persuade Labour to remain in the Coalition when the moment arose. The 
flyer bore the title 'Mr. Attlee's call - "I WANT THE PARTY TO BE READY! "'. Of course, precisely 
what Attlee wanted Labour to be readyfor was the crux. 
"o NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting together with Herbert Morrison, 26 & 27 February 1944. 
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position'. 141 This was the polar opposite of Attlee's position, an attempt to begin an internal 
debate in which Labour's hostility to continued restrictions on its independence would come to 
the fore. Yet, while the electoral truce was considered at length at the subsequent special meeting, 
Shinwell's bid to stir the pot did not work, and the general feeling remained that it was impossible 
to disturb the arrangement while the conflict continued. 142 Moreover, Attlee and Morrison 
solidified this position for at least the rest of the war by securing agreement that any decision to 
amend the truce would have to be backed by the Conservatives - which Churchill was hardly 
likely to do. 143 The leaders had again succeeded in tying their followers in knots with a policy that 
cancelled itself out, and committed Labour to the status quo until the end of the war. 
Yet, with this small but important victory achieved, Attlee and Morrison began manoeuvring 
against each other once again, as the concomitant issues of the future and the leadership began to 
provide the public basis of their feud. This tendency was to sharpen in the final year of the war, as 
these issues came to represent the battleground in which their conflict - really about nothing more 
complex than who was to be leader and who was not - was decided. Morrison, still smarting after 
his humiliation three months before, consequently renewed his efforts to position himself as being 
closer to the mood of Labour than Attlee, by advocating an immediate return to open conflict at 
constituency level, suggesting that the parties could all run 'Government' candidates at by- 
elections, with ministers avoiding speaking at the hustings. 144 Putting himself in touch with 
Labour's 'soul' in this way offered another vehicle for Morrison to try and cleave the party away 
from its leader. Yet, duplicitously, and indicative of the illusory and purely rhetorical nature of 
his concern for the feelings of the Labour party, removing ministers from electoral conflict in this 
fashion simultaneously offered a further means to entrench the long-term Coalition that, as we 
have seen, Morrison favoured. It would permit party conflict to occur and discord to be 
unleashed, while permitting senior leaders to remain 'above' it all and continue in alliance. It is 
possible that through this the Coalition could have been consolidated as a feature of British 
political life for the foreseeable future, the sealed world of wartime 'high politics' remaining a 
closed one. Morrison's strategy, as so often before, enabled him to play both sides, depicting 
himself as Labour's champion and a partisan figure in order to dislodge Attlee by pursuing a 
course which, at the same time, facilitated attempts to try and keep the Coalition in being and 
prevent a return to political independence. Morrison won agreement that the proposition would at 
14 1 NEC minutes, 25 February 1944; Dalton Diary, 'Saturday 26 1h to Sunday 27h' February 1944 (pp. 712- 
5). 
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least be discussed with Churchill. 145 However, just days later, Attlee responded to his rival's 
move by submitting a counter memorandum dismissing the idea, in which he argued that free 
elections would give succour to those who wanted Labour out of office and precipitate the 
collapse of the government, calling for the maintenance of the status quo. 146 
On the matter of continuing the Coalition after the war, Attlee and Morrison co-. operated in 
winning unanimous agreement that, while Labour should fight an election as an independent 
party - which we must doubt whether either of them really favoured - it would be better to refrain 
from making any formal commitments or public declarations of this decision, on the grounds of 
avoiding the 'suicide' of confronting a victorious Churchill too early, and presenting the 
Conservatives with the opportunity to win a huge majority off the prime minister's back. 147 This 
qualification was telling, and a better illustration of their true concerns than support for 
independence. Dalton hoped to wait at least several months before withdrawing from the 
Coalition, while Morrison wanted to continue the government for a full year into peacetime with 
no election. "' Combined with his existing preference for an election with a common manifesto, 
the fagade of all his attempts to position himself as a more faithful representative of the party is 
apparent. 149 Dalton suggested that a period of delay before an election, and attempt to continue 
the Coalition, could be publicly justified on the grounds that the 1940 Conference had endorsed 
the entry into office not merely to pursue victory but to ensure a 'just peace', arguing that they 
could assert the need to stay in harness with the Conservatives to carry this out. 150 These positions 
are also consistent with the arguments advanced earlier in the thesis, of preference for the amiable 
co-operation of coalition compared to the difficulties of party politics. Though it is unclear how 
widely supported this proposal was, it is worth pointing out that, for all the different options 
posited, the entire episode was essentially a debate between the leaders over what would provide 
the most effective kind of posture to keep the Labour party in its place and hostage to their 
wishes. 151 The agreement that Labour should fight an election as an independent party was 
probably used simply to avoid provoking early opposition. Independence does not seem to have 
been taken seriously, and all the positions were routes towards a common goal: the maintenance 
of the status quo. The range of possible tactical arrangements should not obscure this. Further, 
there is no reference in the minutes as to the timing of an election - indicating that the leadership 
145 Dalton Diary, 'Saturday 26h to Sunday 27h' February 1944 (pp. 712-5); Attlee papers, Morrison to 
Attlee, 9 March 1944. 
146 NEC papers, Attlee memorandum, I March 1944; Attlee papers, Attlee to Bevin, I March 1944. 
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's' Neither the minutes nor Dalton's own account record the vote. 
195 
group had got their way in avoiding commitments. 152 The option of continued coalition, and 
possibly delaying an election, was therefore still open to Attlee; the leaders had overcome the first 
hurdle in what would be the most difficult party management task they had yet attempted. But at 
this stage, more important than a commitmentfor coalition was preventing a commitment against 
it. 
But the meeting was more of a success for Attlee than Morrison. The Home Secretary suffered a 
blow to his plans for a future of seemingly permanent coalition, when the NEC also ruled that 
there should be 'no question' of a 'coupon' election. 153 His idea of a common manifesto 
amounted to a 'coupon'. This was an overt rejection of his strategy, and one which, in the period 
discussed in the next chapter, would precipitate a fundamental realignment in Morrison's entire 
political position in consequence. With his 'coupon' idea formally rejected, Morrison would soon 
begin to cast around for a new posture which would prove more popular. The position that he 
would adopt afforded the two emerging camps within the leadership group an issue of decisive 
significance to orient themselves around. Within months the question of election policy was the 
key issue, or pawn, in the struggle with Attlee for the leadership. For the moment, though, it was 
only a derailment of Morrison's strategy, not that of the other leaders. While Attlee had 
engineered a 'coupon' for by-elections, there is no firm evidence to suggest that anyone besides 
Morrison definitely favoured a 'coupon' general election. 154 It likely would have been impossible 
to win support for such a course anyway. If the leaders had gone down that route, the effect could 
have been to fatally split Labour, and leave them isolated in whatever political arrangement was 
the outcome - as in 1931 - by costing them their power base, the Labour party itself. On the 
crucial question - the continuation of the Coalition after the war, regardless of the circumstances 
or timing of an election - the leadership group, and particularly Attlee himself, remained firmly in 
the driving seat. Moreover, and critically, cross-party alliance was not ruled out as an option, the 
minutes recording that 'the question of any future Coalition, its nature and terms, should be left 
over for further discussion'. 155 this left open both the possibility of immediate coalition after the 
cessation of hostilities, and reforming the alliance after an election. In what can only be read an 
ingenious attempt to put a suspicious party off the scent, the meeting agreed to put out a press 
communiqud stating that they had been considering the winning of the war with Hitler and post- 
152 NEC papers, minutes of NEC meeting together with Herbert Morrison, 26 & 27 February 1944. 
153 Ibid. It is not clear as to whether there was a vote on this specific decision, or how widely supported or 
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155 Ibid. The conclusions also stated that the question of 'future alignments' were to be considered in 
conjunction with ajoint meeting of the NEC, Administrative Committee and TUC. 
196 
war 'problems', with no mention made of political arrangements. 156 The intent is clear - and 
significant in itself 
It seems obvious that the leadership group all planned to remain in office, but were too cautious 
to declare this openly in the knowledge that the reaction from Labour would be one of fury. 
Further, to play their hand when the moment of decision was still months, or possibly years, away 
would only enable internal opposition to ferment. It was a more sensible strategy to await the end 
of the war and then try to persuade their followers of the merits of the case, using appeals for 
national unity and political pragmatism, than to set off a Labour party civil war in the interim. But 
there were differences between Morrison's idea of a common government manifesto with each of 
the parties simply varying their emphasis on a common theme and then reforming into a new 
Coalition, and those of the others. Attlee clearly had the support of Dalton and, presumably, 
Bevin as well. Perhaps Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton intended to stand on Labour's own platform and 
then rejoin the Conservatives; perhaps they wanted to wait long enough to nullify the prospect of 
a Khaki election and then return to independence; perhaps they were unsure about their precise 
course. Regardless, Attlee had secured an important success in having the Coalition option still 
open. For the moment, then, these manoeuvrings for advantage among the leadership were still an 
off-stage, private, battle invisible to the party. It was about whose strategy would be implemented 
and who would get credit. Only later would they converge with broader party politics and become 
the key component of the decisivepublic battle between Attlee and Morrison. 
V 
Soon afterwards, the leadership found themselves dealing with a succession of crises that again 
threatened Labour's stability. A sequence of upheavals culminated in a major new internal 
conflict, as Bevan challenged both the political and union leadership and an outright institutional 
schism formed for the first time since the 1930s. Bevan had continued to bolster his position since 
the previous summer, making open and direct attacks on the leadership via Tribune. 157 He always 
believed that the party sold itself too cheaply in May 1940 and, emboldened by his growing 
stature, was now confident enough to constantly and aggressively pursue the Labour ministers. 
He supported the CPGB bid for affiliation, and advocated the broadening of Labour into a 
'Federation' of progressive forces, persisting in arguing for a new political alliance with such 
"' Ibid. 
157 See, for example, Tribune, II June 1943. 
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entities as a means to force the party in a new direction. 158 In February 1944, Bevan launched a 
brazen critique of the Labour front bench during a speech in the Commons, declaring that 
We can no longer rely -and this has been true for a few years - upon the representatives of this bench to 
defend either Parliament or the principles of the party to which they belong, and the sooner this is stated the 
better. It is a disgraceful exhibition of incompetence on the part of the Parliamentary Labour Party. 159 
The denunciation provoked a furious response, and a resolution was moved at the PLP that the 
party 'emphatically resents and repudiates the criticism of its elected leaders'. '60 Next, Shinwell 
tried to reverse the strategy agreed upon about the truce by advocating that Labour end it 
unilaterally, regardless of what Churchill thought. 161 In late March, largely as a result of a 
Conservative rebellion, the government was defeated in the Commons over a clause in the 
Education Bill - the first time it had lost a vote in the House since its formation. Churchill was 
characteristically combative, meeting his critics head on and demanding a vote of confidence to 
overwhelm them. 162 Attlee threatened MPs with resignation in order to force Labour to support 
the government by flatly telling the PLP that, unless they were given backing, the Labour 
ministers 'would not go on', but still ran up against heavy opposition. 163 However, the crisis 
prompted Bevin to attend a PLP gathering for the first time in more than a year, the Minister of 
Labour wading in with one of his authoritarian interventions by the end of which the party's 
hostility to following Attlee's instructions was replaced by 'overwhelming' support for such a 
course. '64 Attlee then found himself in another of his spats with Laski, when the latter submitted 
to the NEC a draft statement for the annual Conference. 165 The contents of this - attacking 
government policy on reconstruction - were so explosive that the effect would have been to 
present to the Conference delegates an overt denunciation of the Coalition's policy as 'a disaster 
of the first magnitude'. 166 Unsurprisingly, Attlee was apoplectic and had Middleton tone down the 
offending statement, the leader stressing that 'No one who acclaimed 'The Old World and the 
New Society' [Labour's 1942 policy document] expected that in two years ... a completely 
socialist Britain would be established'. 167 The cumulative effect of these crises was to exacerbate 
dissension - already increasing after the weakening of authority in the PLP - and permit those 
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who wished to do so to challenge the ascendancy of the leadership group for the first time since 
their resurgence the previous summer. 
Bevan did this in decisive fashion, following a series of strikes in the coalfields in early 1944 over 
the deadlock in negotiating a minimum wage for the miners. In response, Bevin assumed new 
powers - Defence Regulation IAA - to impose heavy penalties on those seeking to engineer 
strikes in essential services. These were hugely controversial and widely seen as reactionary. In 
late April, Bevan put down a Prayer in the Commons for the powers to be annulled, criticising the 
fact that IAA allowed Bevin to imprison strikers for five years. 168 Bevin was unapologetic at the 
PLP on 28 April and vigorously attacked Bevan in response, winning the support of Labour MPs 
for 1AA by a 'large' majority. 169 Greenwood sought to reinforce the decision by warning that, 
given this overwhelming backing, any attempt to recant once in the Commons and support Bevan 
would raise 'a major issue of discipline'. 170 
Yet, in fact, this was precisely what happened. Bevan, as expected, went for Bevin in the House 
the next day, launching a vitriolic assault on the Minister of Labour, as well as denouncing union 
leaders for their connivance in IAA. 17 1 He accused Bevin of undermining the sovereignty of 
Parliament by avoiding revealing his plans for IAA until the last moment but conspiring with the 
TUC in designing them, charging the Labour movement's most powerful figure with 
orchestrating a 'careful ly-prepared campaign' of 'calumny' against British trade unionists. 172 
Stokes drew parallels between Bevin's powers and those of the Gestapo. "' The Minister of 
Labour took the bait. As someone who regularly asserted that he had done more for the working- 
classes than any other man, he reacted with characteristic ferocity. 17' Greenwood also condemned 
Bevan, but, in the division, the Welshman led twenty-three MPs into the lobby against the 
government, fifteen of them Labour Members. 175 Moreover, seventy-three Labour MPs abstained, 
while only fifty-six obeyed the official decision - half of whom were members of the Coalition 
anyway. 176 Attlee's biographer puts much of the revolt down to the personal motivation of the 
PLPI seeking retribution for Bevin's perennially patronising attitude towards them. 177 But 
168 Hansard, vol. 399,28 April 1944, cols. 1061-1126. 
169 PLP minutes, 27 April 1944. 170 Ibid. 
17 1 Hansard, vol. 399,28 April 1944, cols. 1061-1126. 
172 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. Bevin declared that he had not forced a reluctant TUC into accepting iAA: the union bosses had 
done so unanimously, and defended his prior consultation with the General Council by stating that 'Try to 
imagine ... the Minister of Health coming to this House and saying 'I have refused to meet the doctors". 17'Hansard, vol. 399,28 April 1944, cols. 1061-1126.. 176 Ibid. 
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regardless, Bevan had instigated a large rebellion by no less than one hundred-and-nine Labour 
MPs, and led them in defying a decision reached 'overwhelming[ly]' only the previous day. It 
was a powerful demonstration of his new stature as someone who, through his oratorical prowess, 
was able to motivate and capture the sympathies of his party. Even during the fifties, Bevan's 
ability to move the PLP was always significant, but constrained by an enduring personal dislike 
of him. 178 But during the war he was able to win the backing of a disunited party, unhappy in its 
restraints, with symbolic protestations much easier. He had inflicted a major humiliation on the 
leadership, a decision strongly supported one day being rebelled against en masse the next. That 
the minutes of the PLP meeting strangely recorded Greenwood's warning that MPs had better 
adhere to the decision implies that he, at least, suspected that it had all been too easy. 179 
The leadership group determined almost immediately upon expelling Bevan. "o Labour's rising 
star was thus faced with being forced out of the party for the second time in five years. Personally 
challenging the country's most powerful union figure was a bold move, but that few would have 
been so foolhardy underlines the capacity for misjudgement which would always hinder him. On 
2 May 1944, the Administrative Committee recommended to the PLP the withdrawal of the whip, 
while Bevan was subjected to an intense barracking by Labour ministers and their proxies at a 
party meeting, being charged with having 'ceased entirely to co-operate'. 181 Attlee made clear that 
he favoured expulsion, while Greenwood argued that, if Bevan was not forced out for 
orchestrating the rebellion, official decisions would be meaningless. 182 Greenwood, Pethick- 
Lawrence, and the rest of the PLP's ruling body thus publicly staked their authority on expulsion, 
declaring the rebellion to be a test of strength and demanding that the party back them. 183 In a 
venomous atmosphere, Bevan defended himself, and a counter-resolution, opposing the 
withdrawal of the whip on the grounds that it would be 'injurious to the unity of the [PLP]', was 
put down. 184 The assembled MPs were unable to reach a decision, and the discussion was 
adjourned. "' Ede recognised that Bevan's real objective throughout was self-advertisement, 
recording in his diary that 'the only cure for Bevan's frame of mind [is] office'. 186 He had filled 
the void left by Laski and Shinwell, establishing himself as Labour's most important rebel figure 
and someone who would be a major player in the future. Nonetheless, the ambitious Welshman 
178 Even at the height of his powers during the early fifties he barely scraped onto the PLP Executive. 179 PLP minutes, 27 April 1944. 
180 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 2 May 1944; PLP minutes, 3 May 1944; Ede Diary 3 May 
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1944 (p. 182). 
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183 PLP minutes, 3 May 1941. 184 Ibid. 
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was in grave danger. The leadership group and the Administrative Committee were unanimously 
against him, and set upon throwing him out of the party. Bevan's only advantage was that so 
many MPs were sympathetic and willing to disobey Bevin. 
At Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence's behest, the Administrative Committee opted to reinforce 
its position by deciding to collectively resign if expulsion was not carried out., 87 But Bevan 
poured yet more fuel on the fire by asserting in Tribune that the Labour ministers were secretly 
planning to stay in the Coalition after the termination of hostilities as part of 'a grand post-war 
surrender'. 188 Shinwell began the next PLP meeting by introducing a resolution that the whip not 
be withdrawn, and the matter referred to a joint meeting with the NEC instead. ' 89 Greenwood and 
Pethick-Lawrence immediately made clear that they opposed this, and insisted on outright 
expulsion. 190 Attlee made a strong speech supporting them, but the PLP's governing body 
suffered yet another humiliation when the MPs voted in favour of Shinwell's proposal by 
seventy-one votes to sixty. 191 Greenwood was 'taken aback'; no matter how vigorously he tried, 
he simply could not force his followers to do as he ordered. 192 Party discipline seemed on the 
point of collapse, and the positions of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence in ruins. The limits to 
the power of the Administrative Committee were now plain for all to see. Mass resignation was 
ultimately not carried out or even threatened, for in light of the mood of MPs it would have been 
an enormous gamble. "93 For five years, the Labour ministers and their proxies had been fighting 
to keep control of the PLP, and prevent it from becoming gripped by indiscipline; but in early 
1944 this scenario at last came to pass. Discipline was not to be restored until Labour left office 
the following May, and the PLP was consequently left rudderless. Bevan, meanwhile, had very 
publicly got the better of his enemies and, in doing so, smashed the structures of authority which 
the Labour ministers had constructed in 1940. 
At the session with the NEC, the difficulties of expelling Bevan became still more evident. 194 
Despite Attlee and Morrison both making the case for forcing Bevan out, a fractious meeting 
eventually agreed to a motion from Sam Watson that, while Labour 'profoundly deplored' 
Bevan's actions, and called for him to give written assurances about his behaviour, he would not 
Ede Diary, 4 May 1944 (p. 182). 
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be expelled. 195 Griffiths again needled his leaders by arguing that the PLP's refusal to back them 
on 1AA was 'final', and proposed that no disciplinary action whatsoever should be taken. '96 
Watson's motion - which Bevan was hardly likely to refuse - was passed by twenty votes toý 
eight. 197 While this may have offered a pragmatic route out of what was by now a full-scale crisis, 
nevertheless the NEC had publicly refused to back the Administrative Committee, leaving 
Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence humiliated and their authority in tatters. Bevan had 
precipitated a major revolt and escaped meaningful sanction; a man who still could not secure 
election to the PLP's governing body had humbled it and defied the best efforts of the rest of the 
leadership to force him out. They had gone to the brink against Bevan and lost. In defeating the 
leadership in so spectacular a fashion, Bevan had won another major victory and delivered an 
unambiguous warning of his rise. '98 
Moreover, the MP for Ebbw Vale had largely achieved this through his prowess as an orator. That 
his new position was constructed -and subsequently maintained - by his oratorical abilities 
underlines how far Bevan, the iconic left-wing ideologue, in fact represents the best 
demonstration conceivable of the powerful utility of rhetoric conjectured by the 'high politics' 
approach. His actions, and character, support the notion that Bevan used rhetoric to mask his 
behaviour, project his ambitions, and achieve goals really animated by self-interest. Proficiency 
as a public speaker enabled him to motivate MPs and propel himself into Labour's upper echelons 
by orienting himself towards the Labour party itself and understanding 'power' in that context. In 
reality, then, Bevan is a quintessential demonstration of the validity of the 'high politics' 
methodology. Through his rhetoric he has hoodwinked generations of historians. Even more so 
than for the party management strategy espoused by Attlee and his senior colleagues, the best 
example of the power and use of rhetoric between 1939 and 1945 was Bevan. 199 
At the PLP less than twenty-four hours later, he amazingly went onto the offensive yet again, 
arguing against even the limited sanction he had been subjected to. 200 Bevin was 'almost 
hysterical'. 201 Yet though he had beaten Bevin once, it was this that finally forced Bevan into line 
as, unable to rely on the plainly ineffective political wing, Bevin called on the trade unions 
instead, bringing them to bear against not only Bevan but the PLP as a whole. 202 Bevan's actions 
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thus precipitated an institutional schism, in addition to humiliating the political leadership. At the 
TUC, one union boss threatened that his union would pay no more affiliation fees to Labour until 
proper discipline was' implemented. 203 After a series of threats from the unions and yet more 
meetings, Bevan eventually gave the required assurances, and an amendment was made to the 
Standing Orders declaring that no MP could put down a motion in the Commons in defiance of 
the party meeting. 204 Yet this did not disguise the fact that Bevan had forced his adversaries into 
an embarrassing climb down. He justified signing the declaration by stating that if he was 
expelled it would leave the leadership group 'with a clear field to accomplish the ruin of the 
Labour movement', but the real reason was surely that Bevan knew he had already scored a 
stunning victory, and Bevin was now mobilising the unions against him. 205 Likely of equal 
significance - and typical of Bevan - was thatý as Campbell has pointed out, he was for the first 
time to be a candidate in the NEC elections at the next annual Conference. 206 His position 
immensely enhanced, a satiated Bevan cleverly withdrew from the frontline of Labour politics for 
the remainder of the war and awaited the future. 
Shortly afterwards, Allied forces began Operation Overlord and the invasion of France. This was 
the beginning of the end of the struggle with Hitler but, for all the rapture that accompanied the 
success of the landings, Labour politics quickly resumed their fractious course. Further, even with 
the Bevan controversy over, the institutional row only got worse. At a joint NEC-TUC- 
Administrative Committee meeting in late June under the title 'Attacks on the Trade Union 
Movement', Bevan came in for far stiffer criticism from the unions than he had ever been 
subjected to by politicians. 207 In a long speech, Citrine announced that the MFGB, Bevan's own 
union, had passed a resolution 'deploring' his actions, and suggested that the political and 
industrial sections were in danger of becoming 'opposing factions'. 209 Citrine also made clear that 
he expected support and not 'vituperations and invectives' from Labour MPs, threatening that the 
TUC would publicly defend itself if the PLP was unable to control its members. 209 Greenwood 
and Dalton were vocal in backing the unions, the latter wanting union leaders to go to the 
constituencies of rebellious MPs and 'work on' their local parties, presumably a reference to de- 
selection. 2 10 The implication of Citrine's threat - that the TUC was prepared to have a showdown 
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with the PLP - was quite clear, provoking Laski's likening the unions to the 'Gestapo' .2 
11 The 
eventual outcome, though, was stalemate. It was decided that with Bevan having given 
assurances, and new Standing Orders in place, the movement should wait and see how events 
developed. 212 The situation drifted and, ultimately, no more was done. Bevan had established 
himself as a genuine political heavyweight. But in permitting the bullying Celt to stare down the 
Administrative Committee, the leadership allowed Bevan to think that he could take on 
established authority and win. This perception was to wreak havoc in the succeeding decade. As 
subsequent events would show, it is possible, with the benefit of hindsight, to see that in failing to 
expel Bevan in 1944 the leadership committed a major error. This episode also shows up the 
limits to the authority of Attlee. For all his ability to manipulate and direct Labour, he still 
operated under very restrictive conditions and could not always win through. 
vi 
During the period from mid 1943, important political shifts had occurred within the Labour 
movement. The rapid decline in discipline which followed the changes in the Administrative 
Committee adversely affected the stability of the parliamentary party, and virtually destroyed the 
positions of 'acting leadership' which had been built up so successfully by Pethick-Lawrence, 
Greenwood and, earlier, Lees-Smith. Though still formally in charge of the PLP, the authority of 
Attlee's proxy figures had been shattered. 213 They were never to recover this, and spent the 
remainder of the war virtually pleading with their MPs to do as they ordered. Initiative in the PLP 
now resided elsewhere. 
Yet, while it would not be an exaggeration to state that central authority in the parliamentary 
party had been no less than devastated, in other respects the situation had much improved. At the 
root of this was Attlee himself. The Labour leader oversaw a reassertion of his, and senior 
colleagues', authority in the summer and autumn of 1943, moving decisively and suddenly 
against opposition on the NEC, bringing control of the dangerous 'reconstruction' issue into the 
hands of the leadership group themselves, and working to both conciliate the party and begin 
preparing for the future by re-starting policy development. After two years of serious threats to 
his authority, Attlee was able to recover his position with the same boldness he had displayed 
21 1 NEC papers, joint meeting of TUC, NEC and PLP Administrative Committee, 28 June 1944.. 
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earlier in the war. Coupled with the latest major extensions of his powers in the Coalition, 1943-4 
saw a return to his successful leadership of old. 
Moreover, Attlee also began to move the party towards a future of continued alliance with the 
Conservatives. Though still much too early to reveal his hand publicly, nonetheless the leader 
ensured that the option of remaining in the Coalition was open to him as the war entered its final 
stages. This issue was also developing into a core component of the contest between him and 
Morrison for the leadership, as both men sought to implement a particular agenda. The Home 
Secretary, in his idea for a return to open rank-and-file conflict but with 'Government' platforms, 
adopted a rhetorical position directly between Attlee and the Labour party, while adopting a 
substantive position the implementation of which would have resulted in a far lengthier restriction 
of political independence (or, in Labour parlance, 'betrayal') than anything Attlee seemed to be 
contemplating. Though his idea of a common manifesto was rejected in February 1944, this does 
not alter the significance of the point. This increasing alignment between the subject of Labour's 
future, and the feud over the party's top job, was to accelerate in the subsequent period, 
eventually coming to represent the public manifestation of that competition and the major tactic 
employed by Morrison in trying to destroy his rival's control of the party and replace it with his 
own. 
During the period in question, the Home Secretary had, however, suffered serious damage. For 
five years, he had been awaiting the right opportunity to strike at Attlee and transform himself 
from heir apparent to leader. While his preparations to do so continued during the period - 
refusing to accept defeat after the treasurership misadventure and pressing on with his aggressive 
partisanship, his career ascendancy being labelled 'the outstanding event' of the early 1940s, and 
even being compared to Churchill - nonetheless the Mosley fiasco, and the resultant censures 
upon him, inflicted grave damage to Morrison's standing. The leader, meanwhile, cynically stood 
above it all, and only intervened to force his followers away from the brink when Morrison had 
already been attacked and wounded by the entire Labour movement. Moreover, one of the most 
significant of all the shifts within the party was that Labour's Big Four were increasingly divided 
into two camps. This new alignment was, at root, a manifestation of the Attlee-Morrison power 
struggle. There is little doubt that Attlee got the better of the shadow-boxing between Labour's 
two leading politicians here, as well as with regards to their wider engagement with the political 
front lines. Having come through the crisis years of 1941-3 with his course battered but intact, the 
popularity of his rival corroded, and retaining freedom of action for the future, Attlee appeared in 
too strong a position for Morrison to challenge. 
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The most startling success of the period, however, belonged to Bevan. His decision to pick a fight 
first with Bevin, and then both the party and union leadership, was the culmination, and pay-off, 
to his wartime rise to prominence. At the end of the confrontation he was publicly undefeated - 
with the credibility which that brought - and occupied a now unassailable platform as Labour's 
leading non-ministerial figure. In a restless party, Bevan had positioned himself as a skilled orator 
and polemicist. Campbell has rightly criticised Bevan's refusal to acknowledge that Labour, by 
being in off ice and gaining experience, but still not entirely identified with the government, 
enjoyed a double-dividend. 214 Nevertheless, Bevan's struggle against the most powerful 
politicians of the period signified how he now orbited increasingly close to the centre of the 
political solar system. In using the prominence provided by Tribune and the Commons chamber, 
he was making the most of an opportunity to become the articulator of disillusionment across a 
whole range of issues. Hence, despite continued absence from the NEC and the Administrative 
Committee, Bevan showed sound judgment in exploiting platforms outside the structure of the 
Labour movement to establish himself as a major figure within it, and someone whose stature 
necessitated that he be admitted to the party's inner circle once the war ended. By 1944, Bevan 
was well on the way to depicting himself as a man with unique access to the party's soul - the 
same perception that was to serve him so effectively until his death. The platform that would 
anchor the rest of his career, and sustain an eventual campaign for the leadership, had thus been 
constructed. From this perspective, it could be argued that it was, in reality, the years 1943-4, not 
his post-war creation of the NHS, which represented the crucial formative period for the 
ambitious Welshman. 
The events described in the current chapter had seen something of a sea-change in Labour party 
politics, as had occurred in 1941. While that of 1941 witnessed a major decline in the ability of 
the leadership to guide the party, and a consequent series of challenges to their authority, during 
1943-4 the pendulum had, to a limited but important extent, swung the other way - certainly to 
the advantage of Attlee himself. The Labour ministers had successfully ridden out the troubles of 
the preceding two years and, despite the obvious problems confronting them in an attempt to 
persuade their followers to remain in the CoalitiQn, also retained complete freedom of action in 
that regard. It was thus with a degree of optimism that they could head into what turned out to be 
the final year of Labour's war. 
214 Campbell, Bevan, p. 129. 
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Chapter seven - Triumph 
Over the final period of the war, the various crises which had gripped Labour since 1939 reached 
a climax, as the struggle with Hitler came to an end, the Coalition government dissolved, and 
Labour won the subsequent general election with a landslide victory. This penultimate chapter of 
the thesis describes how these events came about, and bow the struggles which had impacted 
upon the party were resolved. Most significantly, the two separate but central stories we have 
traced in the thesis - the Labour ministers' collective struggle against their followers over the 
direction of the party, and the contest for the leadership between Attlee and Morrison - now 
converged. The Labour ministers' balancing-act thus came together with the struggle for the top 
post in the party and, in July 1945, the biggest political stakes of all. The party remained unhappy 
and the Labour ministers had to continue their efforts to control it. But with the end of the war in 
sight, decisions which had previously been uncertain over the future of the Coalition and 
Labour's independence now had to be made, bringing the divergence between internal 
restlessness and the ambitions of many of the Labour ministers into sharp focus. Given the 
imminent removal of the basis for the cross-party alliance in the first place - the war - the status 
quo, proceeding as politics had for five years, was no longer sustainable. The loan that the leaders 
had taken out with the Labour party in 1940 now had to be repaid. 
At the same time, the Attlee-Morrison power struggle entered its final stages. The contest at last 
became overt, culminating in Morrison's launching a challenge to his rival after Labour's election 
victory. In this last phase of the war, with everything still to play for, the pursuit of ambition and 
personal power became more unrestrained than ever. Repairing his damaged internal standing 
after the upheavals of the Mosley episode, Morrison managed to construct a position of such 
strength that he seized all the initiative in his feud with Attlee and established himself as the 
effective leader of the party for six months, as his ambition was finally unmasked. The period 
described in the chapter represented the highpoint of Morrison's political career. Moreover, the 
question of who would lead Labour now moved into alignment with the broader struggle between 
the ministers and their party. As will be seen, other than a new rupture over Greece, virtually all 
of Labour's internal conflicts from 1944-5 were about decisions for 'the future'. Further, these 
conflicts became pawns in the struggle between Attlee and Morrison. Morrison was undoubtedly 
the more aggressive for, having long played both sides in adopting a rhetorical posture intended 
to drive a wedge between Attlee and the party, while taking a full part in the Labour ministers' 
immersion in office, after the NEC's rejection of his 'coupon' idea, he now effectively defected 
from the rest of the leadership group and fundamentally altered his position. He abandoned the 
strategy, and doctrine, employed by the senior figures since 1939, and sought instead to base his 
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claim to the leadership on becoming the most vigorous advocate of withdrawal from the 
Coalition. Morrison's new stance captured the imagination of a disillusioned party, and Attlee, 
favouring a continuation of the Coalition for several months at least, was forced onto the back 
foot as Morrison launched an all-out effort to seize the leadership. 
From the summer of 1944, there was a discernible movement back towards party politics. It was 
generally accepted that, sooner or later, politics would return to 'normality'. In the country at 
large, this recognition that things would change in the near future also meant that Common 
Wealth, the progress of which had been deeply alarming to some, quickly lost ground. It was 
reduced to an unsuccessful application for affiliation to the Labour movement! The question of 
how to respond to the uncertain future of post-war thus immediately pressed upon Attlee in the 
summer of 1944, and, with the conflict with Germany expected to be over by the end of the year, 
a series of contentious internal debates began. Continuing his previous, incremental, efforts, 
Attlee took the lead in trying to map out a new course and, once again, haul Labour in his chosen 
direction, but, despite initial success, was forced to swim against the tide of powerful internal 
currents. There were now visible limits to how far Attlee could afford to go. One immediate 
difficulty was when to schedule the Conference. In mid July, Attlee and Dalton decided to avoid 
holding it in the near future following the upheavals of the Bevan-Bevin clash. 2 The leader's 
instinctive ability to read the mood of his followers had not been diluted by four years of 
separation, Attlee being 'all for' using the German flying bomb threat as a suitable pretext for 
delay. 3 During this behind-the-scenes intriguing with Dalton, it also became clear that Attlee had 
reached a decision about which of the post-war options open to them Labour should pursue. 
Those options were immediate withdrawal from office at the end of the war, and a general 
election; continuing the Coalition for approximately six months and then holding an election; or 
staying in harness until the defeat of Japan, expected to take a year after the defeat of Germany. 
The option of indefinite or pen-nanent coalition which, as the thesis has suggested, was toyed with 
1 NEC Organisation sub-committee minutes, 22 November 1944; NEC minutes, 8 December 1944; NEC 
Election sub-committee minutes, 7 January 1945. 
2 Dalton Diary, 18 July 1944 (p. 770). In mid May, the NEC had agreed to postpone the annual Conference 
until December, in light of the preparations for D-Day and the transport strain the invasion would place on 
the country - NEC minutes, 16 May 1944. It is interesting that there is little real evidence of preparations 
for a Conference in June in the months beforehand. The usual intense surge of policy statements and 
declarations was largely absent. Although there is no documentary evidence to support such a claim, it does 
not seem implausible that the leadership - who, via their positions in government, were aware of the 
imminence of the attack - had no real intention of holding a Conference in the summer all along. It is 
difficult to believe they would have been disappointed at having to postpone the annual confrontation with 
their followers. 
3 Dalton Diary, 18 July 1944 (p. 770). 
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earlier in the war perhaps no longer seemed a realistic option - possibly as a result of the 
instability of the Bevan episode. The interesting aspect of this, of course, was that all of these 
options remained time, notpolicy options; as such it reinforces the perception of calculating, self- 
interested politics. 
Both Attlee and Dalton, while definitely in favour of continuing the Coalition for a suitable 
period in order to allow Churchill's victory aura to dissipate, now seemingly ruled out any idea of 
a longer-term alliance with the ConservativeS. 4 Whether such a strategy would ever have been 
practicable is debatable, but Attlee had certainly hitherto shown little inclination to restrict his 
options. His position throughout the war had remained consistent, seeking to retain flexibility and 
then wait and see. Yet he had now apparently come down in favour of one particular course. This 
was an important shift, and represented the beginnings of the alignment between the Attlee- 
Morrison struggle and the issue of the party's future. To this end, Attlee also sent a signal to 
Labour that he did intend to leave the Coalition at the end of the war, announcing to his followers 
5 
that he would enter into negotiations with the prime minister over the timing of an election. His 
Organisation sub-committee also recommended to the NEC that Labour should seek an 
independent majority at the next election. 6 Given how little overt political controversy occurred 
over the next few months, these decisions must be judged a success. Attlee privately agreed with 
Dalton that the ideal scenario would be 'if we had no election for ... six months after the German 
7 
surrender, and if then we could separate from the Tories without too fierce a quarrel'. Underlying 
this, of course, was the fact that the question was no longer a hypothetical one; a decision now 
bad to be made. Even though he had thus far managed to outmanoeuvre all internal opposition on 
the issue, it seemed that Attlee had at last been forced to acknowledge the limits of what his party 
would stand. Yet, as will become clear below, whether this shift encapsulated his true position 
remained unclear. 
Around this period, a second major shift occurred which was to prove similarly critical in the 
events described in this last part of the thesis. This was that Labour's Big Four were now firmly 
divided into two camps. In one were Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton, while, in the other, Morrison 
stood alone. Dalton was in agreement with Attlee's election strategy and had drifted into Bevin's 
orbit within the government! With Attlee enjoying rather weightier support than Morrison, this 
new state of affairs constituted an important change in the power relationships and signified that 
4 Ibid. 
5 Minutes of the special PLP meetings, 8& 12 July 1944. 
6 NEC minutes, 26 July 1944. 
7 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 19 July 1944 (p. 770). 
8 Dalton Diary, 1,4, and 6 September 1944 (pp. 782-7). 
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the agreement between the leadership group - which had held since 1939 - was breaking down. 
This agreement was to be finally broken by Morrisonjust months later. The divides were not, 
moreover, ideological, but a reflection of the mounting personal tension between the leader and 
the heir apparent. 
In late July, the NEC agreed - despite opposition from Laski, Shinwell, and Wilkinson - that it 
would be better to delay the Conference. 9 Attlee had got his way. His other proposal, that Labour 
should fight the general election as an independent entity, was also approved, and he, along with 
Dalton, Greenwood, Laski, and Wilkinson, were tasked with drafting a public announcement of 
this. 10 Yet, cleverly, Attlee and Dalton sought to drag this process out, on the grounds that the 
precise wording would be difficult. " Given that the war was expected to end soon, this was 
another way to simply put off action and avoid committing themselves. Their proposal had said 
nothing about the timing of an election, or whether Labour should remain in the Coalition until 
then. 12 As had been the case earlier, there was also no mention of a commitment against forming 
a new coalition after the election - which, given the likelihood of defeat, must have seemed an 
attractive prospect. Attlee now revealed his position on timing by winning 'general' acceptance - 
which presumably means from Dalton and Greenwood, but not Laski and Wilkinson - for his 
view that the ideal strategy would be to stay in office for six months after the defeat of 
Germany. 13 Reaffirming the assertions made above that Attlee was signalling to his followers that 
he was in favour of independence after all, he made, as in February, a statement in which he 
strongly affirmed that the party would fight an election as an independent entity. 14 However - 
and, again as in February, suggesting that his recent shift towards independence had been a feint - 
it seems that Attlee also still wanted to retain the option of long-term coalition, objecting to any 
public declaration of his own proposal! 15 Moreover, as far as we can see, there was no mention 
made of long-term arrangements. The difference in the possible courses suggested at different 
times by Attlee and other Labour leaders may seem slight, but in fact had quite different 
implications. Quite apart from any preference for long-term independence or alliance - which is 
not clear from the documentary evidence - Attlee certainly believed that Churchill would not lose 
an election. 16 The ambiguity in Attlee's positioning, and the fact that he is not recorded as having 
9 NEC minutes, 27 July 1944. 
10 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 26 July 1944 (pp. 772-3). 
11 Dalton Diary, 22 August 1944 (p. 779). 
12 NEC minutes, 27 July 1944. 
13 Dalton Diary, 22 August 1944 (pp. 780). This drafting sub-committee was not minuted. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Dalton Diary, 22 August 1944 (pp. 779). 
16 Bevin almost certainly already favoured long-term coalition over traditional party politics. When Attlee 
informed him of the plan he was putting to the drafting team of a six month postponement, Bevin was 
furious - but only because Attlee had the temerity to try and get this through the Labour party first before 
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expressed a definite view, one way or the other, on the issue until towards the end of the war 
should not prevent recognition of the fact that his activities had all been pointed in that direction 
since 1941. As we have seen, he had sometimes fought determinedly against his followers to 
preserve that route. Attlee had not dissented from the pro-coalition posture adopted by the other 
leaders. The sheer consistency in his behaviour offers compelling evidence about his preferences. 
Nevertheless, while Attlee had begun to steer Labour on a new course, having secured provisional 
agreement for his idea, and now enjoyed a division of the leadership group which was firmly in 
his favour, his attempt to retain this last option was eventually to provide Morrison with the 
means to challenge his leadership. 
In the meantime, however, Attlee sought to exploit the question of the future of the Coalition as a 
new weapon against the weakened Morrison. At his instigation, the NEC again explicitly rejected 
any possibility of a 'coupon' election. 17 It was a shot clearly directed at Morrison, and, in early 
October, Attlee turned this into a public broadside, when the dr-aft that he had been working on 
for three months was finally released to the press. 18 Employing vitriolic language and making a 
great show of rejecting Morrison's idea, it declared that 'We do not believe that any responsible 
statement would advocate following that evil precedent [of the 1918 election]. Despite malicious 
whisperings to the contrary no responsible leader of Labour has ever toyed with the idea of a 
coupon election'. 19 
This language was, to say the least, strong. Attlee was discrediting his opponent while 
entrenching his own control of Labour's election posture. The target was obvious, for Morrison's 
ccoupon' proposal was no secret. Attlee had successfully turned Morrison's 'champion of 
socialism' posture back on him, and exploited his lack of membership of the Executive - and 
inability to challenge it before it was published - to publicly humiliate his rival. Underlining how 
ruthless Attlee could really be was the fact that Morrison had, for several months, in fact 
recognised that the Coalition could not be an indefinite arrangement. 20 As will be demonstrated 
below, the NEC's rebuff over his proposal for a common manifesto had pushed Morrison into a 
dramatic about-turn. Nonetheless, the leader struck another blow to the Home Secretary's fragile 
standing, and instigated the beginning of the final clash between them. Given the circumstances 
informing 'your Government colleagues'! Terming it an 'amazing procedure, Bevin told Attlee that this 
was 'a strange method to invite loyalty'. Bevin's attitude makes clear that his preference would have been 
for Attlee to ignore the party and push this through the government first - which is itself indicative of his 
views on the subject. Attlee papers, Bevin to Attlee, 13 September 1944. 
17 NEC minutes, 13 September 1944; NEC papers, Attlee memorandum. The leader submitted a 
memorandum to the Executive urging a clear rejection of the possibility. 
" NEC papers, press release, 5 October 1944. 
19 fbid (my emphasis). 
20 The Times, 23 May 1944. 
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of the autumn of 1944, with Morrison's fortunes at their nadir, Attlee's victory in the long- 
running struggle with his old rival seemed all but certain. 
But Morrison quickly retaliated and, in choosing to fight on the same ground, precipitated a 
further convergence between the two primary conflicts within the party. The damage inflicted to 
his popularity by the Mosley fiasco had been severe, he had been off the NEC since 1943, and the 
war was widely expected to be over by the end of 1944. In this climate, Morrison had to rebuild 
his position, and quickly. He did so by taking Attlee's tactic of using the emotive issue of 'the 
future' as a pawn even further, for co-operation within the government had become increasingly 
difficult to sustain throughout 1944.21 With the end of the war approaching, both Labour and the 
Conservatives simply had less inclination to compromise. Partisan feeling increased in vigour, 
and there was a sense of general drift back to party politics - which Attlee had been forced to 
recognise in his declared election policy. The Daily Herald became increasingly anti- 
Conservative, while even Bevin was publicly combative. 22 Morrison seized on this as an 
opportunity to return to his familiar tactic of advertising his own socialist credentials in 
comparison with the unexciting Attlee. With Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton unwilling to disrupt 
Coalition harmony, the Home Secretary adopted a position on socialist legislation which would 
clearly prove more popular with the party, and used it to spark a major internal conflict. In mid 
October, Morrison therefore suddenlyjumped ship - abandoning the leadership line that he had 
been so integral in defending - by pressing for a public confrontation with the Conservatives and 
demanding new 'socialist' measures from the government. 23 This was a fundamental change in 
his position, and the most significant shift by any leading politician since 1939. It entrenched the 
division of the senior figures into two camps and signalled the beginning of a desperate nine 
month race for the leadership. In undertaking this shift, Morrison abandoned the doctrine that he 
had readily propagated for five years and attached himself instead to the mood of hostility and 
disaffection within the party. 
Declaring himself opposed to the attempts of the others to avoid a break over policy with the 
Conservatives, Morrison responded to Attlee's 'malicious' statement with a new memorandum 
explicitly calling for Labour to put forward far-reaching demands for a 'great national plan', and 
pushing for the Labour ministers to force concessions from Churchill - always a popular cry 
within Labour circles. 24 Bevin saw straight through it, and was furious at the latest attempt by 
21 The best account of the increasing difficulties is Addison, The Road to 1945, pp. 23447,252-58. 
22 Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, pp. 311-7,329-9; Dalton Diary, I September 1944 (pp. 7834); Daily Herald, 
September-December 1944. 
23 Morrison papers, Morrison to Bevin, 17 October 1944. 
24 Ibid. 
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Morrison to bolster his internal standing, refusing to be involved. 25 Attlee and Dalton were 
negative as wel 1.26 But this only played into Morrison's hands. Invited to a special NEC meeting, 
and backed by Wilkinson, who shaped the discussion in his favour from the chair, Morrison 
forced his opponents into a comer. 27 His proposals were populist and hardly something Attlee 
could publicly disavow. Greenwood, constantly searching for a means to appease the PLP, 
backed the Home Secretary. 28 The next day, the deputy leader made clear in the Commons that 
the party hoped that the new Prolongation of Parliament Bill would be the last. 29 Morrison had 
thus set a trap, choosing an appealing posture to start his comeback. The majority of the NEC 
backed his plan, and ruled that the ministers should pressurise the Conservatives to get as much 
legislation onto the statute book as possible. 30 Rather than defying this and giving Morrison what 
he sought -a confrontation they could not win - Attlee and the others signalled acquiescence but 
in practice ignored it. 31 
Morrison, as Bevin recognised, had clearly made this departure from his previous stance as a 
political tool, developing a new position while Attlee held steadfast to the old doctrine. The 
convergence between disillusionment over the question of the ministerial line - which had always 
been formulated primarily by Attlee - and the rivalry over the post of leader had therefore now 
occurred. Morrison had delivered an unambiguous reminder of how dangerous an opponent he 
was, having retaken the initiative and exploited the problems within the government as a means to 
undermine Attlee's authority. Soon Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton were refusing to back his 'great 
national plan', resulting in Morrison's announcement that he would continue the campaign single- 
handed . 
32 Attlee tried to blunt his attack by adopting chameleon-like qualities and suddenly 
producing a memorandum not dissimilar to Morrison's, apparently having arranged beforehand 
that Bevin and Dalton would reject it - enabling the leader to suggest that he had been 
C 33 overruled'. Within months, the situation between the Labour ministers bad degenerated to the 
point that Dalton's Distribution of Industry Act was the last major struggle with the 
Conservatives. 34 Fearing electoral rout, Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton could see little point in 
permitting Churchill to depict himself as a reformer by passing more legislation. 35 Morrison, in 
25 Ibid. See also another letter imploring the Minister of Labour to join him - Morrison papers, Morrison to 
Bevin, 25 October 1944. Bevin papers, Bevin to Morrison, 24 October 1944. 
26 Ibid. 
27 NEC minutes, 29 October 1944. 
28 NEC minutes, 30 October 1944. 
29 Hansard, vol. 404,31 October 1944, cols. 668-72. 
30 NEC minutes, 29 October 1944. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Morrison papers, Morrison memorandum to Attlee, Bevin and Dalton, 22 November 1944. 
33 Dalton papers, copy of Attlee letter to Morrison, 22 November 1944. 
34 Dalton papers, Dalton to Attlee, 6 February 1945; Brooke, Labour's War, pp. 228-9. 
35 Harris, AtIlee, pp. 236-7. 
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contrast, wanted to achieve as much reform as possible - or at least to be seen to be attempting to 
36 do so - in order to emphasise Labour's distinctive line. The irony of all this, of course, was that 
the naturally authoritarian Morrison would never have been one to damage the government; but, 
safe in the knowledge that his opponents would hold the line, he was free to depict himself as the 
sole authentic representative of his party's wishes. The episode constituted an important 
reassertion of himself by Morrison, and marked the beginning of his efforts over the next six 
months to make his momentum overwhelming. He had outmanoeuvred Attlee and successfully 
portrayed himself as Labour's most vigorous advocate. It is clear that the leadership rivalry and 
the broader questions of the future of the Coalition could now no longer be separated. With the 
end of the war in sight, both of Labour's primary protagonists had seized upon the latter issue as a 
means to damage their opponent. 
H 
While the leader and heir apparent continued their power struggle, Greenwood and Pethick- 
Lawrence tried in vain to rebuild the authority which had been shattered by Bevan. For five years, 
the spectre of a loss of control over the PLP and resultant anarchy had been narrowly avoided; 
but, with Bevan's public victory, that had now come to pass. Until the end of the war there was to 
be a sense of chaos and that the parliamentary party was rudderless. Greenwood and his deputy 
did manage to block attempts by Shinwell to engineer a combustible free vote on the Town and 
Country Planning Bill, but the continued fragility of their position was made clear as soon as a 
real challenge was made. 37 When Bevan again defied the official line in October and voted 
against the government's Unemployment Insurance Bill, the Committee opted not to even try and 
take any action against hiM. 38 This is suggestive of Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence's lack of 
confidence that they could defeat Bevan in a test of strength after their humiliation at his hands 
four months earlier. Unwilling to challenge the emboldened Welshman, the apparent truce of the 
summer had, in fact, amounted to a concession of defeat. The situation soon got worse, for the 
PLP only agreed to back the government's Employment White Paper on the proviso that it was 
not committed to supporting any of its specifies, after Bevan denounced it as likely to create 'A 
Nation of Fully Employed Tramps' . 
39 The state of central authority in the PLP was now tenuous 
36 Ibid. 
37 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 18 & 20 July 1944; PLP minutes, 12 July 1944; see also PLP 
1 
papers, minutes of special meeting, 12 July 1944; PLP minutes, 2 August 1944 &4 October 1944. 
a PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 17 October 1944. See also the minutes for 5 December 1944. 
39 Tribune, 2 June 1944 and PLP minutes, 14 June 1944. 
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at best, and, despite a tightening-up of the Standing Orders, the position of both Greenwood and 
Pethick-Lawrence had been fatally undennined. 40 
Moreover, this soon evolved into a fresh test of the Labour ministers' authority. In September, 
Dalton began re-writing Full Employment andFinancial Policy for inclusion in a manifesto, 
supporting nationalisation of major industries but refraining from slipping into socialist dogma. 41 
However, when presented to the annual Conference - which was at last held in December - the 
revulsions towards the party's economic policy became apparent. 42 At a disruptive event, a young 
Ian Mikardo made his mark for the first time as a constituency delegate when, strongly supported 
by the rank-and-file, he put down a resolution denouncing Dalton's work as an 'abandonment of 
all socialist policies and objectives', and demanded a policy of more extensive public 
ownership. 43 Shinwell was put up to represent the Executive and defend its ambiguous statement 
on nationalisation, but, despite his fiery speech, the parallels between the official position and that 
of the government were unappetising to a party eager to be free from the restraints of coalition. 44 
The Mikardo resolution was consequently carried, and the NEC compelled to amend its 
statement. 45 Defeated on such a symbolic issue of policy-making, the episode was a serious 
humiliation for the leadership. Even amid more contentious periods earlier in the war, the Labour 
ministers had still been able to win on the big symbolic questions; but now, at a time of relative 
calm, their position had been rejected. Bevan took the opportunity to mark his own election to the 
NEC by revelling in the defeat in Tribune. 46 As noted above, political intrigue at the highest 
echelons of the Labour party continued largely as normal; but, at the lower levels, the leadership 
group and their proxies had lost control of their followers. 
The mood of hostility at Conference which contributed to the Mikardo revolt was shaped largely 
by the issue of the Greek civil war. In early December, Labour had been provoked into a rage 
worse than anything seen since the Beveridge crisis, over Churchill's decision to use British 
47 troops against the Communist EAM in the country. Aligning Britain with the Greek monarchy 
against the guerrillas who had borne the brunt of the fighting against the Nazis was hugely 
40 NEC papers, 'Memorandum on Discipline and Standing Orders', 22 November 1944. This memorandum 
was submitted to all MPs, and threatened that persistent rebels would be reported to the NEC, and gave 
Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence formal powers to themselves decide the PLP position without a vote if a 
sudden situation arose in the Commons. 
41 See 1944 LPACR, pp. 50-2. 
42 1944 LPACR, pp. 161-8. 
43 1944LPACR, p. 163. 
44 1944 LPA CR, pp. 160- 1. 
45 1944 LPA CR, p. 168. 
46 Tribune, 29 December 1944. 
47 The best account of this split is Andrew Thorpe, "In a rather emotional state'? The Labour party and 
British intervention in Greece, 1944-5', English Historical Review, 121 (2006), pp. 1075-1105. 
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controversial, and the revolt which followed gave free rein to the disaffection within the party. 
There was general hostility to the operation in the country as well, interpreting it as a transparent 
attempt to prop up the forces of reaction against freedom fighters. In reality, the government saw 
the crisis as a first test in deciding the European balance of power in the emerging geopolitical 
rivalry with the Soviet Union. Yet, even though Labour's representatives in office grasped the 
Russian threat as keenly as any Conservative, this did nothing to mollify the hostility which their 
support for the operation engendered. 
Although Greenwood and Pethick Lawrence managed to avoid a large revolt in the Commons 
after a motion of censure was put down, colluding with the government and winning a 
conciliatory statement, the affair still poisoned the atmosphere at Conferencejust days later. 48 
Greenwood, in his capacity as someone independent of the govemment, was put up to introduce 
an emergency resolution to the delegates, but it was a fudge, declaring that Labour called for the 
government to 'facilitate an armistice ... with a view to the establishment of a provisional national 
government' - which was, of course, precisely what British forces were in the process of 
accomplishing. 49 It was hardly the denunciation of the Coalition that many desired. As Bullock 
has observed, Attlee was much too shrewd in the context of his ongoing struggle with Morrison to 
50 involve himself in a headlong collision with the delegates. Instead, the leader left that task to the 
Minister of Labour. 51 Bevin's intervention was the defining moment of the Conference, facing the 
passionate hostility of the audience unmoved, and seeming to take pleasure in weighing in with 
an authoritarian speech in which he declared that the Labour ministers had concurred with the 
decision to use force and would not be swayed. 52 He did not bother to be conciliatory nor seemed 
concerned with the anger of the delegates, having already mobilised the union bloc vote to ensure 
victory. 53 In a speech eerily reminiscent of his 1936 demolition of Lansbury, he told the 
Conference that 'We cannot govern this world by emotionalism, it [calls] for hard thinking', 
attacked EAM and declared that 'I cannot bring it into my conscience that any one of the 
54 decisions was wrong'. Bevan received loud cheers when he suggested that Bevin was a 'fascist' 
48 Hansard, vol. 406,8 December 1944, cols. 992-1014; PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 5,6 &7 
December 1944. There were two meetings held on the Oh; PLP minutes, 7 December 1944. Pethick- 
Lawrence had taken the lead in winning agreement that if the goverrunent gave a statement making clear its 
commitment to democracy in Greece, the PLP would abstain on the censure motion. This was successful, 
Eden making a conciliatory speech in the House, and the party abstained. 
49 NEC minutes, 12 December 1944; 1944 LPACR, p. 143. 
50 Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 345. 
51 Dalton Diary, 13 December 1944 (p. 186). Attlee asked Bevin to do so at the last moment; Laski was 
present when he made the request to 'come in'. Laski told Dalton that 'it was a fantastic conversation, it 
was like trying to persuade Tetrazzini to sing'. 
52 1944 LPACR, pp. 145-7. 
53 lbid; Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 254. 
54 1944 LPACR, pp. 14547. 
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in a scathing speech, and called for the Labour ministers to exercise 'socialist' influence or get 
out of office. 55 Griffiths, too, joined in the attack, and denied that what the Labour ministers 
proposed as government policy represented the repressive activities British forces were engaged 
in. 56 But the resentment that washed over Bevin on the platform did nothing to alter the result. 
Backed by the unions, Attlee's enforcer saw to it that the official resolution was passed by an 
overwhelming majority of 2,455,000 to 137,000 votes. 57 
Beyond the Greek question, the Conference was something of a mixed bag for the leadership. 
They had been defeated by Mikardo and faced a major revolt over Greece. Bevan's rise, 
meanwhile, was confirmed when he won election to the constituencies section of the NEC for the 
first time. 58 This was the pay-off for his defeat of established authority earlier in the year. He had 
enjoyed a rather more successful war than his hero Fox. His rise to power during 1944 had been 
remarkable. A polemical tract entitled ny Not Trust the Tories? had sold 80,000 copies, 
reinforcing his status as Labour's coming man. '9 He remained unable to win election to the 
Administrative Committee in November, with even Shinwell managing to scrape back on. 60 But 
the extra-parliamentary environment now offered real fruits for Bevan. Within weeks of his 
election, Tribune editorials were openly arguing for him to be given a senior post in the party 
hierarchy. 61 Bevan had employed the circumstances of the period to propel himself into the higher 
levels of the British political world. The man who would one day instigate a sequence of events 
which would tear Labour apart for three decades was within sight of possessing genuine power. 
On the other hand, Attlee's October statement on fighting a general election as an independent 
entity was accepted virtually unanimously. 62 Moreover, there was still no mention of a pledge 
against forming a new coalition after the election - which strengthens the notion that the leader 
was not entirely committed to reclaiming independence. 63 His provisional approval for a six 
month continuation from the NEC drafting team also remained a valuable asset. The Labour 
ministers registered another success, when their statement on The International Post- War 
Settlement, moved in a powerful speech by Attlee himself, and which, though clothed in the 
language of internationalism, underlined the move towards the cold realpolitik that would 
55 1944 LPACR, pp. 14849; Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, p. 346. 
56 1944 LPACR, pp. 149-50. 
57 1944 LPACR, p. 150. 
58 1944 LPACR, p. 131. Bevan came fifth out of the seven elected. 
59 A. Bevan, Why Not Trust the Tories? (London, 1944). 
60 PLP papers, Administrative Committee election results, 15 November 1944. Griffiths topped the poll 
with 115 votes. Shinwell, at the bottom, attracted sixty-three, while Bevan polled fifty-three. 
61 Tribune, 9& 23 January 1945. 
62 1944 LPACR, pp. 112-16; Dalton Diary, II December 1944 (pp. 814-5). 
63 Dalton Diary, II December 1944 (p. 815); Hansard, vol. 406,5 December 1944, col. 411. 
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henceforth define Labour's foreign policy, was passed by a large majority. 64 While rebuffed over 
the emphasis to be put on national isation, then, the leadership had otherwise secured backing for 
the rest of their key policy choices. Though Greece revealed how unhappy the party remained, 
nonetheless, as 1944 came to an end, it was clear that this level of dissidence was ultimately 
tolerable. 
65 In the NEC elections, Morrison secured his own return to the NEC. Moreover, he now at last 
threw off the restraints he had worked under for six years, and, more openly than ever, waged his 
challenge to Attlee. His long-standing ambition to dominate the Executive - seen earlier by his 
pursuit of the positions of general secretary and the treasurership, and then trying to acquire the 
former post for his prot6gd Webb - at last became a reality. Over the subsequent six months, the 
Home Secretary was to cluster into his hands an unprecedented degree of influence and authority, 
stamping his personal seal upon virtually all of the Labour party's policy and employing the NEC 
as a vehicle for his own power. After a year of setbacks in which his prospects of replacing Attlee 
had declined inexorably, Morrison bounced back with a ferocious energy, conducting a series of 
rapid manoeuvres which, in several bold strokes, turned the tables on Attlee and swung the 
advantage in their struggle for the leadership firmly in the other direction. 
Key to this was the change in his favoured election policy. Morrison now moved towards support 
for immediate independence, in contrast to Attlee's apparent desire to perpetuate the Coalition. 
Immediately after the Conference, Morrison became the chairman of both the NEC Policy sub- 
committee and the new Campaign committee set up to draft Labour's manifesto, plan election 
preparations, and direct overall strategy. 66 The Home Secretary used the latter body as a high- 
powered vehicle to map out Labour's ffiture, and, largely on his own authority, established 
67 himself as the architect of Labour's entire general election effort. Exploiting his renewed access 
to the levers of Labour's institutional machinery, Morrison placed himself at the forefront of 
decision-making and constructed a formidable internal platform which enabled him to drive the 
party's planning for the future virtually single-handed. Though Attlee and Dalton both sat on the 
Campaign committee as well, it was Morrison who really directed it - by the time it held its first 
meeting, he had already written the first draft of the manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, and then 
64 1944 LPACR, pp. 131-33,13940. 
65 1944 LPACR, p. 13 1. Morrison came fourth in the ballot. 
66 NEC minutes, 10 January 1945. 
67 A glance at the sheer number of issues considered by the Campaign committee at all its meetings gives a 
sense of the range and extent of Morrison's influence, as well as his personal centrality. See NEC 
Campaign sub-committee minutes, 19 March 1945. For example, one meeting (19th March) dealt with 
twenty-four separate issues. 
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oversaw its refinement over the next two months. 68 Moreover, he produced what was clearly a 
manifesto for an immediate election -a position rather at odds with Attlee's favoured six month 
postponement. Having had his 'coupon' proposal rejected, Morrison thus shifted completely the 
other way and advocated a diametrically opposed strategy. The document stoked up fears about 
'another 1918' by stressing the need for immediate action on reform as soon as the war ended. At 
the same time, despite wishing to strengthen his base, Morrison - determined as ever to appeal to 
the wider electorate - produced a relatively moderate document, containing pledges of extensive 
reform while simply ignoring the Mikardo resolution and avoiding socialist dogma. 69 It was he 
who determined the primary components of the Labour campaign - moderate policies, emphasis 
on their own war record, and stress on Conservative culpability in the crises of the previous 
70 fourteen years - and thus was, far more than Attlee, the planner of the shape of Labour's future. 
MorTison completely by-passed the trade unions and refused to afford them a role in the process, 
much to the chagrin of Citrine. 71 In his element, plotting a campaign and expertly working a 
bureaucratic machine, in the first months of 1945 Morrison circumvented Attlee and exploited the 
new positions he had acquired to do all the important work - and hence determine the 
fundamentals of Labour's stance - personally. 72 
Morrison expertly walked the fine line between his self-styled role as the socialistic champion of 
the party and the pursuit of a distinctly pragmatic, rather than doctrinaire, stance. This bid to play 
all sides simultaneously - expanding his own position, undermining that of Attlee, and trying to 
win an election with moderate policies while avoiding angering the party - was a remarkable 
success. Let Us Face the Future was, in many respects, the greatest achievement of Morrison's 
career. Establishing himself as the overseer of the move into the post-war world, there was little 
better conceivable advertisement of his abilities. He crafted a manifesto which enabled him to 
simultaneously stamp his own seal on the party's new beginning and afford it its best chance of 
winning an election. Moreover, in their clashing electoral strategies and views on the Coalition, 
his rivalry with Attlee now had public substance other than simple ambition. After years of 
restraint, he had thus been able to fully exert his abilities. All this was the ideal preparation for 
him to launch his coup. 
68 NEC Campaign sub-committee minutes, 19 February 1945; NEC minutes 28 February 1945; NEC Policy 
sub-committee minutes, 23 January 1945; Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 33 1. 
69 NEC Policy sub-committee minutes, 27 March 1945; NEC minutes, 28 March 1945. 
70 NEC Campaign sub-committee minutes, 19 February 1945. 
71 Warwick University, TUC papers, minutes of special General Council meeting, 23 May 1945. 
72 Attlee played little discernible role in either formulating policies for the election or the details of the 
campaign. 
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The Home Secretary also worked to significantly increase his visibility in the PLP, the arena 
where any challenge to Attlee would have to be decided. 73 Moreover, the PLP was now 
anticipating a showdown between the two, and many were actively choosing sides. A pro- 
Morrison group of backbench MPs was already pushing the Home Secretary's case in agitating 
74 for a leadership ballot once Labour left office. These were joined by his closest ally, Wilkinson, 
Webb and, on the NEC, Laski, as well as some trade union leaders . 
75 By the second half of 1944, 
there existed a clear desire in the party for the issue to be finally resolved. Further, the contrast 
between the energy of Morrison, a natural campaigner, bold leader, and public figure, and the 
flatness of Attlee could hardly have been more apparent. More than ever, the heir apparent now 
looked like a genuine political giant. The internal pendulum was clearly swinging towards 
Morrison and away from the delaying tactics of Attlee, Bevin, and Dalton. Morrison had simply 
adopted the more internally popular posture. The period from late 1944 until July 1945 was thus 
the high watennark of Morrison's internal power. To all intents and purposes he, not Attlee, was 
the leader of the Labour party in the first half of 1945. He had chosen a position on Labour's 
future by virtue of it being the opposite of that of Attlee - immediate withdrawal versus a six 
months continuation - and entrenched both the growing divide between the positions of the two 
and the convergence between broader conflicts within the party and the rivalry at the top. 
Following up his initiative on aggressive legislation by plotting and leading a bold new course 
intimately associated with him personally, Morrison secured a second, and this time more 
significant, victory. For the next six months, Attlee - who, months earlier, seemed to have already 
consigned Morrison to defeat - was to be constantly outmanoeuvred. 
ifi 
The shocks at the turn of the year over Greece, like the Bevan clash the previous spring, 
precipitated another shift in the position of the leaders. The NEC announced that the recent 
Conference would be the last before the decisions on a general election were taken. 76 This 
declaration was much more in line with Morrison's strategy of forcing a break with the 
Conservatives than the cautious approach of the other leaders. Yet the announcement also 
reflected the Home Secretary's anxiety lest his moderate, middle-ground campaign be wrecked by 
ideological purity. The Executive resolved to ask all sections of the movement to 'refrain' from 
73 Morrison attended approximately three-quarters of PLP meetings from early 1945 (while Attlee attended 
only one-third). 
74 Dalton Diary, 18 October 1944 (p. 795). 
75 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, pp. 340-1. 
76 NEC minutes, 10 January 1945. 
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submitting resolutions to the next Conference. 77 Chastened by the Mikardo resolution, it was an 
attempt to ensure that only Morrison's official manifesto was discussed. Shortly thereafter, they 
set out to rig the agenda even further by deciding to simply 'eliminate' all problematic resolutions 
from debate. 78 
In early 1945, however, internal dissension largely subsided. United in anticipation of leaving the 
Coalition, for the next five months Labour was more quiescent than at any point since 1940. 
Precipitated by the fact that the war proceeded so quickly that domestic controversy briefly 
receded into the background, attention was focused elsewhere as Nazi Germany collapsed, and 
little else of note occuffed. '9 By early February, the Red Army were at the Oder, within fifty 
miles of Berlin; around the same time, British and American forces began assaults on the Rhine, 
and, in March, the Rhine was crossed. Political tensions between the parties consequently again 
increased in intensity over March and April, as the government suffered fresh by-election 
defeats. 80 Labourwas itching for independence, and the Conservative party wanted an immediate 
election to ensure victory off Churchill's back - itself in conflict with the prime minister's 
romanticism, which was not so party focused. Despite his own backing for Attlee's cautious 
strategy, Bevin's temper again got the better of him when, angered by Churchill's oration to the 
Conservative conference in April, he responded in a damning indictment of the Conservatives' 
record in a speech at Leeds. The Minister of Labour called the party a 'one-man show', and 
attacked the prime minister as being untrustworthy as a peacetime leader. 8' The speeches 
garnered considerable attention and increased the pressures within the political nation for 
82 83 
separation still further. The response to the latter oration, especially, was electric. The 
77 Ibid. 
78 NEC minutes, 28 March 1945. 
79 Some efforts were made to harass the govermnent over Greece, but a Labour delegation to Churchill in 
January - as well as the success of the British forces - brought the controversy to a quick end - PLP 
Administrative Committee special meeting minutes, 15 January 1945. Griffiths tried to pursue the Labour 
ministers over reconstruction, but Greenwood and Pethick-Lawrence procrastinated endlessly - PLP 
Administrative Committee minutes, 15 & 27 February 1945. Stokes was threatened with expulsion for his 
repeated rebellions against the official line, prompting him to pledge 'a real effort to march in step' - PLP 
Administrative Committee minutes, 6& 20 March 1945. 
so Labour lost a seat in Motherwell to the Scottish Nationalists, while the Conservatives lost the seat for the 
Scottish Universities to an Independent, and Chelmsford to Common Wealth - Butler, Twentieth Century 
British Political Facts, p. 255. 
8' The Times, 9 April 1945. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Harris has credited Bevin's speech with so up-lifting the mood of the Labour party that many of the 
internal tensions were, for the moment, healed - Harris, Attlee, p. 249. 
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hermetically-sealed world that party politics had been since 1939 looked increasingly in danger of 
rupture. 84 
With Morrison having seized so much initiative in the first months of 1945, Attlee attempted to 
head off his rival's rapid build-up of power. Increasingly taken up with foreign rather than 
domestic policy, the leader accompanied Eden to the San Francisco conference throughout March 
and April on the future of international relations. With the two opponents having staked out 
divergent positions on the future of the Coalition, Attlee countered Morrison by appointing Bevin, 
rather than the Home Secretary, as the Labour liaison with Churchill while he was away. 85 As the 
leader and Bevin were in agreement on seeking to prolong the life of the government beyond the 
end of the German war for at least six months, it was an attempt to ensure that the Home 
86 Secretary did nothing to circumvent Attlee and sabotage the Coalition. He advised Bevin to 
keep in close touch with Morrison - which translated as keeping an eye on what his rival was up 
to. 87 But Attlee's gambit to contain Morrison did not work; in fact, the reverse occurred. 
It became impossible to head off the agitation for a return to party politics any longer when, on 8 
May, VE Day was declared with the German surrender. After almost six years of war, Britain was 
victorious. But the nation's political leaders could spend little time celebrating; rather, they had to 
turn their attention back to what to most of them - desirous as they were of continuing the 
Coalition - must have seemed to be the problem of party politics. With the end of the raison d'6tre 
for the Coalition imminent, the parallel power struggles examined in the thesis therefore built 
towards a conclusion. Decisions had to be taken, and Attlee was out of the country. On 10 May, 
Bevin and Morrison met with numerous Labour ministers, and agreed that an October election 
would be preferred to one in the summer of 1945.88 For all the fervour of the party at large, its 
upper echelons were still sensible enough to try and remain in office until the contest came. 
Attempting to turn this momentum for delay until October into a bid to remain in the Coalition for 
longer still, Attlee, from San Francisco, broached with Churchill the possibility of the government 
84 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, II April 1945. The Committee called a special meeting to 
emphasise that despite 'recent speeches ... nothing ought to be done ... which would ... precipitate a political 
crisis'. 
85 The Daily Herald reported that Attlee had appointed Bevin 'Acting Leader', much to the displeasure of 
Greenwood (and, one imagines, most Labour MPs) - PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 18 April 
1945. 
86 PLP Administrative Committee minutes, 18 April 1945. 
87 Bevin papers, Attlee to Bevin, n. d.. Carrying out this job, Bevin and Morrison, according to Dalton, 
briefly got along 'surprisingly well'- Dalton, Memoirs, p. 458. 
88 Dalton Diary, 10 May 1945 (p. 858). The day before, ajoint meeting of the NEC, TUC and 
Administrative Committee to agree a formal statement on the victory avoided explicit statements and said 
only that they reaffirmed their 'pledge of full and effective co-operation' in seeking the defeat of Japan and 
ajust peace in Britain -NEC papers, minutes of ajoint meeting of the NEC, TUC and PLP Administrative 
Committee, 9 May 1945. 
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continuing until the end of the Pacific war - whenever that occurred. 
89 Given that this was widely 
expected to take approximately a year, the leader's real agenda was thus clear at last. But when 
Morrison and Bevin conveyed the proposal to the prime minister, the Home Secretary leapt on 
Churchill's statement that the Conservative party was putting him under pressure to fight an 
immediate election to effectively jettison Attlee's proposal, and make clear that he was opposed 
to going on until the defeat of Japan - implicitly encouraging the prime minister to force the 
issue. 90 Morrison, not Bevin, had taken the lead here, stealing a march on Attlee and trying to 
engineer the end of the Coalition. This chicanery in undermining the leader's course and 
entrenching a perception of continuation as impossible was seemingly a success, and, the next 
day, following Churchill's threat, even Attlee communicated his support for an October election 
rather than at the defeat of Japan. 91 Yet all expected the prime minister to force a contest in the 
summer instead. 92 
But Attlee's switch was just a ruse, probably necessitated by him being out of the country. When 
he returned, the struggle with Morrison for control of the party's course erupted into full-scale 
conflict with the Home Secretary pursuing his own agenda and vigorously trying to bring the 
Coalition down, and Attlee trying to both stay in office and prevent his rival from augmenting his 
standing any further. This final stage of the wartime rivalry between the two was to remain at this 
intensity until July. It was, moreover, this issue that afforded their personal struggle a publicly- 
acceptable substance and gave the division of the leadership group into separate camps a 
rhetorical basis other than simple venom. That Morrison could manoeuvre much more freely than 
the leader was his great advantage, while Attlee was compelled to hold the line. 
With the time for decision approaching, Churchill relented to pressure from Beaverbrook and 
Bracken, and formally wrote to Attlee on 18 May, immediately upon the latter's return to Britain 
and just three days before the 1945 annual Conference, offering Labour a choice between either 
93 
remaining in the Coalition until the defeat of Japan or fighting an immediate election. Before 
sending it, however, in full awareness that the Labour leader was to use it to try and persuade the 
NEC to stay in office, Churchill met with Attlee to decide on what the contents of the letter would 
be. 94 Attlee immediately backed away from his rejection of continuation the previous week, 
95 
concurring with Churchill on the desirability of remaining in alliance. Attlee also consulted with 
89 Bevin papers, copy of Morrison letter to Attlee, II May 1945. 
90 Dalton Diary, II May 1945 (pp. 858-9). 
91 Bevin papers, copy of Attlee letter to Morrison, 12 May 1945. 
92 Dalton Diary, II May 1945 (pp. 858-9). 
93 PREM 4/65/4, Churchill to Attlee, 18 May 1945. 
94 PREM 4/65/4, Churchill to the Chief Whip, 18 May 1945. 
95 Ibid. 
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96 Bevin and Dalton on how to create the circumstances to remain in office. Both of those two now 
97 
also favoured going on until Japan was defeated. The three were evidently determined to hang 
onto office for as long as possible, and displayed a not-insignificant amount of guile in trying to 
bring this about. It is not unfair to state that Foot's charge that Labour's most powerful figures 
had to be 'hauled out of [the Coalition] by the scruff of their necks', has a ring of truth. 98 Trying 
to come up with a formula to outfox their respective parties, Churchill agreed without demure to 
Attlee's suggestion to include a pledge that the Coalition would urgently implement the proposals 
for extensive reform already before Parliament, giving Attlee a valuable weapon at the decisive 
NEC meeting three days later. 99 The Labour leader had secured from Churchill what he desired, a 
suitable inducement for the party to carry on. For all his professed willingness since the previous 
summer to leave office, once the moment of decision actually arrived, the fagade of Attlee's 
position was exposed. The leader, believing that Labour would be routed, had no intention of 
leaving office - certainly not until the party stood a chance at an election. 
At Blackpool, the weekend before the Conference, Attlee's Machiavellian struggle to keep 
Labour in the government came to a head. His clear adoption of a position, after the obfuscation 
and vagueness of the previous nine months, had given Morrison forewarning of what he was 
planning, and the time to prepare to outmanoeuvre him. Further, the Home Secretary's base of 
support was significantly strengthened going into the event, with a pro-Morrison bloc beginning 
to take shape, underlining again how effectively he had seized all the initiative since December. 100 
Shinwell and Bevan met privately and agreed that they were opposed to continuing the Coalition, 
conveying this to Morrison, and reinforcing his determination to lead the opposition to Attlee's 
bid to stay in office. 101 Bevan also wanted to replace Attlee with Morrison. 102 The Welshman had, 
throughout the war, concentrated his fire on the government or the Labour ministers as a group; 
he had made few attacks on Attlee personally. But, newly secure, this changed as he increasingly 
blamed Attlee directly for what he diagnosed as Labour's problems, attacking him for not 
disassociating Labour from policy on Greece, and calling his decision to go to San Francisco as 
Eden's deputy his 'Crowning Blunder'. 103 In a scathing indictment of Attlee's entire leadership 
96 Ibid; Dalton Diary, 18 May 1945 (p. 861). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Foot, Bevan, p. 500. 
99 PREM 4/65/4, Churchill to the Chief Whip, 18 May 1945. 
100 Donougbue and Jones, Morrison, pp. 340-1. 
101 Ibid. 
102 G. R. Strauss interview, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 340; Vernon, Wilkinson, p. 197. Bevan 
was staying with Strauss at this time, and apparently engaged in the intrigue on Morrison's behalf via 
telephone. 
103 Tribune, 30 March 1945. 
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since 1940, Bevan asserted that he had been a 'humiliating' representative, and accused him of 
'consistently underplaying his position and his opportunities'. ' 04 
Morrison was now buttressed by the backing of a significant range of figures - in addition to 
Wilkinson and Laski, he was supported by Bevan, Cripps, and Shinwell, as well as the PLP 
backbenchers mentioned above. 105 All of them thought that a leadership contest must occur before 
any Labour government was formed. 106 They all began to canvass openly during the Conference, 
disparaging Attlee and pressing Morrison's case. 10' Wilkinson asked Dalton to pressurise Attlee 
to step aside and allow Morrison victory. 108 A definite anti-Attlee bloc thus coalesced at precisely 
the same time as Morrison had the advantage over his opponent in most other respects as well. 
But Laski was energised more by sheer hatred of Attlee, than fervour for the heir apparent 
himself. He wanted rid of the leader before the general election even occurred, and, while he was 
agitating for Morrison, he also tried to get Deakin to persuade Bevin to challenge Attlee as 
well. 109 The Minister of Labour was apoplectic, and simply conveyed news of the intrigues 
straight to Attlee. 110 The long-anticipated power struggle had thus broken out. It was the 
submergence of wider internal politics - disaffection with coalition and Attlee's strategy since 
1939 - into the rivalry over the leadership which allowed this struggle to at last be pursued 
without restraint. 
At the decisive NEC meeting, Attlee, Dalton, and Bevin all argued in favour of Churchill's 
proposal. "' However, disregarding the promises of extensive social reform -the content of his 
own 'great national plan' - Morrison took the lead in opposing them, forcefully pushing for 
rejection of the offer. 112 Having known for weeks what his opponents were attempting to do, the 
Home Secretary had been able to set the ideal trap. His gamesmanship aside, though, he was 
surely correct on the substance of the issue. If the Labour ministers tried to stay in office and were 
rejected by the party - as they surely would be - it would be a disaster. After five years, the 
inevitable backlash had now occurred. While Attlee's strategy had bought the time needed to 
make Labour electable, the only viable option that the party would now accept was withdrawal. 
104 Ibid; Tribune, 19 January 1945. 
105 G. R. Strauss interview, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 340. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Dalton Diary, 20 May 1945 (unpublished). The main agitators were Cripps, Wilkinson, Laski, and 
Webb. 
log Ibid. 
109 Dalton, Memoirs, pp. 46-7; Attlee interview, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 341. Attlee was 
certainly of this view (Attlee, As It Happened, p. 168). 
110 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 168. 
1" NEC minutes, 20 May 1945; Dalton Diary, '19 May-22 May 1945' (pp. 861-2). 
112 NEC minutes, 20 May 1945; Morrison, Autobiography, p. 235; Dalton Diary, Is & 19 May 1945 (pp. 
861-2). 
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There was little sense in fighting a battle that they could not win, even if Attlee, Bevin, and 
Dalton seemed determined to try. The Labour party was resolved to escape its political 
straitjacket, and Morrison had guessed that it would succeed in doing so. In his contest with the 
others for the hearts and minds of their followers, be therefore again presented himself as the 
advocate of independence, taking up a position directly between Attlee and the party, and 
marshalling the opposition to his rival. Morrison was vocally supported during the debate by 
Shinwell - who 'let rip' against Attlee - Laski, Wilkinson, Griffiths, and Bevan. 
' 13 This attempt 
to exploit the powerful internal sentiments for withdrawal was a success, and all except three 
members supported his opposition to Churchill's offer as the NEC rejected outright the notion of 
remaining in office. ' 14 
These were the final schisms that forced Labour out of the Coalition. Morrison had personally 
engineered the failure of Attlee's last throw of the dice. It was a major victory, and the biggest 
blow he had yet inflicted to his rival. It was now evident that Morrison was capable of besting the 
Attlee-Bevin axis after all. Further, he cemented the image of himself as Labour's champion, in 
touch with its feelings on the most important political issue since 1940, and made Attlee appear 
its betrayer. Moreover, in contrast to any notion of a developing ideological struggle, the entire 
issue had been, from beginning to end, a pawn in the Attlee-Morrison power struggle. The 
postures and proclamations of politicians are doubtless very often internalised, i. e. they come to 
believe them. But there is a remarkable correlation between the thrust of rhetoric and self-interest. 
What was even more duplicitous was that, just the previous week, Morrison himself had actually 
got the NEC to agree to formally request the Conference not to 'tie the hands' of the Executive 
with any declarations against the possibility of forming a new coalition after the election! 115 
Morrison was determined to destroy Attlee's course and bring down the Coalition as a means to 
seize the leadership; but he was perfectly amenable to forming another alliance with the 
Conservatives once he himself became leader. That the resolution stressed that no-one had 'any 
desire or intention' to do so does not obscure the utter fagade of Morrison's position! 16 The 
posture he had adopted since abandoning his 'coupon' idea was, therefore, seemingly never a 
sincere one, for he had left open the option of moving back to coalition once he became leader. 
The case he had argued to win rejection of Churchill's offer was a cover; despite his rhetoric, 
Morrison had, in fact, not performed the about-turn he seemed to have over 1944-5. He had 
instead got both of the two things he had wanted all along: destroy Attlee's strategy and retain the 
113 NEC minutes, 20 May 1945; Slowe, Shinwell, p. 203. 114 NEC minutes, 20 May 1945. 
115 NEC minutes, 18 May 1945. Attlee was not present at this meeting - presumably he was still returning from San Francisco. 
116 Ibid. The resolution stated that 'circumstances cannot be adequately forseen'. 
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option of coalition. ' 17 Given the stakes involved, it constituted surely one of the most brilliant and 
audacious series of manoeuvres in recent political history. 
It was the biggest defeat suffered by Attlee in a decade as party leader. Gambling his authority on 
persuading the NEC to stay in office, he had been unceremoniously rebuffed. In abandoning his 
custom of detecting in advance, and leading, the currents of internal opinion in a desperate bid to 
continue the cross-party alliance, the leader gravely misjudged what his followers would 
tolerate! 18 It was one trick too many. In doing so, Attlee handed Morrison, already stronger than 
ever before, a huge propaganda coup. For six years, Morrison had struggled to establish himself 
as a more faithful embodiment of his party than the incumbent; now, at the very end of the war, 
the leader had gifted his rival the best proof of this he could ever wish. 
With Morrison's defeat of Attlee, the Coalition quickly collapsed. The other members of 
Labour's Big Four were too wise to detach themselves from their followers any further, accepting 
the NEC decision immediately. 119 Though Attlee had given Morrison's attempts to discredit him 
an air of verisimilitude, the latter was thus denied the additional opportunity of portraying the 
leader as attempting to abandon, Labour. But this could not alter the fact that Morrison had scored 
another stunning victory, this time by confronting and defeating Attlee openly on the NEC. 
Replying to Churchill, Attlee tried to argue for the election to be scheduled for October, a last- 
ditch attempt to stave off a Khaki election with a prime minister at the height of his powers. 120 
Unsurprisingly, it did not work - Churchill was never likely to fall into the trap, and plumped for 
an immediate election. 121 He saw the King and resigned, and the Coalition came to an abrupt end. 
Britain's wartime ministry had been formed at the behest of the NEC; now it was ended by the 
same means. Churchill was appointed the head of an interim 'caretaker' ministry of 
Conservatives and National Liberals, and polling day was scheduled for 5 July, with the results to 
be announced three weeks later, when the votes of the armed forces had been collected. 
117 All Morrison would have to do would be to persuade the NEC to agree to rejoin the Coalition. The 
important thing to remember is that though this would have been impossible at this point, Morrison - 
expecting to lose the election - would have calculated that a dejected party and NEC would become more 
receptive to the offer of coalition once defeated. The trade unions would almost certainly have insisted on 
power over impotent Opposition. Essentially, he expected the calculus to change, and retained the 
proverbial golden ticket necessary to undo what he had done on the 20th. 
118 Attlee, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not acknowledge his attempt to remain in office in his memoirs - 
Attlee, As It Happened, pp. 157-60. 
119 NEC minutes, 20 May 1945. 
120 NEC papers, press cuttings of Churchill and Attlee letters (both were released to the press as formal 
explanations to the public for the break up of the government), 18 May & 25 May 1945. 121 Ibid. 
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Attlee had been bested by Morrison, and the Home Secretary further consolidated his position and 
claim to the leadership. The linked questions of their feud and the Coalition aside, however, the 
Conference was a triumphant event for the leadership group. With the news that Labour was once 
again in Opposition, the mood of the party instantly improved. Despite a surprisingly narrow vote 
on reconsideration of Communist affiliation, the Conference witnessed strong endorsement of the 
Morrison-created electoral platform, and acquiescence to the leadership's continued political 
primacy over their followers. 122 Though this lack of opposition was doubtless due largely to the 
acclaim that the Coalition was over, the leadership group turned this momentarily unquestioning 
support into a firm mandate. Of course, that they had avoided resolutions proposing alternatives 
to the manifesto, and presented delegates with a take-it-or-leave-it approach, was a powerful tool 
in achieving this, as by 'eliminating' alternate resolutions there was simply nothing to replace the 
manifesto with. But the leaders also used the event to push the theme that continued co-operation 
with the Conservatives was impossible - which, of course, only Morrison had professed to hold 
as an idjefixe. Nevertheless, this new combativeness yielded results, re-establishing the internal 
strength which had been battered by war and coalition. The leadership group, then, did have to 
repay the loan they had taken out in 1940; but they did so in such a way as to steal their enemies' 
thunder, silence alternative sentiment, and collectively reorient themselves from being the 
advocates of coalition to the advocates of independence. By the end of the Conference, even 
Attlee had altered his position in line with this. 
Introducing Let Us Face the Future, Morrison delivered for the second time in two years one of 
the great Conference performances with a speech which served the dual purpose of signalling his 
candidacy for the leadership. 123 He placed little emphasis on his true concerns with moderation, 
and instead made an aggressive oration on the necessity for socialism and nationalisation in what 
he termed 'the most important general election of all time', rousing the audience in a way Attlee 
never could. 124 He received a thunderous standing ovation lasting several minutes, the Daily 
Express declaring him the 'undoubted leader' of the Labour party, and the manifesto was passed 
125 unanimously. . With Labour's entire programme so closely associated with him, a big boost in 
his vote in the NEC elections and, moreover, having personally forced Labour out of the 
Coalition, Morrison stood at the very pinnacle of his powers. Buoyed by success after success, it 
was the public triumph - and endorsement - he needed. 126 
122 1945 LPA CR, pp. 81-2. 
123 1945 LPA CR, pp. 89-92. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Daily Express, 23 May 1945; The Times, 23 May 1945; News Chronicle, 23 May 1945. 
126 Morrison's vote went up to 424,000 and he climbed to third in the poll, surpassing Griffiths. Only Laski 
and Shinwell polled more votes (430,000 each) -NEC papers, 'Results of Conference Ballot, Blackpool, 
1945'. 
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While many of the struggles within the party had been subsumed in the period described in the 
current chapter, nonetheless the 1945 Conference made clear that the leadership group remained 
very much in control of the Labour party despite six years of political restraint. That this was so 
was testimony to the skill of those leaders in plotting and navigating their course, particularly 
Attlee. The unanimous support for the manifesto showed where real power still resided. 
Collectively, the leaders, through flat rejection of the idea that anyone else knew what was in 
Labour's best interests, ensured that the policies on which the party stood were theirs, and theirs 
127 
alone. Doctrinaire proposals like Mikardo's had simply been disregarded. Despite the Greek 
controversy, their new approach to foreign policy received a ringing endorsement after speeches 
by Attlee and Bevin, affording them a virtual free hand in international affairs when Labour 
entered office in jUly. 128 After imposing tight, and deeply resented, controls on their followers 
since 1939, upon loosening them the leadership found themselves not only still at the head of the 
party, but in command of it. With Labour relatively united and their standing publicly restored, 
senior figures - Morrison especially - could look to the future with renewed confidence. 
Abandoning Labour's independence in 1940, their ability to hold sway over their followers had 
been comprehensive; reclaiming that independence five years later, the leadership's successful 
imposition of their own policy choices was a final vindication of the wisdom of the high-wire 
balancing-act on which they had gambled their political futures. 
IV 
This affirmation of support for their strategy, however, did not alter the fact that, having forced 
Labour out of office, momentum in the party's central conflict had swung firmly in Morrison's 
direction. Laski took advantage of Attlee's defeat and immediately joined in the effort to bring 
him down. In late May, he wrote to Attlee directly and brazenly told him that he lacked the 
charisma to win an election, and called for him to be replaced hefore it occurred: 
I have been acutely aware for many months ... of the strong feeling that the continuance of your leadership 
is a grave handicap to our hopes of victory in the coming election. [This opinion] is felt by a majority of our 
own Executive. It is felt by the outstanding trade union leaders ... and the rank-and-file ... share this view 
profoundly. So ... do many of your parliamentary colleagues. 
129 
127 No mention of the commitments forced onto the NEC at the 1944 Conference appeared in the election 
platform. 
28 1945 LPACR, pp. 107-9,115-9. 
129 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Attlee 29 May 1945. 
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Laski told Attlee that immediate resignation would be a 'great service' to the party. 130 The leader 
was dismissive in his reply - 'Dear Laski, thank you for your letter, contents of which have been 
noted' - and he otherwise ignored the attack. 13 1 But this open cball enge by the NEC chairman 
was a further indication of Attlee's perceived weakness. The campaign to replace him was now 
underway. Battle-lines had been drawn, and the resultant power struggle was, despite the general 
election, to consume Labour affairs for the next two months. 
In the meantime, Labour returned to the hurly-burly of party politics with aplomb, throwing itself 
into the election campaign. When Attlee, Bevin, and Morrison entered the Commons for the first 
time since the break up of the government they were cheered loudly. 132 The leadership group 
immediately set about reasserting themselves, with the Administrative Committee ceasing to exist 
and formally reverting to the pre-war Executive Committee. 133 Attlee resumed his role as head of 
the PLP, and Greenwood reverted to the position of deputy. Pethick-Lawrence, having played 
such a critical role since 1939, was given the entirely titular position of being the party's 'third 
man'. 134 
After formulating Labour's policy agenda, and wounding Attlee by forcing the break-up of the 
Coalition, Morrison now strengthened his position still further by masterminding the campaign as 
well. His rise over the first half of 1945 had been one of the most comprehensive in recent 
political history. Taking an office in Transport House, he thus enhanced his new dominance at the 
heart of the party. Labour published hundreds of thousands of copies of Let Us Face the Future, 
and Morrison was one of only two of the leaders to have a pamphlet specifically devoted to him, 
the other being Bevin. 135 When the government broke up, he also resumed his position in the 
136 London Labour party, involving him directly in the campaign in the capital. All of this 
represented the ideal launching pad for his imminent challenge to the party leader. Morrison's 
desire to change constituencies - from blue-collar Hackney to white-collar East Lewisham - and 
to be seen to lead Labour's great advance was yet another aspect of his construction of an image 
as a genuinely national figure, and demonstration that he, not Attlee, was Labour's senior 
politician. 137 Combined with his recent dominance in all other respects, Attlee could do little to 
compete with all this; he simply lacked the dynamism of Morrison in full flow. The former Home 
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Secretary travelled around the country giving speeches and was chosen to deliver Labour's final 
election broadcast, Morrison's biographers noting that he 'strode through the campaign like the 
real leader of the Labour party and a future leader of the country'. 138 The tactical shift that he had 
made from October 1944 had been a resounding success. Before the election was even held, then, 
Morrison's accession to the leadership now looked all but inevitable. 
But the challenger was not to have things entirely his own way. The campaign saw the emergence 
of Attlee from the warrens of Whitehall and onto the public stage for the first time, via a very 
public besting of Churchill. Attlee himself made around seventy appearances at rallies and 
meetings, while taking care to ensure strict adherence by all speakers to the official line. As the 
leader put it, one 'silly speech by Aneurin Bevan might easily be used to stampede the electors 
away '. 139 But it was Churchill himself who gave Attlee the chance to strengthen his limited public 
profile, and afforded Labour a huge propaganda boon. In his first election broadcast in early June, 
the prime minister began the first of two scandals that were to dominate much of the campaign. 
He famously asserted that a Labour government would have to rely on 'some form of Gestapo' in 
order to control the country and suppress dissent. 140 For Churchill to compare his former 
colleagues to the Gestapo - who were, in 1945, anything but clich6d villains of popular culture - 
was widely considered offensive. Consequently, the broadcast backfired: rather than depicting the 
schemes of Labour as leading to a curtailment of freedoms, it made the iconic war leader appear 
just another party politician. Attlee responded with a broadcast which made a similarly large 
public impact and was, in the words of a biographer of both men, 'quietly devastating'. 141 The 
Labour leader stated that 
When I listened to the prime minister's speech last 
* 
night in which he gave such a travesty of the policy of 
the Labour party, I realised at once what was his object. He wanted the electors to understand how great the 
difference was between Winston Churchill, the great leader in war of a united nation, and Mr. Churchill, 
the party leader of the Conservatives. He feared that those who accepted his leadership in war might be 
tempted out of gratitude to follow him ftu-ther. I thank him for having disillusioned them so thoroughly. 142 
13' NEC papers 'Broadcasting', n. d.; Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 337. It is worth pointing out, 
though, that, in Harris' view, Bevin received even more press attention than Morrison during the campaign 
- Harris, Attlee, p. 258. 139 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 167; Attlee papers, 1/24, undated memorandum. 
140 David Cannadine (ed. ) Blood, Toil, Tears andSweat. Winston Churchill's Famous Speeches (London, 
1989), pp. 270-7. 
14 1 Roy Jenkins, Churchill (London, 200 1), p. 793. 
142 Roy Jenkins (ed. ) Purpose and Policy. Selected Speeches by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. C. K 
Attlee (London, 1947), p. 3. 
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143 The broadcast 'was the making of Attlee as a campaign leader'. Though he was usually 
eclipsed as an orator by Morrison and Bevin, his calmer tone was better suited to the medium of 
these radio broadcasts - which approximately half of the population tuned into. 144 Attlee simply 
seemed the more mature, reflective statesman than the prime minister. The episode provided the 
leader what he so badly required within Labour itself - public stature and a means to be seen, like 
Morrison, as a loyal champion of socialism. Attlee had been outmanocuvred in virtually all 
respects by Morrison throughout 1945, and powerless to prevent his seizures of authority. But the 
leader had consistently retreated in such a fashion as to deny his rival the opportunity to deliver a 
fatal blow - for example, by immediately accepting the decision to leave office in May - and he 
had very publicly got the better of Churchill. This underlined the fact that Morrison's efforts to 
depict him as an inattentive leader were incorrect. Moreover, and crucially, Attlee remained the 
incumbent - with the inherent advantages that brought - and there was, thus far, no sign of a 
major PLP revolt against him. For all Morrison's popularity, it was the union MPs who 
dominated the arena where a leadership contest would have to be fought, and they were Attlee's 
base. Morrison still had to seize an entrenched position, while Attlee had merely to defend it. 
The Labour campaign was, however, gravely damaged by the second of the scandals alluded to 
above, this time centred upon Laski. This episode also at last brought the conflict between Attlee 
and the NEC chairman to a head. Displaying political stupidity of the highest order, Laski offered 
the Conservatives an inflammatory controversy with which to dominate the press in the weeks 
preceding the election, when he created a Zenoviev letter-esque scare by asserting in the Daily 
Herald that, though Attlee was to accompany Churchill to Potsdam, he could do so only as an 
observer, and that Truman and Stalin should be aware that if Labour won the election they could 
not be bound by any agreements reached with Churchill. 145 Even worse, Laski declared that the 
NEC would have to approve the policies chosen at Potsdam before they could be implemented. 146 
This raised the spectre of NEC control over the elected government. Attlee later commented that 
Laski's political nous was 'not very good'. 147 It was, to say the least, unlikely that a Labour 
Cabinet would have accepted subordination to the NEC; but Attlee felt Laski conceived of 
himself as being a 'leading figure on the political stage'. 148 
143 Jenkins, Churchill, p. 793. 
144 Ibid; R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, 7he British General Election of 1945 (Oxford, 1947), 
p. 175. 
145 Daily Herald, 15 June 1945. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 168. 
14' Attlee, As It Happened, p. 16 1. Attlee's hatred for Laski is one of the few passions which shines through 
in what is otherwise an emollient memoir. 
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The demand was instantly leapt on by the Beaverbrook press as a challenge to the constitution. 
The press baron asserted that Attlee was a mere puppet, and that an extra-parliamentary 'secret 
ruling caucus', with Laski at its head, would pull the strings of a British government. 149 
Beaverbrook produced previous statements by Laski on how Labour would abolish the monarchy 
and use force to implement its will, under the headline 'Laski Unleashes Another General 
Election Broadside: Socialism Even If It Means Violence'. 150 He charged that Labour's aim was 
the replacement of Parliament with a 'dictatorship' presided over by Laski . 
15 1 This was the ideal 
platform for the Conservatives to frighten voters, and the scare became the defining story of the 
whole campaign. Laski sued for libel and retracted his statement, but that did nothing to stem the 
flow of headlines. 152 Churchill also manoeuvred himself into the crisis, exchanging a series of 
public letters with Attlee in which he tried to depict the Labour leader as the pawn of an 
unaccountable body, exploiting the party's constitutional provisions that it was governed by the 
NEC and Conference. ' 53 Attlee flatly denied this, but the damage was done and the controversy 
persisted until polling day. 154 Public opinion swung sharply back towards the Conservatives in the 
three weeks preceding the election - the period dominated by the scandal - and it is difficult not 
to suspect that Laski inflicted a significant setback to the perception of Labour that its leaders had 
been so assiduous in cultivating. 
Attlee was furious. While his immediate priority was to concentrate on rebutting the accusations 
of dictatorship, he soon seized on the fact that his old enemy Laski, the non-politician, was at last 
vulnerable. The episode thus enabled the leader to finally get the upper hand in their venomous 
feud. Some time later, after Labour had won the election, Attlee turned his attention to the man 
who, weeks before, had called for him to resign, and sent Laski a famous and stinging rebuke 
which, in no uncertain terms, finally silenced him. The leader warned that 
You have no right whatever to speak on behalf of the government. Foreign affairs are in the capable hands 
of Ernest Bevin. His task is quite sufficiently difficult without the emban-assment of irresponsible 
statements of the kind which you are making. A period of silence on your part would be welcome. 155 
It was Attlee's most forceftil response to Laski and, where previous exhortations had failed, this 
one did not. Laski had placed himself in a position where Attlee could finally exert his authority 
"9 Daily Express, 16 June 1945. The headlined warned that 'Obscure Laski Caucus Will Give Orders'. 
'50 Daily Express, 20 June 1945. See also 23 & 25 June. 151 The Times, 21 June. 
152 For an account of subsequent events, see David Howell, 'The Laski Libel Trial', in Howell (ed. ), 
Dictionary ofLabour Biography, vol. XI, pp. 117-29. 
153 See The Times, 21,22,23 & 24 June 1945. 
154 Daily Express, 4 July 1945. ne headline was 'Shall the Laski 25 Rule Great BritainT 
155 Hull, Laski papers, Attlee to Laski, 20 August 1945. 
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and crush him, having wrecked his own credibility by harming Labour so publicly. Chastened by 
the attacks on him - and exhausted by his libel case - Laski posed none of the problems for the 
Labour ministers during the subsequent period that he had between 1939 and 1945. 
While Attlee and Morrison continued to circle one another, and Laski threatened to derail the 
party's plans, the campaign itself wore on. A war-weary population was just as anxious as the 
Labour party over 'the future', and it was this, largely symbolic, topic which provided the 
substance of the election. 156 People desired compensation for the hardships of the preceding 
decades and expected politicians to meet that desire. Both the main parties campaigned 
intensively - their propaganda initiatives, hinted at above, were aggressive, while, at a local level, 
campaigning consisted of a mixture of self-glorification and scare-mongering. The state of the 
organisational machinery of the two parties is difficult to assess, and only tentative conclusions 
can be drawn. The Conservatives were certainly in poor condition, with the party having suffered 
stagnation and loss of activity at both a central and local level. Churchill felt this to be significant 
in his defeat, with many Conservative agents and workers going into the armed forces while 
many local Labour figures - usually trade unionists - remained at home. 157 On the other hand, in 
March, Labour had fifty-eight full time agents - most of whom had no experience - while the 
almost three hundred Conservative agents were being released from war service. 158 It would be 
safest to say that the local organisation of both parties is in need of sustained investigation, but 
varied from locality to locality and was often ramshackle; yet it seems difficult to believe that 
Labour did not have at least some advantages in this respect. At a central level, the picture is 
clearer. The machinery of Central Office rusted away under Churchill and, though Labour's 
organisation similarly collapsed in the first years of war, from 1942 Middleton and Shepherd 
spearheaded a concerted effort to reverse this, with extensive access to party funds. Labour's 
central machinery was therefore in fact in rather good condition by 1945.159 
When the election results eventually came through on 25 July, to the shock of most politicians, 
the Labour party, not the triumphant war leader Churchill, secured a landslide victory. Almost 
everyone had expected the prime minister to win this snap Khaki election. But Labour won 393 
seats and attracted 47.8% of the vote, compared to the Conservative's 213 seats and 39.8%. The 
party had, moreover, reinforced its industrial heartlands with major inroads into more prosperous 
areas, as well as prized Conservative strongholds which, in normal circumstances, it could never 
156 The best account of the election itself can be found in McCallum and Readman, The British General 
Election of 1945. 
157 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. six, p. 509. 
"' Addison, The Road to 1945, p. 258. 
159 See the current author's forthcoming article 'The organisation of the Labour party during the Second 
World War' (in preparation). 
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have hoped to win. Yet circumstances were anything but normal. Having lived under controls for 
six years, the population saw many features of Labour's manifesto that hardly appeared new. The 
political credibility of the party - having been rebuilt by its membership of the Coalition - was 
such that a Labour government was no longer unthinkable. But, likely of greater significance than 
local organisation, was the contrasting tone and vision offered by the two parties. As above, the 
people wanted change. This may have been a vague longing, but the definite commitments of Let 
Us Face the Future were simply more attractive to a country which had experienced years of 
deprivation and war than the cautious tone of the Conservative campaign, based around a policy 
of wait-and-sce. Churchill had concentrated on his war record, but the idealistic longing for a new 
beginning which pervaded most sections of Britain did not find a reflection in the Conservatives. 
Labour had won a famous victory. 
Its leaders having expected defeat, in the end, the Labour party was able to forin a majority 
government for the first time in its history. As the thesis has demonstrated, it was the war years, 
not the internecine struggles of the 1930s, which in fact represented the crucial formative period 
for Labour, and permitted the evolution into the election-winning entity that the party became by 
1945. Involvement in the Coalition at the behest of Attlee and the other leaders, for all the 
discontent it engendered, had facilitated this remarkable transformation. The changes were, 
moreover, reflected not only in the location of the parliamentary seats won, but in the 
composition of the new PLP as well. MPs were now a balanced mixture of different social 
classes; working-class MI? s were no longer so predominant. Not only a majority government but a 
national party as well, in 1945 Labour could, for the first time, claim to be representative of the 
country over which it was to preside. Utopianism, rather than the two parties themselves, 
probably represented the key to the election. But as far as any one man was responsible, it would 
be Morrison. He had created both the platform that Labour stood on and the campaign itself. At 
the same time, it was Attlee's strategy, chosen in 1939 and adhered to since, which had made 
Labour electable again. A direct result of the course mapped out six years before, Labour's 
victory was Attlee's triumph; but it was Morrison's as well. 
V 
With Labour secure in office, the struggle between Attlee and Morrison finally reached its 
culmination. Moreover, despite the latter's series of public victories, this was to be fought on 
ground on which Attlee was well-prepared. Churchill's message to the leader on 26 July, 
conceding defeatý was the beginning of a dramatic series of intrigues over the course of a few 
hours which took place before the new government was formed. When the letter arrived, Attlee 
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and Morrison were meeting with Morgan Phillips, Laski, and Bevin in the latter's room at 
Transport House, holding talks on the new government. 160 Our understanding of events that day 
is hindered by the fact that this gathering was unfortunately not minuted, and consequently we 
must reconstruct it largely from memoirs and other recollections . 
161 Nonetheless, sufficient 
information is available for us to gain a clear picture of events. When Attlee conveyed the news 
of the prime minister's letter, Morrison immediately attempted to seize the leadership before his 
opponent could see the King and accept the commission to form a government, arguing that no 
such invitation should be accepted before the PLP had met and formally chosen a leader. 162 His 
ostensible justification was that, under party rules, at the beginning of each parliamentary session, 
MPs should be able to confirm the man who they wanted to lead them. 163 In reality this was, of 
course, merely a transparent attempt to exploit his standing and popularity to dislodge his rival. 
Morrison would also have realised that it would be virtually impossible to dislodge a newly- 
appointed prime minister if Attlee actually accepted the commission. Therefore, the previous day, 
Morrison had informed Attlee that, whatever the election results, he intended to stand against him 
for the leadership. 16' When Attlee had communicated this to Bevin, the union boss 
165 
characteristically exploded with rage: 'I won't have it. You leave him to me'. Bevin then 
telephoned Morrison and warned him that 'If you go on mucking about like this, you won't be in 
the bloody government at al li. 166 
Laski backed Morrison in demanding that Attlee inform the King that Labour needed two days to 
16 168 
choose a leader. 7 Both argued that the rules of the PLP had to be observed. Morrison later 
asserted that he would not have sought the position, but had been 'pressed' by his supporters. 169 
As with the earlier struggles over election policy, this emphasis upon good practice represented a 
publicly-acceptable means for Morrison to try and snatch the leadership by putting before the new 
PLP - less union-dominated than before -a straight choice between himself and Attlee as the 
160 Dalton, Memoirs, p. 468. 
161 Tellingly Attlee did not mention the meeting, or Morrison's intrigues, at all in his autobiography - 
Attlee, As It Happened, p. 17 1. 
162 Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 340; Harris, Attlee, p. 263. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Morrison papers, Morrison to Attlee, 25 July 1945. Morrison wrote 'that I am animated solely by 
considerations of the interests of the party, and regard for their democratic rights, and not by any personal 
unfriendliness towards yourself, I need hardly assure you'; Dalton, Memoirs, p. 468. 165 Ibid. 
16'5 Ibid. 
167 Granville Eastwood, HaroldLaski (London, 1977), pp. 341-2; Morrison, Autobiography, p. 245. 
168 Morrison, Autobiography, p. 242. 
169 Ibid. In his memoirs, Morrison entitled the relevant section 'Rights of the Parliamentary Party' and 
wrote that 'I was disturbed to learn that moves had begun to propose me as leader of the party in place of 
Attlee. I promptly took steps to see these activities stopped' - Morrison, Autobiography, p236. In reality, 
of course, just the day before, Morrison had formally proposed himsetrto Attlee. 
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new prime minister. "O However, forewarned by Morrison's communiqud the previous day, Attlee 
and Bevin immediately moved to block him, and fiercely objected to the idea on the grounds that 
it was unconstitutional . 
17 1 They argued that the electorate had voted for Labour on the assumption 
that Attlee, the party leader, would be prime minister, and hence it would be improper to suddenly 
impose someone else. ' 12 As the argument raged, and the conflict over the competing 
constitutional provisions of the party and country offered a convenient fig-leaf for a struggle over 
the topjob in British politics, Morrison was called away by a telephone call from Cripps; when he 
returned, he announced that Cripps also supported his call for a ballot on the leadership. 113 
However, Morrison's momentum was in fact never more than an illusion. While he was 
conferring with Cripps, Attlee and Bevin moved to derail his challenge without him even 
realising it. They decided that Attlee should simply pre-empt the contest by accepting the King's 
commission on his own authority that afternoon, and then present Morrison with a fait 
accompli. 174 For all the dynamism of the heir apparent and his role in overseeing a landslide 
victory, it was Attlee who held the position of leader and the freedom of action it afforded. Bevin 
told him 'Clem, you go to the Palace straight away', but Attlee probably needed little 
encouragement - he later recalle "d 
that he had already decided after Morrison's letter to simply 
ignore his rival's demands. ' 75 Attlee felt that he, not Morrison, had propriety on his side: 'If the 
176 King asks you to form a govcmmentý you say Yes or No, not "I'l I let you know later"' . 
The meeting broke up with Attlee and Bevin revealing none of this, and Morrison under the 
impression that, having confronted Attlee and forced his rival into a comer, the way lay clear for 
him to assume the premiership. 177 Yet whatever the impression that Attlee gave to his opponent, 
the Labour leader never had any intention of allowing him the opportunity to seize his position. 
The heir apparent remained in high spirits throughout the day, and, at the victory rally held that 
evening at Westminster Central Hall, an ecstatic Morrison and his supporters set to work pressing 
his case to MPs, asserting that 'We cannot have this man as our leader'. 178 As suddenly as he had 
170 Moreover, an 'unusually large' number of MPs, many of the Attlee's original supporters, had retired at 
the 1945 election, their places taken by new ones who would not have the same loyalty to Attlee stemming 
from his performance during the period 1931-35 - PLP papers, Carol Johnson letter to PLP, 14 June 1945. 171 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, pp. 34. 
'72 Ibid; Dalton, Memoirs, pp. 468,473. 
173 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, pp. 34. 
174 Ibid; Attlee interview, cited Harris, Altlee, p. 263; Bullock, Bevin, vol. 2, pp. 392-3. 175 Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 263. 
176 Ibid. Years later, Attlee was rather more venomous towards Laski than Morrison in recalling the affair - Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 4. 
177 Attlee interview, cited Harris, Attlee, p. 263. 
178 The Star, 27 July 1945; cited in David Howell, Attlee (London, 2006), p. 134; R. Boon and J. Parker 
interviews, cited Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, pp. 341-2. 
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manufactured it, however, Morrison's victory turned to dust before his eyes. His understanding of 
the meeting was very different from what had actually taken place. While he was at the rally, 
Attlee was secretly at the Palace. 179 The first that Morrison knew of the fact that the issue had 
already been settled was when the leader arrived at the rally. 180 Attlee simply went up onto the 
platform and announced that he had been appointed prime minister, news greeted by wild 
applause. 181 It does not require a fertile imagination to conceive of the shock Morrison must have 
felt. 182 After overpowering Attlee for months on end, at the final hurdle he had been decisively 
outnianoeuvred by the leader. Events would suggest that Morrison's greater prominence counted 
for little against the powers and prerogatives enjoyed by the individual who held the position of 
leader, with the latitude it afforded. Morrison had, throughout 1945, done all the work in crafting 
an election platform, and more than any other figure to lead Labour to victory; but now Attlee got 
all the power. 
The campaign upon which Morrison had surreptitiously been embarked for six years, and had 
been preparing for since 193 5, thus col lapsed on the brink of victory. Final ly crossing h is 
personal Rubicon, he had been swiftly defeated. This reversal, however, was due not to any real 
mistakes by Morrison himself, but to the astuteness of Attlee. Though of divergent personalities, 
as political operators he and Morrison were generally evenly matched - hence the fascinating 
nature of their twenty-year contest for ascendancy. But, while Morrison was the more dynamic of 
the two, and his success in driving the party was remarkable, it was still Attlee who held the 
stronger cards. As incumbent leader, backed by the ballast of the union Mps, and allied to the 
most powerful figure in the Labour movement, the uncharismatic but calculating Attlee possessed 
strengths Morrison could not. Despite Morrison's attempts to isolate him from the party, in the 
end the leader defeated his rival by simply accepting the premiership without his knowledge. 
Holding the position of leader, Attlee wielded what amounted to a veto. He had employed it to 
great effect. 
Yet there was a postscript to this for, amazingly, Morrison still would not concede defeat. He 
made two last desperate, allempts to restart his challenge to Attlee at meetings of the PLP 
Executive and the PLP itself on 27 and 28 July respectively. 183 This was a miscalculation, for he 
179 Harris, Attlee, pp. 2634. 
180 Ibid. 
... Ibid. 
182 Adding insult to injury, Morrison was then forced to pose alongside Attlee and Bevin and smile for 
photographers. In the photograph, Bevin and Morrison stared at one another, while Attlee stuck out his 
chest. The photograph appears on the inside cover of J. T. Murphy, Labour's Big Three: A biographical 
study ofClement Attlee, Herbert Morrison andErnest Bevin (London, 1948). 
183 PLP Executive Committee minutes, 27 July 1945; PLP minutes, 28 July 1945. 
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made himself look nothing more than an ambitious adventurer, and the result was a further 
consolidation of Attlee's position. At the PLP Executive, Morrison again pressed that the Labour 
constitution required them to elect a leader, while Wilkinson had worked on some of the members 
prior to the meeting. 184 It was doubly duplicitous given that; beforehand, Morrison met with 
Attlee and asked to be Foreign Secretary. "' Attlee had avoided giving commitments, but did 
acquiesce to Morrison's request to be the 'number two' man in the party and government; Attlee 
'readily accepting' his being the unofficial deputy prime minister. 186 But the attempt backfired, 
and Morrison was rebuffed as the PLP Executive gave its unanimous backing to Attlee to form a 
ministry. ' 87 Before the PLP meeting on the 28th, Wilkinson, the last to give up, continued busily 
pressing Morrison's case - even though senior figures had already accepted the seals of office! '88 
But Bevin opened the meeting and brought the intrigues to an emphatic end with a stirring speech 
about Attlee's 'unimpeachable personal integrity' -a barb clearly directed at Morrison - and 
moved a vote of confidence in him, passed with an ovation lasting several minutes. 189 Morrison 
did not speak in support of itý despite his later claims that it was he who proposed Attlee as 
leader. 190 That those present knew of Morrison's activities, and gave Attlee such a public 
endorsement regardless, was highly symbolic. As his biographers observed, Morrison emerged 
from this last bid to stop Attlee with little credit, for his own agenda in pushing for a contest was 
painfully apparent. 191 Morrison's later protestation that 'the idea [of snatching the leadership] 
never entered my head' was a blatant fallacy. 192 
vi 
The combination of an election victory and the defeat of Morrison left Attlee in an unassailable 
position. From political weakness and limited influence during the 1930s, the war had 
transformed the Labour leader. No longer an uncertain or hesitating figure, once within sight of 
power in 1939 Attlee had displayed a remarkable ability to take Labour in the direction he wished 
and retain its backing at the crucial junctures. Traditional, and withering, criticism of Attlee for 
184 PLP Executive Committee minutes, 27 July 1945; Dalton Diary, 27 July 1945 (unpublished); Vernon, 
Wilkinson, p. 197. 183 Dalton, Memoirs, p. 474. 
186 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, 1/17, draft autobiography. 
187 Dalton Diary, 27 July 1945 (unpublished); PLP Executive Committee minutes, 27 July 1945. 
188 Wilkinson met new Labour MPs at a railway station and asked them to back a motion which would be 
moved at the PLP. She also harassed Surnmerskill in a ladies' toilet, and got into a row at the meeting itself 
with Leah Manning: 'He [Attlee]'s no good. We must have Herbert'. Vernon, Wilkinson, p. 197; 
Surnmerskill, Manning and Roben interviews, cited in Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 346. 
'89 PLP minutes, 28 July 1945; Ede Diary, 28 July 1945 (p. 228). 
'90 lbid; Morrison, Autobiography, p. 246. 
'9' Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 343. 
192 Morrison, Autobiography, p. 245. 
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his poor leadership between 1935 and 1939 and again between 1951 and 1955 is not without 
merit; but this period, as well as the six years of his own ministry, was a rather different story. 
Neutering all internal opposition, navigating a political course of severe difficulty, and securing 
Labour greater power than it had ever possessed - all the while engineering himself a central role 
in running the country, and defeating a much more prominent rival in Morrison - the war years 
had been the making of Clement Attlee. Very few political actors would have had the skill to do 
what he did between 1939 and 1945. Always an unfathomable figure to historians, the thesis 
hopes to have proposed a new way of perceiving the prime minister and understanding his 
character and leadership. 
Once in Downing Street, Attlee gave a final demonstration of his abilities in balancing, and 
reconciling, competing tensions and interests, this time in forming a government. He constructed 
what amounted to a web of influence, with himself at the centre, while the talents of others were 
put to full use. Attlee also captured all of his enemies and bound them to him, rendering them 
largely powerless to challenge him. It was almost the perfect way to form an administration. 
Attlee disregarded Morrison's request to go to the Foreign Office and made him Lord President of 
the Council instead, tasked with being an overlord on the domestic front and directing the 
implementation of Labour's programme. This offered a means to tie his adversary's fortunes 
irrevocably to those of the government. In such a prominent role, Morrison would have made a 
useful fall-guy if things went awry, as Attlee must surely have calculated (and he did with other 
trouble-causers). Attlee kept his rival even more closely associated with the ministry by 
appointing him Leader of the Commons as well - making Morrison effectively the government 
spokesman in the chamber. No longer would Morrison be able to place himself directly between 
Attlee and the Labour party; the prime minister had made him his right-hand man. While initially 
reluctant to be without a department, Morrison acquiesced. 193 
Aware that Bevin and Morrison would be unable to work together, Attlee also denied Bevin's 
hope of the Treasury, and appointed him as Foreign Secretary, partly in the belief that Bevin, a 
'tank' in the view of the prime minister, would prove better suited than anyone to dealing with the 
Russians. Likely of equal weight was that if Bevin was allowed to roam across the domestic arena 
he would surely only antagonise his Cabinet colleagues - most of whom, having suffered under 
him in the PLP since 1940, felt little affection for him. Entrusted with foreign affairs and removed 
from the jostling of domestic ministries, Bevin could still play his role as Attlee's enforcer, 
interfering where necessary. Therefore it was Dalton, who, like Morrison, had wanted the Foreign 
193 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, 1/17, draft autobiography; Dalton, Memoirs, p. 474. 
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Office, that went to the Exchequer. 194 The main intellectual force behind Labour's 1930s policy 
renaissance thus found himself presiding over the management of the government's resources for 
the implementation of policies he himself had played no small role in shaping. With these 
appointments, the distribution of senior Labour figures was complete. It was, moreover, an 
arrangement that best harnessed the individual capabilities of each of Attlee's colleagues: 
Morrison as administrator, Bevin as enforcer and tough negotiator, and Dalton as financial expert. 
Moreover, the framework represented a means to control the ministry, with the power bases of 
each - particularly Morrison - formidable, but limited. 
Constructing the rest of the government, Attlee displayed all his other gifts for party management. 
He brought within it all the key figures in the party, including his enemies, tying them to 
collective responsibility, and minimising their ability to attack the government. One of Attlee's 
more astute decisions was sending both Shinwell and Bevan to ministries with tasks widely 
expected to prove difficult, if not impossible. Attlee hinted at his tactic in his memoirs: 'There 
were two positions which would be of great importance in view of our legislative programme and 
of the urgency in the problems to be faced by their occupants - Fuel and Power and Health'. 
195 
Shinwell went to the former with orders to nationalise the mines and electricity, Attlee telling him 
196 this 'as if ordering a drink from a waiter'. Shinwell later admitted that 'if I'd know what it was 
197 
going to be like, I'd have asked for something easier'. He was a spent force, but it was better to 
control him with a 'reward' of this kind. Similarly, Bevan was sent to the Ministry of Health, with 
the equally thankless task of creating a National Health Service. A man of Bevan's personality 
could not seriously have been expected to stick at ajob which required the avoidance of 
emotional spasm. Moreover both, having hoped to replace Attlee, immediately dropped the idea 
and shifted to supporting the leader instead once he dangled the carrot of office in front of them. 
But Attlee clearly also regarded both jobs as convenient political graveyards. Wilkinson, 
Morrison's most fervent supporter and who continued to press his case even when he himself had 
given up, was made Minister of Education, a job likely to prove similarly problematic in an 
atmosphere of post-war dislocation and shortages. Cripps, having returned to the party and 
immediately supported a challenge to the leader, was given the Board of Trade. The only person 
that there was nothing for was Attlee's most despised enemy. Laski immediately approached the 
prime minister about becoming ambassador in Washington; but Attlee never even acknowledged 
194 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 5. 
195 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 178. 
196 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 154; Shinwell's notes on 1945, in the possession of Alan Shinwell, cited 
Slowe, Shinwell, p. 206 & p. 203. 197 Ibid. 
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the request. 198 Morrison later tried to get his old ally a peerage, but the prime minister steadfastly 
refused. '99 
Attlee had little choice but to include Greenwood, who became Lord Privy Seal, and was tasked 
with assisting Morrison with general co-ordination. But he was as ineffective in office this time as 
he had been under Churchill. What was a happy culmination to a fluctuating war thus quickly 
turned into another downward spiral, and, in 1947, Attlee sacked him from the government. 
However, Attlee again harnessed Pethick-Lawrence successfully, as he climbed to high office by 
being appointed Secretary of State for India. To be given the role of Secretary of State for 
Britain's most prized imperial asset at such an obviously critical point underlines how he had 
distinguished himself in carrying out his wartimejob. The solidly dependable Pethick-Lawrence 
had been an asset to his leaders, and his place in the party and government hierarchy was secure. 
He was given a peerage and moved to the Lords, and spent the next three years working closely 
with Attlee and Cripps on the sub-continent before retiring following Indian independence. 
Unlike Greenwood, Pethick-Lawrence's war had been a success. 
Further down the pyramid, Alexander remained at the Admiralty, a ministry he had proven 
efficient in administering over five years. He later moved to Defence. Whiteley became 
government Chief Whip, having served dually with Margesson in that capacity since 1940, and 
been constantly attentive to keeping the PLP loyal. Ede, his administrative skills at Education 
having endeared him to Attlee, went to the Home Office for six years, the longest tenure of the 
century. Like a few others - Pethick-Lawrence and Alexander, most notably - Ede played an 
important role in keeping government business running, while Attlee and the senior figures 
concentrated on carrying out the central objectives of reconstruction and reform. They were all 
regarded as a safe pair of hands. Even the minor players in Labour's war, then - or at least those 
who had played the game in the right way - were rewarded. Griffiths, in contrast, was someone 
who had not played the game in the right way. Despite being popular in the PLP and a favourite 
of the local parties, his withering criticisms during the war had not endeared him to his leaders. 
Harassing them for six years, unlike other rebels, Griffiths would pay a price. His views and 
symbolic protests, emanating from a man naturally loyalist by temperament, were representative 
of the wartime views of much of the party, and hence something that the Labour ministers had 
always had to take account of. But his constituency was also the natural base of his leaders. Once 
they were out of the Coalition, the tension between them and the backbone of their support was 
198 Hull, Laski papers, Laski to Attlee, 2 August 1945; Kramnick and Sheerman, Laski, p. 491. '99 Morrison later wrote of this incident that 'Attlee could be a big man ... but he could be a little man too' - Morrison, A utobiography, p. 238. 
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gone, and they could draw on that constituency as readily as ever. Unlike other wartime 
dissidents, in 1945 the leadership group did not need to conciliate Griffiths, and no useful purpose 
would have been served in doing so. He was thus made Minister of National Insurance, ajob 
without a seat in Cabinet. More so than the posts given to other rebels, given Griffiths' popularity, 
it is difficult not to see this as a punishment. 
In creating his ministry, therefore, Attlee displayed a sound grasp of where the talents of 
particular individuals could be put to use. Sending Bevin to the Foreign Office and having 
Morrison as a domestic overseer, particularly, proved to be masterstrokes. But he also ensured 
that those who might be inclined to threaten the new equilibrium were tied to him. Collective 
responsibility and the lure of office - from which they could always be ejected - was the best 
guarantee of extracting good behaviour. Once in office, these individuals immediately ceased 
plotting against Attlee. 200 Namier remarked of the eighteenth century that whoever held the 
cattractive power' of office invariably received an accession of followers eager to receive 
favour. 20 1 The same could be said of the prime minister in his construction of a new order in 
1945. With his alliance with Bevin firm, the party bound to him, and Morrison's power play 
defeated, the position of Attlee at the apex of the Labour pyramid was secure. He 'reigned 
without challenge', as Dalton put it. 202 After six years of walking a tightrope, the leader was now 
free to drive a government of his own. 
It is perhaps Shinwell, of all people, who offers the most fitting conclusion to this story. After a 
similarly unsuccessful attempt to replace the prime minister two years later, he recalled that 'Not 
long afterwards a number of the plotters were given jobs in the government by Attlee. I 
mentioned this to him one day. Attlee laughed. He was perfectly aware of what had been going 
on. It is not bad tactics to make one's enemies one's servants'. 203 
Whether Shinwell grasped the irony of this seems unlikely. 
VIII 
Even the collapse of the two key pillars of the internal order that Attlee had imposed in 193940 - 
the alliance between the leadership group into a bloc at the head of the party, and the structures of 
200 Vernon, Wilkinson, p. 197; Robens, Summerskill and Manning interviews, cited Donoughue and Jones, 
Morrison, p. 346. 
201 Sir Lewis Narnier, England in the Age ofthe American Revolution (second edition) (London, 1966), 
P622 4 2. 
Hugh Dalton, High Tide andAffer. Memoirs, 1945-1960 (London, 1962), p. 237. 
203 Shinwell, Conflict Without Malice, p. 134. 
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authority that they built to control their followers - in the last fifteen months of the war did not 
preclude the eventual triumph of the line which he had held to since the beginning of the events 
examined here. The final year of the war demonstrates better than any other the totality of 
leadership control over the party, and the extent to which Labour was run in a 'top-down' 
manner. The events of 1944-5 underline the fact that the leadership group could seek to take the 
party in whichever direction they chose - and they did. Tactical options were there to be created, 
chosen, and employed. Critical in maintaining the ascendancy of their strategy was that, in a 
structural sense, at the end of the war, Attlee and the other leaders were still the sole powerful 
occupants of that bridge which connected the separate sections of the Labour movement, as well 
as high off ice, together. Though Shinwell had long straddled different parts of the party, as now 
did Bevan, only the leadership group had consistently shown the ability to actually drive events 
across the structure, or link to the government. As a result, their authority had held. The 
circumstances of coalition had led Attlee to construct Labour's wartime balance of power in this 
way in 1940, and he and his colleagues remained in that position at the end of the war. 
Controlling the structure in this fashion enabled them to largely contain internal opposition, and 
restrict its ability to stretch across the entire institutional apparatus and into the different sections 
of the movement, preventing any individuals from posing a challenge to their overall position, 
simply a localised one. Thus, for example, Laski's antics on the NEC in the middle stages of the 
war did not threaten the leaders' control of the PLP; Shinwell lacked the authority in either arena 
to do more than pursue personal vendettas; and Bevan was only able to straddle the movement as 
a whole at the very end of the war, and was an 'outsider' for most of it. Despite serious crises, 
then, the internal order was preserved though five years of separation. Hence, the real threat to the 
path chosen by the leadership group was instead diffuse - the general disaffection which 
pervaded the party. While widespread and exploited by others for their own ends, this disaffection 
had, through the various tactics of Attlee and the others, ultimately proven sustainable. 
The period described in the current chapter had seen the culmination of the struggles which had 
driven Labour party politics for six years. Events came to be focused almost exclusively upon the 
decisive stage of the conflict between the leader and his challenger. The revisionist Morrison and 
the status quo Attlee waged an intense competition which dominated politics at the top of the 
party during the final year of the war. The period from mid 1944 until mid 1945 was essentially a 
year-long battle for the leadership itself. As we have seen, virtually everything became attached, 
and subordinated, to the conflict between Labour's two senior politicians. The fracture of the 
leadership group into two camps fundamentally altered the nature of relationships at the upper 
echelons of the party, as co-operation ended and the fagade of agreement dissolved into open 
rivalry. The long-running questions of whether to continue the Coalition and the position of the 
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Labour ministers within the government all became pawns in that competition. Ideology played 
little part in this conflict; fought between two temperamentally similar actors, it was driven by 
clashing self-interest, opportunism, and the naked pursuit of power. It was a contest in which both 
protagonists struggled for the credit to be won from undertaking a particular course of action, all 
the while pursuing their own agenda. It was a complex balancing-act, and one which produced an 
urgent and intense conclusion to the struggle. The pendulum in the conflict swung both ways over 
the period, from Attlee's early undermining of a weakened Morrison, to the Home Secretary's 
stunning resurgence after his defection from the leadership's collective position, and then Attlee's 
final victory in July 1945. If Morrison himself had not been destroyed by the events of that month 
- and he certainly had not - then his ambitions had been. Never again, moreover, was he to enjoy 
the influence that he wielded in the first half of 1945. Even more remarkable than the expansion 
of Morrison's power, though, was Attlee's eventual success. Even a rival at the height his powers, 
driving the party largely single-handed, had proven unable to dislodge the canny Labour leader. 
Possessing a landslide majority and ensconced independently in office, the party's situation at the 
end of the war was testimony to the skill with which Attlee, above all others, had directed Labour 
between 1939 and 1945. It was a direct result of his genius for party management. Labour's 
political credibility had increased exponentially, and its senior figures demonstrated themselves 
capable in guiding the nation's affairs. Far from being an anonymous leader, Labour's position 
was in fact a product of the authority of Attlee. Every bit as much as for Churchill, then, the 
Second World War had been Attlee's war. 
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Conclusion 
It is certainly the case that, while scholars have always acknowledged that the Labour party 
gained valuable experience during the Second World War, and that the period was crucial in 
shaping Labour's fortunes and capacity for government, previous historiography has tended to 
concentrate primarily upon issues of policy. Comparatively little attention has been paid to issues 
of leadership relations and personal conflict at the top of the party. As the thesis has 
demonstrated, this is an important subject, and one which must be examined if the full 
significance of Labour's wartime experience is to be assimilated. This period, 1939 to 1945, 
represented the key formative years for the Labour party's development and consolidation it into 
something it had never been before, and would not be again for almost half a century: a genuine 
party of government. 
At the end of the war, the Labour party's political position had been transformed beyond 
recognition. Central to this was the leadership of Attlee. It was his strategy, determination to 
direct his followers as he saw fit, and desire to keep as many options open as possible, that 
determined the party's trajectory during six years of crisis. The thesis has conducted what 
amounts to an analysis of the 'making' of Attlee, that most impenetrable of politicians. Far from 
being a conventional biography, it has instead sought to fully integrate Attlee within the context 
of his environment. This has enabled the construction of a case study of his leadership, and 
considerati6n of its nature. Attlee has always been a puzzling figure, but more recent literature, by 
Beckett and John Swift, has seen him as a skilled leader. Perhaps the best grasp of Attlee, 
however, was offered by James Margach. 1 His analysis of the Labour leader's personality is 
worth drawing on at length. Far from being a weak figure, Margach has described the 'cold' 
Attlee as being 'as ruthless as a butcher' with 'extraordinary bloody mindedness', determined to 
2 
establish his own position and preserve it against rivals. He saw in the leader 'a streak of cruelty 
and cynicism', even 'callous indifference' and 'heartlessness', which enabled him to dominate the 
3 
party and outmanoeuvre his enemies. Far from lacking ambition, Attlee 'captured the leadership 
when no-one was looking' and then retained it through cool calculation, deliberate measures, and 
careful manoeuvre for two decades. 4 'In the elusive art of managing men ... Attlee was 
1 James Margach, The Anatomy ofPower: An enquiry into the personality of leadership (London, 1979). 
2 Margach, Anatomy of Power, pp. 4,11. 
3 Margach, Anatomy ofPower, pp. 11,25. 
4 Margach, Anatomy ofPower, p. 4. 
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outstanding'. 5 Adept in the 'base techniques of cunning [and] calculation', he became the 'most 
unfeeling' of prime ministers, and is quoted by Margach as publicly expressing the view that 
'ruthlessness' was the most important attribute for the successful politician. 6 The current author 
has attempted to show how these qualities operated in practice. Observing Attlee in action at a 
crucial moment of the party's history, and in the period preceding his own ministry of 1945 to 
195 1, the current work has offered an examination of how a figure who had thus far been a 
largely unimpressive leader became so successful. 
What was Attlee's own conception of leadership? He certainly lacked much in the way of a 
public personality. Even when he was prime minister, other members of the government were far 
more prominent than him. If we are to understand his leadership, we must therefore consider 
other factors. As the thesis has demonstrated, this man who engendered so much dissatisfaction, 
who often gave an impression of appearing ineffective, and for many years was widely seen as a 
stop-gap leader, in fact retained a strange ascendancy over his party. Even during 1935 to 1939 
and again from 1951 to 1955, he survived frequent dissatisfaction and heavy criticism. Though he 
often appeared vulnerable, Attlee defeated or outmanoeuvred the most prominent politicians of 
his day. There is clearly, therefore, something about the precise nature of his leadership - how 
best to conceive of it - which must be grasped. It may be seen that Attlee's conception of 
leadership was, in fact, 'non-leadership', but that is too simplistic. Temperamentally inclined to 
appear - and be - passive, and preferring where possible to guide rather than dictate, we must not 
lose sight of the fact that Attlee still essentially made whatever decisions he pleased, and then put 
them into effect. He favoured a consensual style, but was quite capable of ruthlessness and being 
decisive when he saw fit. 
Before offering a final assessment of Attlee's leadership, it is perhaps worth pointing out that this 
question, of the nature of political leadership and the way different actors operate, offers fertile 
ground for fresh historiographical enquiry. The best study of this type, of course, is Williamson's 
analysis of the leadership of Stanley Baldwin, and his consideration of the nature of leadership, 
and its impact, is worth drawing on at length. 7 As he wrote of Baldwin, the key questions to 
consider are: 
What gave Baldwin his dominance? What were the sources of his power, and how did he exercise it? What 
kind of politician was he, and what constituted his 'leadership'? Political leadership is not a single, 
undifferentiated, activity, conducted by all its practitioners in the same manner. If its essence is the 
' Margach, Anatomy of Power, p. 14. 
6 Margach, Anatomy of Power, p. 25. 
7 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, especially the introduction and chapters two and five. 
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acquisition and retention of sufficient authority to command support or acquiescence, its performance is 
nevertheless a complicated matter. Support or acquiescence may derive from several sources, each with its 
own demands - Cabinet or shadow Cabinet, Parliament, party organisation, or wider public groups. The 
materials are correspondingly various: policy, legislation, or administration; strategy or tactics; 
parliamentary opinion, party management, the media, sectional interests, or public attitudes. ... If an 
individual leader is to be properly understood, the specific qualities of his leadership must be identified. 8 
Sustained attention to the problem of the nature of leadership would be rewarding. Because each 
possible study would be as distinctive from the others as their subjects, if more scholars were to 
think seriously about the way in which politicians operate in their leadership roles, incisive work 
could be undertaken. Unlike Baldwin, the example cited above, traditional charges against Attlee 
- that he was, in many respects, largely anonymous - are not without merit. Attlee, again unlike 
Baldwin, was certainly not a 'political teacher' or 'public moralist'. 9 But he did possess unusual 
talent. As above, then, we must look elsewhere: to his abilities of management, efficiency, and 
guidance of committees and bureaucracies'. It was here that Attlee excelled in projecting himself, 
and it is here that the key qualities of his leadership can be identified. The thesis has been 
concerned primarily with describing Labour party politics and factionalism during the Second 
World War, rather than exclusively concerned with the question of the nature of leadership. But it 
does hope to have suggested the way in which we should seek to understand Attlee as a politician, 
and demonstrated his management of his own party. Whatever other judgements we might make 
on his wartime career, Attlee had demonstrated tenacity and a capacity for steeliness. He was 
plainly determined to control the Labour party, and, when he did let it off its leash, it was 
intended primarily as a device to frighten his Coalition partners. Attlee possessed a deep and 
strong conception of personal duty, something which manifested itself in his resolve that the party 
must serve the country, and willingness to disregard its immediate complaints. This had been at 
the centre of his wartime leadership, and was an approach, and mindset, quite different from that 
of his first four years as leader, when he had been seemingly content to let his party lead him, 
rather than the other way around. 
Attlee should therefore perhaps be understood in the following way: as someone who was a poor 
leader from 1935 to 1939, and a virtual non-entity from 1951 to 1955, but who was uniquely 
suited to the work he found himself faced with from 1939 to 195 1. As Leader of the Opposition in 
conventional circumstances, when it was necessary to set out a vision for the party and country, 
Attlee was singularly ineffective. He lacked the charisma or dynamism to offer much in the way 
of vision, and was unable to motivate his followers or really lead them anywhere. He was always 
'Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, p. 61. 
9 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, p. 1 55. 
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an anonymous figure, poorly understood by contemporaries, let alone historians. But when faced 
with a specific task to master, with the need for careful positioning and patience, and when within 
reach of power, Attlee was in his element. This had been the case since his time in local 
government in East London. Few were better at working institutional levers and attaining their 
objectives by stealth. Similarly few were more adept in the black arts of manoeuvre. Many of the 
most guileful political actors are of the Disraelian or Wilsonian mould. But there is another kind 
as well - the behind-the-scenes manipulator and worker of committees. The former could go to a 
hostile meeting and, through a combination of dazzling boldness and craftiness, come up with a 
formula which enabled them to buy the support of different sections of the audience and win the 
day. The other type of actor would already know before the meeting how it would vote, having 
built a majority for his positions long before. Attlee was of the latter variety. We should therefore 
identify two distinct phases to Attlee's leadership: one to which he was temperamentally ill- 
suited, and one in which his quiet abilities in manoeuvre and administration made him the ideal 
figure. 
From the beginning - coaching Greenwood from his North Wales sickbed during the summer of 
1939, deciding on his own authority that Labour would enter the government - and then 
throughout the Coalition - resisting the demands of his followers, and finally attempting to 
prolong the lifetime of the cross-party alliance - Attlee displayed little willingness to submit to 
the dictates of others, and instead fought to hold control of decision-making in his own hands and 
retain freedom of action. Through this means, the leader was ruthless in ensuring that others 
would be unable to take the party on a different course. Successfully imposing himself on his 
followers, Attlee established the primacy of his own authority and forced the Labour party down 
his chosen path. Only once, in his bid to continue the Coalition in May 1945, was his decision- 
making defeated. Given the tensions his strategy engendered, Attlee's high-stakes juggling act 
over six years must bejudged a remarkable political feat. 
In May 1945, with his policy position on the Coalition destroyed by Morrison, it seemed probable 
that Attlee would fall and be replaced by his rival. But, in the event, the Labour party was not 
sentenced to Opposition once more, and Attlee seized the opportunity to defeat Morrison by 
simply refusing to even give his opponent an opening. Their rivalry had been ever present during 
the period, even if it had sometimes retreated into the background, and it dominated the final 
phase of the war. Morrison possessed strengths of personality that Attlee never could, but in the 
end, no matter how capable or 'legitimate' the heir apparent, the leader successfully saw off his 
opponent. Despite having been dangerously isolated by Morrison over the Coalition, he quickly 
changed position, his 'little man' persona facilitating a retreat that a more adversarial politician 
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could never have pulled off. In July, he then became prime minister before the heir apparent 
could mount a challenge. Attlee later recalled that 'There was some little difficulty with Morrison 
who had some idea that he ought to be prime minister ... The idea was fantastic and certainly out 
of harmony with the feeling of the party'. 'O 'Little difficulty' was correct; in July 1945, Attlee 
secured a remarkably easy victory over Morrison. It was a moment of triumph and a fitting end to 
his wartime leadership. Securely in charge of his party, and prime minister with a huge majority, 
the strategy that Attlee plotted in 1939 had paid off handsomely: not only during the war itself, 
but in steering Labour towards its first successful ministry as well. 
In contrast, the Labour party's great dynamic force, Morrison, failed to seize that which he most 
desired. Morrison is often portrayed in historical writing as the near farcical 'villain' of Labour 
politics, the constant schemer who never quite became leader. He is also depicted as bumbling 
and clumsy. Yet this is unfair, and clearly informed by hindsight - we know that he never became 
leader, and so he is a convenient adversary figure. Morrison in fact possessed energy and flair 
matched by very few, and prevailing perceptions of him overlook just how capable a politician he 
really was: to suffer so many defeats, reversals, and set-backs between the 1930s and the 1950s, 
and yet to remain at the top, and the assumed leader-in-waiting for two decades, is - or should be 
- instructive. Almost all politicians would have faded away, fatally damaged, after just a handful 
of the blows Morrison suffered. Yet his position never collapsed, and he remained at the pinnacle 
of politics for twenty years. That he never became leader should not prevent recognition of the 
fact that, as a politician, he was every bit the equal of his rival Attlee. 
Morrison's wartime rise to a prominence, via his stewardship of the Home Office, was matched 
only by Bevin and Churchill. He possessed an effortless air of authority, and hugely strengthened 
his position in 1944 to 1945 as he repeatedly outmanoeuvred Attlee in a demonstration of his 
claim to the leadership. Morrison engineered the destruction of the Coalition, depicted himself as 
Labour's champion, and was the architect of the party's entire general election effort. From the 
beginning, Morrison had exploited the fact that Attlee's position required him to hold the line; 
hence, while the Home Secretary was more draconian towards dissent than anyone, when it suited 
his purposes he was willing to adopt positions which would undercut Attlee. Carefully 
positioning himself in the political and rhetorical space between Attlee and the Labour party, 
Morrison spent six years building his strength, taking any opportunities to weaken his opponent, 
and awaiting an opportunity to strike. Morrison did at first sight appear to be the party's natural 
leader. But, in the end, that counted for little against an entrenched institutional manipulator like 
Attlee. The incumbent displayed a better awareness of the location of power in the party. Thus, 
10 Churchill College, Cambridge, Attlee papers, 1/17, draft autobiography. 
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while Morrison was more publicly prominent and popular than Attlee, this in itself was no route 
to the top. Attlee had three central advantages over Morrison - he was backed by the bulk of the 
union MPs, was the incumbent where Morrison was the challenger, and the division of the 
leadership group into rival camps in 1944 occurred firmly in his favour. Morrison was in a camp 
of one, and simply outnumbered. Whereas Attlee had most senior figures supporting him (albeit 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm), Morrison's most prominent ally was Laski, who was not 
even an MP. Other senior figures did not come out in his favour. His biggest supporter among 
MPs was Wilkinson, but she was a minor politician and much too emotional about him. The 
support that Morrison possessed thus posed little threat to the formidable base of Attlee. But, 
regardless of this, and the failure of Morrison's primary objectives, his wartime career as a 
minister had been a resounding success, and his position as overlord in the new government 
reflected his abilities and central importance. No-one was better suited to co-ordinating the 
government and attempting to put into effect its programme. Despite having just sought to 
dislodge the prime minister, Morrison was in that respect virtually untouchable. 
It must be suggested, then, that it would have been better for the challenger to Attlee's position if 
Labour had lost the 1945 election. With victory in the bag, it would be difficult in any 
circumstances to dislodge a newly-appointed prime minister. But if Labour had lost the election, 
things could have proven quite different. A defeated party may well have been receptive to 
Morrison and reticent to support a leader whom few felt they ever understood. Given the 
trajectory of their conflict over the preceding months - with momentum clearly in Morrison's 
favour - another election defeat would have presented the ideal opportunity to replace Attlee. 
Moreover, as the new leader Morrison would likely have been able to tack back towards his 
original position, and persuade the party to reform the Coalition after all - the option he had 
craftily established prior to his sabotage of the government in May 1945 - with 'trade union 
common sense', as Dalton noted during the phoney war, recognising that office was preferable to 
Opposition. As it was, the election victory, and the security it afforded Attlee, was instantly 
exploited to scupper Morrison's chances. Moreover, Attlee's recognition of Morrison as the 
'number two' was so vague as to commit him to nothing specific. Morrison had supplanted 
Greenwood as Attlee's deputy. But that was as far as it went. 
11 
Attlee and Morrison had been the central figures in defining Labour's war, and it had been their 
rivalry and co-operation that had determined much of the events described here. But Labour's 
wartime politics were about more than just these two men. A wide array of individuals had all 
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played significant roles. More than anything else - ideas, philosophical clashes, sociological and 
economic change - the period was therefore shaped by people. Any conclusions must thus be 
predicated on reiteration of the centrality of power-political struggle and sheer ambition. Events, 
and the sequence of these events, make clear that the struggles between prominent figures were 
plainly those of personal conflict, not ideology. Bevan's rise, Morrison's scheming but parallel 
intolerance of dissent, Attlee's canny leadership, Bevin's petulance and authoritarianism, 
Greenwood's resurgence, Laski's increasing impotence, and Dalton's disinterest in sectional 
concerns and immersion in office, to name merely some of the most significant shaping forces: in 
a cumulative sense, these politicians give form to a distinctive story about Labour during the war; 
but as individuals, they also tell very different stories: about what they perceived their interests to 
be, their personal rivalries, and individual manipulation - for many different ends - of a highly 
unusual political situation. The structure of wartime politics provided a framework for Attlee and 
the other leaders to fulfil their ambitions and exercise power in the arena they were instinctively 
at home - government. The goals pursued by these individuals, and the conflicts they entered 
into, represented the core of the Labour party's wartime evolution. 
As far as the leadership group themselves were concerned, united by a shared conception of the 
importance of office and determination to keep their followers subordinate, the differences 
between them were purely personal, not ideological or even, for the most part, political. But while 
many of their enemies held different ideological views, nonetheless even their concern had been 
with self-advancement and the pursuit of vendettas, constantly orienting themselves around the 
party itself, and seeking power in that context, in contrast to the leadership's rather different 
horizons. Those within the political system, at its apex - the leadership group - were animated by 
an attempt to play that system and maintain the status quo. Those outside it were intent on forcing 
their way within it. The situational and ideological differences between the dissentients and the 
Labour ministers should not obscure recognition of the fact that they were in reality playing rather 
different games. The notion of temperament - used by Lewis Namier to identify different 
conceptions of advancement, self-interest, and power-seeking behaviour - may be a valuable tool 
for understanding Labour politics. " But the most difficult opponents of the Labour ministers as 
the war progressed turned out to in fact be their ideological and political bedfellows. The gulf 
between them, and the conflict which threatened Attlee's balancing-act, was marked more by 
disaffection and restlessness than genuine divergence over policy. 
11 Though one must be very careful not to tie Namier and Cowling together, nonetheless the similar 
interpretations of politics advanced by both are useful to any attempt to rethink Labour politics in this 
direction. Cowling conceded that Namier's 'historical manner and interests contributed so much ... that it is difficult to be sure where his influence has been operative'- Maurice Cowling, Religion andPublic 
Doctrine in Modern England vohime III. Accommodations (Cambridge, 2001), p. 646. 
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The 'second division' of figures had also been of great significance in Labour politics during the 
war. Men such as Greenwood, Lees-Smith, and Pethick-Lawrence provided the allies that the 
Labour ministers so needed. It was once remarked of Thatcher that every leader 'needs their 
Willie', and, in a sense, the same held true here. Without the support of those able to manage the 
party and maintain its support, Attlee and other senior figures would have been in real trouble. 
But the 'second division' was important in other ways as well: the war served the purpose of 
weeding out the ineffective and highlighting the incapable, both within and outside the 
government. Some politicians had risen, others had fallen. For example, by 1945 Greenwood and 
Shinwell were marginalised, while, in contrast, Bevan was someone who could no longer be 
ignored. The hierarchy which prevailed at the end of the war was rather different from that which 
might have been expected in 1939. The war thus provided a crucial testing ground. This group of 
figures, particularly the loyalists, also permits a wider point to be made, again about Attlee: his 
tactic of employing the abilities of virtually everyone around him, even his enemies. This was 
more than simply binding them to him; it reflected a willingness to recognise the talents of others 
- even if he was prepared to simultaneously put the screws to them in other ways. 
The thesis has attempted to assemble a concerted study of party management, manoeuvre, and the 
calculated and instrumental usage of rhetoric. Attlee had been the embodiment of this, balancing 
tensions, striking poses intended to impart different things to different audiences, and all the 
while pursuing his own goals. But the other key figures within the party had joined in this game 
as well - and 'game' it was. The leadership's concentration on using policy statements, speeches, 
literature, and legislative measures as a means to mollify their followers underline not only their 
close attention to the problem of party management but also, perhaps, offers a glimpse into what 
politics is really like, leaders suddenly deciding they had better produce new initiatives to keep 
their followers happy while concentrating on their own objectives. The Labour ministers also 
articulated a docfrine of 'responsible' conduct as a means to ensure that the Labour party 
remained subordinate to their own choices, applying it in various forms from 'constructive 
Opposition' to the electoral truce, the Churchill Coalition to the by-election 'coupon', the need 
for patience to implied threats of the risks of electoral annihilation. The willingness of the Labour 
leaders to continue the Coalition also shows that the mood of wartime radicalisation of politics 
was perhaps less significant than is commonly thought. To assume otherwise is to conftise the 
sociological with the political, or to be hoodwinked by historical mythologies. Attlee's wartime 
doctrine had been sufficiently persuasive to his followers - even if most of the party did not like 
its prescriptions - to keep them in check and permit the Labour ministers to concern themselves 
with the opportunities of office. Henry Kissinger once remarked that 'the real distinction is 
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between those who adapt their purposes to reality and those who seek to mold reality in the light 
of their purposes', and the Labour ministers had achieved this with a virtuoso performance of 
political leadership. 12 Michael Bentley has commented that 'doctrine can be understand both as an 
intellectual domain and as a mechanism whose function consists less in complementing thought 
than in obviating it'. 13 
The doctrine shaped a commonly-held set of assumptions in the political world about 'what to do' 
given the emergency facing the country which was persuasive, powerful, and difficult to dissent 
from (not least because it was actually trite) and thus sustained a distinct political language and 
framework for wartime politics. It is perhaps worth pointing out that Churchill did something 
broadly similar with his own party, to sideline his Conservative opponents. The leading political 
actors from all parties thus sought a strategy, rooted in the language of national 'crisis', which 
enabled them to 'get on with thejob' and cluster into their hands a huge amount of power. But 
nowhere was this more effectively conceived and employed than by Attlee within the Labour 
party. Central to this was their willingness to use rhetoric, in many different forms. Rhetoric is, as 
Bentley argued, an 'intellectual art-form' taking on numerous manifestations - policy initiatives 
or appeals for support through manifestos, broadcasts, articles, and formal speeches. 14 Other 
forms include shaping policy options, and restricting what is politically possible in order to 
advance a particular agenda - which the Labour ministers' dominance of government committees 
left them particularly well suited to. There is certainly a distinction between different types of 
rhetoric. One is just that, rhetorical: perhaps not strongly believed even by those who utter it, and 
utilised purely for purposes of manipulation. The other is thematic, and agenda-based, and is 
more substantive. It is projected in order to attain a specific goal. 'Rhetoric' therefore 
encompasses shaping the political environment in two rather different ways. The two can sit 
comfortably alongside one another, but they are distinct. Both had been present here. This careful 
and deliberate reliance on rhetoric provided critical ballast for the leadership group during the 
war. 
That Labour politics was driven by, on the one hand, intense personal conflict, and, on the other, 
the leadership group's struggle to maximise their power relative to the wider political nation, 
would again suggest the merits of the 'high political' approach in assisting interpretation of this 
period. Though at first sight it may appear that internal politics during the war was dominated by 
" This is one of Kissinger's best known maxims, but the original source is unclear. It can, however, be 
found online at http: //%vww. guotationspage. com/guote/3095. html accessed 9 August 2007. 
" Michael Bentley, 'Party, Doctrine and Thought', in Bentley and John Stevenson (eds. ), High and Low 
Politics in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1983), p. 143. 
14 Bentley, 'Party, Doctrine and Thought', in Bentley and Stevenson (eds. ), High and Low Politics, p. 137. 
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ideological conflict, as the moderation of the leaders clashed with the socialist demands of their 
followers, the thesis has demonstrated that this was in fact not the case. It was this environment in 
which the leadership of Attlee flourished. Moreover, while political circumstances were 
undoubtedly restrictive, nonetheless the thesis' concentration upon this very narrowness has 
actually permitted construction of a focused analysis of how politicians behaved. Though there 
remains the problem, as posed at the outset of the thesis, of the decline of personal papers and 
correspondence which took hold from c. 1940, as politicians saw each other more regularly or 
simply picked up the telephone (and which impacted upon many of the politicians considered 
here), nonetheless this can, and should, be folded into a wider question: can we still 'do' high 
level political history for the period after c. 1940? 
The thesis hopes to have suggested that, whilst much rich information will inevitably be lost 
where papers and correspondence are less voluminous, if different types of sources - for example, 
official records - are available, then enough information can still be gleaned to permit an 
examination of the outlines, and trajectory, of political action. This sort of analysis can therefore 
be attempted even where the decline of correspondence is a serious problem. We can build up a 
picture of the things politicians do and say, as well as the contradictions between these things, 
and, by tracing their activities and their private intentions where we can discover them, map out 
their behaviour and the objectives which animated them. Or, as Jonathan Clark has put it, 'the 
discernment of agency by the narrative of political action'. 15 To conclude otherwise would be a 
rather depressing conclusion. The thesis also serves to suggest the merits of 'high politics' to 
Labour history as a whole, which is usually dominated by ideological or sociological 
explanations. Cowling observed that 'even' Labour politics 'have to be understood as a matter of 
ambition, manoeuvre and situation'. 16 Given the manner in which Labour party history has 
always been written, the historiographical implications ofthis position are considerable. As 
Kenneth Morgan has noted, it is a part of Labour 'tradition' and 'mythology' 'that it has always 
been a different kind of party, a crusade, born anew in the working-class struggles of the late 
17 Victorian era'. This is key to the party's identity, just as is the underlying Conservative doctrine 
of resistance to certain social changes and the maintenance of economic inequality. But whether 
this provides a useful map to the history of Labour party politics is, frankly, open to doubt. 
III 
15 J. C. D. Clark, English society, 1660-1832: Religion, identity andpolifics during the ancien regime 
(Cambridge, second edition, 2001), p. 2. 
16 Cowling, Religion and Public Doctrine, volzime III, p. 53 9. 
17 Kenneth Morgan, 'The High and Low Politics of Labour: Keir Hardie to Michael Foot' in Bentley and 
Stevenson (eds. ), High and Low Politics, p. 287. 
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As we have seen, Attlee's leadership was consistently impressive, and at times commanding. 
Often it left many of his followers exasperated, but this was because, trapped in a strange 
netherworld between party and office, the bulk of the Labour party had little to do but dream of 
the future. They would have eagerly supported the Beveridge report and other programmes for 
social reform anyway, but simple boredom meant that they seized on such episodes with an 
excitement that inflamed the issues to the point of combustion. 18 But the course chosen by the 
leaders, building Labour's credibility, experiencing office, and extensive leverage and influence 
within the administration, erased the damage done by 1931 and re-established the party as a 
vehicle capable of winning elections. However different in personality, all four of the leadership 
group were born administrators and expert workers of a bureaucratic machine. This was critical in 
their success and enjoying so much influence. Few Conservatives could match them, and never 
before had Labour wielded such power and influence as here. It is certainly true that the internal 
criticism of the ministers was unfair: they wielded authority within the government, dominated 
the home front through control of key portfolios, and of the five War Cabinet members who were 
to all intents and purposes irremovable, three - Attlee, Bevin and Morrison - were Labour 
politicians. Only two - Churchill and Eden - were Conservatives. The Labour party could hardly 
be said to have a bad deal from the prime minister. The Coalition was a genuine Ministry of 
Talents, or something approaching it, and was 'above' party at its upper echelons, a remarkable 
feat given the continued prevalence of partisan feeling. At the end of the war, virtually all the 
leading politicians in the country, both Labour and Conservative, wanted to continue the 
Coalition rather than return to traditional party politics. Moreover, the Labour ministers were well 
respected by their colleagues, and Churchill was sympathetic to their internal difficulties. 19 The 
charge that Attlee secured a bad deal from the Conservatives in 1940, or that the Labour ministers 
represented the party ineffectively, cannot be sustained. 
Sometimes cautiously, sometimes coercively, at times sincerely and at others duplicitously, the 
Big Four's collective direction of the Labour party between 1939 and 1945 was an almost 
unqualified success. The Labour ministers established themselves as credible statesmen, and were 
18 Of course, that the internal schisms which occurred when the bulk of the Labour party failed to discern 
that, while the government refrained from using socialist language, much of what it was doing was in fact 
socialist, paradoxically demonstrates once again the overriding role of rhetoric in politics: without it, the 
Labour party could not grasp the substance of what was really happening! Divorcing these two concepts in 
understanding political leadership is impossible. 
19 For example, when Dalton and Attlee had been confronted with intense Conservative opposition to their 
requisitioning plans for the coal mines, Churchill - who, of course, had little instinctive feeling for the 
Conservative party anyway - sided with the Labour ministers. He warned Attlee 'Don't let them [the 
Conservatives] all form up on you', and offered to assist by broadcasting to the nation on the need for coal 
economy in order to force Conservative compliance - Harris, Attlee, p. 200. 
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now at the head of a reinvigorated party and a strong government. Attlee and the other leaders 
largely achieved the goals they had set out with in 1940: enhancement of their own standing, 
preservation of their authority, experience of governing and advancement of a Labour agenda. 
But the strategy was always about more than the immediate interests of themselves and the 
Labour party; it was also about long-term success. Refusing to serve in the country's hour of need 
would have been political suicide, but, due to their exertions, Attlee and the rest of the leadership 
group had exploited their access to power, and Churchill's neglect of the Conservative party, to 
establish Labour as a viable candidate to form a government in its own right, They could thus 
look forward to the future with confidence. Through their experience of the Second World War, 
then, they finally completed the project that they had, in different ways, embarked upon fourteen 
years before: the rebuilding of the Labour party. Far more than the internal struggles of the 1930s, 
it was in truth the experience of 1939 to 1945 which produced the party that emerged into the new 
dawn of the post-war world. Moreover, through the quality of its leaders, it was a Labour party 
stronger than its numerically more powerful Conservative rivals. Unlike the leaders of that party, 
the Labour leadership had never ceased paying attention to their own party or to the future. Even 
if it had not been a pain-free education, a recovery which seemed inconceivable had been 
affected. 
Despite all the qualifications which can be put on Labour's 1945 election victory, and mindful of 
the dangers of being seduced by prevailing historiographical perceptions of the 1930s as a 'bad 
time' and the Attlee government as the nation's deliverance, nonetheless, something clearly had 
changed. True, public opinion was moving towards the Conservatives in the three weeks 
preceding the election; Conservative local organisation was in ruins, while Labour's was 
beginning to perform well; enemy bombing, industrial reorganisation, and other causes of the 
mass exodus of the population from parts of the country left some constituencies resembling 
modern day Old Sarums, easy prey for the Labour party; and only a minority of the middle class 
voted Labour. But, despite all this, as far as can be seen, the election really was determined by a 
war-weary populace. Simon Green has attributed to the legacy of wartime deprivation 'a critical 
alteration in common culture', with 'the eclipse of the idea of austerity' and other Puritan virtues, 
as evidenced by the rise of the wartime black market . 
20 Far from being an understandable 
response to the possibility of death in war, this signified 'a more permanent change in popular 
attitudes towards consumption'. 21 In other words, a people who had money now wanted, 
expected, and demanded things; Labour promised more to satiate them than the frugal 
20 S. J. D. Green, 'The Strange Death of Puritan England, 1914-1945', in Wm. Roger Louis (ed. ), Yet More 
Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London, 2005), pp. 185-202, at 
201. 
21 Ibid. 
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Conservatives. 22 Further, and perhaps most significantly, the choices open to politicians were now 
immensely restricted, more so than before; declaring the need for a return to the pre-war order, or 
denying the aspirations of the population, would have been politically inept. For thirty years, 
politicians had managed to stave off the full effects of democracy; but now the necessity of 
appeasing a restless people defined the parameters of what was politically possible for 
generations. In many respects, then, the democrats had at last got what they wanted. Whether this 
turned out to be a good or bad thing is a matter of debate. But a substantial degree of power had 
been shifted from the politicians to the populace. 
Labour's Utopian promises were decisive in winning them the election, as well as negative 
perceptions of the Conservative party that even the most popular politician of the entire century 
could not arrest. But the course favoured by Churchill was hardly one of heartless penny- 
pinching, as so often depicted; his background as an enthusiastic social reformer alone belied that. 
The prime minister's position was instead 'no promises but every preparation'. 23 He simply 
focused upon what was, after all, reality - that Britain's post-war financial position could not be 
predicted - while Labour offered a pipedream. The people were, understandably, sick of reality, 
and many of them bought into Labour's dream; but then, as Geoff Fry has remarked, 'came the 
24 
reckoning'. The reforms of the Attlee government may have been pushing at an open door, but 
given Labour's subsequent disregard for Britain's long term strength in putting its schemes for El 
Dorado and Shangri-La so completely into effect, it is difficult to escape the belief that the 
country would have been better off with a Conservative victory in 1945. With the last vestiges of 
an old political and economic order soon to be destroyed forever, for Britain, and its people, the 
tragedy of the 1930s was complete. 
22 Wages had outstripped price inflation during the war, but, at government diktat, there were precious few 
consumer goods to spend the money on. 
23 W. S. Churchill, 'No promises but every preparation', The Listener, 25 March 1943. 
24 G. K. Fry, The Politics of Crisis: An Interpretation ofBritish Politics, 1931-43 (Basingstoke, 2001), 
p. 209. 
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